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**Faculty of Political Science, Public Administration
&
Diplomacy**

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN LEBANON

M.A. Thesis

by

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Political Leadership in Lebanon


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
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
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ABSTRACT

Even though there is a strong disagreement in the Lebanese political system over what precisely leadership is; most agree it remains the basic and key factor in the quality of performance and effectiveness of Lebanese institutions. It is generally asserted that the Lebanese government, the private sector's socio-economic conditions, and education, would improve much under a competent leadership. The study of leadership is not a mathematical or scientific application of rules and logarithms, rather it is an art. It is the art of influencing and motivating followers to achieve common goals that would serve the general well being of the ordinary citizen. For one thing, the socio-political world isn't nearly as orderly as the scientific world, since it is not exposed to rigid rules and regulations.

Unfortunately, Lebanon is in great need for educated and competent leadership. The reality, however, seems like a distant dream. Therefore, the main focus in this research will be on defining and understanding leadership. Chapter one will provide an overview defining the nature, qualifications, and values of leadership. Chapter two will explain the various types of leadership. Actually in this chapter, the main focus will be on the classical theory of leadership and its application in Lebanon. Chapter three will explore to the study of power and authority as applied to leadership. Subsequently chapter Four will entail an analysis of leadership problems and trends in Lebanon. Last, chapter five entails an overall conclusion of the entire research.

This research concentrates strictly on the leadership in Lebanon. To perform such a research I had to examine and rely on various sources and data such as:

- Books and publications,
- Periodicals,
- Newspapers,
- Television interviews and other audio visual programs,
- Internet website sources and articles,
- Special interviews with scholars specialized in the study of business and public administration as listed in the bibliography.

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CHAPTER I

DEFINITION AND NATURE OF LEADERSHIP

The first and most basic literature in human societies, glorifies stories about heroes, champions and the great valor of their leaders. The American writer, editor, and teacher, Joseph Campbell specialized in medieval literature analyses. In his research on various mythologies he found that, in every culture there was but one typical mythical hero, who became the founder and creator of something such as- “a new age”, “a new religion”, “a new city”, or even a “new mode of life”. Campbell affirms that, in order to find something new, one has to leave the old and go in search of the new. In other words, it involves a journey leaving behind the old to create the new (Young, p.2).

Actually the subject of leadership existed since the inception of first families, tribes or organizations were founded. When we affirm such terms it reflects images of powerful, energetic individuals who control victorious armies, shape the course of states, and look for the conquest of large empires. Military, political, religious, and social leaders, are credited to be responsible for important historical events. Eventhough we do not know exactly how much influence a particular leader really had at that time, and how the environmental events were running. However, this often unconditional reliance on leadership, may be because it is such a mysterious and puzzling authority since it touches everyone’s life and since the human socio-psychological behavior is in constant need for having someone to lead and indicate the path to be followed. Whenever two or more persons meet to work together, the

first issue revolves around, who is the responsible leader, and who is the mind and brain to rely and lean on. Many questions are subsequently asked about great historical leaders such as: What made Mohandas Gandhi, Adolph Hitler, Winston Churchill, and many others rise to power and hypnotize the masses that almost made them Gods. Scientific research on leadership did not begin till the twentieth century and the focal point of the research has been on finding out a scientific approach to study, analyze, and understand leadership and its effectiveness.

This research will review the findings and basic theories on defining leadership and its effectiveness, with particular emphasis on leadership in Lebanon. In this introductory chapter the focus will be on defining the nature of leadership.

Leadership definitions:

According to James McGregor Burns (1978), Leadership is an elusive but attractive topic of constant interest to people. It is one of the most fascinating and basic issues in organizational settings, and at the same time it is the least understood phenomenon on earth that has literally numerous definitions. Usually people concentrate on the heroic images of leaders, on what they do, what they are able to accomplish, their influence and control over individuals and organizations (Burns, p.2).

The period of 1900 to 1960:

Definitions of leadership in the first decades of the Twentieth Century, was highlighted by control, and centralization of power. A conference on leadership was held in 1927, during which, William Moore defined leadership as: "The ability to

impress the will of the leader on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation” (Moore, p.124).

In the period between World War I and World War II, among of the prominent scholars, who wrote on leadership, were E. Bogardus (1934), C. Pigors (1935) and J. Tead (1935). Each defined leadership differently. Bogardus defined it as a “personality in action under group conditions... it is interaction between specific traits of one person and other traits of the many, in such a way that the course of action of the many is changed by the one” (Bogardus, p.3).

On the contrast, Pigors stated that leadership is: “The process of mutual stimulation which, by the successful interplay of relevant individual differences, controls human energy in the pursuit of a common cause” (Pigors, p.16).

Tead, elaborated on the previous definitions and he referred to leadership as: “The activity of influencing people to cooperation toward some goal which they come to find desirable” (Tead, p.20).

From these definitions, one can conclude that the concept of leadership as control and authority had clearly lost its dominance.

During the 1940's, the focus was on the writings of two scholars: F. Reuter and C. Copeland. During this decade, the approach to understanding leadership began to dominate the public administration and management literature. Reuter defined leadership as: “The result of an ability to persuade or direct men, apart from the prestige or power that comes from office or other external circumstances” (Reuter, p. 133).

While Copeland introducing a touch of behaviorism wrote:

“Leadership is the art of dealing with human nature... it is the art of influencing a body of people by persuasion or example to follow a line of action” (Copeland, p.77).

In fact, the period of 1940's represented a significant move away from the old and classical understanding of leadership as an authoritative dominance. Leadership in the 1940s was viewed as the promotion of the group approach and human behavior relationship to leadership.

During the 1950's, large numbers of public administration and management specialist defined leadership as a relationship that develops commonly shared goals. In 1952, A.W Halpin, and B.J.Winter, defined leadership as:

“The behavior of an individual when he is directing the activities of a group toward shared goals” (Halpin, A.W and Winter, B.J. 1952 p. 6).

In 1959, S. Bellows, defined leadership as:

“The process of arranging a situation so that various members of a group, including the leader, can achieve common goals with maximum economy and a minimum of time and work (Bellows, p. 14).

In summary, the 1950's witnessed the continued influence of group theorists on the focus of leadership studies. However, the behaviorists - a newly born school, focused their work on modifying observable behavior, rather than on thoughts and feelings of the individual- they have accepted much of what the group approach to leadership had already achieved, making considerable inroads into the group dominance of the field. The bulk of the reviewed definitions indicated that the scholars viewed leadership as an influence process oriented toward achieving shared purposes.

Leadership definitions 1960-1980:

Leadership definitions in the sixties showed increasing support for viewing leadership as a behavior that influences people toward shared goals. For instance M. Seeman defined leadership as: “Acts by persons which influence other persons in a shared direction” (Seeman, p. 127).

M. Lowry, a renowned scholar on public administration, defined leadership as:

“The ability (and potential) to influence the decision and actions of others (followers) and therefore to exercise power over the decision-making process of community life” (Lowry, p. 8).

In general the scholars of the 1960s showed remarkable agreement and harmony in understanding leadership. The majority of those who were willing to put their ideas on leadership on paper to reach a comprehensive and meaningful definition of leadership, rallied around the idea of leadership as a behavior that influences people toward shared goals.

The popularity of leadership studies in the 1970s was clearly growing. The literature in this decade shows an important shift from the group approach of the social psychologists, to the organizational behavior approach of management. Scholars wrote much about it, highlighting the behavioral concept of leadership. Two impressive conclusions come through, loud and clear, as one reads the literature of those scholars. The first was that the scholars found it increasingly difficult to define leadership, so they deliberately chose not to give a closed and narrow definition. In this process, they implied that everyone knew what leadership was, so it wasn't necessary to define it. The second impression was that as the decade ended, the

scholars about leadership were increasingly careless in their use of the words leadership and leader (Burns, p.241).

Here are some examples of definitions from the 1970s that one can chose to illustrate the above statement. The first definition was given by K. Boles and D. Davenport who stated that:

“Leadership is a process in which an individual takes initiative to assist a group to move towards the production goals that are acceptable to maintain the group, and to dispose of those needs of individuals within the group that impelled them to join it” (Boles and Davenport, p. 117).

A. Moloney, however, defined leadership by putting more emphasis on goal attainment.

“Leadership” she wrote, is defined as “an interpersonal process of influencing the activities of an individual or group towards goal attainment in a given situation”

She added other variables to explain her definition by stating that:

“It is important to understand that leadership is not a synonym for either administration or management. Leadership is a process whereby the leader can influence others to perform beyond those activities commanded by individuals in formal authority positions” (Moloney, p. 11).

While one may applaud the ideas in the second statement, her explanation seems different from her definition, and that could lead to some confusion.

Thus, the 1970s started with unsophisticated leadership studies and ended up with serious challenges in the views about leadership. While the dominant paradigm remained firmly in control, and the overwhelming majority of leadership scholars

adhered to their framework, several scholars in various academic disciplines developed theoretical frameworks of leadership that challenged the organizational behaviorists. As a result, leadership studies were never the same, and the 1980s saw a blast of new ideas about the nature of leadership and its study.

Definitions of the 1980s:

Between the periods of 1980 and 1983 many books on leadership were published. Such a literature blast triggered a comprehensive review and analysis of leadership definitions of the 1980s quite difficult to fully understand. This explosion made it all more important to try to determine what leadership scholars thought about the nature of leadership in the 1980s. Topping the list of theoretical framework on leadership for the 1980 was one, J.C. Rost, in his book “leadership for the twenty-first century (1991) **“do the leaders wishes”**. This type of leadership definitions gave the message that leadership was basically doing what the leader wants done. This concept of leadership became common to many authors in the media (newspapers, newsmagazines, and television news) who used the word leadership in the 1980’s (Rost, p. 5-6).

In 1983, R.M. Kanter, defined leadership as: “The existence of people with power to mobilize others and to set constraints” (Kanter, p. 249).

The researcher J. Misumi, in 1985 defined leadership as: “ The role behavior of a specific group member who, more than other members, exerts some kind of

outstanding, lasting, and positive influence on fulfilling the group's functions in problem solving, goal achievement, and group maintenance" (Misumi, p. 8).

Based on the above definitions of leadership, one can conclude that the dominant "do-the-leader's wishes" concept of leadership is more today alive and well known. It is common among scholars who focused on studying the leader and what he or she does, as the essence of what leadership is all about, and on what the leader fails to do as the lack of leadership. In brief, at the end of the 1980s, leadership was still predominantly thought of as leaders getting followers to fulfill the leader's wishes.

Leadership versus Management:

Actually there is a continuing debate, arguments, counterarguments and disagreements about the differences between leadership and management. Given the nature and loyalty of change and the technological challenges we face, the key to making the right choices will come from understanding and representing the leadership qualities necessary to succeed in an increasingly unstable global environment. To survive in the twenty-first century, the general consensus calls for a new generation of leaders not managers. A proper definition and understanding of leadership are best revealed when compared to management.

Chart Distinction between Leader and Manager

Table -1

LEADER	MANAGER
The leader innovates	The manager administers
The leader is an original	The manager is a copier
The leader develops	The manager maintains
The leader investigates reality	The manager accepts reality
The leader focus on people	The manager focuses on system and structure
The leader inspires trust	The manager relies on control
The leader has long -range perspective	The manager has a short-range view
The leader ask what and why	The manager asks how and when
The leader has his/her eye on the horizon	The manager has his/her eye on the bottom line
The leader originates	The manager imitates
The leader challenges the status quo	The manager accepts it
The leader is his or her own person	The manager is the classic good soldier
The leader does the right thing	The manager does things right.

Source: (Bennis, p.45).

These are profound differences between leaders and managers.

While leadership is about innovating and initiating, management is about managing the status quo. Leadership is creative and adaptive. Leadership looks at the horizon, not just the bottom line.

Leading is about effectiveness while managing is about efficiency that is, manager's value stability and order. Leading is about what and why, whereas managing is about how and when. Management is about systems, controls, procedures, policies, and structure. Leadership is about trust and people that is, leaders are concerned with what things mean to people, and they try to get people to agree about the most important things to be done.

Warren Bennis and Joan Goldsmith suggests that "Managers do things right and leaders do the right thing" (Bennis and Goldsmith, p. 4). Doing the right thing implies a goal, a direction, an objective, a vision, a dream, a path, or even a reach.

Leaders base their vision, their requests to others, and their integrity on facts and careful estimates. A leader is someone who has the capacity to create a persuasive vision that takes people to a new place, and to translate that vision into action. Leaders draw other peoples to them by making them part of their vision. They pull rather than push. This pull style of leadership attracts and strengthens people to join in a vision of the future (Farr, p.2).

One can say that organizations need both managers and leaders to survive. Thus while management and leadership are both important, leadership must come first, since one must have a direction before intelligently decide which management systems, structures and controls will best get there. Leadership defines what the future will look like, line up people with that vision and inspires them to make it happen inspite of obstacles (Bennis and Goldsmith, p. 8).

Following this brief expose, the one question that comes often to mind, is whether leadership is learned or innate? While trying to find out an answer to this question,

this research will examine both claims about leadership to find whether or not leadership is a natural or nurtured feature.

The nurtured aspect of leadership.

According to the American expert on leadership John C. Maxwell, leadership is nurtured. It is a characteristic that is achieved and learned; it is not a natural trait from within. "Leadership is not an exclusive club for those who are born with it. The traits that are the raw material of leadership can be acquired. Link them up with desire; and nothing can keep one from becoming a leader" (Maxwell, p. 10). Leadership as a result is developed and not discovered. Learning and developing whatever abilities you have is far more important than the abilities that you were born with. Maxwell states that there are four types of leaders: the leading leader, the learned leader, the latent leader, and the limited leader. Under each of these four categories are qualities and skills that are acquired and not discovered from within.

The first category is the leading leader. He/ she is born with leadership qualities, observes its models throughout life, and learns additional training and self-discipline to become a great leader. The other three qualities (learned leader, latent leader, and limited leader) are considered to be acquired.

The second category is the learned leader. He has seen leadership modeled most of his life, has learned it through training, and always has self-discipline to be a great leader.

The latent leader or what is called the dormant leader refers to that individual who has just recently seen leadership modeled, is learning to be a leader through training, and has self-discipline to become a good leader.

The limited or the imperfect leader refers to the fourth category. Here the leader has little or no exposure to leader's qualities. He/she has little or no experience in leadership training, nor has he/she the desire to become a leader.

As stated in Maxwell's theory, leadership is acquired and the key to it is the ability to develop qualities that make a good leader. Leadership is the ability to influence, the one who believes to be a leader, and has no followers, is only taking a desert walk. The ability to influence and obtain followers need to be developed through training (Pae, p.14).

In respect to the theory that leadership is nurtured, it highlights that, everyone has the potential of becoming a leader. **Leaders are made, not born.** Leaders are everywhere, for it is a learned characteristic and behavior. According to this theory, everyone is a leader. Girls who grow to be mothers, boys who grow to be fathers, teachers, and any old person on a street corner, have the ability to lead. Many people have the capacity to lead an organization, community, family, profession, and most important, themselves. Some individuals will not describe themselves as leaders based on traditional notions of formal leadership when in fact; they do make a difference in their organization through their commitment, adopted values, and action toward change. Leaders are not born with innate characteristics or skills turning them to be leaders. A person's environment can influence the development of leadership skills and interest (Kellerman, p. 22).

The innate aspect of leadership.

Another view claims that leadership is natural and not nurtured. There are people in the world who have the ability to lead, and others who do not have it. Some people have a natural position for the quality of leadership, and this niche provides a very good relation between extraordinary leaders and followers. For instance, there are many cases when a mother is required to take special courses in order to become a better mother. However, no matter how much she is taught and lectured about being a real mother, she has no ability to learn because the qualities, features and traits of a mother are not within her. The characteristics of leadership in this mentioned case are natural. Some people have a natural trait of motherhood or leadership while others do not. Just as one is born with innate features of playing basketball, of musical inclinations, of an ability to paint and draw, of an ability to speak in public; leadership is also a natural feature. Although one may train to become a basketball player, to become a great pianist, or to become a speaker, the truly great athletes, musicians, and speakers have natural talents and abilities (Bennett, p. 4).

Among many of the great leaders that history has seen, Abraham Lincoln proves to be a classic example of how leadership is an innate characteristic. His instinct for leadership was shown through his excellent roles as a president. Lincoln came from a poor and uneducated family. When his father could spare him from his daily duties, Lincoln attended an ABC school where he had less than one full year of formal education in his entire life. Both Lincoln natural birth mother and father were very uneducated, giving him no chance of learning the qualities of a leader. On his own, Lincoln continued his quest for knowledge by reading in every spare moment he had.

He spent most of his time reading the family Bible. Lincoln had a natural talent for public speaking and was an excellent lecturer. His ability to present his ideas of morality and slavery gave him much respect throughout the country. As president of the United States, Lincoln was able to pull the country back together and abolish slavery. His skills as a leader helped him to lead the country away from secession. Lincoln had little formal education and very little military training or experience, but was able to save the country in the time of need and crisis. There may have been ways for Lincoln to refine his leadership skills, but there was no instance in his life where he had any type of opportunity to learn leadership, instead it was an innate characteristic, which he had within himself. Of all the American presidents, Lincoln is probably the one about whom much has been written. Many critical evaluations of his life have been published and he remains one of the foremost products of American, democracy and an expressive spokesman for its ideal (Microsoft Encarta, p.1-2).

Lincoln is a perfect example of a leader who was born and not made. His intelligence, charisma, perseverance, and responsibility, helped him to become one of the most famous and well-known leaders in all of history. The complexities of leadership have always been questioned, and will continue to be questioned. Leadership has been one of the oldest preoccupations of the world and will continue to be this way. Throughout this research, we can conclude that leadership is both a natural and nurtured characteristic. Any human being has the potential of becoming a leader but the true extraordinary leaders are the ones that possessed the quality from birth. Maxwell identifies four categories or levels of leadership. The famous leaders did possess the quality of leadership at birth and continued to develop and train to

become better leaders. Those who were not born with the characteristic of leadership can acquire this trait to a certain degree by self-discipline and training. The key to leadership is the ability to develop these qualities that make a good leader. Leadership is the ability to influence and lead. Those characteristics can be acquired through much dedication but the true extraordinary leaders are the ones who possess this trait from birth. It is a common belief that all humans may have some abilities within themselves. They are innate, lying dormant, waiting for the need or desire to light, up and come to the surface. Almost everyone during his/her life is given an opportunity to lead, whether in the family, business, or even in the community. It is important to become aware, that leadership in itself has many levels. This research focuses on the outstanding one on the top of the pyramid.

Leadership effectiveness:

Another point in this research needs to be highlighted, it is leadership effectiveness. In fact, in all cultures and all organizational situations, being an effective leader is tough, and not an easy task to achieve. In the meantime, organizations pay heavy price for bad and ineffective leadership. Among the key factors to becoming an effective leader are; practice and learning from one's mistakes. Unfortunately, organizations especially in the less developed world often do not provide the environment in which leaders can practice new skills, try out new behavior, explore their credibility, and examine their impact. In most cases, the price to pay for making mistakes is so high that new leaders or managers opt for safer routine and habitual actions. Without such practice and without failure, it is difficult

for leaders to become effective. The question is therefore, what are the obstacles in learning to become an effective leader? Aside from different levels of skills and abilities that might prevent a leader from being efficient, several other obstacles to successful leadership can exist (Nahavandi, p.15-16).

Firstly, organizations face considerable uncertainty that creates pressure for quick responses and solutions to problems. The external factors also demand immediate attention. In an atmosphere of crisis, no time or patience is available for learning. Ironically, the implementation of new methods of leadership, if they were allowed, would make dealing with complexity and uncertainty much better in the long run. As a result, a brutal rotation continues, allowing no time for the learning that would help solve or prevent a current crisis. Furthermore, the lack of learning and experimentation, in turn, causes the perpetuation of the crisis, which makes it again impossible to have time to learn and practice new behaviors (Yukl, p.49).

Secondly, organizations are often inflexible and unforgiving. In their push for short term and immediate perfect performance, hence, they do not allow room for mistakes and experimentation. Very few organizations encourage taking risks, and making mistakes; they are the exception. The rigidity and rewards systems of many institutions discourage such activities (Yukl, p. 51).

Thirdly, organizations fall back on old ideas about what effective leadership is, and therefore, rely on naive and unsophisticated solutions that do not fit into the new and complex problems. Sometimes the use of simple ideas, provide only temporarily solutions (Nahavandi, p.7).

Fourthly, another factor that can pose an obstacle to effective leadership is the difficulty involved in understanding and applying the findings of academic research. In the laudable search for precision and scientific rigor, academic researchers sometimes do not clarify the application of their research (Nahavandi, p.8).

Effective leaders have many qualities as stated below:

- They are honest. This gives them credibility, resulting in the trust and confidence of their people. Credible leaders promote greater pride in the organization, a stronger spirit of cooperation and teamwork, and more feelings of ownership and personal responsibility.
- They do what they say they will do. They keep their promises and follow through on their commitments.
- They make sure their actions are consistent with the wishes of the people they lead. They have a clear idea of what others value and what they can do.
- They believe in the innate confidence of others.
- They admit to their mistakes. They realize that attempting to hide a mistake is damaging and would erode their credibility.
- They create a trusting and open climate.
- They help others to be successful and to feel empowered.
- They do not push too much. They encourage members to do more, but know when it is too much.

- They roll up their sleeves. They show the members they are not just the figurehead or decision maker. Members respect leaders more when they show the readiness to work side by side.
- They avoid phrases that cause anger, lack of enthusiasm and confrontation. For example, instead of saying you have to do something, effective leaders request or recommend that members do something (Serafinchon, p.3).

Finally, I can say that the complex and never-ending process of becoming an effective leader requires experimentation and organizational support. Organizations that allow their leaders at all levels to make mistakes learn and develop new skills produce and create effective leaders.

Characteristic of Leadership:

To better understand the personal uniqueness of leaders it is imperative to look at their characteristics and qualities. When people make a decision to follow a leader, they do it primarily because of one of two things: the leader's character, or the leader's skills. Followers want to know if the leader is the person they want to follow and if he/she has the skills to take them further. According to Warren Bennis, leaders come in every size, shape, and nature, that is they could be short, tall, tidy, careless, youthful, aged, male and female. Yet, they all seem to share some, if not all, of the following characteristics.

The first ingredient of a leader is the **guiding vision**. The leader's job is to create a vision. Today having a vision for the future and communicating that vision to others

are essential components of great leadership. Visionary leaders imagine an ideal future for their organizations that goes beyond the ordinary and beyond what others may have thought possible. They strive to realize significant achievements that others have not. Visions can be small or large and can exist through all organizational levels. Leaders must know what they want and followers must understand what that is. The leader must be able to articulate that vision, clearly, and often while followers should understand the vision and be able to state it clearly themselves. However the vision still means nothing until the leader and followers take action to turn that vision into reality (Cox, p.5).

The second ingredient of leadership is **passion and enthusiasm**. It is the passion for the promises of life, combined with a very particular passion for a vocation or career, a profession, a course of action. Without hope, we cannot survive. The leader who communicates passion gives hope and inspiration to his/her people. Passion can be lived through enthusiasm, through liveliness and through established and solid commitment to a vision (Bennis, p.39).

Enthusiasm emerges as a crucial characteristic of leadership since followers want and need leaders who can communicate shared values with passion and confidence. They want leaders who have energy, who become involved, who express their true passion for what the organization is working to achieve. Passion provides individuals with the light of leadership and creates an undeniable drive to make a difference.

The next basic ingredient of leadership is **integrity**. Integrity is a similarity between what you say, and what you do, as well as what you say about what you did. Integrity is the foundation of leadership, it enables an organization to achieve its mission.

Moreover, integrity is the strength, unity, clarity and purpose that supports and continues all of the activities. Warren Bennis in his book “On Becoming a Leader”, states that, there are three crucial parts to integrity: **self-knowledge**, **frankness** and **maturity**. He claims that knowing oneself is the most difficult task anyone can face. The leader never lies to himself, especially about himself. He knows his faults as well as his possessions, and deals with them directly. The second part of integrity is **frankness**. Frankness is the key to self-knowledge since it is based on honesty of thought and action, a dedicated loyalty to principle, and a fundamental accuracy and completeness. The last element is **maturity**. Maturity is important to a leader because leading is not simply showing the way or giving orders. Every leader needs to have experience. If some qualities such as learning to dedicate, be observant, capable of working with, and learning from others, never behaving like a slave, always truthful are found in a leader then he can encourage followers and inject these qualities in them (Bennis, p.40-44).

The fourth fundamental ingredient of leadership is **trust**. Leaders build trust by being reliable, dependable and persistent. They position themselves clearly by choosing a direction and staying with it, thus projecting integrity. In leadership, the establishment of trust may be the most important factor in his or her success. Leaders may be said to earn the trust of their followers, who have the capacity to give that trust. Trust thus becomes a part of the relationship between those who would be leaders and their followers, even when the leadership position is independently determined, as it usually is (Salomon, p.2).

I believe leadership functions only on the basis of trust. If we cancel the trust, then we will lose the basic foundation of leadership. Trust is like money, it is tough to get and easy to lose and without trust leadership is impossible. A proverb comes here to mind:

“Better to be poor and honest than a rich person no one trusts”.

Two more basic ingredients of leadership are **curiosity** and **daring**. The leader wonders about everything, wants to learn as much as he can, is willing to take risks, experiments, and tries new things. He does not worry about failure, but embraces errors, knowing that he will learn from them. However, this does not mean taking foolish or thoughtless risks. Any important risk is carefully evaluated and entered into only, after a thoughtful calculation of the chances of success. But, once taken, the focus is on making the risk work, not on avoiding, minimizing, or recovering from failure (Cogner, p.10).

Whenever an opportunity is adequate a risk is taken. The willingness to take risks and accept responsibility for the outcome is a consistent quality among effective leaders. Either the leader self-confidence or his fears will control everything he does.

In summary, this chapter dealt with literature review of leadership definitions, leadership versus management, leadership effectiveness and finally the characteristics of leadership. Chapter two will concentrate on the types of leadership emphasizing the classical theory and its application in Lebanon.

CHAPTER II

TYPES OF LEADERSHIP

This chapter will focus on the different styles of leadership. Leadership style is a constant pattern of behavior presented by a leader over a period of time. Researchers have identified different leadership styles depending on the situation. Thus, certain leaders may be chosen based on their style and depending on various factors that are peculiar to a situation an organization faces at any given time. The study of leadership styles takes into consideration what a leader does, say, and the way he/she acts. It has to do with the study of the leader's approach to the use of authority and the resultant participation of others in decision-making (Boulgarides p.59).

There are different leadership styles that can be identified each having a special characteristic and each having its pros and cons. A brief explanation of each style will be given, describing the situation in which it is used, presenting its application.

One of the most known investigations on the effects of leadership styles was conducted in the 1930s by the scholars K. Lewin, and R. Lippitt, The two scholars listed four different styles of leadership: the autocratic leader, the bureaucratic administrator leader, the democratic leader, and the laissez-faire leader.

The Autocratic Leader:

The autocratic leader is often referred to as the classical approach of leadership. It is one in which the leader keeps as much as possible to himself, power and the decision-making authority. In other words he/she seeks little group participation in the formulation of policy and its execution. The leader does not consult employees, nor are they allowed to give any meaningful input. Employees are expected to obey orders without receiving any explanations. Moreover, the motivational environment is based on either rewards or punishments, depending on every situation. Actually the autocratic leader dominates team members, using single opinion to achieve its objectives. This approach of leadership requires continual pressure and direction from the leader in order to get things done (Lewin, and Lippitt, p.12).

Some people think that this style includes yelling, using shameful language, and applying threats through the abuse of power. According to A. Brennen, the philosophical and analytical writer at the Bahamas Technical Institute, some studies claim that organizations with autocratic leaders have higher earnings and absenteeism than other organizations. Therefore, these studies conclude that autocratic leaders rely on threats and punishments to influence employees whom they do not trust, and do not allow participating and offering contributions. Yet, the autocratic leadership is not all bad. Perhaps, in specific societies, primitive environments and situations, be the most appropriate and efficient one. (Boulgarides p.61).

These situations in autocratic leadership can include:

- New untrained and unskilled employees who do not know which tasks to perform or which procedures to follow.

- Where effective supervision can only be provided through detailed set of orders and instructions.
- Where employees do not respond to any other leadership style.
- Where high-volume production is needed on a daily basis.
- Where time is limited to reach a group or team decision.
- If the work area was previously poorly managed, and needs quick and immediate rewarding.

Furthermore, Brennen pointed out that autocratic leadership style should not be used:

- When employees become tense, fearful, or angry.
- When employees expect to have their opinions heard.
- When-employees begin depending on their manger to make all their decisions.
- When the employees' morale is very low along with, absenteeism and repeated strikes.

In spite of the mentioned above weaknesses, the authoritarian leadership style is well suited for certain environments such as the military or prisons. In those settings, where the lives of people depend on others, the authoritarian style is more efficient. This style would also be appropriate for directing beginning teachers in school settings because of their inexperience and their constant need for more directives. Researches have shown that the authoritarian leadership style is preferable to a democratic one for the achievement of certain tasks. Although people love democracy, but it does not mean that it will automatically lead to a more productivity. An authoritarian leadership style is thus well suited in a very structured environment,

where the lives of people are at stake, and where the level of professionalism is quite low (Boulgarides, p.62).

The bureaucratic administrator leader:

The well-known German sociologist, Max Webber, highlighted a basic fault in the common leadership styles that had prevailed throughout history. He stated that with patriarchy, the leader was the founder or oldest member of the group. With patrimonialism, the leadership role was inherited from one's father or other ancestor. With feudalism, it was the lord over the vassal. In all of these forms of leadership, the power and authority of leadership was centered in the person of a single individual, rather than on institution. In this case, what one might expect to happen whenever such a leader either dies, is removed from his position? Historically, the followers under such a leadership command suffer from confusion, uncertainty and division such as the case when the Lebanese President Bashir Jumayil was assassinated. Very rarely another similar leader would emerge to take command and bring order. Therefore, Webber highlighted the need for a type of organizational structure that bypass the individual leader. According to Webber, organizations need stability, endurance and permanence, which would be impossible to achieve through any single leadership style. Organizations need a type of structure and management that would provide keeping power, and allow them to continue to function, regardless of what happens to the individual leader. The solution to the problem according to Webber was found in strengthening the bureaucracy (Hitt. p .146).

Hitt wrote that although today the term bureaucracy carries a great deal of negative suggestions, signifying red tape, and carrying out little official duties, one must appreciate that, since at the time of Webber's writings, a bureaucratic structure promised an approach that would cure the single dominant leadership styles of their ills. One can surely appreciate that, in many quarters and societies today, bureaucracy continues to prosper and flourish (Hitt, p. 146-147).

The essence of the bureaucracy's role and importance is captured by Weber in this passage:

The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical learning which the officials possess....
The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in the very nature of bureaucracy (Greth, and Mills, p. 198).

Bureaucratic leadership is where the manager rules by the book. In other words, everything must be done according to procedures or policies. If the book fails to cover a particular case, the manger refers to the next level above him or her. This manager is really more of a "police officer" than a leader. He/she implements the rules only.

According to Brennen, this leadership style can be effective:

- When employees are performing routine tasks over and over with little creativity.
- When employees need to understand certain standards or procedures.
- When employees are working with dangerous or delicate equipment that requires a definite set of procedures to operate.

- When safety or security training is being conducted and last.
- When employees are performing tasks that require handling cash.

A description of the bureaucracy is highlighted by Max Weber outstanding the principal advantages of a bureaucratic organization:

The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. ... Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination reduction of friction and of material and personal costs- these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic organization (Greth, and Mills, p. 214).

However the bureaucratic leadership style has also its disadvantages and would be ineffective in the following situations:

- When formal work habit become hard to break, especially if they are no longer useful.
- When employees lose their interest in their jobs and in their fellow workers.
- When employees do only what is expected of them and no more.

Finally, this style of leadership is based on the utilization of a system of files to solve problems. It can be described as leadership by centralization (Brennen, p.5).

Democratic Leadership Style

In making the transition from bureaucratic administrator leadership to democratic leadership style, it is important to distinguish between the pros and cons of this style.

The democratic leadership style is also called the participative style as it encourages employees to be part of the decision-making. The democratic leader keeps the employees informed about everything that affects their work and shares with them decision-making and problem solving responsibilities. In addition, the democratic leader allows his team to decide how the task will be undertaken, and who will perform which task. This style requires the leader to be a coach who has the final say, but gathers information from staff and team members before making a decision. Democratic leadership can produce high quality and increase the productivity for long periods of time. Many employees appreciate the trust they receive from their boss and respond with full cooperation, team spirit, and high morale (Beaulieu, p.3).

A good democratic leader encourages participation and wisely delegates authority, but never loses sight of the fact that he bears the crucial responsibility of leadership. He values group discussions and inputs from his team and can be seen as a principle personality in order to obtain the best performance from his team (Scholl, p. 4).

According to A. Brennen, the democratic leader is normally the one who:

- Develops plans to help employees evaluate their own performance.
- Allow employees to establish proper goals.
- Encourages employees to grow on the job and be promoted.
- Recognizes and encourage talents and achievements.

Like the other styles, the democratic style is not always appropriate. It is most successful when used with highly skilled or experienced employees or when implementing operational changes or resolving individual or group problems.

The democratic leadership style is most effective when the leader:

- Keeps employees informed about matters that affect them.
- Encourages employees to share in the decision-making powers and problem solving duties.
- Provides opportunities for employees to develop a high sense of personal growth self-esteem and job satisfaction.
- Challenges employees to solve large or complex problems that require lots of input.
- Motivates employees to seek changes for a better environment to solve employee's problems.
- Encourages team building and participation.

Democratic leadership should not be used in situations when:

- There is not enough time to get everyone's input.
- It is easier and more cost-effective for the manager to make the decision.
- The business cannot afford mistakes.
- The employee feels threatened by this type of leadership,
- The employee safety is a critical concern.

One can conclude that, with respect to leadership styles, democratic leadership encourages the employees' participation and professional growth. It is well suited in environments where people have a very high level of education and expertise in

technology or professions such as engineers, lawyers, doctors, professors, etc. The democratic leadership style promotes greater job satisfaction and improves employees morale (Scholl, p. 6).

The last style to be dealt with, is the laissez-faire leadership or in other terms “free-rein” or “hands-off” style.

Laissez- faire leadership style.

Laissez-faire is based on almost noninterference in the affairs of others. Therefore, the laissez-faire leadership style is one in which the leader provides little or no direction and gives employees as much freedom as possible. The greater authority and power are given to the employees who must determine their goals, make their own decisions, and resolve their problems by themselves. In general this approach leaves the team struggling with little direction or motivation.

Historically this type of leadership proved to be effective in exceptional cases. A. Brennen claims that, the laissez-faire technique is usually appropriate when employees

- Are highly skilled, experienced and educated.
- Have pride in their work and the inner drive to perform their jobs successfully on their own.
- Use outside experts, such as staff specialists or consultants to increase efficiency and productivity.
- Are trustworthy and experienced.

Thus, once a leader has established that his team is confident, capable and motivated, it is often best to step back and let them get on with the task, since interfering can generate resentment and reduce their effectiveness. By handing over his authority, a leader can empower his group to better achieve their goals. This type of leadership is often idealistic and utopian.

Like the autocratic, the bureaucratic and the democratic leadership style, the laissez-faire leadership has its weaknesses too. This style ought not to be used especially when:

- It makes employees feel insecure due to the lack of leadership.
- The leader cannot provide regular feedback to let employees know how well they are doing.
- Leaders are unable to thank employees for their good work.
- The leader doesn't understand his or her responsibility and is hoping the employees can cover for him /her.

One can tell that this leadership style is quite the opposite of the authoritarian style. There is the absence of any real leadership and every one is free to do as they please. Usually, when there are no goals or direction there is a state of confusion, and lack of confidence in leadership. Employees also doubt their own ability to accomplish the task at hand; thus productivity is usually very low and corruption is high. Although this leadership style is seldom advocated, it has been used by persons who are highly motivated and can work totally on their wish (Scholl, p. 6-7).

In conclusion, each style has its place in an organization and can be used for different situations, tasks, related to the maturity and level of professionalism of employees. A

good leader uses all three styles, depending on what forces are involved between the followers, the leader, and the situation.

The authoritarian style is used on new employees who are just learning the job. The leader is competent and a good coach. The employee is motivated to learn a new skill.

The bureaucratic style is used when employees act according to habitual procedures and policies. The leader implements policies and rules by the book

The democratic style is used with a team of workers who know their job. The leader knows the problem well, but he wants to create a team where the employees take ownership of the project. The employees know their jobs and want to become part of the team.

The laissez-faire leadership style is when the employee needs to take ownership of the job. The situation might call for the leader to be other place doing other things (Boulgarides, p.62).

Moving from the classical theory of leadership style to the practical leadership, in Lebanon, one finds out that, the Lebanese leadership application is based on three types: family leadership, religious leadership and political leadership. The Lebanese society was challenged by deep social, economic, political and sectarian divisions. Let us begin with the first type of Lebanese leadership- the family style.

Family leadership and feudalism:

The dominance of the family marks itself in all phases of Lebanese life including social, political, financial, and personal relationships. In the political sphere, families

compete with each other for power and prestige, thus combining forces to support family members in their quest for leadership. In business, employers give preference to hiring relatives, brothers, sisters and cousins and often merge their resources in operating a family enterprise.

On the personal level, the family has a widespread role. To a great extent, family status determines an individual's access to education and chances of achieving fame and wealth. The family also seeks to ensure an individual's traditional values with accepted standards of behavior, so that family honor and valor are maintained. An individual's ambitions and goals are modeled by the family in accordance with the long-term interests of the group as a whole. Just as the family gives protection, support, and opportunity to its members, the individual member offers loyalty and service to the family (Collelo, p.1).

The current state of Lebanon is directly related to the workings of the traditional Lebanese political structure dominated as it is by certain class families and leaders within them. The working wheel of this system is called al zu'ama (lordship). The concept and practice of the al zu'ama must be defined for better understanding. The term za'im (plural zu'ama) comes from the Turkish word "ziamet", which denotes a military commander superior to the officers in the military corps. Yet the term was adopted during the Ottoman domination of Lebanon to differentiate a certain category of feudal dignitaries from the bulk of the feudal lords (Jhonson, p.5).

The writer Dekmejian Hrair, in his book "Patterns of political leadership" stated that there are six factors in the Lebanese perception by which the general public spontaneously identifies a za'im:

- Family and blood relations.
- Historical titles (sheikh, emir, beik, etc.).
- Wealth and economic power.
- Religious and sectarian representation.
- Representation of a regional or international power.
- Education as well as art culture.

As such, the zu'ama of various regions dominated the political climate and economic environment (Dekmejian, p.12-13).

It may come as a surprise that a country claiming to be democratic and pluralistic as Lebanon, takes the lead in political succession, even in those political organizations that have the most progressive ideologies. For instant, Walid Jumblat, president of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), inherited his position from his father, Druze leader Kamal Jumblat, who founded the party. Few expected that Walid Jumblat would last politically as a clan chief. He was educated at the American University of Beirut and then continued his education in France. Jumblat was not politically active in his youth. He earned a reputation as a wealthy young man who lives mainly for pleasure, commonly wore jeans and a leather jacket, rode a motorcycle, and broke up with traditions by marrying a non- Druze Jordanian woman. Jumblat's political inherited role was unstable at the start, as he lacked the political stature, experience, and charisma of his late father (Hammad, p.2).

Similarly, the case of Bashir Jumayil and his elder brother, Amine, who rose to the leadership of the Phalangist Party, founded by their father, Pierre Jumayil. The same

applies to the leadership of the Lebanese National Bloc passed from Emile Eddeh to his son Raymond, while the presidency of National Liberal Party passed from Camille Chamoun to his son Dory. Likewise, Tony Franjiyyeh took over leadership of the northern Lebanese Maronites from his father, former Lebanese President Soliman Franjiyyeh, who in turn had inherited that leadership from his elder brother, Hamid. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Sunni community based around Tripoli was held for some time by the Karami family, passing from Abdel-Hamid to his son Rashid, and then to Rashid's younger brother, Omar. A similar arrangement applied to the leadership of the Beirut-based Sunni community, which passed from Riad Al-Solh to his sons Taqiyyeddin and Rashid, and from Saib Salam to his son Tammam (Hammad, p.6).

Moreover, all the fore-mentioned heirs to leadership rose to the highest levels of government. All occupied various presidential and ministerial positions. Soliman Franjiyyeh, Camille Chamoun and Amin Jumayil served as presidents of the Lebanese republic, while all the above mentioned members of the Solh and Karami families served at various points as prime ministers, a position no less important than that of the presidency.

Regarding feudalism, perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of the Lebanese political families is that a significant number of its members are large landowners. Indeed, a clear relationship existed between large landownership and the acquisition of political power in Lebanon as this was evident in the pre-Ottoman times. It is often difficult to determine which came first, land or power; suffice to say, that the two variables were mutually reinforcing, and usually resulted in extending a family

influence. With the emergence of the metropolis of Beirut, the value of the feudal lands in the mountains declined, especially in the war period. Many rural land owners began selling portions of their holdings and pursuing professional or commercial interests in the modern sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, land remained an important ingredient of political power (Dekmejian, p.16).

Hrair Dekmejian, claims in his book "Patterns of political leadership", that three-fourths of Lebanese ministers had ties to the land, either through their family or by direct personal ownership. He emphasized that ministers could be classified as landowners who considered themselves as nothing but "propriétaire terrain"- indeed, put aside their involvement in politics, they had no other but landowning. Presently ministers are new rulers of political parties loyal to Syria or forming the new wealthy class: "les neavaux riches" Other ministers owned various amounts of land but chose to delegate responsibility for running these estates to relatives or appointed representatives. In certain cases while the minister himself did not own large territory, other members of his family did, therefore, he came from a land wealthy family. Table 2 indicates the distribution of these landowners since 1975 in terms of their specific geographic connection (Dekmejian, p.18).

Table 2. *Lebanon: Great Landowning Families*

<u>Region</u>	<u>Family</u>
North Lebanon	Franjiyyah Karami Mu'awwad Karam Ghusn Abbud
South Lebanon	As'ad Khalil Salam Solh Zayn Usayran
Mount Lebanon	Arslan Jumblat Abi al-Lama Khazin
Biqa'	Hydar Skaff Himadih

Source: (Dekmejian, p.18).

Religious Leadership:

Religious leadership is not very much different from family leadership. Political power and government bureaucracy in Lebanon are organized according to religious groups and communities better known as confessionalism. In fact, the history of the Near East played a crucial role in the emergence of an unusual number of confessional groups in Lebanon today (Khashan, p.61).

Religious and political pluralism go hand in hand. Religious sect is a vehicle for social and political identity and power. As Lebanon entered the twentieth century, the religious sects multiplied. For those who deny that sectarianism had a major role in Lebanese war, it was at least one of the variables in the conflict. Several important participants in the war were identified almost exclusively with one religious group or another. For example, the Phalangist Party had a Maronite leadership and membership, the Progressive Socialist Party had Druze leadership, and mostly Druze membership, "Amal" had Shi 'ite leadership and Iranian connection, and 'al-Murabitoun" (Independent Nasserite Movement) had mostly Sunni Moslem leadership and membership (Khury, p.103).

The National Pact of 1943 was a reflection of sectarian conflict, a compromise formula which would allow Lebanon to achieve independence and unity of polity. The scattering division in the new election laws in 1943, was protested by the Muslim community in Lebanon, who demanded a fair share of power and a guarantee of the Arabic character, and affiliation of Lebanon. Political representation and ideology in the new state became a source of argument around which religious sects had opposite opinions. Nonetheless, it became obvious in the early seventies that the rules stated in the National Pact were becoming strained and stressful: Shi 'ite leadership wanted economic redistribution and more equity in political representation; Sunni leadership wanted a fairer distribution of posts with an eye on the presidency and army leadership; Maronite leadership refused to consider any alternation of the old formula of the National Pact (Khury, p.122).

The Shi 'ite Leadership:

Leadership of the Shi 'ite community ... [was] held by the Imam Musa al-Sadr, a son who inherited the office from his father. Imam Musa al-Sadr, who was elected in 1969 to head the newly created Shi 'ite Muslim Higher Council, was highly respected in Lebanese politics. He quickly began to organize and agitate the general population of southern Lebanon and the Shi 'ite community in particular. His *Harakat al-Mahrumin* (Movement of the Deprived) developed as he created a military movement, *Amal* (Hope), which was very active in the civil war. Some proclaim that Sadr did not support the demise of the regime, but instead he sought to improve the status of the Shi 'ite community and the defense conditions of southern Lebanon in face of Israeli attacks (Farah, p. 14).

The Sunni Leadership:

The Sunni leadership was also calling for a change. *Al-Tajamu' al-Islami fi al-Shamal* (the Muslim block in the north) issued a declaration early in 1975, suggesting one of the three options:

- A census to determine which sect had a majority in the country and should accordingly, have the presidency;
- Shifting to a collective presidency which would be headed on a rotational basis by each of the major religious communities: Maronites, Sunni and Shi 'ite;
- Considering the president a mere figurehead and placing power in the hands of a prime minister elected by a non-sectarian parliament (Butros, p.44).

The Sunni Mufti announced that he was in favor of free competition for the presidency rather than assigning it to one specific sect. *A-Musharaka*, which meant full Muslim participation in all state institutions, became a politically popular phrase and slogan in 1974. (Butros, p.45).

Lebanese Rightist Leadership:

The rightist reaction to the entire situation was completely inflexible. *Lijnat al-Buhuth al-Lubnaniyya* (The Lebanese Research Committee) published a study expressing the Christian position on the issues raised by the Muslim circles. The study concluded that the best solution to the problems is by sticking strictly to the National Pact, reviewing freedom of the press and political parties, banning the purchase of property by non-Lebanese, and limiting the number of foreigners residing in the country. The Phalangist Party and the National Liberal Party (NLP) also rejected any amendment of the National Pact (Butros, p.45).

Lebanese Leftist Leadership:

The leftist socialist leaders adopted a platform summarized by Jumblat in the following demands:

- Amending the electoral system to reach proportional representation;
- Amending the constitution to render it more democratic and non-sectarian;
- Adopting an economic reform plan to achieve a more equitable distribution of income in the country;

However, in 1976, Jumblat became more ambitious, so he tried to completely defeat the rightists, and establish socialism in Lebanon (Butros, A. 1997, p.45-46).

When the various groups stumbled into the war, their strategies were as follows. The Shi 'ites, at least their leader Imam Sadr's group, took part in the war because they expected any change to be in their favor. Sunni leaders consistently withdrew from active fighting, but contributed to the crisis by refusing to allow the use of the army to control the situation. The Palestinian forces were drawn to fight to defend their Lebanese base, which they had come to view as a last refuge for their armed presence. A huge group of leftist individuals and political parties joined the fight with the PLO to effect a change in the political system which might, at best, place them in power, or at least force the government to recognize their presence and grant them a share in the power structure. Maronite leadership took opportunity to try, first to implicate, then to expel the Palestinian armed resistance as a prelude to regaining, or possibly extending their hold on the reign of power.

The Maronite leadership was actually split into groups of various shades of extremism and moderation. Raymond Iddi, a Maronite leader and a candidate for the presidency, ended his alliance with Chamoun and Jumayil after the 1970 presidential elections. During the presidency of Franjeh, Iddi formed an alliance with the two Sunni leaders, Salam and Karami. *Takattul al-Wasat* (The Middle or Moderate Bloc), as it came to be known, continued after the war had begun in 1975. Iddi was the only Maronite leader of stature to continue residing in west Beirut after the war had started. His moderate position was not appreciated by his fellow Maronites (Butros, A. 1997, p.46).

One can say that religion in Lebanon often determines social and political trend. Each group has its own, political, cultural, and leadership agenda.

Political Leadership:

Like family leadership and religious leadership, political leadership played a major role in Lebanese society. In pluralistic societies such as Lebanon, patronage is often a common feature of the political process, the promotion of the interests of a particular sect is frequently widespread. Although patronage is prevalent in developed countries and lesser developed countries alike, clientelism may be deep-rooted in Lebanon than in most other nations. The pervasiveness of this system in Lebanon is easily traced to feudal times, wherein the overlord allowed peasants and their families the use of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. In more recent times, this social system has been translated into a political system, the overlord has become a political leader or *zaim*, the peasants have become his constituents, and instead of land, favors are exchanged for electoral loyalty. Although clientelism has its roots in the rural areas, it now pervades towns and large cities down to the small neighborhood level. The failure of the development of the process variables that are essential in a competitive and pluralistic system, has made the rise of clientelism inevitable in Lebanon (Khashan, p. 145).

A *zaim* is considered to be a political leader, and rather than being solely an officeholder, he may be in Lebanese society as a power broker with the ability to manipulate elections and the officials he helps to elect. Accordingly, *wastah*- which is the ability to attain access to a power broker- is widely sought, but only achieved at some price (Khashan, p. 146).

Another component of the Lebanese patronage system is the important role of family. Actually the major determinant factor of political opportunity is one's family

background, including family name, prestige, and ties. The larger the number of family members who have been ministers, the more prestigious and powerful is that family considered to be. However, the reverse is not necessarily true; a family cannot be automatically regarded as politically weak because only one of its members became a minister. A large number of ministers from a particular family may indicate a high ambition in the family. Accordingly, it was not uncommon for more than one member of the same family to hold office in the same government; for example, four different members of the Solh family have held the position of prime minister. In reality, the position of *zaim* is frequently hereditary, and politics is often treated like a family business. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, Amine Jumayil (The Phalangist Party), Danny Chamoun (The National Liberal Party), and Walid Jumblat (The Progressive Socialist Party) inherited their father's political responsibilities (Dekmejian, p.92).

The Lebanese political game has always been played according to "no win-no lose" formula. The Lebanese politics has always been characterized by the ability to absorb rather than to eliminate new social and political forces. Thus Lebanon's political system had to be viewed through the overlay of clientelism, a system that had persisted in one form or another for over centuries of years (Dekmejian, p.94).

CHAPTER III
POWER AND AUTHORITY
IN THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP

Sources of Power:

It is useful to understanding the concept of power in the Lebanese system and how leaders are able to influence each other in governmental organizations. Power by definition involves the capacity of one party to influence another party (Yukl, p. 142).

One of the most widely used approaches to understanding the source of power, comes from the research by both scholars J. French and B.H. Raven conducted in 1968. Their findings outline five sources of power vested in the individual: legitimate power, reward power, coercive power, expert power, and referent power. The following table illustrates such groupings.

Table: 3 - French and Raven Sources of Individual Power

Legitimate Power:	Power granted by the organization is called legitimate power. People at the highest levels in the organization have more power than do people below them. Others comply because they accept the legitimacy of the position of the power holder.
Reward Power:	It is the authority to give employees rewards for compliance. Others comply because they want the rewards the power

holder can offer.

Coercive Power: It is based on a person's ability to punish for noncompliance; thus others comply because they fear punishment.

Expert Power: It is the power based on a person's expertise, competence, and information in a certain area. Others comply because they believe in the power holder's knowledge and competence.

Referent Power: It is based on the person's attractiveness to and friendship with others. Others comply because they respect and like the power holder.

Source: (Nahavandi, p. 100).

The first three sources of power- legitimate, reward, and coercive- are identified as position powers. Although they are vested in individuals, the individuals have access to them because of the position they hold.

Political sociology is a discipline that studies the relationship between the state and the society. Thus, In order to understand the concept of power one must understand the relationship between person (A) and person (B). If (A) makes (B) to do something even if (B) does not want, (A) would have a certain power on (B). In that sense, power is a very important concept. If a power of a person becomes legitimate, it means authority. In other words, authority means **legitimate power**. For example every political leader would like to have an authority over his people because these political leaders would like their followers to believe in them. In that sense if political leaders can make followers believe in them, they would have a legitimate power. A

leader's legitimate power disappears if the title or position he/she holds is taken away. As we move up the organization's hierarchy, we find that members possess more and more legitimate power. Actually In theory, organizations give all presidents' equal legitimate power. But of course, some leaders are more likely than others to invoke their legitimate power by claiming phrases as: "look, I'm the boss around here". When legitimate power works, it often does so because people have been trained to accept its influence. Experiences with parents, teachers, and law enforcement officials, cause members to enter organizations with a degree of readiness to submit to legitimate power. Examples of legitimate power are hierarchical structures in organizations, bosses, parents, police officers and so forth. All are in positions that give each certain right to decide, take action and have others do the same by virtue of their rank and position (Yukl, p. 147).

Similarly, in order to reward or punish, a leader needs to have access to resources. As is in the case with legitimate power, such access comes from holding a position within the organization.

In the case of **reward power**, it usually backs up legitimate power. For example, leaders are given the chance to recommend raises, effectuate performance evaluations, and assign preferred tasks to followers. Of course, leaders can attempt to exert influence over their people with praise, compliments and sweet talk, which also constitute rewards.

However, when rewards are used frequently as source of influence, people may come to perceive their relationship to the leader in purely economic terms. That is, they will expect a reward every time they are asked to do something new or unusual. It is more

satisfying for both parties to view their relationship in terms of mutual loyalty and friendship. Rather than using rewards as incentives in an impersonal, mechanical way, they should be used in more symbolic manner to recognize accomplishments and express personal appreciation for special contributions or exceptional effort. Used in this way, reward power can be a source of increased referent power over time (Yukl, p.148).

Coercive power also supports legitimate power since the individual has access to it because of his/her position. Coercive power is the ability to control others through the fear and punishment. Examples of coercive power include policemen giving tickets for speeding, a teacher detaining disruptive students after school, or employers firing unproductive workers. However, when dealing with societies, most of them involve some coercive power, but some are structured mainly by it. At the level of nations one can find such coercive societies, particularly those in which the political regime rules over all major institutions and groups, leaving no independent businesses, no independent schools, and no independent farms. The regime runs all at the point of a gun. Most of these coercive societies are commanded by totalitarian regimes. There is no law above the regime and that which is not permitted to the citizen is forbidden. And all that matters is controlled by the center, which is the top of the totalitarian pyramidal hierarchy of power. Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union, Mao Tse-tung in China, Pol Pot in Cambodia, Adolph Hitler in Germany, Enver Hoxha in Albania, Abed El Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Khomeiny in Iran and even Assad in Syria are perhaps the most noticeable examples of totalitarian rulers who received ninety nine percent of electorate's approval. They created social orders ruled by fear

of the consequences of disobedience, insufficient enthusiasm for the regime, punishments for the violation of any rules and regulations, or simple mistake such as accidentally wrapping fish in a newspaper showing a picture of Stalin (Rummel, p. 4).

In all cases, once the access to rewards or punishment are revoked by an organization, a leader or individual relying on such sources loses power. Because the source of power is related to the individual's position, followers are most likely to react by complying or opposing leading a series of coup d'état in vicious circles. Generally the harsher the source of power used, the less willing subordinates will be to comply (Navahandi, p. 101).

The last two sources of power – expert and referent – are more personal. Access to these two sources of power does not depend solely on the organization.

In the case of **expert power**, people have influence over others because they have special expertise, knowledge, information, or skills that others lack or need. People will listen to the experts, follow their advice, and accept their recommendations. Thus expert power corresponds to difficulty of replacement. Consider the business school that has one highly published professor who is an internationally known scholar and past presidential cabinet member. Such a person would obviously be difficult to replace and should have much greater expert power than an unpublished lecturer.

In other cases, those who have expert power might not hold official titles or any legitimate political leadership power. However, people will bypass their manager and their organization's formal hierarchy and structure, in order to seek help from those who have the expertise they need. For example, many secretaries have acquired expert power through long experience in dealing with clients, keeping records or

sparring with the bureaucracy. Frequently, they have been around longer than those they serve. In this case, it is not unusual for bosses to create special titles and develop new job classifications for those experts to reward their expertise and prevent their resignation (Dugan, p. 5).

The **referent power** operates in much the same way as expert power. Individuals with referent power have power because others like and respect them. As with the expert power, this power does not depend on the position or the organization. The person has power because he or she, is a role model for others. In this case of referent power, followers welcome the influence process and in many cases seek it, and they generally respond with commitment and acceptance. When people admire a leader and see him/her as a role model, then the leader is considered to be a referent power. For example, students may respond positively to advice or requests from teachers, who are well liked and respected, while the same students might be unresponsive to less popular teachers. Referent power takes time to develop and it is a two-way street. For instance, the lieutenant of the military police unit gained referent power as he brought hot chocolate and cookies to the security guards that were working in the late shift. Thus, the use of expert and referent power also is related to higher satisfaction and performance (Navahandi, p. 102-103).

It is obvious that leaders need some power to be effective, but it does not mean that more power is always better. The old saying “power corrupts” perhaps continues to be true. The amount of necessary power will depend on what needs to be accomplished, and on the leader’s skill in using the amount of available power. In summary, legitimate power and reward power are likely to produce compliance with the boss’s

wishes. Coercion power is likely to produce resistance and lack of cooperation. Referent and expert power are most likely to generate true commitment and enthusiasm for the leader's agenda.

The rise of power by the leadership

Leadership and power are closely related concepts. Both are often defined as processes of influence through which others move towards certain behaviors or attitudes. Organizations are highly political places, where members compete for power and scarce resources, and pursue their own agendas. Organizational leadership is generally seen as revolving around the leader's power- in getting others to perform or follow his/her vision, and in allocating resources, rewards and sanctions (Avery, p.42-43).

Organizations succeed or fail, not only because of how well they are led, but because of how well followers follow. Followers are the basic elements for the leadership to rise to power. Without the leader and the follower's characteristics, no relationship can form. First and foremost, followers hold the leader in high admiration. They are strongly devoted to the leader, and a strong emotional bond forms between followers and their leader. They admire their leader; imitate the leader's behaviors and gestures; and are likely to talk, dress and act like him. This intense emotional bond and attraction to the leader creates a situation whereby followers will obey the leader without question. They have total confidence in the leader's vision and direction (Cogner, p. 329-330).

Table: 4- Characteristics of followers.

- High degree of respect and esteem for the leader
- Loyalty and devotion to the leader
- Affection for the leader
- High performance expectations
- Unquestioning obedience

Source: (Cogner, p, 328)

Good and effective leadership is of great importance to any organization. Likewise, it should also be recognized that good and efficient followers are also as significant and important. A leader with a very good set of followers would surely be more effective in performing his/her tasks than one who has a set of disobedient and rebellious followers. Moreover, all those qualities of good leadership are aimed at developing a good team of followers.

Syed Alhabashi wrote in an article under the name of “Good followers make an effective leader” a dialogue between Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth Caliph of Islam and one of his followers: “Oh Ali!, why is it that our empire under Umar ibn al-Khattab’s (the second Caliph) rule was so peaceful and tranquil, while now under your rule, we seem to have so many problems of all sorts?”

The Caliph replied, “When Umar was ruling the empire, he had the privilege of having citizens like me, but now I am very unfortunate to have citizens like you”.

The above dialogue clearly illustrates the limitations faced by even the most effective leaders who have to struggle with their followers who fail to play their proper role (Alhabashi, p, 3).

Obviously, the followers who are employees, civilians and citizens need to realize that they have certain roles to play in order to be recognized as those responsible for shaping the organization. Firstly, they have to fulfill their obligations till the end. Secondly, they should fully understand and appreciate the very purpose of their organization's existence. In other words they should make the extra effort of reading, discussing, attending briefings about the purpose of the organization so that they know the future directions and plans. Thirdly, it should be the responsibility of every follower to ensure the organization success. For example, the followers need to point out to the leader, when something is not right, instead of simply agreeing to everything that comes from the leader and be complacent. This is often the case, especially when someone feels obliged for some reason to be blindly loyal to the leader (Alhabashi, p, 4-5).

In summary, followers are more likely to be effective if they view themselves as active, free and independent rather than passive and dependent on the leader. Followers can play an important role in improving leadership by providing accurate information, challenging weak decisions, resisting inappropriate influence attempts, giving support and encouragement, and providing coaching and advice (Yukl, p. 137).

Power and corruption of the leaders:

Moving on to the notion of power and corruption of the Lebanese leaders, one may notice that in the late 1980s, after more than several years of civil strife during which as many innocent people have lost their lives. Lebanese politics had become synonymous with bloodshed, and political power had come to be associated with firepower, weapons and armaments. Within this context, it was sometimes difficult to recall that Lebanon was once considered by some to be a model of pluralistic democracy in the Arab world. Despite the widespread erosion of law and order and the reduced effectiveness of the central authorities in 1987 some leftovers of the national traditional political system continued. In other words, the president, as provided for in the constitution, had been elected by the legislature, or Chamber of Deputies. He controlled over a carefully selected cabinet, commanded the Lebanese armed forces, and supervised the civil service, but at this point, much of the resemblance between this framework and the pre 1975 civil war national-level political structure ended. In 1987 the president controlled only a small portion of the country. Many of the traditional *zuama* of the various sects who had formerly participated in Lebanon cabinets were dead. And the civil service, which still collected taxes and provided services to some parts of the country, did so at greatly reduced levels (Alhabashi, p.6).

The emphasis in this section of the paper we will focus mainly on the most three powerful political figures in Lebanon before and after the Taif agreement, which are: the president of the republic, the prime minister and the head of the parliament. These three political figures are also known as the “TROIKA”.

Presidency before Taif agreement:

The presidency before the Taif agreement, as might be expected because of the significance of the family with its strong figure and influential role of the *zaim*, Lebanese have come to accept a powerful national leader. Indeed, the constitution granted the president vast authority. He is the commander in chief of the army and security; he can appoint and dismiss his Prime Minister and cabinet; he dispersed laws passed by the chamber of deputies, and could have also propose laws, enacted “urgent” legislation by decree; he could dissolve the chamber of deputies, and exercise considerable influence throughout the bureaucracy.

Apart from the constitutional powers, the president was constrained by the necessity of obtaining cooperation from at least a majority of the *zuama* of the various confessional communities. In addition, he had to provide order to other competing interests, including those of religious, business, and labor leaders. Moreover, the president, who by custom is a Maronite, must try to work in harmony with the prime minister, who by custom is a Sunni Muslim. Together, they are the most renowned members of the executive regime, and exercise a direct and personal influence over the deputies and other political leaders. In regards to his/her election, the president is elected by the chamber of deputies, and not by direct public votes. He/she is selected for a six-year term and may not succeed himself, but he may serve any number of non-successive terms. In theory, anyone who meets the suitable requirements for election to the chamber of deputies can be elected president; in reality, before the 1975 civil war powerful Maronite *zuama* usually were elected. Exceptions were President Fuad Chehab , President Charles Helou and especially President Camille

Chamoun, who unsuccessfully sought to diminish the power of the *zuama*. At times, political direction and interconfessional internal strife have been strong; nonetheless, the reality has usually been that no one could be elected president without the support of a wide spectrum of confessional blocs.

Although the constitution granted the president wide autonomy in conducting the affairs of state, it is questionable whether the Lebanese leaders who negotiated the National Pact envisioned the growth in power that occupants of the office assumed in later years. For many Lebanese, especially Muslims, the presidency came to symbolize political tyranny and sectarian hegemony. In domestic matters involving regional interests, the powers of the local *zuama* always held influence. But on boarder national-level issues, the Maronite presidents tended to defend Maronite interests. This was factual with regard to the pan-Arab question and the events that led to the 1958 civil war. With respect to the Palestinian controversy, and in response to any call for fundamental political reform, especially *Musharaka*, that is, a more equitable distribution of power between the president and the prime minister. Some presidents have viewed the office as a means for exaggeration and overdoing. Sulayman Franjieh, for instance, a *zaim* from Zgharta, who was elected through the efforts of traditional *zuama*, is commonly regarded as having used his office to reward family and constituency. Many observers believe that nepotism and mostly corruption reached an intolerable level under Franjieh tenure (Dekmejian, p.18).

The 1975 civil war has left a permanent mark on the institution of the presidency. In the 1980s, the office no longer was viewed as a product of inter-sectarian consensus. The rise in sectarian consciousness has forced each president – and the prime

minister, for that matter- to be more accountable to the demands of his narrow community. At the same time, as the external actors such as Syria and Israel have influenced elections, and as the power of the militias has increased, the status of the president did not extend much farther than the limits of the Presidential Palace of Babda (Bejjani, p.6).

Prime Minister before Taif agreement:

Regarding the prime minister and the cabinet, as noted, the president was constitutionally empowered to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet. Although a prime minister need not be a member of the chamber of deputies, this has usually been the case, particularly because the president must consult with the deputies before naming a prime minister. The president and the prime minister plan over the composition of the cabinet and present the nominees to the chamber of deputies to ask for a vote of confidence. Concerning power, as the highest Muslim political official, the prime minister can bring a significant amount of authority to his position. In practice, however, the power of the prime minister has varied according to his personality, his base of support, and the preferences of the president he served. A distinguished prime minister can enhance the prestige of the president, and the office has been held by some fairly capable politicians. Clearly, a prime minister's constitutionally mandated power is small, and over the years his most effective methods of action have been informal. His resignation could embarrass a president, influence popular opinion, and increase Muslim opposition. He could persuade the chamber of deputies to voice a vote of no confidence and force the president to

reappoint a new list of ministers, by this means, delaying governmental operations. In the end, however, these informal weapons were almost unimportant in comparison with the president's disposal. If the prime minister's actions caused a president to be disappointed, the minister could be dismissed and replaced with a more flexible individual. For example, in 1973 when Saib Salam resigned as prime minister to protest the government's refusal to oppose with force Israeli attacks, President Franjieh nominated a political unfamiliar to the post. Although the nomination was defeated, the eventual replacement was decidedly less resistant than Salam. Since the 1975 civil war, the president has been forced to treat his prime minister with greater deference, but in the late 1980s the balance of political power in what remained of the official government was essentially unchanged from the pre-war status.

In theory, the cabinet is the vehicle through which the country is administered. It is supposed to set policy, prepare legislative bills, and appoint or dismiss top members of the bureaucracy. Historically, however, ministers have often used their positions to increase their patronage within their constituencies and to add to their personal wealth. Any Lebanese citizen can be appointed as minister, but most often influential *zuama*, have held these positions. Actually, there is no set number of ministers, but historically it has fluctuated between four and twenty-four, expanding and contracting according to political necessities. Sometimes a minister held more than one portfolio; as of early 1987, there were ten ministers holding among them sixteen portfolios. And as with much of Lebanese politics, members of the same privileged families have tended to hold cabinet positions. As indication of postwar reform, however, and in

recognition of the growing Shi 'ite population, in 1984 the Ministry of State for the South and Reconstruction was created (Bejjani, p.10).

Finally one may say that, even though cabinets were in an almost constant state dissolution and reformation, the same men tended to be reappointed to the same or to other posts in the government.

Chamber of deputies before Taif agreement:

Reaching the legislature part, the chamber of deputies, which sometimes also called the parliament, has many responsibilities, but electing the president is its most important task. Despite its legislative role, traditionally the chamber of deputies seldom has been involved in law making or policy formulation. The constitution details the duties and procedures of the chamber of deputies and grants it considerable authority in such matters as budgetary oversight and amending the constitution. But because the strength of the presidency and the power of the *zuama*, the chamber of deputies generally have been fragmented, somehow inefficient body, playing an insignificant part in Lebanese politics.

Deputies are elected every four years by popular vote, but only within structures of the confessional system. Competition within districts is intrasectarian, for example, a Greek Catholic from one list would campaign against Greek Catholics from other "lists". To ensure the success of the candidate in a campaign "list", a *zaim* often enters into complex alliances with *zuama* supporting other "lists" in other districts. As a result, one *zaim* may support another *zaim* in a neighboring district but oppose him in another district. Money of course, has been at the center of this system. Regardless

of confessional association, candidates have tended to be men of wealth, often landlords, lawyers, or businessmen, with family connections to the local *zaim*. Not surprisingly, candidates have frequently spent large sums of money to win elections.

Little reform to this system has occurred. One important factor maintaining the system has been the governments voting regulations, which encourage an individual to vote in his hometown or village, regardless of how long he may have lived elsewhere. This policy reinforced the political hold of the *zaim* and, at the same time, discouraged the emergence of modern political parties.

Several features characterized the chamber of deputies in 1987. By custom, its speaker –which is also referred to as its president- who is elected by deputies, is a Shi'ite Muslim. To be suitable for election, an individual has to be at least twenty-five years of age; still most members of the chamber of deputies were over fifty years old. Only one woman, Mirna Bustani, had ever served in the chamber of deputies, and this was under unusual circumstance. Her father, Emile Bustani a deputy, died in an airplane crash in 1963. Being an only child, Mirna was appointed to complete her father's term in the 1960 as chamber of deputies (Dekmejian, p.22).

The parliament traditionally has played a significant role in financial affairs, since it has the responsibility for levying taxes and passing the budget. It also exercises political control over the cabinet through formal questioning of ministers on policy issues and by requesting a confidence debate.

Situation after Taif Agreement:

The Taif Agreement was the draft of the new constitution, from which was born what came to be known as "The Second Lebanese Republic"-the first republic being established according to the constitution of 1926, which was amended a number of times, most importantly in 1943, when parliament ended the French mandate and announced the nation's independence- At the state level, the Agreement produced a three-man show or "TROIKA" consisting of the three Presidents: the President of the Republic, that of the Council of Ministers, and that of the Parliament.

Many different interpretations of the way to implement the agreement have emerged. These differences result from the effort of each President, as a representative of his confessional community, to enhance his position and his privileges.

The Taif Agreement greatly reduced the power of the President traditionally reserved for the Maronite community. Starting at the top of the pyramid, the President of the Republic acquired greater symbolic powers. The Presidential rights have been abused since the signing of the agreement in 1989. This was further achieved by vesting more authority into the prime ministerial post, customarily a Sunni position. The insistence of the President of the Republic to exercise many of the rights that the agreement has already canceled represents an attempt to maintain some common unwritten practices in order to revitalize the old, pre-war system, thus limiting the intention of the Taif Agreement through different practice. For instance, one may mention the insistence of the President of the Republic on attending, and thus presiding, over every meeting of the Council of Ministers in order to declare that he still has control over the executive power.

Furthermore, the Taif Agreement intended to shift the role of ministers from “helpers” of the President to “partners” in the government. This rearrangement was evident by the fact that the executive powers were delegated to the Chamber of Deputies. However, the fact that from the beginning of the formation of the new government, ministers were largely from the old ruling elite, which disadvantaged the essence of any reform.

The Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, essentially a Shiite post, had his position enhanced through the extension of the term in office.

Moreover, the functions of the Chamber of Deputies were spoiled by the vested interest of the “Troika”- an acronym synonymous with the decision making process of the President, Prime Minister and Head of the Chamber of Deputies-. Another weakness suffered by the Chamber dealt with the role of the Deputy Head of the Chamber. At the Taif talks the attending deputies did not specify the functions of this position. Afterwards never since signing the agreement had the Deputy controlled over any session. Similarly the duties of the Deputy Prime Minister in the Council of Ministers remained unresolved until early of the year 2000.

Related with the above state situation was the inability of the post-Taif governments to undertake comprehensive administrative reforms.

Bureaucracy and corruption:

Moving on to the notion of corruption, it is best described in the Lebanese bureaucracy.

According to Maroun Kisirwani, an associate professor in the department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut, Lebanese citizens of all backgrounds and political persuasions, consistently express their low opinion of the performance of the bureaucracy. The two major complaints are, the presence in the bureaucracy of extensive corruption and favoritism. In dealing with the government, the citizens often prefer to deal with a member of his/her own sect, since they come to think that while the official may not be any more honest, he/she will at least not discriminate in his dishonesty on the basis of sect. In fact, in everyday transactions, for example registering a vehicle or obtaining a driving license, routinely require the payment of a bribe. Some Lebanese, while continuing to complain, have come to regard these small routine bribes as a kind of tax or tariff.

Bribes are nothing new in Lebanon, but in the wake of the civil war their payment seems to have reached high to a large extent. They are widely essential in transactions between citizens, government, and the amounts involved can be outsized. For example, the registration of deeds establishing the ownership of property, has become an expensive proposition for citizens: the fee is usually a percentage of the value of the transaction and can run into the thousands of dollars. Another example could be on obtaining telephone service, which can also require substantial bribes, or the use of “*wasta*”. In addition to this sort of corruption, which most Lebanese citizens have personally experienced, there is considerable belief that corruption exists at the higher levels of government. Thus, stories circulate of major corruption including influence of markets, diversion of funds, conflicts of interest, and dishonesty. Such stories are widely discussed and circulated among the Lebanese citizen. In many ways the

country is like a small town in which every individual sooner or later hears the details of everyone else's secret (Kisirwani, p.2).

Despite the low regard, which most Lebanese citizens have for the bureaucracy, they continue to cope with it. Primarily, people continue to pay bills for government services such as electricity and phones, even when it is not easy to do so. These are, of course essential services over which the government has a control over. However, citizens also continue to engage in legitimizing transactions such as registering property and vehicles and obtaining many required government permits for various purposes. These are also time consuming and expensive activities. During the war, the motives for this behavior were not altogether clear. When asked, most Lebanese indicated that fear and uncertainty were major factors in their respect for the law. Not having the proper documents made one defenseless in a variety of situations. Whatever the case may be, to this day, the willingness of citizens to deal with the bureaucracy in this arranged manner has contributed greatly to its survival (Kisirwani, p.4).

Comparison with leadership in the developed countries:

Leadership in short came to be referred to as a social and cultural phenomenon. A leader who is considered effective in Singapore might seem too authoritarian in Sweden. The charisma of an Egyptian political leader has no effect on the French or the German. Understanding leadership, therefore, requires to a high degree, understanding the cultural context in which it takes place. Culture consists of the commonly held values within a group or people. It is a set of norms, customs, values,

and assumptions that guides the behavior of a particular community or nation. Culture gives each group its uniqueness and differentiates it from others. Man is strongly influenced by his culture. It determines what he considers right and wrong, and it influences what and whom he values, what he pays attention to, and how he behaves. Culture affects values and beliefs and influences leadership and interpersonal styles (Navahandi, p. 7).

Culture exists in many levels. The basic one is the national culture level. The national culture level is defined as a set of values and beliefs shared by people within a nation. National culture has a strong and pervasive influence on people's behavior in everyday activities.

Cultures shape our views and expectations of our leaders. For instance, people in the United States do not expect leaders to be a failure proof, whereas, in many other cultures, leaders' admission of mistakes would be intolerable and a deadly blow to their authority and ability to lead. For example, many U.S. presidents, most recently President Clinton, when faced with no other option, the Monica's affair has recognized his mistakes openly and proclaimed to have learned from them. Such admissions are rarely forthcoming in other countries. By contrast, President Vincente Fox of Mexico had consistently refused to admit any error or change course in the handling of his country's economy. He firmly states that he made no mistakes. In another situation is when in 1998; Indonesian President Suharto apparently admitted mistakes that contributed to his country's economic crisis, he was seen as weak and incompetent. Indonesians did not forgive him, and he eventually resigned (Navahandi, p. 9-10).

Each country and region in the world has developed a particular organizational and management style based largely on its national culture. This style is called the national organizational heritage. Although there are many differences from one organization to another, and from one leader to another, the national heritage is noticeable and distinct (Navahandi, p. 10).

There are several models to understand national cultures. The very well known model that has direct application to organizations is called “High-Context and Low Context Cultural Framework”. In this model, context refers to the environment and the information that provides the background for interaction and communication.

Leaders from high-context cultures rely heavily on the context, including nonverbal signs and situational factors, to communicate with others and understand the world around them. They rely on personal relationships to establish communication.

Leaders from low-context cultures focus on explicit, specific verbal and written messages to understand peoples and situations.

For example, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Korea and China are all high context cultures, where subtle body posture, tone of voice, detailed rituals, and a person’s title and status convey strong messages that determine the behavior. Communication does not always need to be explicit and specific. Trust is viewed as more important than written communication or legal contracts.

In low-context cultures, such as Germany, Switzerland, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, people pay attention to the verbal message. What is said or written is more important than nonverbal messages or the situation itself. People are, therefore, specific and clear in their communication with their leaders.

The difference between high and low context can explain many cross-cultural communication problems that leaders face when they interact with those who are of a culture that is different from their own. The low-context European and North American leaders might get frustrated working with followers from high-context Asian or Middle Eastern cultures. Whereas the low-context leaders focus on specific instructions, the high-context followers aim at developing relationships. Similarly, high-context leaders might be offended by their low-context followers' straight forwardness, which they can interpret as rudeness and lack of respect (Yukl, p. 413-417).

One of the major functions of leaders is the creation and development of a specific culture and climate for their group or organization. Leaders, particularly the founders, leave an almost indelible mark on the assumptions that are passed down from one generation to the next. In fact, organizations often come to mirror their founder's personalities. If the founder is control oriented and autocratic, the organization is likely to be centralized and managed in a top-down fashion. If the founder is participative and team oriented, the organization will be decentralized and open. The leaders make most, if not all, of the decisions regarding the various factors that will shape the culture (Navahandi, p. 18).

In brief, Leaders are increasingly confronted with the need to influence people from other cultures, and successful influence requires a good understanding of the cultures. Leaders must be able to understand how people from different cultures view them and interpret their actions.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN LEBANON

Politics and leadership problems:

Political systems have their strengths and liabilities. Lebanon is no exception. During the two decades preceding the 1975 civil war, many western scholars referred to Lebanon as the “most stable democracy” in the Arab world; however the political system fell short and was not democratic as one hoped. Democracy as a system, was lacking in Lebanon, because equal opportunities for citizens as well as political accountability and political responsibilities of officials and institutions were absent. Lebanon had, and still maintains a confessional system based on a formula of allocating political and administrative functions to the religious sects. Such a system has historical roots, but it was the National Pact in 1943 that officially institutionalized it (Krayem, p. 1).

Measured by standards, regional or international politics, Lebanon is a complex country to understand, in times of peace or war. Lebanese politics and the leadership continuous crisis have struck the entire fabric of the society, and crippled the work and effectiveness of the state. In fact, there are endless political, as well as leadership problems in Lebanon: Economic bankruptcy, national and internal polarization, Israeli invasion, submission to regional powers, and above all lacks of a free,

independent and visionary leadership. These problems will be analyzed briefly here after.

The economic bankruptcy:

During the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the Lebanese economic system enjoyed relative stability, and an impressive average rate of economic growth. Estimates of the rate of growth varied from one report to another, there was however, a general agreement that the rate of growth in real terms averaged over seven percent per annum in the 1950s and dropped to an average of five to six percent annually during the 1960s (Dubar and Nasr, p.130)

Lebanon was not yet directly involved in, or directly affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict. It benefited economically from its financial and commercial roles as an intermediary between the Arab countries, and the international market. The Lebanese economy then formed a service-based economy, externally oriented, and dependent on foreign capital. The rapid and irregular economic growth resulted in an uneven social, sectoral and regional development. In the late 1960s, especially after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, internal and regional changes began unfavorably to affect Lebanon. Internally, socio-political and religious polarization among the Lebanese increased. There was a growing migration of the rural population to Beirut, moving into a state of poverty around the city, and suffering from rising inflation and cost of living. Socio-political tensions fueled rural uprisings and work's strikes, and contributed to the emergence of militant student's complaint movement. In fact, these socially oriented movements strengthened class solidarity, shared aims and introduced

class identity patterns based on religion, tribal or even regional affiliation and commitment. Within the framework of an Arab-Israeli empire, indeed, social identity patterns developed along horizontal class lines, but this development ended by the outbreak of the civil war and a quick reaffirmation of rigid sectarian divisions and identity patterns (Dubar and Nasr, p.130-133).

National and internal polarization:

The second political and leadership problem that prevailed in Lebanon is the popular polarization issue.

Polarization occurred into two broad camps, and around two different political programs, that fueled the political crisis of the system. For instance, Kamal Jumblat, formed and led a self-proclaimed “democratic, progressive and non-sectarian” front, which later allied itself with the Palestinians. This front grouped several nationalist and leftist political parties and organizations that formed the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) in 1976. The conservative forces on the other hand, led mainly by the Christian Phalangist Party, formed another block called the Lebanese Front. The Lebanese National Movement advanced a comprehensive political reforms plan which called for the total abolition of “political confessionalism” and the implementation of wide democratic reforms in the political, electoral and administrative systems. However, the Lebanese Front rejected these reforms and advocated an alternative, although less articulated plan that varied from maintaining the status quo to political decentralization and possible federalism. The presence of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon and the support it enjoyed from wide

segments of the Lebanese Muslim population in particular, and from certain national leaders, complicated the conflict further. The hush and weak political and leadership system could not withstand the pressure. An internal compromise became harder to achieve.

By 1977 the LNM forces were in retreat, and their ability to influence political events declined especially after the assassination of Kamal Junblatt in 1977. Gradually, the LNM abandoned its program of political reform, and in 1980, began building bridges with the traditional Islamic leadership. The new program that it developed was based on preservation of the traditional confessional system, but with a redistribution of confessional power to reflect demographic and political changes. During the period of 1976 to 1982, the Lebanese state under the leadership of president Elias Sarkis undertook various initiatives to reach a negotiated settlement to the Lebanese conflict, but none succeeded. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Front was gradually strengthening its position, and awaiting favorable regional developments to pressure its role and power. During this period the Lebanese National Movement was too dependent on the Palestinians and unable to initiate political negotiations process or participate in providing an effective solution to the civil war (Younis, p. 33).

Israeli Invasion:

Another political conflict added to Lebanon's plight was the Israeli invasion of 1982. The attack was a stunning blow to the Palestinians and the LNM groups; this invasion dramatically strengthened the Lebanese Front, bringing its leader Bashir Jumayyil to

the presidency. Bachir Jumayyil was assassinated within days after his election, and his brother Amin was rapidly elected in his place.

In the wake of the invasion, American involvement in Lebanon became evident, and it mainly aimed at negotiating a withdrawal agreement between Lebanon and Israel that it was hoped, would be a precursor to a fuller peace treaty between the two countries. However, by 1984, less than two years after the Phalangist Party and President Amin Jumayyil's leadership reached power, the Israeli "new order" in Lebanon had all but collapsed. On May 17, 1984, the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement ran into strong opposition from Syria, was not ratified, and soon was ended by the Lebanese president Amine Jumayyil. Israel began withdrawing from most Lebanese territories, except a border strip in South Lebanon. Thus, the Lebanese government moved away from Israel and the United States and reopened a dialogue with Syria to find a way out of the deadlock. Indeed, by 1985, Syria had regained most of its power over Lebanese territory that it had lost to the Israelis in 1982 (Chomski, p. 14).

Leadership problems:

The internal problems of that period and in different areas of Lebanon increased the sectarian character of the Lebanese conflict. Confessional separation reached its peak and the confessionally based militias ruled various regions of the country. In the "Christian areas", the militias spread slogans of a "Christian republic," "Christian security," federalism and partition. In the "Muslim areas," the emerging radical Islamic movements raised the slogans of an "Islamic republic".

A state of political paralysis prevailed in Lebanon between 1986 and the end of President Jumayyil's term in 1988. In September 1988, and at the end of Jumayyil's leadership term, the failure to elect a new president led to a political vacuum which threatened to lead to partition. Jumayyil appointed a temporary cabinet headed by the Army commander Michel Aoun, but this cabinet's authority was only accepted in Christian areas. In West Beirut and other regions of the country, another cabinet was headed by Salim al-Hoss. The executive authority, was split between the military government of Aoun, and the civilian government of Hoss. The two governments stood against each other and each claimed exclusive legitimacy. The legislative authority also experienced a vacuum because the parliament failed to renew the one-year term of the speaker, or to elect a new one. In that sense Lebanon lacked a qualified leadership to lead the country. Aoun and the Lebanese army troops under his command, began also a "War of Liberation", supposedly against all foreign forces; In reality the war was directed mainly against the Syrians. This war had devastating consequences; instead of curtailing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, it caused an increase in their numbers and power. Moreover, the areas under General's Aoun's authority were overwhelmed and devastated by Syrian shelling causing a massive emigration of the inhabitants of these areas.

Unfortunately, soon, another war broke out in 1990. This time between Maronites against each other. Aoun's troops on one hand, and the Lebanese Forces militia, led by Samir Geagea on the other. This inter-Maronite war was militarily devastating, and politically catastrophic, because it eroded the capabilities of both forces, individually

or together, to effectively reject, or change the political compromise, represented by the Taif Agreement, that had been reached, and imposed for implementation. A smaller and more localized conflict between the two Shiite forces, Amal and Hizbollah, proved that Lebanon had no national leadership to restore peace to its people. Lebanon was most intensely affected by the intra-confessional clashes (Laurent, p.4).

As a reaction to the devastation of the war of liberation and the intra-confessional battles, public intolerance for the perpetuation of the civil war led to the support of a quick settlement. Indeed, during the years of the civil war there had been many indications that the majority of ordinary citizens and many social, cultural, and popular organizations were against the partition of Lebanese of citizens, regions and cities. They continuously expressed their desire for unity, confronting the militias, as they did for example through massive demonstrations. The dismantle of the militias and the rebuilding of the Lebanese state were viewed as the only rational ways out of the civil war trap. There was also a general agreement that none of the warring factions could decisively win the war, and that there was no alternative to a new compromise ensuring the continuity of Lebanon as an entity having a united central political system (Laurent, p.5-6).

These internal changes happened together with developments on the regional and international levels that favored a political settlement in Lebanon. The Lebanese conflict had always been closely linked and in significant ways to the Arab- Israeli conflict. The various Lebanese groups had repeatedly, attempted to exploit their relations with foreign regional powers to promote their own internal interests. Such

links complicated and intensified the civil war. Indeed, the polarization among the Lebanese, and their strive to defend or promote their interests facilitated external intervention. In order for a peace resolution to succeed, it was necessary to decrease the role of external forces, or to have the warring parties commitment to abandon their allegiance to outside power.

Outside influence over the Lebanese leadership:

The fact that Lebanon's confessional, and capitalist system functions at all is a wonder, since the Lebanese political system continues to be influenced, and even controlled by outsiders' mandate.

This research will briefly deal with this foreign influence on Lebanon since the 1980s, because it created a complete vacuum in the total absence of a Lebanese national leadership.

Israel and Palestinians Influence:

Between 1984-1985 Israel, had already lost interest in Lebanon because it was preoccupied with the rising of the Palestinian "*intifada*" which had erupted in December 1987 in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As for the Palestinians in Lebanon, the expulsion of Palestinian troops from Beirut in 1982, dramatically weakened their influence. Later developments between 1983 and 1988 - battles between Syrian and Palestinian troops in the North, and the battles between

Amal and the Palestinians in Beirut, and various intra-Palestinian fights- contributed further to the weakening of their power in Lebanon. The remaining Palestinian armed forces were isolated in few refugee camps South of Lebanon, in Tripoli and in the North. (Krayem, p. 78).

Syrian Influence:

In contrast to the Israelis and the Palestinians, Syrian influence in Lebanon increased steadily. Syrian influence in Lebanon had always been extensive, but the military intervention of 1976 gave it a solid material footing, and later on legal status under the Arab League's mandate.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Syria was struggling with its own internal problems and was unable to focus on Lebanon's domestic ills. Even so, some sources have ascribed to Syria a prominent role in aggravating the 1958 disturbances, claiming that it worked to unseat the Chamoun regime. Then, in the late 1960s the rise of Palestinian guerrilla activity in southern Lebanon contributed to tense Lebanese relations with Syria. Although the Syrian government was reluctant to permit guerrilla attacks to originate from Syrian soil, for fear of Israeli reprisals, it was much less reticent to see such activity occur in Lebanon. Thus, in 1973, when the Lebanese Army finally was engaged in fighting against Palestinian guerrillas, Syria closed its borders in protest to pressure the Lebanese government to retract its anti-Palestinian policy.

Since the start of the 1975 civil war, Syrian involvement in Lebanon has been significant and inconsistent. On the one hand, the regime of President Hafiz al Assad

opposed the permanent fragmentation of Lebanon, fearing that the creation of a Maronite ministate would lead to the establishment of “another Israel”; on the other hand, Syria opposed the idea of the formation of a radical Lebanese, left-wing state on its borders.

In the early stages of the Civil War, Syria pretended to be a mediator, arranging several short-lived cease-fires. In February 1976 Syria helped formulate a one-sided political reform package, known as the Constitutional Document that granted more power to Muslims at the expense of the Christians. This compromise however was never implemented. When diplomacy failed, Syria intervened militarily. In 1976, as the battle was going badly for the loosing Christian Lebanese Front, Syria moved to prevent its total collapse, using Palestinian units Al-Saiqa, under its control to reestablish a balance. In May, Syria was instrumental in having Elyas Sarkis, a pro-Syrian technocrat, elected president. By 1977 about twenty seven thousand Syrian troops were in Lebanon, technically as the largest part of the Arab Deterrent Force, set up by the League of Arab States in October 1976. Ironically, Syria with twenty seven thousand troops did not support its installed president to restore peace to the land and lead it out of its tragedy. On the contrary, Syria played the conflicting Lebanese parties against each other.

As the conflict wore on, the situation changed dramatically for Syria. In 1978 Bashir Jumayyil began his drive to incorporate all Christian militias under his Lebanese Front. He provoked Syria's animosity by destroying in June 1978 the Marada group, the pro-Syrian Franjiyah militia, and by his increasingly close ties to Israel. Syria allied itself vigorously with the leftist groups against the Christian forces.

In 1978, the Lebanese Front, forced Syrian troops to leave its areas (East Beirut and some regions to the north) after a fierce military confrontation. In the 1980s, Syria was the dominant external actor in Lebanon. It physically controlled much of the country, over which it imposed its will. At times, Syria resorted to a policy arrived at maintaining the Lebanese conflict alive and active by renewing the animosity between the warring factions. In 1982, Syrian troops were forced by the Israelis invading troops to leave West Beirut along with the Palestinian militias. However, within a few years, Syria was able to return to Beirut under the Hoss government. In 1987, Syrian troops reentered West Beirut, as well as various regions of the Mountains, the Shouf and southern suburbs of Beirut. In 1990, Syrian troops under an international cover reentered East Beirut and other predominantly Christian areas that they had been forced out of since 1978 (Chalala, p. 10).

Lebanon continues to lack its own national leadership. Instead, it had Syrian installed leaders serving and promoting Syria interests in Lebanon.

Arab States Influence:

The Arab scheme in the Lebanese conflict was divided into camps. The Gulf states who aimed at minimizing the threat of regional escalation, and was also interpreted by some as an attempt by these states, especially Saudi Arabia, to counterbalance Syrian influence in Lebanon with a little bit of its own influence. The other group of the Arab left led by Syria aimed at imposing total control over Lebanon as a puppet state. Although the Syrians strengthened their influence over Lebanon, especially after the Gulf War, some political observers interpreted the coming of the Lebanese-Saudi

businessman Rafiq al-Hariri to power in 1992 was a sign of a renewed Saudi role in Lebanon (Chalala, p. 12).

A third actor was Iran. Iranian clerics and their religious regime that overthrew the Shah in 1979 and promoted the establishment of Islamic fundamentalist regimes in other countries sought its share of the Lebanese cake. The Iranian clerics exploited their existing ties with the Lebanese Shia community to advocate the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Iran sent around one thousand to two thousand revolutionary Guards to Baalbak in the Beqaa Valley, ostensibly to fight with Lebanon against Israel, but more likely in an attempt to gain influence among Lebanon's Shia Muslims and train their militias. Some Iranians maintain that the guards were sent as a gesture of thanks to Syria for Syrian support of Iran in its 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Syria was exercising its influence over the Lebanese Shia and facilitated Iran's direct links to Hizbollah, which has been connected to some terrorist incidents and to the hostages in Lebanon, and which appears to be part of or patterned after, a similar group in Iran. Iranian support for Hizbollah was evident by the flow of Iranian weapons sent to Hizbollah via Syria (Chalala, p. 18).

American Influence:

The United States was interested in constraining the crisis in Lebanon so as not to disrupt the Arab-Israeli peace process. After the development of the Gulf crisis in 1990, the United States had additional concern for controlling Iraq by gaining Syrian support for the Gulf war coalition. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union strengthened American influence in the region especially in

Lebanon. This allowed it to pursue its policy objectives with fewer global obstacles. The United States supported the Taif negotiations and provided its support to restore peace to Lebanon via Syria's participation. The main purpose was to recreate a Lebanese national leadership (Salman, p. 22).

Under the above mentioned circumstances, sixty-two Lebanese deputies met in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia to discuss national reconciliation on the basis of a document that had already largely been prepared by the Arab Tripartite Committee- which was composed of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, and President Shadli Ben Jedid of Algeria, to resolve the Lebanese conflict. Following strenuous consultation with Syria, the United States and various Lebanese leaders, and after twenty-two days of discussion and consultation with officials and leaders in Lebanon, the deputies reached an agreement on October 22, 1989. The National Accord Document, or the Taif Agreement as it came to be known, constituted the outcome of a process of reconciliation among the Lebanese. The success of the accord was due to the effective acceptance by the Syrians, and the support by the Arabs, and the international community. In a statement following a summit meeting in Malta, the United States and the Soviet Union expressed to the international community their support for the Agreement. In addition, the United Nations Security Council Declaration on October 31, 1989, supported the agreement, and the Lebanese authority resulting from it (Salman, p. 26).

Thus, the Taif agreement has been clear evidence that Lebanese leadership was created by outsiders. Its fate was dictated by foreign actors mainly Syria.

The Taif Accord did not establish a clear and relatively stable formula to rule, govern, and exercise authority in Lebanon. In addition to the previously mentioned problems, one can note the failure to establish a new socio-political force and leadership to implement the agreement fully, and to lead the nation towards a more democratic system.

The Lebanese state in the post-Taif era has been controlled by contradictory and conflicting socio-political forces. On one hand, the militias that were dominant during the war years, were encouraged to participate in the political reformation process. That's because they were considered to be representative of a reality that needs to be acknowledged first, and gradually changed at a later stage other armed militias were allowed to maintain their arms and military training under the pretext of fighting Israel. Clearly the Taif did not bring peace rather it consecrated the fact that one Lebanese group was the winner of the conflict and the other was the loser. On the other hand, new socio-political forces foreign to the war, came into power; and they represent the economic power of local capital allied with regional capital, with important support from the rich and conservative Gulf States. This new socio-political alliance was not agreed upon because their program includes contradictory visions and interests. The coming of Rafik al-Hariri to power as a prime minister in October 1992 reflected such developments.

The Hariri Phenomenon:

The Hariri phenomenon took place in the context of particular regional and internal developments.

Regionally, it came about in the aftermath of the Gulf war and the launching of the Madrid Peace Conference. The American administration acknowledged the Syrian role in Lebanon and the Middle East, and in return, the Syrian regime adapted itself to the new trends and conditions and accommodated the interests of the super powers, especially of the Americans, the Gulf states and Iran in Lebanon. Internally, the socio-economic and political base of the old system was already weak, if not destroyed, and there was an urgent need to restructure a new Lebanon. Therefore, the Hariri government introduced representatives of the new segments of the bourgeoisie who were foreign to the political process, and most of whom had lived outside the country during the war years. Significantly, these leaders came into power with their own concepts and program of reconstruction and development, although the local environment was not prepared to cope and handle these concepts.

The new socio-political coalition became based on these segments of the new bourgeoisie, controlling the internal financial and economic life of the country. Soon the system became more centralized, and concentrated under a small group headed by Rafik al-Hariri himself. This coalition was politically supported by both the militia forces and some of the neo-traditional forces.

The internal compromise between these factions, and the rush to accommodate a compromise between the Syrians, a sort of a balance for the Gulf states influence headed by Saudi Arabia, and supported by the United States, produced an unstable,

strange, inconsistent, and somewhat troublesome ruling formula referred to as the “Troika”. Many government policies have been conflicting with Lebanon’s national interests such as heavy debts, corruption, Syrian hegemony etc. This was especially true of the administrative "reforms" that turned out to be an ill-planned administrative vicious circle of corruption and inefficiency. Instead of modernizing and reforming the existing administration, the government kept it as it was, and established at the top, a parallel administration tied closely to the Prime Minister (Mathews, p. 11).

At the socio-economic groundwork, some intellectual critics claim that, Hariri has no vision at all; that he is simply repeating the terminology of neo-liberal ideology, trying to run the government and the country like a company and furthering both his own material gains and interests, and that of his allies and partners. Corruption, which has not been an unknown phenomenon in Lebanon’s past, has increased out of proportion with respect to the large amounts of monies involved and wasted. Misuse of public spending is counted in millions of U.S. dollars rather than thousands. To mention but one example, senior officials in charge of the national reconstruction program, openly acknowledge that the contract for the southern part of the coastal motorway, awarded the construction firm of Randa Berri, the entrepreneurial wife of the Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, has been overpriced by several millions of dollars (Salman, p. 3).

Although not particularly visionary, Hariri’s program is nonetheless a project for Lebanon’s future. The “Hariri project” aims at making Lebanon a center for regional business and finance, as well as a tax paradise.

The Hariri project is under criticism for its social coldness. Government policies seem to favor the wealthier elements of society, and seem to care little for the less prosperous and poor people. This observable fact is demonstrated by the reduction of income, the many taxes levied including that of the ten percent. More than one quarter of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line, mainly as a result of the war and displacement and poor economic policies of the government. Here again Lebanon lacks true Lebanese leadership; instead it is controlled by a group of mercenaries. Hariri's economic and social policies, face little opposition from within the political establishment, or from Syria representatives. Adding more fuel to the volatile situation, Damascus constantly interfere in Lebanese sovereignty, particularly where questions of external and internal security are concerned as well as vital economic policies. The Syrian leadership, views Lebanon not as a competitor, but rather as complementing market to its own economy. Some would even referred to Lebanon as Syria's Hong Kong. This process offers labor market for a large number of Syria's unemployed population (Krayem, p. 8).

Lebanese cabinet ministers in charge of economic portfolios are Hariri's own men- a handful of whom were actually employed in his business empire before he recruited them into government. Lebanon's parliamentary elections of 1996, have installed a chamber of deputies whose largest "faction", in terms of wealth, rather than political direction, is a group of contractors and multimillionaire businessmen. Their number has increased considerably at the expense of middle-class professionals and intellectuals who used to be the backbone of Lebanon's statehood (Krayem, p. 9).

One might consider the Taif Agreement to constitute a step forward, but far from providing the basis for a more stable and democratic system in Lebanon. In fact, the civil war experience, showed that the modern state cannot be built on the basis of sectarian identities. There is a need to bypass such an identity, and to establish a clear conception of the national identity. Unless such a state is achieved, the Lebanese might not be able to build up their national unity, and the dangerous options of partition, disintegration, and war remain possible. Moreover, the survival, development, and stability of the Lebanese system "depend on whether the Lebanese republic can break with its history to become truly a commonwealth involving citizens rather than community rights." (Salibi , p. 12).

The dilemma of the post-Taif accord results from the fact that a national and non-sectarian form of representation cannot be carried out by sectarian forces, within a sectarian structure, and under a system which is based on a confessional power sharing formula. Such change needs new forces and a different political and civic – secular culture (Salibi, p.13).

Finally, the achievement of such a task needs for sure a different vision, different political forces, a different notion of politics, and a new free and educated generation. It is a process based on a continuous struggle between the forces of change, and those of tradition. Meanwhile, the Lebanese system continues to suffer from the inadequacies of the Taif Agreement. In such a context, one may say that while the old Lebanese system is dying, the new one is not yet able to establish itself and take off, perhaps one may venture to say the second republic is dying.

Lebanon is in urgent need for national competent, courageous, free and visionary leadership, a Lebanese “Godot”.

Case study: President Camille Chamoun:

The author selected the era of President Camille Chamoun to analyze the displayed leadership qualities during that period in the Lebanese history.

In the history of any country or a nation there are always few leaders who distinguish themselves and play important roles in determining the future destiny of their country. President Camille Chamoun is one of these few Lebanese leaders upon whom this research will focus as an example of a special case.

Camille the son of Nemer Chamoun was born on April 3, 1900 in the town of Dayer al-Kamar of Shouf Mountain. He received his elementary education in the town of Hadath- Beirut. He accompanied his family to exile in Anadol- Turkey in 1916, and was back to Lebanon with his parents in 1918. In 1920 he was admitted to Saint Joseph University, where he graduated later as a lawyer in 1923. Using his friendship with president Emile Eddé, he ran for parliament in 1934 and was elected as a representative for the mountain (Lentz, p. 504).

What characterized Chamoun as a leader is that following his election to the parliament, he quickly secured national fame as a colorful and dynamic supporter of president Beshara al-Khoury. Chamoun had a friendly noticeable character. He also had a gift for making straight to the point and often intelligent statements; a feature that is innate in Chamoun and not nurtured. Like Beshara al-Khoury, Chamoun felt

comfortable among the Druzes and other Muslims while he was also at ease chatting with shopkeepers, kissing babies or mixing with Western or Arab politicians with no difficulty. As a member of relatively humble middle class family, Chamoun disliked the wealth and privileged status of feudal leaders. Thus, Chamoun sought to cultivate a populist image, but one to which workers and men of trade or professions would aspire. Chamoun was proud of his self-made influence and believed that a liberal economic and political system offered Lebanese citizens best path for advancement. In keeping with his popular image, which he was ever conscious of projecting; Chamoun was also an ardent outdoorsman. He was an excellent horseback rider, loved to hunt and maintained a vast collection of rifles and small arms. In 1930 Chamoun married Zelfa Thabit. The Thabits were prosperous and socially well-known family, and the marriage enhanced Chamoun's prestige, a reputation that most often leaders look after (Goria, p. 37).

Above all Chamoun was a dynamic leader and had a charismatic personality. Qualities that were enhanced by his handsome physical features. He proved himself to be meticulous and at times innovative. For instance, from a purely laissez-faire point of view, Chamoun's presidential tenure was noteworthy for its economic liberalism. In terms of novelty, he introduced the Banking Secrecy law which increased the flow of foreign capital to Beirut and encouraged an expansion of Lebanon's services sector. Laws were drafted in an effort to reform the electoral system and improve administrative procedures. In general, however, these policies did little to improve the conditions of Lebanon's significantly large underprivileged population (Lentz, p. 505).

When Chamoun was appointed minister to the ministerial cabinet in the late 1930s, he became the outspoken opponent to the president of Lebanon, then, Bechara al-Khoury. Together with Kamal Joumblat, leader of the Lebanese Drue,z Chamoun formed the National Socialist Front, which successfully toppled the regime of president Beshara al- Khoury. In 1952 Camille Chamoun was elected as Khoury's successor, but soon entered into strong disagreement with Kamal Jumblatt strong enemies. This resulted in Jumblatt leading stiff opposition against the presidency of Camille Chamoun, allying himself with president Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

Chamoun's presidency was exposed to serious threats, when the position of the Lebanese Muslims changed regarding what was taking place in Egypt and Syria. The political developments in Egypt in the 1950s, affected Lebanon for more than two decades. In 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser took over the power in a coup d'état in Egypt, and after the 1956 Suez crisis, he became the most powerful charismatic leader in modern Arab history, fully supported by the U.S.S.R'S regime.

In the Suez war of 1956, president Camille Chamoun refused to sever diplomatic relations with France and Britain in response to their invasion of Egypt, and subsequently the government of Chamoun was charged by Lebanese Muslims with treason to Arab cause and interests. President Camille Chamoun's acceptance of American president Dwight D. Eisenhower's doctrine in March 1957, further increased the antagonism of Egypt and Muslim Lebanese toward president Camille Chamoun. Chamoun's love was for Lebanon and its peoples: its sovereignty independence and freedom in spite of its being an Arabic country.

Calling for Arab Unity since his first day in power, Nasser's dream came true with the merger under his leadership of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic in February 1958. In Lebanon, unionist sentiment among a large section of the Muslim population was much revived, and many delegations from Muslim leaders and the general public visited Damascus in the following day to pay tribute to their towering symbol of Arab Unity: Gamal Abdel Nasser. President Camille Chamoun moved quickly in a counterattack, against the pro-Nasser supporters to protect Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. Fearing the expansion of the pro-soviet, United Arab Republic, he enthusiastically accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, meaning American military assistance against Nassirism and communism. Nasser's cry against the Eisenhower Doctrine was echoed among the Muslims in Lebanon who began opposing the policies of Chamoun's government. Thus, Unionists sentiment along with other feelings of dissatisfaction were Channeled and manipulated by a group of politicians who had lost influence within the governing institutions and were supported by the pro- Egyptian leadership for a rebellion against president Chamoun and his government in 1958. A civil war broke out supported by Syrian troops, President Chamoun stood firm for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon, to the extent that he himself carried the gun and fought from the roof of the presidential palace. Since the Lebanese army took a neutral stand, the rebels, mainly Muslims, fought the government of Chamoun's supporters, mainly Christians. The fighting lasted few months and ended when American troops landed ashore at the request of president Camille Chamoun, as he invoked the Eisenhower's Doctrine and requested American support.

In the sixties the effective presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanon developed in October of 1968, created strong sentiment among Lebanese Christians and made them feel that they should move quickly before the communal balance of power of the country be shifted entirely in favor of the Muslims. Former President Camille Chamoun formed then a Christian front called the Triple Alliance, along with Mr. Pierre Jumayil and Mr. Raymond Eddé. The main aim of the alliance was to preserve the independence of Lebanon. The triple alliance believed that the best way to protect Lebanon and preserve its integrity and independence was to neutralize the Palestinian military activities on its territory. When the Lebanese civil war broke out on April 13, 1975, president Camille Chamoun along with his staunch ally Mr. Pierre Jummayil established their own militias and joined the battles against the Muslim-Palestinian-Syrian alliance. President Camille Chamoun denounced the Palestinian guerrilla activities in Lebanon, and demanded from the government of president Suleiman Franjeh to use the most drastic measures at its disposal against them. President Camille Chamoun fought all the civil war, in defense of Lebanon's independence. He was forced to accept the Syrian Military intervention in Lebanon on 1976, as the last resort to secure calm and order in the country. But he turned later on against the Syrians, accusing them of trying to annex Lebanon. President Chamoun supported the candidacy of Mr. Bashir Jumayil –leader of the Lebanese forces-for presidency in 1982. However, following Bashir's assassination he gave his support to his older brother Amine Jumayil. He accepted a Cabinet seat under the presidency of Amine Jumayil, as the minister of finance. He died on August 1987.

In terms of reputation, personality and national leadership very few politicians in Lebanon could be compared to president Chamoun. He was a true leader with great vision who conducted his struggle to preserve Lebanon's sovereignty and independence facing large and vicious internal, regional and sometime international opposition.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The final section of this research, presents an overall summary about leadership qualities and practices in general and the Lebanese leadership in particular. Since the beginning of history, people have been dependent on “good”, efficient leadership. It is a complex process. Scholars and philosophers, have studied leadership styles and individuals throughout human civilization. Leaders themselves and those practitioners who help them put their administrative knowledge to work have come up with their own insights and solutions to help us better understand leadership.

Although huge variations exist, in the definition of leadership throughout the centuries, there is an agreement, however, that; leadership is a complex phenomenon. No leader can exist without followers- and in turn the leader influences and guides his/her followers to achieve goals. The general agreement confirms that leadership assumes a hierarchy with the leader at the top. Despite the simplicity of these definitions, the actual work of effective leadership is considerably more difficult.

This research pinpoints the huge difference between a leader and a manager. Leaders may be managers but managers are not leaders, consequently, Leading is much broader and different from managing. Managers plan, organize, staff, direct and control. Leaders do all these things, but not exclusively; and when they do them, they

use different ways and different levels of purposes. For example, leaders plan, but their planning, rather than being pedestrian, and lacking imagination as is often with managers, it is more global in terms of setting the agenda for the future.

Actually, no single individual trait or even set of traits is enough to predict who will be a leader and when they will be effective. We do know on the average, a leader has more energy, intelligence, motivation, self-confidence and clear vision than his/her followers.

Regarding the types of leadership, there are four different types of leadership in theory: the autocratic, the bureaucratic administrator, the democratic and the laissez-faire leadership styles.

The autocratic leader receives its vested authority through the office more than from personal attributes. He/she seeks little group participation in decision-making. The advantage of autocratic leader is that he/she gets things done; while the disadvantage of an autocratic leader is that followers become dependent almost puppets of the leader and his/her personal victims when interests are jeopardized.

The bureaucratic leader in brief is based on the utilization of a system of files to solve problems. It can be styled as leadership by centralization. The advantage of bureaucratic administration is that there is a ready system on hand to embark upon the solution of problems. While the disadvantages are that the style is too well organized and tends to depersonalize the organization.

The third style known as the democratic leadership. In this style of leadership, most policies derive from group decision. The leader is involved in policy formation, but does not dominate the group action. The advantage of democratic leadership, is that

individual growth, is enhanced through participation in the organization's operations. While the main disadvantage of this style is that the possibility of the sidelining of leadership initiative as a result of majority group decision.

The last leadership style is the laissez-faire one. In this style, complete liberalism and open-mindedness is allowed. The group lacks direction because the leader fails to help in the decision-making process. The benefit of this style is that every follower has the opportunity to make decisions. While the shortcoming of this type is that it can easily lead to anarchy and chaos, if allowed to function for a long period of time.

Different leadership styles are appropriate in different circumstances. The practical leadership style in Lebanon is unique and different from the classical theory of leadership. Three different types of leadership in Lebanon can be identified: family leadership and feudalism, religious, and political leadership.

The Lebanese family leadership is associated with the concept of "zuama". What most people agree upon is that "zuama" constitutes a category of Lebanese leaders who are central focal point of the political process. There are some traits in the Lebanese perception by which the citizens intuitively identifies a "zaim": the possession of political power centered in the geographical area of Lebanon, the possession of personal wealth or access through family or other ties to economic power, the possession of social prestige by virtue of family name, reputation, history and the ability to attract a client group and promote its interests through the use of his/her own influence. As for religious leadership in Lebanon, it is based on religious groups known as confessionalism. Four different religious leadership can be identified were briefly presented: the Shi'ite, the Sunni, the Lebanese right, and the

Lebanese left leadership. Regarding the political leadership, it played an important role in the Lebanese state. What determines the political governmental position of an individual, is one's family's background. The larger the number of the family membership, the more powerful the family would be. Also the practice of establishing and reinforcing inter-clan ties through marriage had a long tradition in Lebanese political history. Among the factors that entered marriage calculations were the clan's respective power position, rank, wealth and social prestige. For example in the past the Shihab and the Abi al-lama families frequently inter-married, as Lebanon's two foremost clans of amirs, such inter-marriage was considered mutually advantageous. In sum Lebanese leaders till 1975, the beginning of the Lebanese war were created by the position and background of family social standing in a feudalistic system, religious affiliation and beliefs and outside imposition political leadership. However, following the war new breed of leaders emerged in Lebanon backed by political parties, armed militias and money controlled groups or mafias. As examples are the speaker of the parliament –Mr. Nabih Beri known as a militia and leader of the party Amal or Mr. Rafic Hariri a man of wealth and finance. This applies also to Mr. Hassan Nassrallah who combined religious, party and militia powers that contributed to his position as a national leader.

Most successful leaders exercise power in order to accomplish their goals. But there are different levels of power, and the results can vary greatly depending on which level the leader utilizes it. Legitimate, reward and coercive power, are known as position power since the individual has access to them through the position. By contrast, the lowest level of power is generated by fear. The leader will publicly

asserts that something “bad” will happen, or that something “good” will not happen, if the leader does not get his way. This is a coercive psychological power and is sometimes used by politicians and business leaders. This kind of power is easily abused by those who exercise it. A more effective level of power is the reward power. Using the reward power, leaders attract followers with the promise of rewards or benefits. Few leaders do develop referent and expert power to supplement their position power. They use it to make non-routine requests and motivate commitment to tasks that require high effort, initiative and persistence.

One cannot look at leadership in a vacuum any longer. One must take into consideration the task, the organization, and the followers and their needs. A leader who has good followers would surely be more effective in performing tasks. Leaders must try to adjust their own behaviors, change their leadership situation and make better use of their follower’s capabilities in order to become more effective. Followers are expected to function properly, even when their leaders are absent.

Reaching to the point of power and corruption of the leader, one may say that, the Taif agreement improved the position of the Lebanese prime minister at the expense of the president’s traditional functions. The prime minister is now the one who heads the government and acts as its spokesman and “master”. The term of the speaker of the national assembly is extended to four years, instead of one as it was in the past. The Taif awarded that speaker so much power by a sudden change of the Lebanese system from a presidential one to a parliamentary one. In this manner, the parliament under the autocratic leadership of its speaker manipulate the policies of the other two branches mainly the executive and the judiciary. The Maronite exclusive presidency

was rendered to be more symbolic. Despite the fact that the president is still the head of the state, his executive power lies mainly in ceremonial activities. He does share the decision-making responsibility with the prime minister and the council. Therefore, we can clearly conclude, that there are three presidents or leaders to rule Lebanon, the president of the republic, the president of council of ministers and the president of the chamber of deputies (the troika). It is important to see that the Taif Agreement shifted the political power in Lebanon in favor of the Muslims communities.

Corruption and favoritism is best noticed in the Lebanese bureaucracy and this is all due to the lack of efficient leadership. A major reason for the increase in corruption following the Lebanese civil-war, was the growth of the state, and its role in the economy. Consequently, the country's public administration expanded, partly as a natural response to the growing needs of post-war society, and mostly as a result of the spoil and favoritism system.

Actually, like other societies, Lebanon has plenty of problems ranging from its economic bankruptcy, national and internal polarization, the Israeli invasion and poor leadership, foreign occupation of its lands, foreign involvement in its institutions it has no national leadership rather than unfortunately appointed managers. All these factors lead to the weakening of Lebanon and allowing outside influence to affect Lebanese leadership. Syria wants to maintain central and influence over Lebanon and Lebanese affairs. Israel wants influence over Lebanon's foreign and defense policy that will neutralize Lebanon in the Arab world and will deny Syria excessive access and influence over Lebanese affairs. The Palestinians in Lebanon want a safe haven while they wait to return to their homes in Palestine, and last Iranian clerics exploit

their existing ties with the Lebanese Shia community to advocate the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon.

I think that the Hariri leadership and reconstruction program should be rethought to be well designed and based on real social priorities with a long-term vision of sustainable national developmental needs. They should also be subject to official control, public inspection and accountability. International donors should monitor channeled funds and impose conditions of transparency and good governance on reconstruction projects and the institutions implementing them. Donors should also spend their funds specifically in response to the needs of recovery in all regions not favoring the south or Beirut alone.

I believe that Lebanon, like all other countries, does exist within a vacuum of true leadership. Lebanon has been so far a reflection of the regional setting and problems. However, in the increasingly globalization trends, it is time for Lebanon to sum up the courage, defend its national interest and stop acting as the gladiators arena for the conflicts and problems of regional and international actors. Lebanon is in need of a good leader, who knows the way, goes the way, and leads the way.

The Lebanese political system continues to be a product of a mixture of old traditions, factors and concepts all of which **do revolve around the subjugation** of the common citizen to the power exercised by families, religious leaders and outside interference. This corrupt and deviate system from the modern principals of democratic society and state can only be changed through an intense and honest civic and political education

to the Lebanese citizens so that they may freely exercise their freedom of choice in the national elections of their representatives.

This education if properly conducted shall help the Lebanese society to free itself from the chains of religious power and adopt a secular democratic and just system. Furthermore it shall facilitate to proper implementation of either a federal system or highly decentralized one so that Lebanon will leap administratively into the technological and mechanization trends of the twenty first century.

The Lebanese people must evolve from their narrow and ignorant world into a free and just one.

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