The Role of U.S. Covert Action in a Changing World Order

by

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Abstract

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This thesis assesses the changing dynamics of covert action as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Four primary variables are researched in the context of the Cold War period and the emerging new world order. These variables include: (1) the broad characteristics of the international environment that guide relations between international actors; (2) the primary U.S. foreign policy objectives as examined through presidential doctrines; (3) the acceptance of interventionism in both domestic and international domains, and; (4) moral considerations in the policymaking process of a democratic society.

The study concluded that while the primary forces creating the impetus for the institutionalization of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fundamental role of covert action itself has been little affected. The structural system supporting such action has, however, undergone significant changes which are outlined in the study. The U.S. administration has created new justifications for the existence of covert action in an effort to be compatible with its own definition of the new world order.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

General Background

American foreign policy objectives have been redefined several times throughout the nation's history. Its initial foreign policy posture was that of isolationism declared by the founding fathers following the achievement of independence. By the nineteenth century, a position of interventionism was becoming evident as the United States became militarily involved in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Latin America. \(^1\) Interventionism continued until after World War I when foreign policy reverted back to a period of isolationism. Between 1920 and 1940, the U.S. remained neutral and refused to take sides in all wars, including the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the Japanese invasion of China. It was the Second World War that brought America out of its isolation and provided the impetus for its emergence as a great world power.

The American-Soviet alliance during World War II did not continue after the war. The security of the United States began to be threatened by an aggressive and expansionist effort on the part of the Soviet Union, the spread of Communist domination in many parts of the world, and the Communist alliance with national independence movements. \(^2\) The world clustered into two bi-polar blocs and the Cold War was underway.

The ensuing behavior of American foreign policy in this period is classified by analysts by two opposing views. \(^3\) The traditional view contends that the course of

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American foreign policy was determined by the bi-polar struggle between an America intent on establishing an open, liberal capitalist world order and, on the other side, an aggressive, expansionist Soviet Union determined to establish a closed, totalitarian bloc of world states. Traditionalists see American foreign policy decisions as a reaction to Soviet expansionism.

In contrast, revisionists believe America's policies were largely responsible for the Cold War. They see American foreign policy as the operation of capitalist institutional imperatives that seek to secure international markets, raw materials, and cheap labor. Greater emphasis is placed on the sense of moral, social, cultural, historical, and economic exceptionalism that has influenced the American view of itself and its role in the world. This belief tends to define American interests in terms of a world order that excludes virtually all other notions of security. As another concept of an exclusive world order - - that of Soviet Communism - - developed increasing strength, bi-polar conflict was practically inevitable.

Each of the two theories appear to be applicable at various times throughout the post-World War II period. While America's foreign policy behavior could have initially been a reaction to the Soviet threat, as the traditional view purports, it may have been the revisionist's explanation of exceptionalism that perpetuated the relationship that later developed between the two superpowers.

The nature of American-Soviet relations was defined by the doctrine of "containment" that was initially described by American diplomat and Soviet expert George Keenan. Under the anonymous cryptonym "X," Keenan responded to a request from the Secretary of State to privately comment on a paper about Communism. The document was published the following year in a 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs with the title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." His main theme was that Soviet expansion in Europe was motivated by a commitment to the Marxist-

4Ibid.
Leninist ideology which saw conflict between socialism and capitalism as inevitable and made it a duty to subvert or conquer the West.

As it developed, containment consisted of three pillars. Military preparedness and the ability to counter any Soviet moves with adequate force was the first pillar. The second was economic. The strength of the American economy would allow the country to develop the appropriate weapons faster and at less of an economic drain than for the Soviet Union. The result would be an increase in productivity and a rise in standard of living which would challenge the Communist bloc and undermine the people's faith in their own system. Finally, the third pillar was both political and ideological. Democracies would become objects of emulation if they were able to stand up to Soviet pressures. The Soviet Empire would then begin to crack due to its overcommitment to expansion and its inability to simultaneously subsidize its satellites and Third World revolutionary movements as well as live up to the promise inherent in the Communist ideology to provide well-being.

One of the means employed to satisfy the policy of containment was the utilization of covert rather than overt operations. Covert action refers to all adversarial activities that attempt to influence the internal affairs of other nations by secret means. It is similar to subversion which is defined as consisting of "communications and activities undertaken by one state that are calculated to overthrow (or at least undermine) the existing domestic, political (and frequently economic) order of another state." With normal channels of negotiation and diplomacy at one end of the spectrum, and the threat of all-out nuclear war at the other, covert action is occasionally referred to as "the third option." The terms covert operations, covert activities, special operations, and special activities are used interchangeably with covert action.

Covert action is subdivided into functional parts, including psychological, political, and paramilitary. Included in the category of psychological operations are

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6Ibid., p. 407.
two forms of propaganda, "gray" and "black", that influence public opinion in a target country through covert means. Gray propaganda is secretly sponsored in order to appear to have originated from an independent source. Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty are two examples, both of which were founded and supported by U.S. intelligence in the early 1950s. Based in West Germany, RFE stations harshly denounced communism and the Soviet Union without consequence to the U.S. government which could deny its connection to the operation.

Black propaganda is that which falsely appears to come from a particular group. In the 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, U.S. intelligence operatives had a rebel mimic the voice of an official announcer on the government station and proceeded to broadcast on an adjacent frequency. Listeners were led to believe they were hearing the government when they were actually listening to reports from the rebels. Newspapers were also utilized to place articles that created successes for the rebel army in battles that did not exist and to encourage government soldiers to desert or defect.

The second type of covert action, political, is intended to influence the political process within a target country. These operations may involve large scale support for media organizations, labor unions, political parties and other groups, or may aim to influence the outcome of elections. Such was the case in the Italian elections of 1948 when the U.S. made a massive transfer of secret funds to the Christian Democrats in an effort to prevent the Communist Party from winning a majority of parliamentary seats. The funds were spent on campaign paraphernalia to encourage voters to support the existing government. Political operations may also involve anti-terrorist training, sabotage, support of coups d'état, and assassinations.

Paramilitary operations involve recruiting, training, equipping, or advising forces composed of nationals from the target country in an effort to overthrow a government. Although it was unsuccessful, the attempt to remove Cuba's Communist government in

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the Bay of Pigs Operation in the 1960s contained the primary elements of such an operation. Among them was a unified exile organization recruited and trained to participate in the invasion, a propaganda campaign aimed at Cuba, and the clandestine manner of transferring weapons, supplies, and individuals through an airstrip that concealed the U.S. government involvement.11

The policy-making elements of the U.S. executive branch of government are responsible for directing covert foreign policy measures. The primary agency, however, responsible for organizing and carrying out such operations is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Created by the National Security Act of 1947 as a subsidiary of the National Security Council (NSC), the CIA began to utilize covert psychological and political operations within one year. The impetus for such activity was the increasingly hostile political environment of the immediate post-war years that included Soviet troops in the Iranian region of Azerbaijan, civil war in Greece, and Communist governments coming to power in Poland, Hungary, and Romania by 1947.12

Through its frequent use and apparent effectiveness, covert action became progressively institutionalized within the government policy-making apparatus. A mechanism of governmental oversight developed as both successful and unsuccessful operations prompted continuous reappraisals of its role in American foreign policy. These operations were carried out in many regions across the globe and were based on the doctrine of containment.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 shattered many roles and rationales on which U.S. security organizations were based during the Cold War. The elimination of the constraints of a bi-polar international system characterized by intense ideological conflict has provoked what is, in effect, a major identity crisis for the United States.13

Because the formalization of covert action occurred to support the Cold War policy of containment, it would seem logical that its use in obtaining foreign policy objectives would no longer be necessary. However, rather than disappearing with the forces that created it, covert action is but one aspect of U.S. foreign policy whose role is being redefined in the context of the new world order.

**Objective and Need for the Study**

This study sets out to assess the changing dynamics of covert action in U.S. foreign policy in the context of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. Professionals in the field of international studies are beginning to assess the changing world order and its effect on many aspects of world politics (Table 1). For example, the structure of the nation-state system is addressed by Barkin and Cronin's "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," and the future of nuclear weapons is discussed in *Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War* by Michele A. Flournoy.

While the current literature reflects these issues as well as subjects relating to intelligence, it does not appear to give adequate attention to changes effecting covert action. The student of international relations has a justifiable need to comprehend intelligence issues, yet the governmental bureaus charged with this responsibility must, by the very nature of their work, shun the light of publicity.\(^{14}\) Therefore, specific aspects of covert action tend to remain buried. The first purpose of this study, therefore, is to isolate the issue of covert action and include it among the range of issues being applied to the broad changes of world politics.

The second purpose of the study is to offer a presentation of the subject to counter the sensationalized portrayal of undercover activity that floods the media. While the literature on espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage is super-abundant (Table 2), most of it must be taken with more than a grain of salt.\(^{15}\) It is often depicted

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\(^{15}\) Ibid.
in such a manner as to over-romanticize and glamorize an intriguing world of undercover activity. This kind of dramatization overshadows the real functions of covert operations and the important role they play in world politics.

Research Variables

The changing role of covert action is discussed in terms of several research variables that provide the organizational structure of the study. Responses are based on a comparison of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods in relation to their influences on the use of covert operations as an instrument of foreign policy. They are as follows:

1. Characteristics of the international environment;
2. Primary U.S. foreign policy objectives;
3. The acceptance of interventionism;
4. Considerations of morality.

Analytical Framework

The fundamental concepts of the issue being addressed are provided in Chapter I. Chapter II, Review of Literature, describes the origins of covert action from American independence to World War II. The development of covert action is then discussed in terms of its institutionalization and implementation in the post WWII period. Chapter II also discusses events leading to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order.

Chapter III explores each variable individually. The first, regarding the characteristics of the international political environment, refers to the nature of the world order - its structure and general functions - that guide relations between international actors. The second identifies the main foreign policy objectives as reflected by presidential doctrines and shows how the use of covert operations has changed under various administrations. The third research variable addresses the climate of interventionism and its general acceptance in the international community.
and at home. The issue of morality, as raised in the final question, is discussed in terms of its relation to the public's tolerance of secrecy and the importance of moral considerations in the policymaking process of a democratic society.

**Research Methodology and Sources**

A survey of the literature available at local facilities within the indicated time period is being conducted. Potential sources include professional journals, United Nations documents, selected periodicals, and books.

**Limitations of the Study**

There are four primary limitations to this study. First, there is an imbalance of published materials between the two time periods due to the newness of the change in world order. Second, because specific covert operations are not revealed until long after the fact, this study must speculate about possible covert activities occurring in the post-Cold War period. The lack of access to official U.S. government documents serves as a third limitation. Finally, due to the secretive nature of the subject, there is a strong probability that crucial details have been eliminated in the process of declassification.
TABLE 1

Sample of Current Literature Addressing Effects of Changing World Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTHOR (S)</th>
<th>PUBLISHER/PUBLICATION</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A New Europe&quot;</td>
<td>Josef Joffe</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A New Trade Order&quot;</td>
<td>Johnathon Aronson, Peter Cowhey</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 1</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the Cold War: Canada Among Nations</td>
<td>Fen Osler Hampson, Christopher J. Maule, ed.</td>
<td>Ottawa: Carleton University Press</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;America’s First Post-Cold War President&quot;</td>
<td>Theodore Sorensen</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 4</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Building a New NATO&quot;</td>
<td>Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, Stephen Larrabee</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No 4</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Security Beyond the Cold War</td>
<td>Adrian Hyde-Price</td>
<td>London: Sage</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>AUTHOR (S)</td>
<td>PUBLISHER / PUBLICATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;New Mission for Foreign Aid&quot;</td>
<td>James Clad, Roger Stone</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 1</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;New Special Relationships&quot;</td>
<td>Peter Tarnoff</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 69, No. 3</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Redefining Europe&quot;</td>
<td>Robert D. Hormats</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 68, No. 4</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Rethinking the Middle East&quot;</td>
<td>Bernard Lewis</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 71, No. 4</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Superpower Without a Sword&quot;</td>
<td>Alan Tonelson</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 4</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>AUTHOR (S)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Post-Cold War Press&quot;</td>
<td>Henry Grunwald</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 3</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The United Nations in a New World Order&quot;</td>
<td>Bruce Russett</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 70, No. 2</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead&quot;</td>
<td>Colin Powell</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, No. 5</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2

Selected Literature on Espionage, Counter-Espionage, and Sabotage

<table>
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<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTHOR (S)</th>
<th>PUBLISHER / PUBLICATION</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abel</td>
<td>Louis Bernjkw</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear No Evil</td>
<td>Natan Sharansky</td>
<td>New York: Random House</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great True Spy Stories</td>
<td>Allen Dulles</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Treason</td>
<td>Vladimir Sakharov</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside the KGB</td>
<td>Aleksel Myagkov</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>NDA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy</td>
<td>Robert Chadwell Williams</td>
<td>London: Harvard University Press</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Turn to Speak: Iran, The Revolution and Secret Deals With the U.S.</td>
<td>Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr</td>
<td>New York: Brasseys</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordeal By Slander</td>
<td>Owen Lattimore</td>
<td>Boston: Little, Brown and Company</td>
<td>1950</td>
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Table 2, cont.

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<th>TITLE</th>
<th>AUTHOR (S)</th>
<th>PUBLISHER / PUBLICATION</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The American Black Chamber</td>
<td>Herbert O Yardley</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>NDA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Deception Game</td>
<td>Ladislav Bittman</td>
<td>New York: Syracuse University Research Corporation</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Night Watch</td>
<td>David Atlee</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spy Masters of Israel</td>
<td>S. Stevens</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>NDA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Storm Petrels</td>
<td>Gordon Brook-Shepherd</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
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<tr>
<td>Top Secret Ultra</td>
<td>Peter Calvocoressi</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>NDA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Lives, One Russia</td>
<td>Nicholas Daniloff</td>
<td>Boston: Houghton Mifflin</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Special Intelligence</td>
<td>Patrick Beesly</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>NDA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilderness of Mirrors</td>
<td>David C. Martin</td>
<td>New York: Ballantine Books</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*NDA - No Date Available
CHAPTER II

Review of Literature

Origins of Covert Action in U.S. Foreign Policy

Covert action has been a part of American history as early as the 1776 revolution when France covertly supplied arms and other military aid to the American rebels. Before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, one of the earliest committees of the Continental Congress was the Committee of Secret Correspondence. Established in 1775 and later renamed the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee was responsible for diplomatic functions. It also carried out foreign intelligence collection and propaganda operations in France and elsewhere in Europe during the American Revolution. In 1789 the Department of Foreign Affairs was established as an executive department of the U.S. government and renamed the Department of State during the same year. Although intelligence has always been a concern of the State Department, it did not become a distinct professional specialty or organizational entity until the twentieth century.

During the nineteenth century propaganda campaigns were more commonly used than any other form of secret intelligence. However, one of the earlier missions aimed at achieving a political objective involved paramilitary elements of covert action. Former State Department counterespionage agent, William Eaton, led a small army of Arabs, Greeks, Europeans, and eight U.S. Marines across the Libyan desert to capture a North African port in 1805. The object of this operation was to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli who had been carrying out acts of piracy, kidnapping, and extortion against American shipping in the Mediterranean. Although the operation was unsuccessful at
replacing the pasha with his brother, who was considered by the U.S. as being more reasonable, it did convince him to reform his policies toward the U.S.

The Civil War in the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted in further advances in the area of intelligence and its related disciplines. It marked the first American use of systematic military intelligence methods, the use of modern collection techniques, and the establishment of intelligence as a distinct organizational and functional element within an army.\textsuperscript{16}

While the majority of covert activities during the Civil War were undertaken between the Unionists in the North and the Confederates in the South, both sides were involved in activities abroad. The Confederates increased their overseas covert activities after 1864 with the "Northwest Conspiracy." This operation took place in Canada and aimed at separating several border states from the Union and establishing them as a Northwest Confederacy which would then ally itself with the South. The two major objectives of the mission were the release of Confederate prisoners of war held in Illinois and Ohio, and the instigation of a general uprising in the Northwest. The Confederates failed to achieve either objective largely due to Union counterintelligence.\textsuperscript{17}

In Europe, both sides were conducting gray propaganda and secret diplomatic operations aimed at gaining support from the European public and government. Confederate propagandists were successful at publishing such newspapers as the \textit{Index} which employed well-known British writers and appeared to be of British origin. Agents were also responsible for the secret procurement of warships from the British and French without disrupting their claims of neutrality. To thwart their efforts, the U.S. State Department sent an American journalist to Paris to work undercover as the American consul general. There he was able to develop sympathetic pro-Union press contacts in France, Germany, Austria, and England.

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}
According to Fischel, author of *The Mythology of Civil War Intelligence*, approximately 4,200 Union and Confederate spies, scouts, detectives, guides, and informers have been identified from payrolls and other administrative records. However, no comprehensive assessment of their contribution has ever been made.\(^\text{18}\)

Judging from the failures of the Northwest Conspiracy and the inability of the Confederates to establish a French or English alliance, the actions of these covert operators apparently did not significantly alter the course of events.

With the First World War, intelligence functions were given a more formal footing within the State Department. In 1919 Congress created the position of under secretary of state and designated a unit, U-1, to carry out the coordination of intelligence and related operations. The Office of the Chief Special Agent, U-3, was established to handle counter-espionage and counter-subversion both within the U.S. and abroad. This unit was retained, yet reorganization efforts by the Secretary of State in 1927 resulted in the abolition of U-1 and the decentralization of responsibilities. High priority intelligence reports from other government agencies were handled by the secretary himself, while matters relating to Communist subversion became the responsibility of the chief of the Department's Division of East European Affairs.\(^\text{19}\)

Further changes were made within the State Department after the Second World War. In anticipation of American involvement in World War II, it was suggested to the President that a central agency, reporting directly to the President, was needed for the control of all foreign intelligence and covert operations. In 1941, President Roosevelt signed a directive establishing the position of coordinator of information who would be authorized to:

1. Collect and analyze all information and data which may bear upon national security;

\(^{18}\text{Ibid.}\)
2. Correlate such information and data, and make them available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine;

3. Carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the government.20

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) had a budget of $10 million and was divided into four major functional branches: Secret Intelligence, which conducted covert intelligence collection; Research and Analysis, which produced finished intelligence; the Foreign Information Service, which produced overt propaganda; and Special Operations, which carried out covert action operations. As is characteristic of the existence of several intelligence services, the COI and other agencies were caught up in professional rivalries and conflicts. Adversaries of the COI included J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (which had exclusive permission to conduct undercover operations in the western hemisphere), the State Department, Army Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.21

Following Pearl Harbor and the American entry into the war, the COI was forced to work more closely with military intelligence services. The agency was moved from under the direct supervision of the President to the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By an executive order of President Roosevelt in June 1942, the COI became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Administratively, the Office of the General Counsel and the Planning Group were responsible for activities of covert nature (Table 3). The first handled the legal aspects of operating covert proprietary corporations, undercover personnel, and unvouched funds expended on clandestine operations. The latter coordinated OSS covert operations with those of the military agencies.

21Ibid.
Another branch of the OSS included that of Special Funds which dealt with the fiscal requirements of clandestine activities. It financed such operations through unvouchered funds made available by the President and Congress. They were needed to maintain the cover of corporations, training installations, recruiting offices, and agents, and were laundered in order not to be traced back to the U.S. government. For the development of special weapons and equipment for paramilitary operations, the Research and Development Branch was utilized.

The branches responsible for the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence, and for counter-espionage, were grouped under the deputy director for intelligence. They included the Research and Analysis Branch, which produced finished intelligence in the form of daily and weekly reports, estimates, and studies; the Secret Intelligence Branch, which carried out espionage via clandestine methods; the Counter-Espionage Branch, which undertook operations against the Axis intelligence services; the Foreign Nationalities Branch, which collected political intelligence from foreign émigré groups within the U.S.; and the Censorship and Documents Branch, which collected and compiled intelligence through the interception of mail and other private communications for security purposes.

OSS branches responsible for sabotage, psychological warfare, paramilitary operations, and all other forms of covert action were grouped under the deputy director for operations. They included the Morale Operations Branch, which conducted gray and black propaganda; the Maritime Unit, which infiltrated agents and supplied resistance groups by sea; the Special Projects Office, which conducted a variety of operations involving secret weapons; the Operational Groups, which were platoons of specially trained paramilitary troops who fought alongside local resistance groups; and the Special Operations Branch (SO), which carried out sabotage and other physical subversion in enemy territory.

The SO branch was the first organization in American history specifically charged with carrying out physical subversion, sabotage, and paramilitary operations.22

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22Ibid., p. 348.
It received considerable notoriety due to its early success in supporting the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942. SO teams had also infiltrated France, Italy, the Balkans, and Norway to work with the local resistance groups against the German armies of occupation. To assist with the Normandy landings of June 1944, they executed the "Jedburgh Operation" in which three-men teams were parachuted into France to coordinate the French resistance with the Allied invasion force.23

The Operational Groups fought behind enemy lines in Europe and Southeast Asia. After the Normandy landings, they were successful in their operations in Brittany to keep the Germans engaged and denied of the armor they needed to launch a counterattack during the first critical weeks of the invasion. OSS Detachment 101, a group of about twenty agents, infiltrated an area near the borders of Burma, China, and Thailand to establish a guerrilla force of Kachin tribesmen to harass the Japanese. A second group, OSS Detachment 202, operated in China and Indochina.

While these specific missions made major contributions to the Allied victory, the general operations of the OSS had even more profound and long-term influences on American policy as it relates to intelligence functions. Primarily, covert action became accepted as an effective option to accomplish foreign policy objectives. Secondly, the concept of a single, high-level agency for the coordination of national intelligence developed and led directly to the eventual creation of the CIA. Finally, intelligence work was recognized as a distinct professional specialty which deserved the same prestige as military and diplomatic professions.

With little interest in any of the existing plans for a post-war central intelligence service, President Truman signed an executive order in September 1945 terminating the OSS. The Research and Analysis Branch was transferred to the State Department and the rest of the OSS was transferred to the War Department where it became the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). There it experienced a brief bureaucratic struggle between the State Department and the armed services for the control of national

23Ibid.
intelligence.\textsuperscript{24} In January 1946, President Truman signed a directive establishing the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). Comprised of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, the NIA was to plan, develop and coordinate all federal foreign intelligence activities.\textsuperscript{25}

The directive also organized the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which consisted of a small staff of intelligence analysts who coordinated intelligence gathered throughout the government. Staff members and funds were provided by the State, War, and Navy departments since the agency had no budget of its own. Also established was the post of the director of central intelligence (DCI) who was to be appointed by the president and responsible to the NIA. Under the second DCI, the CIG acquired its own budget, established its own divisions responsible for intelligence research and analysis, and took over the SSU from the War Department.

Despite these gains, the CIG had not achieved its intended level of integration. At the DCI's request, the head of the CIG's Legislative Liaison Branch prepared a draft bill for the establishment of a central intelligence agency by Congress and submitted it to White House officials.\textsuperscript{26} Although the Truman administration did not take immediate action on the proposal, it was eventually incorporated into a bill for the unification of the armed services. This bill was the National Security Act of 1947 which established the modern U.S. national security structure. It created the Department of Defense and united the Army, Navy, and Air Force under a single cabinet-level officer, the secretary of defense. The Act also created the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.\textsuperscript{27} The NSC is the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24}G. Treverton, \textit{Covert Action} (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 33-34.
\item \textsuperscript{26}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
highest level advisory body on national security affairs in the executive branch and is a key agent in the coordination of national security policy.
Development of Covert Action in the Postwar Period

Institutionalization:

The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 was a significant step towards the advancement of covert action within the executive branch of the government. It reflected the postwar consensus that military and foreign policies were inseparable components of the nation's broad national security activities. Title I of the Act established the Central Intelligence Agency as a subsidiary of the NSC and made the DCI the head of the Agency. As the successor to the Office of Strategic Services, the primary purpose of the CIA was to serve as the coordinating body of national intelligence organizations. Other duties of the Agency were to:

1. Advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

2. Make recommendations to the President through the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to national security;

3. Correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

4. Perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
5. Perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.\textsuperscript{28}

The CIA was not initially granted intelligence-gathering responsibilities, but acquired this role through later directives and reorganizations.

Prior to the creation of the CIA, the Truman Doctrine was coming into being as a result of troubles in Europe where Communists were taking advantage of post-war unrest.\textsuperscript{29} The fundamental differences between the East and West over the future status of Germany and Eastern Europe were revealing themselves. Concern over possible Communist advances in Western Europe, Greece, and Turkey led President Truman to enunciate his doctrine. At a joint session of Congress, he stated, "Seeds of totalitarianism are nurtured in misery and want... The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation."\textsuperscript{30} It focused American foreign policy on the concern of Soviet expansion and stated that the U.S. would help non-Communist nations resist takeover by internal armed minorities or by outside pressure.

The intellectual framework for the Truman administration's containment policy toward the Soviet Union was provided for in Keenan's telegram which envisioned a strategy implemented through economic and political means. Initially, containment applied primarily to Europe and was essentially nonmilitary in character, involving such measures as the Marshall Plan. From the late 1940s, the policy's effectiveness relied on the principle of deterrence and the maintenance of sufficient military strength. In the later periods of the Cold War, the policy's nature became more military and the U.S. took part in the security pact of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The logic of the containment strategy maintained that if Soviet expansionism were held in check, then contradictions internal to the Soviet system would eventually bring about a

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid.
moderation of the Communist regime in Moscow, thus lessening the Soviet threat to the West.  

The Soviet threat continued to increase resulting in the further implementation of the containment policy and the frequent use of covert methods to obtain its objectives. Through a series of directives and other changes within the government, covert action became institutionalized in the U.S. foreign policy making apparatus. In fulfillment of its fifth stated duty, the CIA was initially charged with covert psychological operations by NSC directive 4/A. This kept the task away from the State Department and provided a means of protecting the U.S. from embarrassment if operations were disclosed.  

During the same month the CIA began operations, the Soviet government established the Communist Information Bureau to coordinate the activities of the local Communist parties throughout Europe. Shortly thereafter, the Communists staged a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and organized a Soviet puppet regime. After the coup, NSC directive 10/2 was adopted expanding the role of covert action from propaganda to direct intervention. It reinforced an existing notion of "plausible denial" which states that operations were to be "planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."  

Operations were being carried out by the Office of Special Operations (OSO), the CIA's espionage branch. Its first operation took place in Italy for the purpose of defeating the Communist candidates participating in the national elections and keeping the Christian Democrats in power. The mission was originally assigned to the Department of State but was reassigned to the CIA after the secretary of state protested that the exposure of such an operation would be disastrous for the administration. The plan involved supplying Christian Democrats with secret funds for campaign paraphernalia such as posters and pamphlets; bribing election officials;
influencing voters with black propaganda; and placing news stories encouraging Americans of Italian origin to write letters to friends and relatives in Italy. Although a similar operation was being conducted by the Soviet Union and the aid provided by Moscow was three times the American investment (approximately $30 million), the Christian Democrats won 307 of 574 Parliamentary seats, therefore excluding the Italian Communists from any role in the government.\textsuperscript{34}

The operation signified the beginning of the "Golden Age of Covert Action," so named because of the frequent use of such activity.\textsuperscript{35} After the victory, the CIA, State Department, and NSC were confident that a broader program of covert action would be an effective solution to the problem of Soviet expansionism. The NSC issued a directive in June 1948 establishing the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) as a permanent covert action agency. Its specific mission was to weaken Soviet control over both its own population and the nations of Eastern Europe, to weaken pro-Soviet regimes and Communist parties throughout Europe and Asia, and to advance the interests of anti-Communist political parties, governments, and leaders.\textsuperscript{36}

Because these responsibilities were seen as extensions of the political and military roles of the departments of State and Defense, the OPC was positioned under their joint control. The budget and staff positions were placed within the secret budget of the CIA, yet the OPC was considered a separate administrative entity. Its director bypassed the DCI and reported directly to the secretaries of State and Defense, however, the OPC was not permitted to initiate any specific proposals for covert action. The CIA would send its proposals to a special panel of State and Defense officials for approval, after which they would be given to the OPC for implementation. This arrangement reflected uncertainty as to the CIA's legal authority for covert action and ensured that the responsibility for such decisions remained at the level of the NSC rather than a subordinate agency.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.
The Cold War atmosphere intensified in 1949 as China's Nationalist Party lost the civil war and the government fell to the Communists. The Eastern and Western blocs represented in the UN were continuing a three-year-old stalemate over the principles and functions of the newly established UN Atomic Energy Commission. With little hope for a compromise, the Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons by the end of the year. These events, along with the establishment of a Communist regime in Russian East Germany, encouraged President Truman to reassess the U.S. national security policy. In January 1950, a joint State and Defense department study group was formed.

The findings of the group, NSC 68, identified the Soviet Union as the principal risk to the West's security and recommended an immediate, massive build up in American military strength. The committee's analysis rested on the key assumptions that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power, that Soviet leadership would refuse to negotiate outstanding issues, and that the USSR would have the nuclear capability to destroy the United States by 1954. The report concluded that America would have to assume primary responsibility for the defense of the non-Communist world and warned of the danger of local wars. Calling for the U.S. to take a lead in opposing communism resulted in the growth of the OPC to a staff of several hundred and a budget in excess of $4.7 million.37

This new importance placed on covert activities created tensions between the OPC and the OSO whose professional staff consisted largely of veterans of the wartime OSS who were moved to the State Department, to the SSU, and finally to the CIG. They were given little assurance for a career intelligence service and resented the OPC for filling its ranks from outside the CIA. They were also skeptical of the soundness of covert operations and viewed the OPC as a potential threat to their own intelligence gathering.38 Under the new leadership of DCI Walter Bedell Smith, the

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37Ibid.
38Ibid.
mechanism of joint-supervision was dissolved and the OPC came under direct supervision of the CIA with the director reporting to the DCI. Smith created the post of deputy director responsible for supervising both the OPC and the OSO. Together, they formed the CIA Clandestine Service. Rivalries continued to pose management problems for their first director, Allen W. Dulles, which were solved by the merging of the two agencies in 1952. During that time, clandestine operations accounted for seventy-four percent of the CIA's budget and three-fifths of its personnel. During the Truman administration the state and defense department overseers, known as the "10/2 Group," authorized 81 covert action operations.

Implementation:

In late 1949, the Truman administration approved a joint Anglo-American operation to overthrow the Albanian Communist Party leader Enver Hoxha. The plan, code-named "Valuable," was to establish the Committee of Free Albanians to function under the covert auspices of the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Albanian émigrés were to be recruited, trained, and equipped at camps in Cyprus, Malta, Frankfurt, and West Germany, and then infiltrated back into Albania to begin a revolt against the government. Although individuals came from Italy, Greece, and Egypt to join the paramilitary group of émigrés, the plan was unsuccessful and terminated in 1952. It was later discovered that the SIS representative to "Valuable's" joint oversight committee was a Soviet double agent.

Following the operation in Albania, American policy makers unanimously agreed to respond to the North Korean's invasion of South Korea in 1950, based on the belief that they had been instructed by the Soviets. Although many operations connected with the Korean War failed, the Clandestine Service successfully recruited

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and trained South Koreans for guerrilla warfare behind communist lines, established escape and evasion networks for American airmen brought down north of the thirty-eighth parallel, and disrupted lines of communication and supplies from China. Because covert activity rather than secret intelligence was the principle function of the CIA during the war, the U.S. was able to develop their capabilities for carrying out such operations.

Due to the designation of the Korean War as a "police action," it was the first conflict in which American military operations were constrained by the need to avoid escalation into a nuclear conflict. These unprecedented demands on the intelligence services, such as conducting covert operations in Communist China while no state of war existed, enlarged the peacetime role of covert operations along with many other aspects of intelligence.42 One such operation, code named "Operation Tropic," aimed to reduce China's role in the conflict and support anti-Communists not affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. The plan involved recruiting Chinese agents in Hong Kong and training them at CIA bases in Saipan and Japan and then infiltrating the Chinese mainland to organize and lead dissidents. No unclassified assessment of the operation was found, yet the implications are that the mission failed. Two CIA agents were captured, sentenced to prison terms in Communist China, and not released until after 1970.

A second mission, "Operation Paper," aimed to support Chiang Kai-shek's refugee army leader General Li Mi to harass and divert Chinese Communists from the war. The plan was to deliver arms and supplies to Li Mi's force in Burma using the Civil Air Transport (CAT) and another CIA proprietary, the Sea Supply Company, to make drops behind Communist lines.43 The Li Mi force successfully entered the Yunnan province of China and advanced approximately sixty miles. However, they suffered heavy casualties which forced them to turn back. A second unsuccessful attempt was made two years later.

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43Ibid.
The first major successful CIA operation after the Italian elections was the Iran Coup in 1953. Under the code name "Ajax," the mission set out to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, and restore Shah Mohammed Reza Pahleavi to power. After seizing power in the government, Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, therefore infringing on both American and British interests in the country. Growing ties between Mossadegh and the Soviet-allied Tudeh Communist Party threatened the U.S. with a Communist takeover in Iran. In anticipation of disapproval by President Truman, the proposal for the plan was submitted to President Eisenhower after his inauguration in January, 1953.

The mission's plan was to support the delivery of decrees signed by the Shah removing Mossadegh from office and appointing pro-West General Fazollah Zahedi as Prime Minister. After several days of rioting from Mossadegh supporters and agitations by Shah supporters paid to participate in the demonstrations, the Prime Minister was convicted of treason and exiled to his village. An international consortium of western oil companies signed a twenty-five year agreement with Iran for its oil, forty percent of which went to a group of American oil companies. One of the primary impacts of the operation on America's use of covert action was its reinforcement for the necessity of thorough and accurate assessments of the political situation upon which its success was based.

Another successful operation carried out by the CIA Clandestine Service took place in Guatemala in 1954. The mission, "Operation Success," aimed to stage a coup d'état to overthrow President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and install a military junta headed by Colonel Castillo Armas. After coming to power in 1950, Arbenz reduced the power of foreign interests in Guatemala. He signed a law expropriating much of the land held by the American-owned United Fruit Company, and, by doing so, received support from the Communist party which was well represented within the government. U.S. officials also feared that a Guatemala under communist influence posed a threat to the Panama Canal.44

44Ibid., pp. 53-54.
The operation had three main components: diplomatic pressure on the Arbenz administration; a campaign to undermine support for Arbenz in the Guatemalan military; and paramilitary assistance to former army officer Armas. The CIA established training bases for Arma's exile army in Honduras and Nicaragua, installed clandestine radio stations, and assembled a private air force of light bombers. Arbenz relinquished power and Castillo eventually took office as president. Almost two years later, however, Castillo was assassinated by one of his bodyguards and Guatemala returned to the oligarchic rule that existed prior to 1944. The success of this operation combined with that of "Ajax" convinced the CIA and American foreign policy makers of the effectiveness of covert action and utilized many of the same methods, techniques and personnel in subsequent operations.45

One of the less successful operations carried out in this time period began in Tibet in 1953. The mission involved harassing the Chinese and destabilizing their Communist occupation of Tibet. To fulfill its purpose, the plan was to train and equip Khamba tribesman refugees to assess the internal political situation and attempt to reverse the Communist takeover. The CIA communicated through intermediary agents but also established contact with the Dalai Lama who was replaced in 1959 by a leader more sympathetic to the Communist occupation. The operation, lasting beyond the turn of the decade, failed due to its unrealistic expectations at a time when other failures resulted in the deemphasis of covert operations in U.S. foreign policy.

In 1954, several years before its reduction in use, covert action received an endorsement from the Doolittle Committee which had been formed by President Eisenhower to study the work of the Clandestine Service. The report stated that "the CIA must build a covert action service more ruthless and more effective than that of America's adversaries."46 In the late 1950s, the limitations of covert action became apparent with the failure of an operation aimed at suppressing Soviet revolts in Eastern Europe using CIA-trained émigrés from the Soviet bloc. Operation "Red Sox / Red

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Cap" was overtaken by a local uprising in Hungary and crushed, along with the Hungarian freedom fighters, by Soviet armed forces. This failure was followed by that of the Service to overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958. U.S. policy makers viewed Sukarno as being sympathetic toward domestic Communists and the Soviet Union. They believed he intended on providing the Indonesian Communist Party with greater representation within his dictatorial government.

The plan was to support a rebellious faction within the army by furnishing them with arms and paramilitary advisors, as well as supplying air support with B-26 bombers and pilots from the CAT. The mission failed when the insurgents were unable to overcome Sukarno's loyal military forces and a CAT pilot was shot down and taken prisoner. President Eisenhower terminated support for the operation due to potential disclosure of the pilot's connection to the CIA. The insurgents continued to fight a guerrilla war but were eventually defeated.

The unsuccessful operation in Indonesia was followed by increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam where policy makers agreed that the policy of containment should be applied. According to an Agency memo in November 1964, preventing a Communist takeover in the area was necessary to "protect [the] U.S. reputation as a counter-subversion guarantor, to avoid [the] domino effect especially in Southeast Asia, [and] to keep South Vietnamese territory from Red hands." No unclassified assessment regarding the impact of the war on American intelligence was found and the effectiveness of many of the operations continue to be debated. However, American intelligence underwent extensive revision as a result of the experience in Southeast Asia. Not only were a variety of technical collection systems developed, but they were able to be tested under actual conditions. The primary failure was the erosion of public confidence in intelligence agencies and the government, in general. It left a legacy of mistrust that manifested itself in congressional oversight of covert

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47Ibid.
49Ibid.
operations. Examples of such missions undertaken in Vietnam include the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and the Phoenix Program.

The SMM began in 1954 in order to select and promote a strong national leadership to rally democratic forces against the communist insurgency. The plan involved creating a unit attached to the U.S. Embassy as the official cover for the CIA Team; organizing and training Vietnamese paramilitary teams in psychological warfare, sabotage, and guerrilla operations; establishing devised facilities (i.e.; the Security Training Center and the Freedom Company) to build infrastructure and encourage citizens to choose South Vietnam during the 300 day regroupment period provided by the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement; establishing an armed proprietary company; and organizing a program through covert contact with Michigan State University to assist in maintaining law and order and conduct counter subversion operations. Initially, the mission was a success as the leader of the SMM chose to support South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in building a functioning democracy in the region. The CIA continued to pledge its full support until Diem's government became suppressive to legitimate political opposition.50

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was created in 1962 to expand U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence, counter-intelligence and covert action operations in fulfillment of the Kennedy administration's plan of May 1961. It aimed to train South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency techniques, prepare residents of the countryside to resist Vietcong forces, and teach Montagnards tribesmen a variety of military and civic skills. Within six months, a strike force of 1,800 Rhade (a group within the Montagnards) took a more active combat role against the Vietcong, patrolling between villages, setting ambushes, gathering intelligence, and coming to the aid of villages under attack.51 This operation led to the creation of several other CIA - Special Forces projects utilizing Montagnards and other ethnic minorities.

51Ibid., p. 473.
The purpose of the Phoenix Program, a third operation utilized in Vietnam, was to weaken the strength and number of Vietcong by encouraging their defection. CIA-funded irregular armies trained by the U.S. Special Forces distributed "wanted" posters for suspects offering a reward and amnesty. Suspects were then arrested and interrogated. The operation was successful in causing the defection of approximately 17,000 Vietcong, the capture of 28,000 suspects, and the death of 20,000, before its termination in 1971.\(^{52}\) However, it has also been referred to as a failure since it did not completely neutralize the Vietcong.

Contributing to what was already considered the largest paramilitary operation of the Service, the secret war in Laos lasted for a period more than a decade. The mission aimed to prevent a Communist takeover after the unified government fell apart in a civil war between Communist, neutralist, and pro-Western factions. The plan involved supporting and directing the military campaign of Meo tribesmen against the Laotian Communists, the Pathet Lao. North Vietnamese armed forces were supporting the Pathet Lao through the construction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the southern part of the country. Laos eventually fell to the Communists; however, the operation was successful at diverting Communist resources from the war in Vietnam. It also brought the issue of secrecy to public attention when the magnitude of the war could no longer be hidden. Senator Stuart Symington, then serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, denied association with the operation after actually having been briefed several years earlier.

One of the primary operations resulting in a drastic decline in the use of covert activities was undertaken to remove the Cuban Communist regime of Fidel Castro from power. Through propaganda, sabotage, and paramilitary activities, the operation, code-named "Mongoose," intended on bringing about an open revolt against Castro.\(^{53}\) For the operation, a unified anti-Castro Cuban exile organization was created, paramilitary forces were developed outside of Cuba for guerrilla warfare, a propaganda

\(^{52}\)Ibid.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., pp. 165-166.
campaign was conducted, and an underground was established to carry out the invasion. According to the 1975 Interim Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, at least eight assassination attempts were made between 1961 and 1965.\textsuperscript{54} U.S. officials grossly underestimated Castro's military capabilities resulting in a failed mission and marking the end of the "Golden Age of Covert Action." Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union were later increased.

In 1970, the CIA funneled more than $1 million to the Christian Democrats in an effort to prevent the Marxist Allende's victory in national elections.\textsuperscript{55} Concerned that an Allende government would establish a Communist foothold in South America, President Nixon authorized a covert two-track strategy. Track I involved exerting U.S. political and economic pressure, while Track II involved the encouragement of a coup by members of the Chilean military. The U.S.-supported elements in Chile planned to abduct the head of the armed forces, General Rene Schneider, as a key figure in the coup. The plans changed when Schneider was killed in a gunfight with the kidnappers therefore securing Allende's victory. U.S. efforts to remove Allende continued after his inauguration as president. Between 1970 and 1973, the CIA covertly provided approximately $8 million to opposition groups within Chile.\textsuperscript{56} In September 1973, a military junta seized control of the Chilean government and Allende was killed.

The next major covert operation took place two years later as the Angolan Civil War was getting underway. In January 1975, Portugal announced it would grant complete independence to its African colony in November of the same year. Power was transferred to a transitional coalition government comprising the three main rebel groups which had fought separately against colonial rule. These groups included the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}
Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). This transitional government collapsed in August after fighting broke out between the Marxist MPLA and the other two groups who leaned further to the West. The capital, Luanda, was left in control of the MPLA which received financial and military assistance from the Soviet Union and troop support from Fidel Castro.

Together, the FNLA and UNITA established a rival administration backed by the U.S. and South Africa. Through a covert operation authorized by President Ford, the CIA furnished them with weapons and other support. The U.S. decision to become involved had been encouraged by the escalation of Soviet arms shipments to the MPLA and Cuba's dispatch of military forces. The administration feared that this aid would lead to the establishment of a Communist regime.

U.S. covert action in Angola ran into opposition in Congress. A debate arose in the U.S. over whether or not to apply the policy of containment to Communist influences spreading in the Third World via surrogates like Cuba. It also focused on the utility of the various means for responding to such actions. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Assistant for National Security Zbigniew Brzezinski argued for the expansion of the containment policy to indirect Soviet threats. Lacking public support for military intervention, Kissinger recommended giving the Angolan rebels $28 million in covert aid. However, policy makers rejected his request stating that the U.S. should only act directly against the Soviets, not against Soviet-sponsored forces. Still reacting to the trauma caused by the failures in Vietnam and Cuba, Congress refused to use irregular warfare to prevent this easy victory by Soviet backed Cuban forces in the Angolan Civil War. Via the Tunney Amendment to the Intelligence Appropriations Bill, Congress forbade the expenditure of any funds in Angola, other than to gather intelligence. A 1975 amendment to the International

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Security Assistance and Arms Export Act also banned covert assistance to anti-Marxist guerrillas in Angola.

In early 1976, Congress approved the Clark Amendment to the annual U.S. foreign aid bill and prohibited U.S. support to rebel groups involved in the war. With the continued support of the Soviet Union and Cuba, the MPLA consolidated its control over much of the country and established itself as the de facto Angolan government. Although it had suffered significant setback, UNITA continued its insurgency. The FNLA was eliminated.

Following Angola, another failure in the containment policy occurred in Ethiopia. After the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, a junta of army officers declared a Marxist regime and joined the Soviet bloc. They were supported by the same type of Soviet military aid and Cuban troops that were provided in Angola, and again, the American commitment was minimal. To deter an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, Brzezinski favored sending a carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf. The departments of State and Defense opposed any demonstration of military force, arguing that it would be seen as a defeat for the U.S. if Ethiopia invaded Somalia. Other areas also written off as part of the "Soviet camp" included Egypt, Syria, Somalia, Algeria and Libya. One speculation for the inability of the U.S. to prevent Soviet influence in this region is the fact that they were far removed from any direct threat involving nuclear warfare.\(^59\)

Covert actions were minimal during this period of détente. Many CIA "dummy" companies were sold and clandestine operatives pensioned off. By the end of the decade, covert action accounted for less than five percent of the total CIA budget.\(^60\) However, activities increased with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The leftist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan overthrew the government of President Muhammad Daoud in April of 1978 and established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under the presidential leadership of Noor Muhammad Taraki.


Taraki's revolutionary economic and social program led Islamic traditionalists and rural Afghan tribal groups to revolt. In December 1978, Soviet military forces invaded and gained control in Kabul. Babrak Karmal, leader of a pro-Soviet Afghan faction, was installed as president. His government remained dependent on Soviet military forces.\textsuperscript{61}

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a setback to superpower relations by bringing an end to the brief period of detente. President Carter responded by withdrawing the SALT II arms control agreement from the Senate's consideration, imposing a grain embargo on the Soviet Union, and ordering the U.S. Olympic boycott of the 1980 summer games scheduled to be held in Moscow. He also declared a U.S. commitment to protect the Persian Gulf against external attack.

The fighting continued and produced large numbers of refugees that fled to Pakistan and Iran. Operating from these bases, the antigovernment Moslem guerrillas (Mujahedeen) were sustained by extensive military and economic assistance from abroad. The group comprised dozens of factions united by a common goal of removing the Soviets. The U.S. headed the international support for the Afghan insurgents and provided more than $2 billion in covert aid between 1981 and 1988. According to John Prados' \textit{Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II}, the number of covert operations tripled to over forty when Reagan became President. Expenditures also increased, largely due to the rapidly growing military assistance to resistance forces in Afghanistan. CIA budgets remain classified, yet one estimate by former member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Gregory Treverton, indicates that by the mid 1980s the total came to approximately $1.5 billion per year. According to Treverton, covert action consumed about one third of that amount.\textsuperscript{62}

Also contributing to the resurgence of the use of covert activities was a complete revision of the Clark Amendment in 1985. In light of the State Department's estimate of a large Cuban troop presence in Angola, Congress permitted covert

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Ibid. pp. 14-16.}
military support to UNITA if the president declared it to be in the national interest and Congress concurred. In an effort to reverse further Soviet-sponsored Communist expansionism, the Reagan administration was implementing a policy of furnishing support to anti-Communist insurgencies worldwide. UNITA was the beneficiary of this policy and began receiving military aid through the CIA.

Another operation occurring under the direction of President Reagan involved the covert support to rebels opposing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In 1979, the Somoza family ended their forty-year rule of the country and were replaced by a broad front dominated by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) through a massive guerrilla offensive supported by Communist China. The family had been helpful to the U.S. in its 1954 and 1961 covert operations in Guatemala and Cuba. Prior to leaving office in 1981, President Carter suspended U.S. aid to Managua, citing Sandinista involvement in the training and supply of leftist rebels fighting the Salvadoran government in El Salvador's civil war.

The Reagan administration terminated U.S. aid to Nicaragua charging that the Sandinistas were part of a Soviet and Cuban directed operation to export Communist revolution throughout Central America. After unsuccessful attempts to informally negotiate with the Sandinistas to end their support of the guerrillas fighting the U.S.-supported government of El Salvador, the CIA plans went before the NSC for approval. Their proposals included support and conduct of political and paramilitary operations against the Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America.

In November, President Reagan approved NSC directive 17 authorizing increased assistance to the internal opposition. A program of covert U.S. assistansce then went to the small groups of Nicaraguan anti-Sandinista rebels forming in Honduras. Struggling to create some unity among the varied anti-Sandinista forces, the CIA first encouraged the groups to join the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN). By the mid-1980s, the FDN had a combined force of approximately 15,000 counterrevolutionaries, or Contras.
Various proposals were made to stop the fighting, yet little progress was being made. Washington insisted that any settlement include the Contras and address El Salvador, while Managua refused to negotiate with the Contra leadership. One such plan, the Wright-Reagan Plan, called for a Nicaraguan cease-fire, democratic reforms within Nicaragua, and a halt to both U.S. military aid to the Contras and the flow of the Soviet-bloc arms to the Sandinistas. However, the Arias Plan, signed on August 7 by the five Central American presidents, replaced the previous idea. It provided for cease-fires in Nicaragua and El Salvador and the termination of outside aid to regional insurgencies. Unlike the Wright-Reagan Plan, it did not force Nicaragua to renounce Soviet bloc military aid.

The peace process led Congress to limit U.S. support to the Contras to humanitarian assistance. In a step that reflected the weakening of the Cold War, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev informed newly elected President Bush that the Soviet Union had stopped supplying arms to Nicaragua.

The open discussions in Congress over the situation in Nicaragua signified a new type of "overt" covert action. However, it was later revealed that the administration had been conducting a secret covert operation of their own by using aid to the Contras as a way to open communication with Tehran. Linking the release of hostages held in Iran created a massive scandal in Washington. Their obsession with secrecy meant that normal procedures for approving covert actions were circumvented, which later surfaced as a challenge to the mechanism of oversight.

**Oversight**

Continual reappraisal of covert action and its role in American foreign policy caused the mechanism of administrative oversight to undergo several changes throughout the post-war period. In 1955, President Eisenhower sought to tighten the executive's control over covert action while still preserving the idea of plausible denial. He issued a top-secret directive, NSC 5412/1, establishing an NSC Operations Coordinating Board as the channel for giving approval for covert actions. Revisions to
the directive resulted in the formation of a senior NSC group, the 5412/2 Committee, to review and approve operations. The group consisted of the president's special assistant and both secretaries of State and Defense. Under President Kennedy, the 5412/2 Committee became known as the Special Group.

The review of covert action remained informal in the executive branch as well as the legislative. No formal subcommittees of Congress existed to deal with the CIA. Instead, ad hoc groups of senior members of Congress reviewed the Agency's budgets, appropriated money, and received a yearly review of CIA activities. To add to the courteous nature of the process, DCIs kept members informed of major covert action projects. A Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of Government was organized in 1954, and as part of its investigation, a small task force under General Mark Clark was assigned to study the intelligence system.

The Clark task force was critical of the CIA administration and expressed concerns about the absence of external controls and oversight. It recommended the establishment of an oversight group composed of members of Congress and distinguished citizens. The idea was rejected by the commission which proposed a joint Congressional oversight committee and an independent group composed of private citizens to monitor intelligence operations for the president. Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution calling for a joint congressional oversight committee. In response, the CIA began a counter-attack on all such proposals to widen the circle of knowledge and control of secret operations. Nonetheless, Congress formed oversight subcommittees of the Armed Services and the Appropriations committees were established in the Senate. The House Armed Services Committee also created an intelligence oversight subcommittee. In the Appropriations Committee, an informal group was designated, but its membership remained secret. President Johnson continued the informality in the executive branch and made only a few minor changes. The Special Group was renamed the 303

Committee after 1964 NSC memorandum NSAM-303. The actual oversight, however, was performed by the president, the DCI, the secretary of defense, the national security advisor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the presidential press secretary.64

The Nixon administration further revised the process in 1970 with NSC directive 40. Under this directive, covert action planning came under a select panel known as the 40 Committee, which replaced the 303 Committee. Nixon broadened the stated aim of U.S. covert action from its previously narrow anti-Communist focus to a general safeguarding of U.S. defense and security. It was this Committee that reviewed the CIA proposal for covert aid to the rebels in Angola and prompted the involvement in the Chile operation. A major change under President Nixon was the drastic reduction in the Agency's role in making foreign policy. During this period, intelligence administrators reduced the size of the CIA by seven percent, making most of the cuts in the Clandestine Service. They eliminated many elements which gave the CIA its clandestine mystique that tended to overshadow legitimate security measures.65

For example, obscure and misleading titles of professional positions were renamed, and a sign was placed on the highway identifying the CIA headquarters in Virginia.

The decade of the 1970s also focused attention on the domestic activities of the CIA which increased the oversight mechanism. As an indirect result of investigations within the Agency, the DCI conducted a review of all activities that could be considered questionable since its establishment. The result was a list of almost seven hundred activities, which became known as the "Family Jewels."66 Items on the list included an assortment of wiretappings, buggings, and break-ins carried out within the U.S., as well as projects such as:

*HT/LINGUAL, the opening of over 200,000 pieces of selected mail between the U.S. and two Communist countries between 1953 and 1973;

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64Ibid., p. 307.
65Ibid., pp. 307-310.
*MH/CHAOs, the joint CIA-FBI infiltration of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the U.S. on the orders of President Johnson to determine whether the movement was financed or manipulated by foreign powers;

*MK/ULTRA, a research and development program sponsored by the Clandestine Service's Technical Services Division to explore the use of drugs, hypnotism, and other psychological techniques used in covert operations;

*ZR/RIFLE, a program to develop a capability for disabling foreign leaders through a variety of means, including assassination.

In December 1974, press reports of some of these activities involving unlawful domestic surveillance operations set off a series of probes of U.S. intelligence agencies. President Ford appointed the Rockefeller Commission to investigate and determine whether the CIA had exceeded its charter. The report found some activities that were well within the authority of the CIA, and others that were specifically prohibited. Ford tried to prevent a congressional inquiry, but the Senate voted to create the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities as part of their increasing role in oversight responsibilities.67 The committee was referred to as the Church Committee after its chairman, Senator Frank Church.

Senior intelligence officials were called to testify and large numbers of classified documents obtained from the CIA and other executive branch intelligence services were reviewed. Disregarding a written request from President Ford not to make the information public, the Committee released an interim report on prior U.S. involvement in the assassination of foreign leaders. The report criticized what it described as an excessive reliance on covert action by the United States. Many of these operations were said to be inconsistent with U.S. values and traditions and conducted without appropriate authorization. The Committee recommended broad new legislation governing U.S. intelligence activities, better executive branch control.

of covert operations, restrictions on intelligence activities such as assassination, and improved congressional oversight. In May 1976, the Senate created a permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to monitor the intelligence community.68

Also in 1975, the House of Representatives voted to create a select committee to examine suspected unlawful or improper intelligence operations. An initial Select Committee on Intelligence was prevented from operating due to a controversy surrounding its chairman who had received secret briefings on misconducts of the Agency. A new panel was established with Representative Otis G. Pike as the chairman. The thirteen-member committee conducted public hearings and prepared a detailed study of U.S. intelligence organization, management, and prior abuses. Over Representative Pike's objections, the full House voted against public release of the panel's final report because of the highly sensitive information it contained.

The Pike Committee submitted twenty proposals to the House on reforming the U.S. intelligence activities. Key recommendations included: having the director of central intelligence concentrate on overall management of the intelligence community and no longer also head the CIA, separating the NSA from the Defense Department, and abolishing the Defense Intelligence Agency. While the reorganization ideas were not adopted, committee emphasis on continuing congressional oversight resulted in the formation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 signified this increased involvement of Congress in covert action oversight.69 It meant that covert actions were to be reported to eight committees, including House and Senate committees on foreign affairs, armed services, appropriations, and intelligence. Sponsored by Senator Harold E. Hughes and Representative Leo J. Ryan, the amendment stipulated that covert action could be carried out only when the president had determined specifically that it was important to the national security. It specifically stated that:

68Ibid.
No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the [CIA] for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of Congress.\textsuperscript{70}

This judgment required the president to send "findings" to Congress which outlined the scope and description of operations.\textsuperscript{71} Findings required the president's signature and therefore eliminated the idea of plausible denial.

Other suggestions of the Church Committee were embodied in President Carter's 1978 executive order 12063 that sought to clarify the boundaries of intelligence activities, establish more effective oversight, and specify the authority of the DCI. The order made the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) the successor to the 40 Committee as the executive branch reviewer of covert action. Membership included the secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, and the attorney general. The Carter administration also tightened the executive branch procedures for reviewing covert action in other ways. No longer were decisions about what merited SCC review, presidential findings, or consultation with Congress strictly the responsibility of the CIA. Before the DCI signed any proposal, it was also reviewed outside the CIA in the State Department and a working group of the SCC.

An expanded definition of covert action under the Reagan administration called for another restructuring of internal procedures. The National Security Planning Group (NSPG) replaced the SCC and made the body more responsive to presidential orders for covert activity. As covert interventions multiplied, new circumstances

\textsuperscript{70}bid.

raised new questions. Congress resorted to broad prohibitions on covert action just as it had in the Angolan situation. Covert actions were becoming somewhat overt. The major operations of the 1980s that were openly debated in Congress became public knowledge as well. The White House was not adamant about maintaining secrecy and regarded covert action as a "good policy and good domestic politics."\(^{72}\)

The most significant law passed during this time relating to covert action was the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.\(^{73}\) The Act repealed the Hughes-Ryan amendment, reducing the executive's reporting requirements for covert action to two intelligence committees and allowing the president to limit prior notice of activities to eight members of Congress. This "Gang of Eight" included the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.

When the U.S. gave covert assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, the executive branch officials justified their support in terms of achieving objectives other than overthrowing the Sandinistas. According to Robert Simmons, then the staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, "everyone discussed but few admitted."\(^{74}\) Different parts of the administration emphasized different purposes. The military stressed that the aid would slow the infiltration of arms from Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador; the CIA focused on turning the Sandinistas inward and away from the export of their revolution; and the State Department emphasized the objective of pressuring the regime into negotiations with the U.S. The arms aid that went to the rebels was a major priority for Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig. In March 1981, President Reagan issued a finding for an operation intended to interdict the flow of arms from Nicaragua into El Salvador. The broad nature of the finding, which proposed to "engage in paramilitary...operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere," created disputes between the administration and the intelligence committees of

\(^{73}\)Ibid., p. 250.
\(^{74}\)Ibid., p. 144.
Congress over the exact purpose of the Nicaraguan operation. The oversight committees did not believe the administration was sincere in professing limited objectives. In their classified reports on the CIA budget, the committees stated that they opposed covert efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas. They formalized their position at the end of 1982 with the first of a series of Boland Amendments that stipulated that no money could be used for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.

Aims of intervention were becoming clearer as Senate committee members met with Contra leaders who explicitly stated their objective to overthrow the Sandinistas. The committee responded by stating that it would approve no more funding for the program without a revised and more specific finding. A new draft still purported the same limited objective which seemed less and less plausible. Congress cut off aid to the Contras in October 1984 and required the president to explain his goals in order for aid to resume. The third, and most restrictive, of the Boland Amendments was passed barring U.A. agencies involved in intelligence activities from providing any aid whatsoever to the Contras. Secretly concluding that the amendment did not apply to the NSC because the council technically was not an intelligence entity, the Reagan White House turned to the NSC to coordinate continuing covert assistance to the Contras. Between 1984 and 1986, NSC staff member Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North directed a secret Contra supply network funded by private and foreign donations.

In January 1986, a finding was sent that outlined the past and future role of the CIA in the operation. It was a formal approval by the president that further committed the U.S.: American arms, bought by the CIA from the Pentagon, would be shipped directly from the U.S. to Israel, for transfer to Iran. The same month, North began to implement his own plan to divert some of the proceeds from the arms sales to the

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Contras. The arms had been sold for nearly $20 million more than the CIA had paid the Pentagon for them. The profits were then laundered through Swiss bank accounts to be drawn on by the Contras.\textsuperscript{76}

The President defended the arms sales as a necessity to improve U.S.-Iranian relations in hopes of releasing the American hostages held in Lebanon. He denied any knowledge of the Contra diversion which directly related to the issue of circumventing the congressional ban on aid to the anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua. In November, Reagan appointed the Tower Commission to review the operation of the NSC. In its February 1987 report, the Commission fixed primary blame for the Iran-Contra affair on the misconduct of senior Reagan administration aides rather than on systemic flaws in the NSC. It faulted Reagan for lax oversight and management of his staff but uncovered no evidence that he knew of the Contra diversion.\textsuperscript{77}

In January, both the House and Senate formed special committees to conduct their own investigation of the scandal. In March they merged to form a single panel to conduct congressional hearings. The investigation revealed the Reagan White House's deliberate attempts to avoid congressional restrictions on U.S. aid to the Contras. Reagan was ultimately responsible for the Iran-Contra affair and it was determined that he allowed overzealous subordinates to distort foreign policy making, get around the law, and mislead Congress.


Emergence of a New World Order

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the effective leader of the Soviet Union. The period prior to Gorbachev's coming to power saw many challenges to the Soviet Union's economic, social, and political well-being. After Leonid Brezhnev's death in 1982, two successions within a period of three years served to demonstrate the severity of the crisis. Under the tenure of Yuri Andropov, the first successor, the dissatisfaction of the regime's intelligentsia became more vocal. This was seen as a crucial gestigation for Gorbachev's views.

The real catalyst for change was the next reign of Konstantin Chernenko. His incompetence engendered a particular feeling of not only hopelessness, but also of deep embarrassment and shame to the Communist intelligentsia and Soviet people. The crisis was visible in declining growth rates, increasing scarcity of exploitable resources, and the worsening imbalance between military production and that for the general economy, especially consumer goods. These conditions gave rise to the need for extensive reforms to maintain its parity with the industrialized West. Between 1981 and 1985, Soviet GNP grew at only about two percent versus 4.7 percent to 5.0 percent in the 1960s. After taking the role of Soviet leader, Gorbachev began programs of political and economic reform that initiated movements for liberalization both in his country and across Eastern Europe. As described in Nathan's United States Foreign Policy and World Order, these changes are referred to glasnost and perestroika.

Glasnost, the Russian word for "openness," is more general than specific in nature. It refers to an opening up of discourse on public and, although to a lesser

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79Ibid.
extent, political affairs. The term embraces a process whereby freer criticism of many aspects of the Soviet system is allowed to develop. However, the full extent of glasnost cannot truly be known because its limits must be sought and tested. The known limits of the reform are that citizens might be encouraged to criticize inadequate delivery of goods and services, or other more benign issues, but not core political processes and institutions. For example food, housing, and medical care may be openly challenged, yet the central role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the validity of socialism, according to Nathan, may not.

The second term, perestroika, is seen as the more significant of the new reform ideas since it refers to the restructuring of the Soviet political economy. Gorbachev defines the term as:

...a word with many meanings. But if we are to choose from its many possible synonyms, the key one which expresses its essence most accurately, [is that] perestroika is a revolution. A decisive acceleration of the socio-economic and cultural development of Soviet society which involves radical changes on the way to a qualitatively new state.

In accordance with our theory, revolution means construction, but it also implies demolition. Revolution requires the demolition of all that is obsolete, stagnant and hinders fast progress. Without demolition, you cannot clear the site for new construction. Perestroika also means a resolute and radical elimination of obstacles hindering social and economic development of outdated methods of managing the economy and of dogmatic stereotype mentality.\footnote{Ibid., p. 492.}

Although the focus of his reforms were domestic, they had important consequences for Soviet foreign policy and therefore Soviet-American relations. Economically, one of the new mechanisms for getting rid of the "outdated methods of managing the economy" is greater autonomy for state enterprises, including self-management and less control from the center; reform of the price structure; movement toward international convertibility of the ruble; rationalization of investment credits;
and greater entrepreneurism in the service sector. Small scale cooperatives are encouraged in order to develop a degree of essentially free-enterprise activities.


The new political outlook calls for the recognition of one more simple axiom: security is indivisible. It is either equal security for all or none at all.... Would it, for instance, be in the interest of the United States if the Soviet Union found itself in a situation whereby it considered it had less security than the U.S.A? Or would we benefit by a reverse situation? I can say firmly that we would not like this. So adversaries must become partners and start looking jointly for a way to achieve universal security.\(^2\)

Evidence of these new concerns in the period since Gorbachev's emergence as the Soviet leader is shown in an overall reduction of Soviet support for liberation struggles in the Third World. They have withdrawn from Afghanistan, refused to expand their levels of support to the Sandinistas, reduced their support for the Cuban economy, and lessened their enthusiasm for continued open-ended support for Angola and the Cuban presence there.

Both glasnost and perestroika represent the onset of the opportunities forecasted by Keenan as the policy of containment was initially being formulated. As did occur, he counted on political, social, and economic tensions to result from the Soviets' internal structure. This mellowing of Soviet power manifested itself in improved ties between the Soviet Union and the U.S. through a continuing series of summit meetings. At the 1991 Moscow Summit, Gorbachev and Bush cooperated in

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 493.
the signing of the START Treaty mandating cuts in long-range nuclear forces. Internally, the ties that bound the Soviet Union as an economic entity were unraveling even further. In major population centers, industrial workers and other employees wanted order in their lives and improvement in their living standards.\(^{83}\)

The Communist governments of Eastern Europe collapsed under domestic pressure when it became apparent that Moscow would no longer resort to force to maintain Communist regimes in its satellites. In 1990, the Final Settlement with Respect to the Germany Treaty ended the post-World War II division of Germany, while the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty provided for the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet military forces from Central Europe. The two agreements marked the end of the long East-West struggle over Europe and signaled the close of the Cold War.\(^{84}\)

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 represented the first post-Cold War international crisis and the U.S. and Soviet Union coordinated closely on their response. The Bush administration became increasingly alarmed over a possible further Iraqi military move to seize the oil fields of U.S.-ally Saudi Arabia. In August, Bush dispatched U.S. forces to the defense of Saudi Arabia. Referred to as Operation Desert Shield, the deployment became the largest American overseas military commitment since the Vietnam War. The U.S.-Soviet cooperation resulted in a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions denouncing Iraqi actions in Kuwait and imposing economic sanctions on Baghdad. In November, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 authorizing the U.S.-led coalition to use armed force to remove Iraq from Kuwait if it had not withdrawn by January 15, 1991. The Iraqi's refused to withdraw from Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War began on January 16, 1991.

Bush justified American involvement in the Gulf by citing the strategic importance of the region and its oil resources and the need to provide the security of U.S. allies. He established the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait as a U.S. policy objective, and asserted that confronting Iraq was a test of the post-Cold War world's


\(^{84}\) Ibid.
ability to maintain peace. He asserted that a set of opportunities for more harmonious and cooperative international affairs had been put at risk by Iraq's actions. Setting forth a global vision for a new international environment, President Bush coined the term "new world order" to describe his idea of a "new partnership of nations...based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action."

By 1991, another event was contributing to the changing world order. In August, a group of top Soviet Communist hardliners staged a coup in an attempt to oust Soviet President Gorbachev. Prior to the coup, pro-reform liberals were pressing Gorbachev for the acceleration toward a market economy and the denunciation of the Communist Party and its ideology. The central government faced increasing challenges to its legitimacy and authority from the Baltic states and other Soviet republics demanding independence from Moscow. The Communist traditionalists felt a threat to their power and urged Gorbachev to take a harsher stand on these events.

The group of eight senior Soviet Communist officials detained the president under house arrest and announced that Gorbachev was incapacitated with an unspecified illness. They assumed central power by organizing themselves as the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Warning that the country was headed toward catastrophe, they had military units positioned throughout Moscow. The coup took place immediately before the scheduled signing of Gorbachev's Union Treaty which decentralized power from Moscow to the constituent republics.

The coup raised concerns in Washington over a possible reversal of improved ties between the two superpowers. In question was the viability of the recently signed arms control agreements including the START and Treaty and the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty. President Bush joined the other Western leaders in condemning the Soviet coup as illegitimate and regressive. He pledged not to recognize the new Soviet leadership and placed U.S. economic aid to the USSR on hold. Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin led the domestic resistance, mobilizing hundreds of

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thousands of pro-democracy citizens in Moscow to defy the illegal usurpation of
to power. Leaders of other Soviet republics joined his stand and endorsed his call for
Gorbachev's restoration as the legitimate leader.

The coup collapsed under the weight of both domestic and international
opposition. Gorbachev was released and declared himself back in control of the Soviet
Union. Bush reinstated the economic programs that had been put on hold in order to
get U.S.-Soviet relations back on track. Emerging as a popular political figure, Boris
Yeltsin's power was greatly enhanced and he virtually became a co-leader of the Soviet
Union. The Soviet republics' desire for independence grew and left the USSR
unstable and more uncertain of exactly who was in control. The Soviet Union was
dismantled at the end of the year. The non-Communist Commonwealth of
Independent States was formed, with a majority of the former republics joining as
sovereign members.

Although the term "new world order" has been subjected to mockery and
cynicism, broken down word-for-word by Professor of War Studies at King's College
in London, Lawrence Freedman explains its usefulness for many critics as: the
persistence of old political vices highlighted by reference to the virtue promised by
"new"; selectivity when taking decisive action in support of international law shown up
by the universalist promise of "world"; while the prevalent disorder in so many regions
contrasts neatly with the hopes for stability implied by "order." Another
interpretation suggests that the phrase is merely descriptive and requires no more than
an acceptance that the current situation is unique and clearly different in critical
respects from the other.

Over the past few years of change leading to the eventual collapse of bi-
polarity, different observers have discerned five alternatives to the old world order. As

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86S. Bialer, "The Death of Soviet Communism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 5 (Council
87L. Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1
described by Joseph Nye, Jr., Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, these include the following:88

1. Return to Bi-Polarity
2. Multipolarity
3. Three Economic Blocs
4. Unipolar Hegemony
5. Multi-Level Interdependence

A return to bi-polarity is highly unlikely. Even if the Moscow coup had been successful and resulting in a harsh international climate, restoring Soviet strength to its previous level would have been required to create the same Cold War intensity. More likely is the formation of a multipolar order. However, it must be distinguished from the nineteenth century structure when world order rested on the balance of five roughly equal powers, and the somewhat multipolar 1970s which gave China and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) additional power positions.

The development of three economic blocs is seen as another viable alternative. This new order argues that an Asian block will form around the yen, a western hemisphere bloc around the dollar, and a European block will cluster around the European Currency Unit, if it should develop. Its primary weakness is that it diminishes the role of military power in security issues. Although the Cold War is over, American troops still maintain a large presence in various parts of the globe.

For some theorists, the Gulf War marked the beginning of Pax Americana in which the world will acquiesce to American hegemony.89 Arguments against this belief address the fact that the world is facing problems that no single power will be able to solve alone. Some of these issues include the drug trade, AIDS, global warming, and a number of others that move across national borders and are largely

89Ibid.
outside of governmental control. The final alternative, multilevel interdependence, describes the distribution of power in world politics like a layer cake. The top layer, military power, is largely unipolar; the middle layer, economic power, continues to be tripolar; and the bottom layer, transnational interdependence, is a diffusion of power. Nye's main point is that power is becoming more multidimensional, structures more complex, and states more permeable. This necessitates a view of world order as more than the traditional realists focus on military balance alone.

\[\text{90} \text{ Jbid.}\]
Table 3
OSS Organizational Chart - 1944

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<tr>
<th>General Counsel</th>
<th>Inspector</th>
<th>OSS Chief Inspector</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Special Relations</th>
<th>Personnel Procurement</th>
<th>HQ &amp; HQ Detachment</th>
<th>Naval Command</th>
<th>Communications</th>
<th>R &amp; D</th>
<th>Presentation</th>
<th>Field Photographic</th>
<th>Medical Services</th>
<th>Special Funds</th>
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<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Service Operations</td>
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Source:
G.J.A. O'Toole, The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage, 1988
Table 4

CIA Organizational Chart - 1947

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<tr>
<th>National Security Council</th>
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<tr>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
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<td>Deputy Director</td>
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<td>Personal Assistant to Director</td>
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<td>Intelligence Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant to Executive Director</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- ICAPS Chief
- General Counsel
- Executive for Administration and Management
- Advisory Council
- Executive for Inspection and Security

- Office of Collection and Dissemination
  - Assistant Director
  - Deputy Assistant Director
  - Consultant Panel
- Office of Reports and Estimates
  - Assistant Director
  - Deputy Assistant Director
- Office of Special Operations
  - Assistant Director
  - Deputy Assistant Director
- Office of Operations
  - Assistant Director
  - Deputy Assistant Director

- Policy Advisory Board
- Planning and Coordination Staff

Source:
CHAPTER III

Exploration of Research Variables

Characteristics of the International Environment

The nature of the international environment is an essential variable affecting the ways in which covert action is utilized as an instrument of foreign policy. By shaping our world, these elements are vital forces that guide relations between international actors. Examining the structure and priorities of the international system during and after the Cold War provides an indication of the direction intelligence will take in adjusting to the new world order and its new world environment. Any changes made in the intelligence apparatus - whether structurally, budgetarily, or functionally - directly affect the use and focus of covert operations.

World Order Structure and Priorities:

The principle causes of the Cold War atmosphere was the duopoly of power left by World War II and the structural circumstances that characterized the international system at that time.91 The order is most commonly described in terms of its bipolarity characterized by the profound ideological gulf that separated the Soviet Union and the United States. Most states were drawn to one of two poles and obliged to relate to the superpowers in terms of their security interests. However, there were others whose attraction was much weaker, and still others that resisted both pulls through nonalignment. So long as this political framework appeared durable, security focused on the military aspects of the bipolar balance.

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The extent of bipolarity was gradually reduced as a result of the process of decolonization. The nonalignment movements of the 1950s were an explicit attempt to escape from the pressures of a bipolar world. In the 1960s, more regimes were released from colonization, and by the 1970s, this trend was reflected in other developments such as the rise of OPEC and the creation of a new global division. The East-West confrontation was joined by a more geographically simple divide between the developed and rich states of the North and the underdeveloped and poor states of the South.

The source of stability in the old world order was the threat and overwhelming fear of nuclear war. It encouraged toleration of a long-lasting standoff instead of risking attempts to resolve the ideological issues. The consequence of such actions could have resulted in the nuclear destruction of our world as we know it. As is evident by our continued existence, the very idea of human annihilation was extremely effective in avoiding such a devastating occurrence. On a smaller scale, a number of Third World conflicts were exacerbated by the Cold War but many were averted or shortened when the superpowers feared that their clients might pull them too close to a nuclear solution.\(^\text{92}\) In Eastern Europe, where ethnic divide and animosities run deep, conflicts were kept in control by the Soviet presence. For the developed world, potential economic disputes among the U.S., Europe, and Japan were also subdued by common concerns about the Soviet military threat.

Structurally, the new world order is far from that of the Cold War. The two poles have been replaced by the emergence of additional poles, the redefinition of security, and the redistribution of power. Without the Soviet pole, there is nothing to attract those states that were once oriented in its direction. These states are now likely to be reoriented toward the West, which is comprised of three distinct poles: North America, the European Community (E.C.), and Japan.\(^\text{93}\) Each of these poles appears


to act as a regional magnet - the U.S. for Latin America and the Caribbean, Japan for East Asia, and the E.C. for central and eastern Europe - where political life is focused more on order and disorder than the ideological rifts. Those states with more order are typically characterized by democracy and market economies, while those more disorderly generally suffer from fragile economies and often deep social tensions.

A number of regions lie outside the immediate influence of a Western pole. Some are generally well ordered and fully integrated into the international community, but others, such as the bulk of Africa, are not. These disconnected areas are the most disadvantaged in the new order because they can no longer play the superpowers off each other, and their appeal to the West must be made largely on the basis of altruism rather than meeting U.S. self-interests. This increased amount of humanitarian gestures and interventions build an environment of interdependence which creates a need for greater order since it is as much a source of conflict as of consensus. Deep resentments can result from the economic inequalities that are caused by states benefiting differently from interdependent relationships.\footnote{Ibid.}

In this new security order defined in economic terms, the functioning of a global market is increasingly relied upon since it provides the means for the growth of national economies. The economic powers of countries such as Germany and Japan will no longer be qualified by a security dependence that imposes substantial constraints on their freedom of action in foreign and domestic policy. This may make the U.S. vulnerable by no longer being able to use the threat of removing its security guarantees to moderate economic policies and restrain competitiveness. The breakdown of order would immediately jeopardize the political relationships of the major developed powers as well as create a degree of domestic instability. It appears that the power and usefulness of protectionism in the new order may serve the same purpose that the nuclear threat served in the old. The consequences, however, are obviously much less devastating.
The completion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contributed to the signification of greater new world cooperation through an international organization in the economic arena. While some may view the GATT bureaucracy as reducing signatory countries' sovereignty in economic decisions, it may also be used as a tool to accomplish greater objectives. When asked if the U.S. would be economically disadvantaged by losing its sovereignty to GATT, economist Gerald O'Driscoll responded by showing the political advantages to such an organization:

At one time the U.S. was a dominant political and economic power, counterbalanced by the Soviet Union. We no longer live in a bipolar world, and the U.S. can no longer enter into negotiations thinking that we are going to get everything we want on every issue. There are simply too many countervailing interests in the world and we must accommodate those interests to conduct successful negotiations. GATT has provided a means for us to achieve many of our goals in world trade.95

Intelligence Changes:

Throughout the Cold War, American intelligence agencies made monitoring the Soviet Union their first priority. They targeted closed societies, or those on the verge of falling into that category. The focus has now shifted to more topical areas of concern based on a new set of global trends requiring a redefinition of national security. Growing global problems were identified by National Security Review No. 29 which in 1991 directed the secret agencies to compile the most exhaustive list of intelligence priorities since the beginning of the Cold War. Beyond nuclear proliferation, narcotics, terrorism, renegade countries, and global environmental problems, NSR-29 calls for more attention to ethnic and territorial disputes around the world; the spread of AIDS and other diseases (which undermine the political stability

of some countries); foreign nuclear safety problems; migration; the international technology race; and a range of macro- and microeconomics issues.96

A world more and more defined by economic strength allows additional countries to gain greater power and influence. However, the possibility of an order other than that of multipolarity has not yet been ruled out. A unipolar order with American hegemony has generally been ruled out in the literature based on the opinion that there are global problems that require more than one government to solve. These issues, however, have been put on "the back burner" for quite some time. Global warming, AIDS, and environmental hazards are not new to the new order and will most likely not be brought to the forefront unless they immediately threaten U.S. interests or are convenient to use in order to execute policies to achieve other ends.

Functional:

With prominence of security now lying in the economic sphere rather than in the military, there is increased attention on economic intelligence. Its purpose is to prevent the U.S. from being surprised by worldwide developments such as technological breakthroughs, mercantilist strategies, sudden shortages of raw materials, or illegal economic practices that leave the country at a disadvantage. Secretly acquiring information on foreign business trends, trade deals, and negotiating positions could be used to avoid such situations.

Commercial intelligence is one "friendly" term to describe a component of economic intelligence and some of its less acceptable tactics. Also known as industrial espionage, its use could severely damage relations between major trading nations when operations become known. Some intentions of commercial intelligence are to identify the negotiating strategies of competitors, protect technological information from being revealed through the open-market purchase of American companies, and assist existing industrial spies in the private sector. The boundaries of economic espionage have yet

to be determined, according to Senator David Boren, chairman of the Senate intelligence committee.97 Spying on foreign companies and giving commercial advantage to particular American companies compromises U.S. values towards the free market system. Industrial spying in a new environment of greater openness and cooperation could prove devastating to existing U.S. companies and those searching for new markets abroad. These types of covert actions are likely to be revealed sooner than later and may pose a variety of unwanted challenges for international business ethics.

In addition to a shift toward economic intelligence, the new world order may see more emphasis on political intelligence in Third World countries. There are national rivalries, such as those between the Arab world and Israel, Pakistan and India, and North and South Korea, whose outcomes are a concern to the U.S.98 There are also growing trends toward independence or autonomy for ethnic, religious or national groups. Without the pull of the Soviet pole, the U.S. can play a greater role in attracting these new nations towards democracy. Rather than use security arrangements as the carrot for these emerging democracies, economic incentives for building the infrastructure, developing the economy, and improving general health and living conditions may prove more effective.

While the need to focus on military concerns will diminish, it will not disappear. The U.S. will still have to be aware of countries that manufacture and store nuclear, chemical, biological, and even conventional weapons. The replacement of the Soviet Union with 15 newly independent states (NIS) increases the potential for uncertainty, chaos, and conflict. One concern to the U.S. is the program of weapons modernization underway in Russia. According to Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, there is a danger of "the largest [weapons] proliferation in the history of the world. Some two dozen countries with a near-term potential to acquire nuclear weaponry are unlikely to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

98Ibid.
and according to a senior CIA official, 'every country in the Middle East has a chemical-weapons program.' Consequently, these weapons checks must be accompanied by knowing a country's intentions for using them, which poses another challenge in the coming years.

Although it is reported to be scoffed at, it has been suggested that environmental intelligence become a new focus for the intelligence community. Monitoring global environmental conditions, such as oil-slicks in the Persian Gulf, the dispersal of pollutants around the globe, and changes in the earth's climate, would give certain technological capabilities a new raison d'être. Continued usage of satellite mapping, for example, would justify requests for increased allocation of funds, or at least ensure a stable place in the budget. However, the source of this suggestion and the timing of its announcement must be kept in mind. The DCI was urged by Democratic vice-presidential nominee, Senator Al Gore, to take the idea into consideration.

Because these issues are of global concern, it may be more suitable to address them through multinational and international organizations. Dr. Loch Johnson, Professor of political science at the University of Georgia, even advocates the sharing of intelligence for the purpose of establishing a United Nations Environmental Intelligence Agency. He believes that as the world begins to acknowledge the affects of global environmental degradation, it may recognize the value of a shared response mechanism through the U.N. This noble expression of concern for the world may not only appeal to the average American voter, but may also offer a realistic justification for contributing to such an agency - equipment used to collect data could also be used for covert monitoring of arms control and cease-fire agreements.

However, with the current structure of a nation-state system, it is too soon for nations to risk engaging in such open communication without existing assurances that

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100Ibid.
101Ibid., p. 59.
their own national interests are not jeopardized. As political scientist Karl Deutsch believes, the nation-state will remain the world's centers of power for as long as they continue to serve as people's most practical means for accomplishing their goals. Since all the basic functions of a political system are held by this power, the failure to utilize it constructively could lead to a breakdown of the system - and war.\textsuperscript{102}

The ability to utilize multinational and international organizations is one indication of the current extent, and possible further development, of a world order based on U.S. hegemony. Not only do they have the greatest influence in the United Nations Security Council - especially without Soviet opposition - but America also has its hand in growing regional organizations. Its continued involvement in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is one example where the U.S. is reaching beyond its immediate geographical area of influence and into the economic matters of the Japanese regional pole.

\textbf{Organizational:}

Changes in the organization of intelligence and covert operations have taken place in reaction to these changes in the international environment. While the exact figure was not available, the intelligence budget has been reduced below that of previous years. In FY 1992, it came to $30 billion - one-tenth of the budget for the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{103} Several DCI centers and task forces have been designed in the wake of hard economic times in order to combine assets of the community. In essence, they are experimenting with ways of conducting high quality work without the high cost. These centers include the Counterintelligence Center and the Counternarcotics Center, both located in the Directorate for Operations; the Counternarcotics Center, located in the Directorate for Intelligence; and a Non-


Proliferation Center, attached to the Office of the Special Assistant for Arms Control in the CIA.

These centers and task forces were arranged by former DCI William Webster prior to his retirement in 1991. Additional task forces, such as the Covert Action Task Force, were arranged by Webster's successor Robert Gates. These task forces focus on a wide variety of topics, including: political, social, and economic changes in the NIS; the economic and technological competitiveness of states; the military threat posed by the NIS; weapons proliferation; the improved use of open sources; the status of the intelligence work force; and informational services that improve the flow of data among the intelligence agencies and field operators.\(^\text{104}\)

In 1992, Congress was considering legislation to reorganize the entire U.S. intelligence community. Chairmen of both Senate and House intelligence committees (Senator David Boren and Representative David McCurdy) introduced nearly identical bills designed to replace previous mandates and reshape the structure of intelligence. Ernest May, director of the Intelligence and Policy Program at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, argues that although "in this changed world changes in the intelligence community are needed to serve the needs of the government as a whole in an effective and timely manner," this proposed legislation is moving "backwards into the future."\(^\text{105}\)

The Boren and McCurdy bills call for replacing the current DCI with a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI would preside over four separate agencies: one for each major category of collection - human, signal, and imagery - and one to produce analysis of the intelligence received. The two bills are similar in that they were both proposed in order to apply the changes in the international environment to changes in intelligence, and are based on two general premises: First, that a new era is opening; and second, that there is a continuing for intelligence functions. However, they differ in some fundamental respects. In acknowledging major changes in the

\(^{104}\text{Ibid., pp. 59-60.}\)
world, the Senate version says that the threat from the former Soviet Union has
"considerably diminished," while the House bill recognizes the "end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union."106

One of the primary suggestions made by the professor is to increase the
authority of the DCI after being changed to the DNI. In theory, the DCI currently has
the authority to carry out his responsibility of coordinating the intelligence community,
yet in practice, the mechanisms available to him are insufficient. The two most
important collection assets, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Satellite
Reconnaissance Agency (SRA), are under the military command structure. While it is
convenient to have military units send up satellites and man listening posts on aircraft,
ships, and military bases, if the U.S. is going to maintain the shift from military
priorities to economics and politics, there should be mechanisms for reinforcing the
change. As of 1991, the DCI could order collection operations at will, although he
was well aware of the fact that these agencies' were financed by the pentagon. To
regain control of these key subordinates of the intelligence community, it was
suggested that the DCI be given the ability to appoint and dismiss these directors
rather than leaving it up to the secretary of defense.107

Four of the elements addressed in the Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992
are seen by Professor May and other analysts as being counter to the bills' stated
objectives. These include provisions regarding the NSC, budgets, a revamped CIA,
and the proposed new analysis agency. The NSC was established partly to provide
the military services with a voice in diplomacy, and the State Department with a say in
defense policy. During the Cold War, the president also used the NSC as a convenient
method of guiding both the State Department and the Defense Department. As the
national agenda changes, the NSC may cease to serve the primary needs of any of the
above institutions.

106 Ibid., p. 64.
107 S. Turner, "Intelligence for a New World Order," Foreign Affairs. (New York: Council
In regards to the budget, the bills would place the entire intelligence budget under the new DNI.\textsuperscript{108} The DCI was originally expected to coordinate spending, but as satellites and other high-cost collection systems became more widely used, the defense department took over this responsibility. Under the proposed bills, the secretary of defense would officially become responsible for ensuring that the policies and resource decisions of the DNI are implemented by elements of the Department of Defense. Intelligence would have its own budget, yet collection systems may not fare as well as big items in a small intelligence budget than as small items in a big defense budget.

The third element addresses changes within the CIA. Under these bills, the large components responsible for analysis would move elsewhere leaving the clandestine service and a small staff to coordinate other human intelligence resources. This could cause the agency to evolve into an organization that fits the image in which it is already often perceived: as an organization for spies and "dirty tricks." During the Cold War, both the directorate of intelligence and the directorate of operations worked together in utilizing information to carry out operations. With the two separated, the clandestine service would receive its guidance directly from the top decision-makers - possibly without consideration of the information gathered from analysts.

The bill proposed changes in the structure of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) of 1991. At that time, the NIC was largely dominated by the CIA. It was even housed within the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia; almost completely staffed by the CIA; and its administrative functions provided the agency, as well. To become an interdisciplinary think tank in practice as well as theory, Boren suggested having a separate and distinct agency from the CIA.\textsuperscript{109} This would allow other departments, such as State and Commerce, to assign advocates of their own perspectives to represent them in preparing estimates. After his appointment, DCI Gates succeeded in strengthening the NIC by giving it its own staff and moving to a facility near the White

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., pp. 160-162.
House where officers will have easier access to policy staff of the NSC. The intent is to improve the flow of intelligence from analysts to policymakers.

Boren and McCurdy believe that separating the two bodies would attract many of America's best and brightest individuals who would otherwise refuse to be associated with an organization that also handles spying and covert operations. They also suggest a new corps of clandestine operators, much in the same way that veterans of the OSS were neglected when the new agency was being formed after World War II. The intention of starting the new era with a fresh group is to recruit individuals with broader knowledge and abilities to better meet these newly defined needs.

The fourth feature of the bills proposes the grouping of most analysts spread out among the CIA, NSA, and elsewhere, into a new autonomous Directorate for Estimates and Analysis. This consolidation would potentially cut down on costs since many agencies have overlapping analysis offices. It would also allow for the integration of information and sharing of resources. However, if a key aim is to more closely associate intelligence and policy, it may be more effective to scatter analysts of intelligence among its users and operators.

For more fitting adjustments to the organization of the intelligence community, May suggests that legislation equip it more appropriately for the future. New legislation should also address subjects not yet touched by current bills. The boundary between foreign and domestic intelligence, for example, may need to change as technological capabilities result in greater threats to privacy. Limitations that worked when the major threat came from communists in Moscow may not work when the enemies may be on U.S. soil in the form of drug traffickers or industrial spies. Other subjects that could be included in legislation include issues of classification, security clearance and access, and dissemination of information.

In addressing any of these subjects, it must be kept in mind that Congressionally mandated changes in the organization of intelligence could present other problems. Most importantly, they could prevent the president and other executive branch officials from establishing processes to cope with the new challenges
of the new environment. Traditionally, the executive branch prefers to make all changes through executive orders and directives without excessive legislation. After the long process of developing covert action oversight mechanisms in both the legislative and executive branches, it should be possible to find a middle ground where legislation is passed that is broad enough to allow the president to make adjustments in plans when they are called for. To reduce impediments to effective intelligence operations and to prevent the reoccurrence of previous scandals, greater cooperation and communication between the two will be needed.

The disappearance of the USSR permits the U.S. to significantly reduce its spending on elaborate reconnaissance platforms and major covert operations. It may no longer be necessary to have large clandestine activities, especially those led by CIA officers for the purpose of collecting information. Since people cost less than high-tech machines, more attention may be placed on human intelligence endeavors. For instance, a military attaché or foreign service official at an embassy could take on clandestine responsibilities with less cost and risk to national embarrassment. While it is not the only way of detecting intentions of governments, human intelligence can play a significant role in this increasing area of need, especially in forecasting events driven by public attitudes and animosities, and destructive outbursts driven by ethnic or religious zeal. Human resources are also the most effective means of penetrating terrorist organizations, drug rings, and foreign governments.

The failure of the CIA to detect the events in Iran in 1978 is but one example of a situation that could have been avoided had agents understood public attitudes or been placed closer to an important individual or decision-making authority. The lessons of Iran were, however, considered in forming later policies. While discussing the controversial issue of arming Saudi Arabia, those opposing the plan contended that the U.S. should reconsider its decision to massively arm the royal family the way it had armed the shah of Iran. Referring to the arms sales to the former shah, Representative Gerry Studds of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said:
"Having seen our policy in Iran be a complete failure, a predictably complete failure, now we're rushing into an arms sales relationship with Saudi Arabia that is possibly even greater than it was with the shah. Our policy of arming the shah to the teeth speaks for itself... Some of the factors that led to the shah's downfall were present in Saudi Arabia. There are divisions within the royal family, there is a reaction against Westernization, 40 percent of the labor force is foreign, and it is clearly a society dramatically different from our own. We need to know more about what is happening there, before we create another surrogate superpower like Iran."\(^{110}\)

Another example is the 1982 U.S. intelligence failure in Beirut. Clandestine intelligence operatives were unable to detect hostile attitudes toward the American military presence and the rise of animosities to crisis proportions. While former DCI Standfield Turner reports that there were indications of an upcoming attack on the American embassy detected by satellite photographs, no human interactions could verify the probability, at least not significantly enough to take the necessary precautions.\(^{111}\) According to Woodward's reports in *Veil*, Lebanese intelligence was receiving approximately two million dollars annually to pay their agents for gathering information on terrorist attacks. At that time, DCI William Casey was said to have good relations with the Lebanese intelligence organization.

This was not the case with the Mossad, Israel's organization, which was seen as withholding information and endangering Americans in Lebanon. Relations deteriorated after Israel invaded Lebanon and the U.S. Marines withdrew. In Lebanon, CIA and Mossad agents worked together but were not permitted to deal directly with one another. All liaison activities were handled through one or two individuals. Peter Mandy, the No. 2 person in the Mossad was known by the CIA as dispensing bits of human-source reports *only* when it specifically served Israeli interests. The intelligence sharing was primarily a one-way-street, therefore leading U.S. officials to apply

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pressure on the Mossad expecting all information that might relate to a terrorist attack against U.S. installations. Unfortunately, the Mossad - like the CIA - showed their lack of trust of anyone.112

More recently, it is reported that there were many intelligence gaps during the Gulf War. The precise location of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the condition of his elite troops were apparently not known. High-flying platforms were utilized but the data did not reach the hands of field officers in time for immediate tactical use. Or, more likely, top decision makers knew much more than they led the public -- and even officials directly involved in the crisis -- to believe. Despite the stated intention to bring down the Iraqi regime, it is possible that the U.S. intentionally averted the capture of Hussein in order to maintain the status quo in the Gulf region of the Middle East.

Former DCI Stanfield Turner believes that the U.S. capability for human spying will never be as effective as some of its foreign counterparts.113 One of the reasons for this disadvantage is the relative newness of the CIA that has yet to develop a sound tradition in this area of expertise. Another more immediate reason is that the CIA's case officers operate under a handicap of not being able to maintain good cover. Many agencies of the U.S. government are reluctant to have CIA clandestine personnel masquerading as their employees, and the operatives themselves are often unwilling to pay the price of integrating themselves into another department's operations.

According to Turner, the U.S. government will not ask American espionage personnel to make the sacrifices that the Soviets asked of their agents. Soviet agents would leave their homes behind, live for long periods in a foreign country, adopt its citizenship and engage in mundane business activities for years before beginning their clandestine activities.114 Washington does not like to expose American agents to the penalties of being caught without holding diplomatic status. As was evident by the

114Ibid.
recent efforts to release the hostages held in Beirut, the government must go to great lengths to protect itself from exposure, as well as protect the identities of their operatives. There is always the possibility that the U.S. does in fact engage in tactics such as those utilized by the Soviets. However, to be effective they would have to continue without the information being declassified for publication, and especially without the slightest suspicion in the general public.

The Soviets were also very active in a range of clandestine activities. While coups in the Third World have brought to power regimes friendlier to the Soviet Union, the Soviets are said to have played a minor role. Some of these include Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s, Peru, Syria, and Libya in the 1960s, and Grenada in the 1970s. However, in Southern Yemen and Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, the Soviets played a central role. They have, however, been better than the U.S. at protecting regimes through covert measures once they acquire power. They also use the same type of tactics as the U.S. such as instigating conflicts. When one KGB defector listed his agency's goals, he included operations in Japan for provoking distrust between the U.S. and Japan, creating a pro-Soviet lobby among the Japanese, and discouraging Tokyo from disputing Soviet control of the northern islands.

The closed nature of the Soviet society probably placed different principles and functional necessities on their intelligence apparatus. It is possible that utilizing greater human sources was more widely acceptable and perhaps even expected. Operating with less pressure on secret activities being revealed at home reduces some of the pressure and consequences caused by the exposure of operations. Comparatively, the Soviet government operated with the type of insulation that the CIA enjoyed during the 1950s.

Focusing on human spying in times of reduced spending means several things for the Clandestine Service: According to Turner, it must first appreciate that the cost of cover has increased and between twenty and thirty percent of a case officer's time.

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115ibid.
will be spent spying and collecting information. Second, it must accept the inconvenience of not having a separate CIA office in every embassy, as there was in the 1950s, because it is too easily identified. Third, the reward system should focus on the quality of the information obtained rather than on the number of agents recruited; and fourth, the type of persons brought into the system must change with the shift in targets.\textsuperscript{117} The Service has traditionally consisted of broad-ranging political scientists, but must now include those conversant with economics, linguistics, and highly technical issues.

The recently passed National Security Education Act is one step towards this end. It will help provide the new talent pool needed for the U.S. intelligence community to function in the new international environment. It sets up an endowment fund of $150 million that will encourage the next generation to think internationally by providing greater opportunities for undergraduate study abroad and language and area studies programs in American colleges and universities. It also provides new graduate fellowships in fields where there is a shortage of expertise, such as in intelligence, diplomacy, commerce, and education.\textsuperscript{118}

While many changes in the intelligence system and more appropriate implementation of covert operations are called for in the new international environment, a lasting world order has yet to be firmly established. The new era has only been in existence for a small fraction of the four decades in which the bipolarity of the Cold War era prevailed. The U.S. will probably not find absolute security in a unipolar system, yet at the same time, a multipolar world will not be void of conflict and competition either. However, unlike other powers who may be threatened by the continued emergence of nationalism and self-determination, America may remain shielded in traditional strategic terms.

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., p. 56.
Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

The articles of the Constitution of the United States of America invite a constant struggle between the executive and the legislative branches for control of foreign policy. Ultimately, the president has primary responsibility for establishing the objectives which will guide the nation during his tenure in office. Although foreign policy goals in practice are seldom completely explicit, well-defined, stable, internally consistent, or ranked according to priority, rational foreign policy making requires the decision-making authority to work out a well-defined and well-ordered set of foreign policy objectives as well as a strategy for attaining them.119 Throughout the decades of American history, these main objectives have been set forth, in part, by the enunciation of presidential doctrines.

According to the U.S. Senate, Final Report Book IV, the CIA assumed the initiative in defining the ways covert operations could advance U.S. policy objectives and in determining what kinds of operations were suited to particular policy needs.120 Not only did various objectives change the geographical emphasis of covert operations, but internal policies and organizational adjustments changed the way in which covert actions were utilized by different administrations from the first postwar president to the last Cold War president (Table 5).

Cold War Presidential Doctrines:

In bringing America out of its pre-World War II isolationism, President Harry S. Truman was successful in committing a reluctant U.S. to the reconstruction of Europe, building democracy in Germany and Japan, supporting the creation of Israel and the establishment of NATO, and proclaiming the policy of containment. Truman

made use of ideological declarations to generate support for his policies. He stated that in the postwar world a struggle was underway between "two alternative ways of life," one free and the other totalitarian. Global peace and the national security depended on American willingness "to help free peoples maintain their free institutions and national integrity" against Communist-led aggression.121 These commitments, as spelled out in the Truman Doctrine, set the precedent for American foreign policy that would later be cited and implemented by subsequent presidents. It was during Truman's presidency that the initial intelligence community structure that supported the later use of covert action developed.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, which was based on a joint congressional resolution, dealt specifically with the Middle East. In 1957, Congress granted President Dwight D. Eisenhower authority to use American armed forces in the Middle East "if the president determines the necessity...to assist any nation...requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."122 The Eisenhower administration focused its attention on Syria which had completed an agreement with the Soviet Union to receive military and economic aid. Aware of these growing ties, the administration concluded that a Communist takeover in Syria was imminent. They believed that the Syrian regime was planning aggression against neighboring states. Acting within the framework of his doctrine, in 1957 President Eisenhower announced plans to airlift arms to Jordan and assured Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon that the United States would help defend them against Communist attack or subversion.

President Eisenhower brought back presidential primacy in foreign policy. The threat posed by the Soviet Union and development of nuclear weapons combined with the Pearl Harbor legacy of surprise attack made Congress eager to leave foreign policy decisions to the president. In spite of this foreign policy consensus, and the

appearance of smooth relations between the CIA and the congressional leadership, there was much discontent within the intelligence community about the lack of efficiency and, among the liberal Democrats, about the "invisible government" aspect of the intelligence community. Eisenhower's leadership style, however, was characterized by informing rather than consulting. His major decisions that affected the later use of covert operations included accepting a cease-fire in Korea without liberating North Korea, staying out of Vietnam in 1954, using the CIA to support the coups in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, and not to support the Hungarian rebels in 1956. In his last days of office, Eisenhower cut diplomatic relations with Cuba but deferred any decisions about covert actions to the incoming administration.

As a critic of the Eisenhower administration's reliance on massive nuclear retaliation for the deterrence of Communist aggression, President John F. Kennedy declared a doctrine of flexible response. In its Cold War commitment to the defense of the free world, Kennedy proclaimed American readiness to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." Flexible response would allow the U.S. to maintain a full range of military forces in order to handle international crises from guerrilla insurgency to all-out war.

During this period, the intelligence system evolved into a massive bureaucracy, essentially untouched by external monitoring, legislative oversight, or detailed accountability. The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, for which the CIA was held accountable, is one major exception. However, it did not lead to significant internal reorganization or to more effective forms of external oversight. The construction of the Berlin wall, continuing unrest in Laos, Vietnam, and the Congo, and the Cuban missile crisis all combined to produce an atmosphere in which the intelligence system, including its covert action component, continued to be perceived as a vital instrument of American foreign policy, and secrecy and limited accountability were assumed to be required. Basic flaws in information gathering and operational

\[123\text{Ibid.}\]
features were, however, revealed. The Kennedy administration, reaffirming the
Truman Doctrine, expressed intentions of pushing forward with programs for military
superiority, flexible response, and support of regimes fighting indigenous communist-
supported revolutionary movements.

As indicated by Dr. Charles Micoleau of the Johns Hopkins University School
of Advanced International Studies, shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion President
Kennedy remarked:

Any unilateral American intervention, in the absence of an external
attack upon ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary to our
traditions and to our international obligations...our nation faces a
relentless struggle in which armies and nuclear weapons serve primarily
as a shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other
tactics steadily advance, picking off vulnerable areas one by one in
situations which do not permit our own armed intervention. The nature
of this struggle means that traditional military instruments are no longer
sufficient to protect our national security, and that as a nation we must
profit from this lesson and reexamine and reorient our forces of all
kinds, our tactics and other institutions.124

Many were surprised at the obvious role of the U.S. in the effort to overthrow the
Castro regime. The implicit suggestion that the government should actively pursue a
policy of covert political intervention was disturbing. It seemed strangely inconsistent
that a government which professed to base its foreign policy on the principles of
international law, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of conflict should
advocate such a policy.

The CIA presence in Africa was enlarged during this period after the
relinquishment of several colonies by European powers. During 1959-63, the number
of CIA stations in Africa increased by fifty-six percent.125 Paramilitary operations

124C. Micoleau, "Need for Supervision and Control of the CIA," The Central Intelligence
75-76.

125G. A. O'Toole, The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionnage (Oxford:
became the predominant form of covert action for the Clandestine Service, surpassing psychological and political operations in budgetary allocations by 1967. This paramilitary emphasis was in response to directives from the Kennedy administration to develop an unconventional warfare capability that could be used to counter Communist guerrilla activities around the world in a manner less likely to provoke a major Soviet-American military confrontation than would conventional warfare.

In Southeast Asia, the CIA became an all-purpose instrument of action like the OSS during WWII. The Agency's paramilitary operations in the region grew too large to remain covert. Harry Rositzke, former CIA officer, noted that CIA station chiefs in Saigon became semipublic figures, and other officers were often cited by name in news reports. In his opinion, the emphasis on paramilitary activities in Southeast Asia diverted the CIA from its more basic tasks: "Much useful work was done, but the covert action pressures on the CIA distorted its overall effort...." 126

Following Kennedy's assassination in 1963, President Lyndon Johnson continued the basic Cold War assumptions about containment and the need for the United States to oppose communist-inspired revolutions. The Johnson Doctrine, declared in 1965 that the U.S. would not allow the establishment of another Communist government in the western hemisphere. It was directed at the Dominican Republic, where a popular revolt had begun against the rightist Washington-backed government. Under his doctrine, Johnson sent troops to the area to help thwart the alleged Communist conspiracy.

Johnson's doctrine was largely based on the geopolitical concept of the domino theory initially spelled out under President Eisenhower. It maintained that if one nation were to succumb to Communism, then surrounding countries would become susceptible to Communist expansionism and eventually fall like a stack of dominoes - one after the other. While Eisenhower used the theory to explain how a Communist takeover in Southeast Asia would ultimately engulf all of the Far East, the Kennedy and Johnson administration cited the threat posed by Soviet and Communist Chinese

126 Ibid.
sponsored aggression in justifying the deepening U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War.

Little concern was shown at the highest levels of the Johnson administration about problems of intelligence agency policy, organization, or controls. These issues were drowned out by the political consensus of supporting a war in Southeast Asia. Some efforts at reform were attempted by members of Congress between 1963 and 1967, in the period between the limited test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and the "Spirit of Glassboro" when President Johnson met with Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. Opposition to the Vietnam War started to reduce the level of secrecy from a number of major questionable CIA covert operations and the number of proposals for increased accountability began to rise. In 1967, *Ramparts* magazine disclosed the CIA's extensive program of secretly subsidizing American private and voluntary organizations aimed at countering Soviet efforts. Among them were student, religious, labor, journalistic, literary, academic research, and publishing organizations, and almost any group with overseas programs. The most widely publicized example was the National Student Association, a student-managed organization comprised of approximately 300 member colleges in the U.S. Between 1952 and 1967, the NSA received more than $3 million in CIA funds for international programs, primarily so that the U.S. could be represented by college students at international youth conferences abroad, where the communist youth movements were strongly present.

The fact that the CIA had covertly invaded the American private sector for Cold War purposes produced a strong negative outcry of congressional, editorial, and public criticism. President Johnson, in the midst of growing opposition to the Vietnam war, ordered an end to the financing of such programs. The shock of the Tet offensive in 1968 marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War consensus in Vietnam as well as Johnson's political career. Richard M. Nixon entered the White House in January 1969 eager to reshape U.S. foreign policy. Along with his appointed national security

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advisor Henry Kissinger, he believed that there was a need to streamline the foreign affairs bureaucracy to allow for innovative and decisive policy making. Both men believed effective diplomacy rested on the exercise of power rather than abstract ideals.

Nixon formulated his foreign policy objectives on a pragmatic approach to world affairs. He introduced his doctrine at a news conference in 1969 during a stopover in Guam. It was a statement of U.S. policy meant to guide American military involvement in armed conflicts in the Third World. The doctrine outlined the parameters of U.S. support for non-Communist governments under Communist attack. Unless another major power intervened, America would not commit combat forces to the hostilities. The U.S., would furnish military and economic aid to friendly states as necessary to defeat Soviet-sponsored insurgencies, but the country under attack had to do its own fighting. Nixon contended that if a nation was unable or unwilling to defend itself then direct U.S. intervention would make little difference.

Nixon's doctrine was widely viewed as a recognition that the U.S. needed to rearrange its global defense commitments. Early in his presidential term, Nixon initiated a policy of Vietnamization, which called for a gradual U.S. troop withdrawal. Although he formulated his doctrine to address U.S. involvement worldwide, it was interpreted to apply primarily to Asia. It maintained the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the Pacific and provided for continued U.S. military and economic contributions toward Southeast Asian and Japanese defense. This vague concept of détente suggested a foreign policy of negotiation, reduced American interventionism abroad, and greater burden-sharing by U.S. allies.

One consequence of this approach was the loss of CIA immunity from unrestrained probing and criticism by the media and Congress. Disclosures about covert operations confronted the Agency with the issue of legitimacy which was heightened with the release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971.\textsuperscript{128} This document, among its other effects, engendered widespread distrust of the government's secret decision-

\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., p. 309.
making structure. President Nixon's trips to China and the Soviet Union and the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements in the early 1970s set the stage for improved relations between the two superpowers. Covert actions overseas began to diminish as a by-product of this atmosphere of greater cooperation.

Two major events of CIA covert activity contributed to the ending of CIA anonymity and its privileged secrecy. One was the disclosure of the CIA's distortion in the electoral process in Chile ending with the election of socialist Salvador Allende in 1970, and the other was the disclosure that the CIA had been engaged in domestic spying on anti-Vietnam War dissidents in violation of its legislative charter. Perhaps if U.S.-Soviet relations had been at a higher level of hostility, these operations would not have been disclosed in such detail, or at least they may have received greater congressional or public tolerance. These abuses occurred by presidential command rather than originating within the CIA leaving the Agency vulnerable in its own defense. Its position reflected the redefinition of foreign policy, the breakdown of consensus, and the evaporation of some of the basic assumptions about the Cold War.

This brief period of détente showed a redefining of relations between American, Soviet and Chinese leaders. It was characterized by trade agreements, cultural exchanges, and an array of greater communications. At the same time, Nixon's tendency for surprise and secrecy by negotiating through back-channels to avoid the State Department resulted in deep suspicions within the U.S. about the activities of the CIA and about the adequacy of arrangements for oversight, accountability and evaluation of secret operations. The ground was laid for major reform. America's entrapment in Vietnam was seen by some as a result of covert operations in Southeast Asia, and Nixon began to face a Congress that was aggressively reasserting itself. The National Commitments Resolution in the Senate in 1969 sought to limit presidential power, and was followed by the repeal of the Gulf of

129 Ibid., p. 310.
Tonkin Resolution in 1970. The Wars Powers Act, passed over presidential veto in 1973, was a major congressional challenge to the "imperial presidency."\(^{130}\)

After President Nixon resigned, Gerald R. Ford, Jr. succeeded as President of the United States. President Ford continued the broad outlines of the Nixon administration's foreign policy. In 1975, he announced a new doctrine reasserting U.S. commitment to the security and stability of the Pacific region. In providing a framework for this doctrine, Ford described the U.S. as a nation of the Pacific Basin with vital strategic and economic stakes in Asia.\(^{131}\) It set forth a series of premises which defined American strength as basic to a stable balance of power in the Pacific. The president called the U.S. partnership with Japan a pillar of American strategy in the region and said the normalization of relations with Communist China remained a paramount aim of U.S. diplomacy. Other components of the doctrine included a pledge of continued U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia; and an assertion that peace in Asia depended on settlement of political conflicts in Korea and Indochina. The doctrine concluded by stressing that U.S. national interests were served by strengthening the self-reliance and regional security of America's friends and allies in Asia.

Responding to major criticisms that had emerged from the various Congressional investigations and special studies, President Ford's intelligence reforms dealt mainly with internal organization. He replaced DCI William Colby with George Bush and charged him with the responsibility of building morale, improving the public image of the Agency, and strengthening support in Congress. The idea of plausible denial which allowed presidents to disclaim knowledge of covert operations was also abandoned.

The doctrine of President James E. Carter Jr. was not proclaimed until the end of his term at the turn of the decade. While in office, his foremost foreign policy priority was to continue the process of détente with the Soviet Union, begun under

\(^{130}\)Ibid., p. 309.
\(^{131}\)Ibid., p. 314.
President Nixon and continued by Ford. Although the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and Moscow's military assistance to leftist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia strained U.S.-Soviet relations, Carter met with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit where they signed the SALT II arms control agreement. Carter also pursued closer ties with Communist China, extending diplomatic recognition to Beijing.

Other fundamental foreign policy goals under Carter included placing emphasis on human rights in international affairs, containing the further spread of nuclear weapons and materials, and curbing both U.S. foreign arms sales and the international arms traffic. Different from the realpolitik of the Nixon/Ford administration, the chief characteristic of the Carter administration was its foundation in idealism. He defended his commitment to human rights on practical as well as moral grounds contending that it was "the soul of our foreign policy" and strengthened American influence in the Third World. He maintained it helped prevent the spread of Communist-sponsored revolutions by encouraging authoritarian regimes to end the repressive practices that fueled unrest and made societies susceptible to leftist appeals. Accordingly, he renewed proposals to increase U.S. aid to Pakistan, Oman, Morocco, the Sudan, and Egypt.

The Carter administration generally opposed the use of covert operations in the aftermath of the broad dislike with which they were viewed following the 1975 investigations. However, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter authorized the supply of clandestine support to the Mujahedeen guerrillas, sharply increased defense spending, and announced that restrictions on CIA activities would be lifted. The Carter Doctrine was initiated in January 1980 when the administration became concerned with Communist influence in the Persian Gulf region. It signified an end to détente and a reverting back to intense Cold War relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

The doctrine declared U.S. readiness to repel "by the use of any means necessary including military force" any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the gulf Region. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, the president stated to a joint session of Congress:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years, you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil-producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world....We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with the developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy.

Carter had campaigned for the presidency in 1976 promising to stop CIA abuses, but in 1980 he was still trying to pass a new charter for intelligence agencies. His primary objective through Executive Order 12036 in 1978 was to codify existing statues and executive orders, rationalize the organization of the intelligence system, place limits on the permissible behavior of secret agencies, and establish further accountability. While attempting to develop this new charter, the Carter administration and DCI Stanfield Turner were adamant on a number of points: they opposed prior

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notification of Congress regarding covert operations, objected to prohibited use of the
media, academics, and the clergy as "cover," and stressed the need for stiff sanctions
on those disclosing the names of agents.

As described by the U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and
Commitments, the order specifically prohibited only a few of the illegal covert
activities which had been the subject of the previous investigations during 1975-76.
Assassinations and conducting experiments on unwitting subjects were banned, yet the
use of American journalists and attempts to overthrow foreign governments were not.
It placed more emphasis on making government officials responsible for their actions
than on spelling out prohibitions as a means of ensuring that intelligence activities did
not violate constitutional protections at home or jeopardize U.S. foreign policies.
Physical surveillance of Americans was limited to suspected foreign agents, terrorists,
narcotics dealers and current or former intelligence employees thought to risk
exposure to the secrecy of intelligence methods and sources. The order also required
disclosure of intelligence agency sponsorship of any contracts entered into with U.S.
institutions, except for non-academic institutions where disclosure was thought to
undermine the purpose of the contract.

For the first time in its history, Congress authorized funds for the operation of
federal intelligence agencies. The amount approved for fiscal 1979 by the bill (HR
12240 - PL 95-370) was classified, but was reported to be upwards of $10 billion.
Amounts authorized for specific programs and the Intelligence committees' directives
regarding specific programs were listed in a secret annex to the conference report on
the bill. The agencies covered by the bill included the CIA, those run by the Defense
Department, relevant activities of the Departments of State, Treasure and Energy, the
FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Agency.135

The leading foreign policy objective under the administration of Ronald W.
Reagan was set forth in his State of the Union address in 1985. The Reagan Doctrine
consisted of the U.S. pledge to support indigenous anti-Communist insurgencies

135Ibid., Appendix - 9A.
battling Soviet-backed Marxist regimes in the Third World. The policy evolved out of the Reagan administration's determination to stem Soviet expansionist influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. He advocated U.S. aid to anti-Communist guerrillas as a cheaper, more politically tenable option for achieving national security aims than the direct commitment of American armed forces. He claimed the U.S. bore a special obligation to defend liberty and democracy and thus to support so-called freedom fighters. In October 1985, the New York Times reported Secretary of State George Shultz as stating explicit U.S. objectives for foreign policy and for covert action:

Can we...accept the existence of the [Nicaraguan] regime in our hemisphere even if we find its ideology abhorrent? Must we oppose it simply because it is Communist? The answer is we must oppose the Nicaraguan dictators not simply because they are Communists, but because they are Communists who serve the interests of the Soviet Union and its Cuban client, and who threaten peace in the hemisphere.\textsuperscript{136}

During Reagan's term, large covert operations in Central America and the Middle East were conducted. They also took on a new character of overt covert operations as the administration lessened the degree of secrecy in fulfilling Reagan's doctrine. Plagued with inconsistencies, the irony of bringing operations out into the open was the blatant violation and cover up of the Iran-Contra affair that resulted in the deterioration of trust between various offices and agencies.

The Reagan administration's approach was driven by 1950s' Cold War assumptions and by a concern to control terrorist activities, the international flow of narcotics, and espionage efforts within the United States by foreign intelligence services.\textsuperscript{137} International tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the early 1980s produced a political climate within the U.S. more tolerant of the intelligence agencies and of the national defense establishment in general. These wider parameters

\textsuperscript{137}Ibid.
in which secret intelligence agencies were then permitted to operate within led Reagan's intelligence advisers to draft an executive order outlining the organization, roles, functions, and limits of the intelligence system.

Although earlier drafts of the proposed new executive order were never released, leaks indicated that they proposed to authorize the use of "intrusive techniques" including searches, physical surveillance, and infiltration of domestic organizations. In its final form, Executive Order 12333 included CIA investigations and covert operations within the United States, surveillance of Americans abroad, the opening of mail in the U.S., and the CIA cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. What were seen by reformers in 1975-76 as unacceptable "abuses" were now permitted. The order did, however, prohibit other abuses such as the unlicensed infiltration of private American organizations, the inherent authority of the president to order wiretaps, and the unlimited authority to investigate leaks.

New World Order Objectives:

In mending relations in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal, Congress received more than 1,000 CIA briefings and 7,000 intelligence reports in 1991 under the presidency of George Bush. President Bush did not articulate what could be called a doctrine of his own yet he continued anti-Communist policies and endorsed the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations that followed Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985. He focused much attention toward the oil-rich countries of the middle east and, based on principle and economic necessity, he established a precedent of unalterable opposition to naked aggression by one Arab nation against another. In doing so, the Gulf War was waged resulting in stronger ties between the U.S. and major oil-suppliers. Aligning with Saudi Arabia, a state with political, economic, and social

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139Ibid.
systems so vastly different from those of the U.S., is directly contradictory to typical ideological rhetoric about supporting emerging democracies.

Carrying on a new tradition of overt covert operations, Bush furnished humanitarian aid to the Contras to keep them intact as a viable opposition force in case the Sandinistas reneged on their promises to hold free elections in Nicaragua. He also initiated the invasion of Panama to oust the Noriega regime for the stated purpose of charging the leader with drug-trafficking.

Anticipating hard economic times, the CIA under President Bush underwent major reorganization and budget cuts. While the Covert Action Task Force was established, covert actions remained a source of controversy between Congress and the executive branch and received less than one percent of the total intelligence budget. Operations focused on secretly inserting pro-U.S. propaganda into foreign media outlets, which may have been a waste of resources due to a relatively open and media-saturated world. More aggressive forms of covert action were employed to disrupt the arming of developing countries, such as North Korea, Iraq, and Pakistan. These operations have occurred too recently to see a significant amount of declassified information available for analysis. At this point, it has been left to journalists and ex-government officials to publish a certain degree of information on details of underlying U.S. objectives and motives.

Journalist John MacArthur's *Second Front* is one such publication. It exposed many tactics of censorship and propaganda carried out by the administration during the Gulf Crisis and other recent conflicts. Government policies, such as the public information policy known as "Annex Foxtrot," were explained. This particular policy was the plan that laid the principles of censorship that would shape the media's coverage of events. Its basic premise was that overseas media representatives were to be escorted at all times in order to dictate how and when troops in the Gulf could be interviewed. The first official wartime censorship since Korea, it also arranged for

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141 Ibid., p. 63.
censors to read and edit the Department of Defense's media pool material prior to being released to the rest of the press corps.

MacArthur refers to specific propaganda items fed to the American public during the crisis in order to drum up public support for the U.S. policy in the Gulf. Among them is the administration's portrayal of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as a modern day Adolf Hitler. Another was to dramatize and overstate the actions of Iraqi soldiers and their military capabilities. Both moves for a pro-war stance were made with the professional assistance of the well established and highly politically connected public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton (H & K). However, as many incidents fabricated by H & K were coming out into the open, their involvement remained hidden, therefore eliminating the influential element of propaganda from the minds of the American public.

The Bush administration argued for the continuing role of the U.S. at the center of the new world order. The initiatives taken on by the U.S. during this time not only focused on problems of a global nature, but reflected the idea that they could be handled from the top down. Some of these initiatives included: to strengthen the role of the U.N. Security Council; take decisive action in the Persian Gulf to uphold the principle of nonaggression; expedite nuclear disarmament; control the arms trade; push the Middle East peace process; and to organize humanitarian relief.142

Dividing these issues into a series of local situations, as opposed to managing them as aggregate global problems, may make them more manageable. It would also allow countries to take a more active role in determining their future as well as build the new world order from the bottom up, rather than the top down. Organizing humanitarian relief in the Third World country by country, for example, opens up an opportunity for the U.S. to encourage individual decolonizing nations to develop political and economic institutions based on the Western model. This transition from socialism to capitalism not only represents ideological change, but opens up new

markets and economic possibilities. At the same time, the problems of the Third World seem less and less of a priority to the U.S. without the threat of spreading Soviet influence.

President Bill Clinton came to the White House with much less international experience than previous presidents at a time when Americans were demanding more government attention on domestic issues. Although he was faced with addressing smaller conflicts around the world, Clinton inherited a more peaceful world in terms of a direct military threat to the security of the U.S. Immediately challenged with ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, his actions would set the standard for addressing other situations and the effectiveness of vital international institutions such as the E.C., the Atlantic Alliance, and the United Nations. Justifying an intervention, Clinton resurrected the domino theory that propelled the U.S. to intervene in Indochina: that instability in the region would spread to other countries thereby endangering the U.S.

Under the same logic, Clinton argued that America's interests required the U.S. to build a world order shaped by U.S. values. "The choice," he said, "is between unstable, highly nationalistic states with centralized and potentially oppressive governments, on the one hand, and democratic states on the other. If America fails in its responsibilities, we will miss an opportunity to create a more democratic and stable world." 143 While a new doctrine is still "inchoate," according to Dr. Stephen John Stedman, Assistant Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a few facets are visible and suggests that the U.S. may be taking on a more crusading, interventionist role in world affairs. 144

Stedman believes that the last two years, have witnessed a series of events, precedents, incremental decisions and policy rationales which are developing this new doctrine in U.S. foreign policy. The precepts of the developing doctrine chafe at traditional notions of sovereignty, remain contradictory, and may lead international

actors into domains that they are ill-equipped to handle.\textsuperscript{145} Much of its focus is on tempering internal conflicts and civil wars which typically have unique dynamics that may render the U.N., an increasingly chosen vehicle for action, unwilling and without resources to handle sufficiently.

The reasons for this position of interventionism goes back to the conviction that America's prosperity in the new world order depends upon international economic interdependence and that a precondition for economic interdependence is the geopolitical stability and reassurance that result from America's security commitments. With this continuing prerogative on economic interests, the U.S. must maintain a military protectorate in economically critical regions to ensure that America's trade and financial relations will not be disrupted by political upheaval. Instead of subscribing to the view that free trade automatically creates a natural harmony of interests among states, American foreign policy makers appear to still rely on a degree of military power to \textit{impose} harmony so that free trade can take place. As then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated in September 1992:

\begin{quote}
The United States cannot afford to step down from our world leadership role because, simply stated, the worldwide market that we're part of cannot thrive where regional violence, instability, and aggression put it at peril. Our economic well-being and our security depend on a stable world in which the community of peaceful democratic nations continues to grow. Hostile and anti-democratic regimes must know that aggression is a risk that will not pay.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

New world order policy objectives based on pacification, stability, and economic interdependence will expand U.S. vulnerabilities and limits of insecurity, therefore necessitating a greater number of security commitments. The U.S. must now not only protect itself against threats to American interests, but also against threats to the security of others. According to a draft of the \textit{Defense Planning Guidance}, the

\textsuperscript{145}Ibid.
U.S. postwar world strategy is, in part, to "retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."

The assumption is that the world will become disorderly if the U.S. cannot solve others' security problems. Other nations would then have to build up their own capabilities which might significantly challenge the U.S. role as a world leader.

This leaves the focus of clandestine operations on monitoring the internal political situations of other countries to ensure that leaders with democratic ideals - or at least those that allow U.S. capitalist endeavors to flourish within their borders - remain in power. To further utilize the domino theory rationalization, the U.S. will have to ensure stability not only in Europe and East Asia, but in practically all regions of the globe. While it appeared that Islamic fundamentalism might replace the previous threat of communism, alliances between the U.S. and the Gulf seems to have kept it in check. Without a dominant ideology opposing America's values, operatives will need to be more aware of other types of threats to leadership and stability. Here, the use of more human resources can be applied to assess the domestic attitudes of the people, as well as monitor developments of local political organizations and parties. Of course, those operations already underway for reasons we may not yet know may be discovered in due time.

\[147\text{Ibid., pp. 14-15.}\]
### Table 5

**Presidential Doctrines and Covert Action Changes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President, Focus of Doctrine, Geopolitical Target</th>
<th>H. Truman</th>
<th>D. Eisenhower</th>
<th>J. Kennedy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Outlined strategy for containing Communism</td>
<td>Supported nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any Communist-controlled country</td>
<td>Expressed intentions for flexible response; reaffirmed Truman Doctrine, continued supporting regimes fighting Communist-supported revolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical Target</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Southeast Asia, Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage and Application</td>
<td>Infrequent Use</td>
<td>Frequent Use</td>
<td>Frequent Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secrecy of Operations</td>
<td>Little Disclosure</td>
<td>Little Disclosure</td>
<td>Little Disclosure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Oversight</td>
<td>Minimal Informal</td>
<td>Minimal Formal</td>
<td>Minimal Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Oversight</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of Major Intelligence Reforms</td>
<td>Formation of CIA</td>
<td>Growth of Agency</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability / Notion of Plausible Denial</td>
<td>Maintained</td>
<td>Maintained</td>
<td>Maintained</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President, Focus of Doctrine, Geopolitical Target</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Aimed to prevent establishment of Communist government in Western Hemisphere</td>
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<td>R. Nixon</td>
<td>Recognized need to rearrange defense policies; outlined limits of U.S. military support for non-Communist governments under Communist attack</td>
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<td>G. Ford</td>
<td>Reasserted commitment to security and stability in Pacific region for economic and strategic interests</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic; Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines, Indonesia; Asia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Usage and Application</td>
<td>Infrequent Use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secrecy of Operations</td>
<td>More Disclosure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Oversight</td>
<td>Increased Informal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congressional Oversight</td>
<td>Increased</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation of Major Intelligence Reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability / Notion of Plausible Denial</td>
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<td>Maintained</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abandoned</td>
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Table 5, cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President, Focus of Doctrine, Geopolitical Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. Carter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared U.S. readiness to repel outside forces by any means, including military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>R. Reagan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pledged to support indigenous anti-Communist insurgencies battling Soviet-backed regimes in the Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa; Asia; Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Bush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraged reform in Soviet Union to end Cold War relations and begin New World Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-Rich Nations of the Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usage and Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent Use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequent Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader Application</td>
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Table 5 - Summary

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Acceptance of Interventionism

Although the jurisdiction of any state is territorial and limited to its own domain, many states' foreign policies involve other states in order to satisfy their interests at home. When such interests demand that a more friendly or more amenable, radical or conservative government is needed in another state to better serve the interests of the first one, then the temptation to subvert the other state is strong. Problems arise when such interventions are complicated by prevailing opinions in the target country which could prevent such actions from taking place. At the same time, those opinions can be swayed with the effective use of propaganda, therefore making the general attitude and mood of a given country an asset for covert operations rather than a liability.

The actual decision to intervene, as well as when and how, rely on current international norms and national incentives. As the collective voice of the international community, it depends both on what the United Nations says and on what its member states want. Both of these determinants are shifting in the aftermath of the Cold War.

National Incentives:

One of the choices facing any society is the balance between foreign and security policy, on the one side, and domestic needs and demands, on the other. During the Cold war, the requirements of national security and global leadership were primary, and domestic needs were correspondingly neglected to a certain degree. The result, as witnessed by the election of the "domestic president," is a new demand for a domestic agenda. As James Sebenius and Peter Peterson, former Secretary of Commerce, stated in Rethinking America's Security:

After four decades of the Cold War, failure to make progress on a "domestic agenda" now threatens American long-term national
security more than the external military threats that have traditionally preoccupied security and foreign policy...failure to invest in productive capacity, research and development, and infrastructure; the crisis in American education; the exploding underclass, and other domestic problems may have greater direct impact [on American institutions and values than the threats from abroad] which have traditionally preoccupied the national security community.\textsuperscript{148}

Part of their argument is that the U.S. has become 'a choiceless society, substituting denial and rhetoric for meaningful action.' The result has been a spiral of deficits and debts accompanied by decline in area of public provision and policy. The United States faces a major crisis in health care, and has a worsening social crisis in which over thirty million Americans live below the poverty line, and in which large segments of its population continue to be deprived of adequate opportunities for economic advancement. The education system also has major deficiencies which have spread to the university level. Some of these difficulties confronting the U.S. provide a rationale for a significant change in national priorities away from foreign and security policy towards domestic issues.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been an emergence of an 'America First' type of thinking based on the proposition that there is a domestic imperative which can no longer be ignored. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe commented in a 1991 issue of the \textit{Washington Post}, the United States keeps "looking overseas when our biggest long-term threats are at home."\textsuperscript{149} This 'America First' attitude was evident not only in Clinton's platform while running as a presidential candidate, but also in Pat Buchanan's and Ross Perot's. With this type of sentiment, the motivations for intervention in the new world era must take on a new character.

\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., p. 10.
Michael Mandelbaum, professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies believes that the age-old motives for intervention have become extinct in the post-Cold War world. He acknowledges the search for economic gain as one such historical motive. As opposed to today's market economies that profit more from international trade and investment in countries than direct political control over them, empires were established to conquer for wealth. Another motive for intervention was glory. Just as for Christopher Columbus, a great adventure was the conquest of alien lands in the name of a sovereign. The most powerful and enduring motive for intervention, says Mandelbaum, has been that of security. During the Cold War, American intervention was driven almost exclusively by the rivalry with the Soviet Union to protect strategic geopolitical regions. In the new order, the forces that have historically driven the governments of the powerful states to intervene have disappeared. For the U.S., the motive for intervention in the post-Cold War era is justified neither by economic gain (in the sense of conquering and controlling), glory, or strategic calculation. The new justification is sympathy.

Sympathy is a powerful human emotion but whether it should be a decisive motive in the conduct of foreign policy is doubtful. Americans typically approve of involvement abroad to relieve suffering under the misunderstanding that the forces would be able to stay out of local politics. Some of the findings of a frequent survey of the American public and of elite opinion makers sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations indicate changes in America's attitude toward foreign interventions. The data is extracted from a survey conducted by the Gallop Organization between October and November 1990, supplemented by selected 1991 Gallop opinion polls and surveys from the National Opinion Research Center. During the period, 1,662 men and women were interviewed in person. Three hundred

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151 Ibid., p. 16.
seventy-seven (377) leaders were interviewed either in person or by telephone. The leadership sample included officials from the Bush administration, Congress, international business, labor, the media, academic and religious organizations, and special interest groups.

In the 1986 survey, the Council concluded that Americans were giving foreign affairs an increasingly high priority compared to domestic issues, yet by an unspecified amount. They affirmed their desire for a stronger U.S. role in the world and remained preoccupied with a military confrontation with the Soviet Union. As the Soviet threat was diminishing, the public ranked the Soviet Union fourth in favorability on its "feeling thermometer" (Table 6) in terms of warmth or coolness toward various countries, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev enjoyed a popular regard that placed him as one of the three most highly esteemed world leaders, even ahead of President Bush. As they did in the 1986 survey, the American public and leaders indicated in the first survey representative of the post-Cold War environment that they wanted the U.S. to continue playing an active role in world affairs, yet with a sense of awareness toward economic vulnerability.

The two studies also indicated a change in the domestic mood of the nation and a substantial shift in foreign-policy goals. When asked to identify the two or three biggest foreign-policy goals, support for defending weaker nations against aggression and for defense of human rights was up - possibly due to the publicity surrounding Iraq's seizure of Kuwait. However, bringing a democratic form of government to other nations, which would, in part, employ the use of covert operations, ranked at the bottom of the list (Table 7). Both the public and the leaders felt that domestic problems were the greatest issues facing the country. Among the individual items of concern, drug abuse and the budget deficit lead the public's list, while the budget deficit and the state of the economy were the top priorities on the leader's list. Uncertainty about industrial competitiveness also ranked high. Not surprisingly, dependence on foreign oil was still considered a significant foreign-policy problem.\footnote{ibid., p. 94.}
Despite the preoccupation with domestic issues, almost two-thirds of the public continued to favor an active U.S. role in the world (Table 8). Awareness of global interdependence grew substantially as more Americans realized that foreign policy makes a major impact on the overall economy, including food and gasoline prices. The perception of America's role in the world also changed. In the 1986 study, the proportion who believed that America played a more powerful role in the world rose, while the proportion who perceived a less-influential U.S. role declined. The recent study indicates more balanced numbers. A decline in the priority of the U.S.-Soviet military confrontation was replaced with an increase in importance of economic issues. The perceived magnitude of U.S. economic problems, coupled with the growing economic power of Europe and Japan has lowered expectations about the U.S. global role. In the past, the U.S. role was closely linked with the public's impression of the military balance with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War brought an understandable drop in support for security alliances, and stationing troops in Europe, and for military interventions in general. Most representative of this attitude in the post-Cold War era was the American public's response to the death of 18 soldiers in Somalia during October 1993: a widespread demand to withdraw all American forces from the area.

A growing awareness of economic and social challenges at home will probably lead most Americans to be selective in supporting U.S. overseas interventions in the remainder of the 1990s. Although there is no longer a clear rationale for intervention as there was during the Cold War, a new approach has emerged: humanitarian intervention. The Gulf War is believed to serve as a model for a new system of global collective security. In response to Iraqi attacks on its Kurdish population the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 688 which set important precedents. It allowed that an act of internal aggression may be deemed a threat to international order, and is interpreted as establishing humanitarian intervention in a state's affairs as a legitimate
response of the international community. The Gulf War and the subsequent protection of the Iraqi Kurds provided the basis for Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, as well as the legal rationale for the 22,000 U.N. troops providing humanitarian relief in Bosnia.

Humanitarian intervention by the U.S. for its own sake is a noble idea, yet hard to swallow. Inevitably, the task of alleviating suffering involves political consequences when the suffering has political causes. The U.S. involvement in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia was seemingly to alleviate the suffering and starvation of civilians. Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq turned into the maintenance of a de facto autonomous zone for the Kurds. They were protected from Saddam Hussein by the U.S. military presence in neighboring Turkey and by the enforcement of a no-fly zone directed at Iraqi warplanes. In Somalia, famine relief turned into counterinsurgency. The U.S. became involved in measures to prevent famine from returning which meant trying to disarm the factions whose wars had disrupted the food supply. In Bosnia, stopping the suffering meant stopping the war; and stopping the war meant devising a political settlement.

Each of these interventions involved either identifying and protecting territorial boundaries or ensuring the placement and operation of a government. Thus, intervention undertaken for "purely humanitarian" reasons is likely to lead to two political tasks: guaranteeing a country's borders, and constructing a government apparatus in places where it is absent. The first challenge not only calls for the relief of suffering, but requires deciding which groups are entitled to sovereignty. The second involves choosing who to run a government, and how. In this second task, the U.S. can call on its Cold War experience in placing and replacing people to positions of power.

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When the U.S. has been involved in these types of political conflicts, it has applied its policies inconsistently. Washington supported the territorial integrity of Somalia, although a secessionist movement was active in the northern part of the country. The U.S. initially insisted upon the territorial integrity of Bosnia within its former borders as a constituent of republic of Yugoslavia. Yet the American government eventually accepted the disintegration of Yugoslavia itself, which it had received international recognition for nearly 75 years. Later, the Clinton administration accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan for Bosnia, which effectively partitioned what the administration had publicly insisted was a single sovereign state. In northern Iraq, the U.S. did not recognize any formal Kurdish claim to independence in order to maintain good relations with Turkey. However, the Kurdish population in Iraq are virtually independent in all but name. The U.S. is unlikely to find a consistent approach, yet even on a case by case basis, the goal of intervention must be clearly defined with a coherent strategy and a keen sense of timing.

International Norms:

The international norm, as determined by customary law, generally accepted principles, and international treaties, has long been against intervention in another's domestic domain. One of the key duties of states is the respect for sovereignty coupled with the prohibition of intervention in the affairs of any other state in the international community. Although the word intervention itself may imply a negative action, there are several legal forms of intervention that are generally accepted among nations. Included among them are:

1. By treaty vis-à-vis another state. One example of this type is the treaty concluded between the two countries in 1921 that granted the Soviet Union a discretionary right of military intervention in Iran if certain Russian interests in Iran were viewed by the Soviet government as "menaced." Although in 1979

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156 Ibid., p. 13.
the Iranian government announced its unilateral discontinuance of the two articles in the treaty granting the Soviet Union a right of intervention, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan can be interpreted to fall into this category. The Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness and Cooperation signed by the USSR and Afghanistan in 1978 allowed the parties to take appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries;

2. If a state seriously violates generally accepted rules of customary or conventional law. Thus, if a belligerent proceeded to violate the rights of neutral states during a conflict, the neutrals would have rights of intervention against the violating belligerent state;

3. Collective intervention undertaken by an international organ on behalf of the community of nations or for the principles and rules of international law. This has been claimed to apply to both preventive and remedial action undertaken on behalf of or by the agencies of such bodies as the U.N. Military intervention at the order of the U.N. or an organization under the Charter, is viewed as a rightful intervention. The U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 is legally considered a collective intervention since it was determined that they were responding to a request to take part in the action initiated by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS);

4. If the citizens of a state are mistreated in another state. The former has a right to intervene on behalf of its citizens after all available peaceful remedies have been exhausted. This rationale was also used by President Reagan in the invasion on Grenada, claiming that Americans were threatened by the political upheaval in the country;
5. *If an invitation has been extended by a lawful government of a state.*

Examples of this type include the landing of American Marines in Lebanon in 1958; the sending of U.S. troops in Jordan following charges that the United Arab Republic was intervening in their internal affairs; and the intervening of British forces in Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya at the request of the respective African governments in 1964. A widely known example of this category includes the U.S. intervention in the Vietnam conflict. Under traditional international law, the intervention would have qualified as a legitimate assistance rendered to a friendly, recognized government at the latter's request, whereas the North Vietnamese activities of aiding the rebels, would have constituted an unlawful use of force unless they went to war against South Vietnam. Since the civil war was supported, on the rebel side, from the outside, third parties may assist the incumbent government. In the case of South Vietnam, six countries sent combat forces: the U.S., South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.

6. *Under situations of self-defense.* Some writers argue that the initial stages of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon represented an act of rightful intervention, on the basis of the objectives stated by invaders. They aimed to drive concentrations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from the Lebanese border regions into the interior in order to rid Israel of continuing attacks across its borders.\(^{157}\)

Dilemmas surrounding these generally accepted forms of intervention are enough to consider without the questionable nature of subversive interventions. There is a legal obligation to abstain from such intervention and respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all other states. Article 2 (7) of the U.N.

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Charter denies the organization authority "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." At the same time, there is an equal obligation embedded in the U.N. Charter to seek the realization of principles of respect for human rights and the self-determination of peoples. The duty to abstain from intervention is firmly grounded in rules of customary law as well as several multilateral treaties, yet many of the obligations relating to human rights and self-determination lack this acceptance in practice. In formulating policy, this leaves questions as to under what conditions should such principles be upheld, and which groups should be supported in the event of civil strife.

The independence movements of the Cold War brought into conflict two strongly held international principles: the sanctity of existing borders and the right to national self-determination. International boundaries were generally maintained throughout the Cold War based on the status quo. The international community, being comprised of sovereign states, shunned secessionist movements since they understandably wanted to protect their own self-interests. However, that norm has not been upheld in the post-Cold War era thus far. In the latter half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, boundaries all over the world were drawn arbitrarily and typically without the consent of the governed. Those boundaries had continued to be accepted largely because there was no prospect of overturning them in a strongly bipolar world with two superpowers that more or less controlled this type of political upheaval.

The second principle had a persuasive rationale, as well: basing the state on the nation, tribe, or other primary group for internal cohesion and stability. Yet that principle also cannot be applied consistently. If every distinct group were given its own state, the international community would divide and subdivide until there were two, three, or four times the current number of United Nations members.

Thus far, according to von Glahn, Political Science Professor Emeritus at the University of Minnesota, no state has a right to intervene in order force compliance by

\footnote{Ibid., p. 237.}
another state in regard to human rights. The U.N has also recognized the duty to abstain from subversive intervention with the intent to promote rebellion, sedition, or treason. The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution in 1947 condemning all forms of seditious propaganda likely to provoke threats to peace. In 1949, and again in 1950, the Assembly urged all states to refrain from any threats or acts aimed at fomenting civil war or subverting the will of the people in any other state. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have ironically been among the greatest condemners of such actions.

Although widely accepted in theory, the norm of nonintervention was frequently violated in practice during the Cold War. The U.S. and the Soviet Union intervened militarily, both overtly and covertly, in the domestic affairs of nations all over the world. These interventions could be somewhat justified by the ideological cause in which they championed. While supporting leftist interventions in Latin America, the Soviet Union criticized the American utilization of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, and Radio Marti as illegal and subversive capitalist enterprises. By all criteria applicable, their existence was a violation of international law since they were in fact partly covertly funded by the CIA.

As the world came to be dominated by two nuclear superpowers polarized along ideological lines, the norm of nonintervention became increasingly popular. It was even stronger due to the presence of nuclear weapons which gave superpower intervention the potential for global annihilation. In 1945, the U.S. was the only nation possessing nuclear weapons. In late 1976, there were at least six nations which admitted to have such weapons - the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, France, China, and India. It was widely believed that Israel also possessed some nuclear warheads. The number of nations with nuclear capabilities had doubled about every eleven years.
Writing in 1978, Deutsch calculated that at this rate, over one hundred countries would have such abilities by 2050.\footnote{Ibid., p. 287.}

Despite the presence of nuclear weapons, the international norm of nonintervention experienced a dramatic change evidenced by the U.N. recognition of the repression of Iraqi citizens during the Gulf War. U.N. secretary-general Boutros Boutros Ghali's predecessor Javier Perez de Cuellar remarked that the world was "clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."\footnote{M. Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," Foreign Policy, No. 95 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), p. 13.}

Two reasons for that shift emerged as Cold War tensions were easing and one of the main purposes of maintaining the norm to begin with was eliminated. With the collapse of communism, there are no longer two superpowers trying to impose their own models of legitimacy on others. This has resulted in greater consensus on a manner of domestic order. The second reason for a shift in attitudes toward intervention is the increasing acceptance of the protection of individual rights as an international norm. However, it appears that this new stance is directly contradictory to national sovereignty because it encourages intervention in the name of protecting individual rights from violations by their own governments. The question is whether this new attention on individual rights is justifiable for intervention since the international community is comprised of states, not individuals.

Intervention seems to be a consequence of the perpetually unequal distribution of power in the international community. The strong have always intervened in the affairs of the weak, and typically for the same reasons. In the post-Cold War era, the world has favored dispatching U.N. peacekeepers in response to conflicts over respecting sovereignty. The list of peacekeeping operations, the number of troops involved, and the size of the U.N. peacekeeping budget all have increased substantially since the end of the Cold War. There have been some successes where the parties
want peace but distrust each other too much to achieve it. In the Golan Heights and in
Cyprus, for instance, the U.N. has played the role of impartial witness, ensuring that
both sides are following through with what they have promised. However, when the
parties in dispute are not willing to carry out the terms of an agreement, a more
formidable military force is needed to assure compliance.

The U.N. is not prepared for such responsibility. It is a fundamental problem
inherent in the nature of the organization which does not allow for military
enforcement of its authority. Therefore, it is up to individual member states to carry
out the will of the international community as reflected by their representative
organization. Undoubtedly, each state must take their national interests into account
when making such decisions. This has resulted in a distinctive pattern in the
international community regarding intervention: agreement in principle, paralysis in
practice.\textsuperscript{164} During the Cold War the international community was divided on its
response. Today, it cannot reach a consensus on how to accomplish what it has
agreed upon.

The difficulty in developing humanitarian or human rights laws will directly
affect the future attitude towards interventions justified by humanitarian concerns. The
Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States was signed by
thirty-five participating states in Helsinki in 1975. It was initiated by the Soviet Union
and its Warsaw Pact allies in 1954 as the European Conference on Security and
Cooperation. Eventually the U.S. and Canada became parties to the talks. Although
the document turned out to be a statement of intent rather than a legally binding treaty,
it addressed the issue of human rights in Section VIII. Also referred to as the Final
Act, the agreement mentioned respect for existing borders; refrain from the threat or
use of force against any state; and refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, in
the internal or external affairs of other states.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{164}Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{165}G. von Glahn, \textit{Law Among Nations} (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
1992), p. 244.
The document resulting from a follow-up conference held in Belgrade in 1977 made no mention of Section VIII. With the breakdown of East-West relations in the early 1980s, further agreements dealing with human rights and intervention were put on hold. Finally, a conference held in Vienna between 1986 and 1989 resulted in the adoption of a human rights and security agreement by consensus of the thirty-five original signer of the Helsinki Accords. The process was implemented by three conferences held in 1990: the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe; the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension; and the Paris Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The first two addressed economic issues and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of the child, while the Paris conference resulted in two major agreements: The first was a major weapons reduction treaty with a secondary agreement disclaiming any future aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. The second, termed the Charter of Paris, was a declaration by the signatories that the Cold War had ended and future relations between them would be based on respect and cooperation.166

Since then, the U.N. has been even more overextended and underhanded. According to Professor Stedman, during the last three years it has been involved in 14 peace missions - the same number of missions as undertaken in all its preceding 43 years. The estimated cost of peacekeeping has grown from $750 million in 1991 to $2.9 billion in 1992, of which member nations have contributed only $2 billion. Part of the reason for the dramatic increase is the expansion of duties: the U.N. is now expected to extend protection to noncombatants and food convoys, to supervise, monitor and sometimes run elections, to oversee land reform, to document war crimes and, if need be, to provide order when societies and governments break down.167

The new guiding principle of interventionism - the international community's obligation to intervene wherever a state or group within a state fails to meet the humanitarian needs of its people - will most likely face the same problem of

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166 Ibid., p. 245.
inconsistency as the Cold War principles. To enforce them consistently would dictate intervention in every civil war. Since potential cases far outnumber the available resources, interventions will probably continue to be selective with the moral justifications applied unevenly depending on the degree of threat to international security. Another inherent problem, however, is that the decisions of the U.N. can still be swayed by the interests of a few - or one.

As the values and interests of intervention become clarified, so too will the quality of available policy instruments. The end of bipolarity significantly reduces the ability of the U.S. to influence former internal allies. Those parties may be able to accomplish their goals through other means or more open utilization of available institutions and process. Since rival factions will no longer be equipped by the superpowers, they could rely on bordering states, for example, which have other incentives for arming warring sides. This could not be the case, however, on the island of Haiti where humanitarian intervention led to a military undertaking requiring the restoration of functioning government institutions weakened under the pressures of war. Surprisingly soon after the conflict, even the British Broadcasting Center (BBC) hinted at U.S. covert support of the rightist party. The details of which will undoubtedly be revealed when the situation settles and is no longer front page news.

Utilizing covert action as a policy instrument is not congruous with the new character of humanitarian intervention, especially if the intervention has the support of the general public and is, at least in part, being conducted overtly. More open measures have a greater likelihood of mobilizing public support and building a sense of national pride for relieving some of the suffering in the world. Unfortunately many are unaware of the U.S. policy positions that help contribute to that condition in the first place.

168 Ibid., p. 9.
Table 6

Country Thermometer Ratings

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Table 7

Foreign Policy Goals Considered "Very Important"
1990/91

Table 8

Public Attitude of U.S. Role in World Affairs

<table>
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<th>Year Surveys Conducted</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>40</td>
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Considerations of Morality

Since the decision to employ covert intervention involves considerable risks in comparison with other policy instruments, it requires a deeper appreciation of the principles governing the employment of such operations, a recognition of their limitations and capabilities, and a more realistic appraisal of the contribution which they can make to national aims. The prospects for the success of a secret operation must be carefully weighed against the costs of failures. While moral considerations are just one component of the decision making process, the mishandling of unsuccessful or extremely unethical operations could have serious side effects both at home and abroad. Not only does the secret nature of covert actions violate the constitution, but risks of their disclosure may lead to public controversy requiring government justification.

Constitutional Violations

The articles of the American Constitution are embedded in the moral ideals and attitudes of its founders. While America has undergone a multitude of changes since independence, its democratic ways remain firmly planted in the original moral foundations of the Constitution. The use of covert activities through a permanent secret intelligence system within this constitutional framework creates special policy dilemmas, especially in a current political culture suspicious of government secrecy. While the very existence of such a system challenges the basis of an open democratic society, any of its subsequent activities are bound to create an equal amount of controversy. This raises serious questions as to the applicability of moral considerations in choosing covert action as a means to accomplish foreign policy prerogatives.
The Cold War's hostile political climate allowed policy makers to adopt, and led the public to accept, restraints on freedom unprecedented in peacetime. By statute, executive order, regulation, judicial decision, and simple practice, Americans were deprived of many constitutional rights as wartime traditions became institutionalized. The most entrenched legacy of the Cold War is a carefully structured system of controls on government information. These secret agencies, secret budgets, secret documents, and secret decisions affecting issues of life and death, war and peace, run directly contrary to the constitutional design for an open and accountable government.

As Senator Daniel Moynihan stated in his assessment of the impact of the Cold War on American life and politics, "The secrecy system protects intelligence errors, it protects officials from criticism. Even with the best of intentions the lack of public information tends to produce errors; the natural correctives - public debate, academic criticism - are missing." The system also undermines the protection of political speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment and erodes due process and privacy rights.

In the name of national security, the CIA still censors the writings of former intelligence officials and regularly deletes information important to public scrutiny. When claims of national security are made, the courts consistently defer to executive authority therefore compromising due process. In the name of foreign policy, the government also restricts information to impair the ability of Americans to influence that policy. In order to maintain a low level of public awareness regarding U.S. foreign policies towards specific countries, citizens are not free to travel on their U.S. passports to certain "enemy countries" declared off-limits on foreign policy grounds. In 1978, Congress amended this Passport Act to prohibit the government from imposing such restrictions, yet the executive branch continues to use the economic embargo laws to ban travel regardless of the lack of congressional endorsement of the policy.

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171 Ibid., p. 130-131.
The Cold War also intensified the unconstitutional practice of government surveillance of persons and groups in America. To punish political dissent, opponents of American policy in El Salvador and the Middle East, for instance, were - and still are - harassed and subjected to secret counterintelligence investigations.172 Under a 1981 executive order still in force in 1991, Americans are even subject to secret searches of their homes and offices if the attorney general asserts they are agents of foreign powers. During the 1980s, the "Library Awareness Program" was initiated whereby librarians were recruited to spy on their borrowers. This meant reporting library users who showed an interest in high-technology literature, regardless of the fact that it was freely available and nonclassified information.

The current classification system has also served as an effective means of preventing public, as well as congressional, access to vital information. The system is based on a 1951 executive order issued by President Truman. It institutionalized the WWII system of military secrecy and, under presidential control, was applied to civilian agencies. After slight modifications by President Eisenhower and the general growth of American bureaucracy over the years, a vast overclassification of government information has resulted. According to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), established through the NSC to oversee the government's information security program, a total of 6,796,501 items were classified in fiscal year 1989. However, from 1986 to 1989, only an estimated three percent of classified documents were marked with an intended date for declassification.173

The right to declassify information rests on executive order and is limited by judicial review. By enacting the Freedom of Information Act in 1966, Congress attempted to get involved in the executive's determination of what particular information should be kept secret. However, few courts are willing to overrule the judgment of the executive branch, especially when issues of national security are believed to be at stake.

172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., p. 131.
The declaration of a new world order presents an opportunity to eradicate some of these Cold War justifications for eroding constitutionally guaranteed liberties. It is clear that the same type of threats no longer exist and cannot, therefore, be used to justify the same limits on liberty and constitutional procedures. Recent developments suggest that these rights may again be granted, or at least attempts are being made towards that end. Congress appears to be reasserting its role in foreign policy matters and limiting executive branch discretion. Not only have there been significant proposals for intelligence reform through the Boren and McCurdy bills, but changes in seemingly outdated legislation are also occurring. Some of these include the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act that barred Communists and others from admission to the U.S. on ideological grounds; an amendment to the economic embargo laws prohibiting the government from regulating the flow of people and informational materials; and renewed proposals to disclose the budget of the intelligence agencies.174

As of 1990, the CIA was still authorized by the CIA Act of 1949 to transfer and receive funds from other government agencies with only the approval of the Office of Management and Budget. This secrecy is another violation of a fundamental check on the federal government provided by the Constitution:

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.175

This provision makes clear the Framers’ intent to protect the right of the people to know how their money is being spent. The courts, however, have refused to hear legal challenges to budgetary secrecy. As Jeane Woods, legislative council for the Center for National Security Studies in Washington D.C. reports, the Supreme Court in 1974 ruled in United States V. Richardson that a federal taxpayer could not sue the

174ibid.
government on the ground that secret CIA funding violated the accounting clause. Three years later in Harrington v. Bush, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said that members of the House had no standing to bring an action challenging the funding and reporting provisions of the CIA Act of 1949. The issue was revived in August 1990 when the Senate Committee on Intelligence agreed to hold public hearings in the next Congress on whether to disclose an aggregate figure for the intelligence activities and fully reconsider whether the changed circumstances in the world should result in a change in policy.

While some changes are occurring, the observer must be careful not to establish unrealistic expectations for the full return of adherence to constitutional rights and privileges. Even before the onset of the Cold War constitutional issues were raised in the belief that rights had been violated in one way or another - the proof is in the fact that the Constitution has been amended twenty-six times since its signing. The potential for problems appears to be inherent in the document itself which seems to proclaim a country and people characterized by a level of morality that not even their ancestors can reach.

The challenges facing intelligence in the new world order may lead to further violations as agencies are busy identifying new enemies based on an expanded definition of national security that justify their continued existence and funding. The prospect of greater focus on economic espionage raises some debate. In August 1990, Senator Bill Bradley spoke out strongly against redirecting counterintelligence programs to technological secrets. Citing Bush's March 1990 Statement of National Security Strategy in which such a focus was suggested, Bradley warned that "economic espionage must not become a pretext for a new program of counterintelligence surveillance of either foreigners or Americans." The existing system of intelligence collection and counterespionage has imposed a significant cost on democratic process and individual liberty. Whether these infringements were ever


177 Ibid., p. 142.
necessary to protect the country in the Cold War era is debatable; it is absolutely clear, however, that the national security apparatus has no legitimate role in protecting private enterprise from foreign competition."\textsuperscript{178}

Halperin and Woods suggest making the elimination of impediments to democratic decision making a high priority in the new order. Among other things, they recommend reaffirming Congress's constitutionally mandated authority in the conduct of foreign affairs; making the information available to Congress (and to the public) that is necessary for it to exercise its authority; ending restrictions on the free flow of information and ideas across U.S. borders; and restoring the First Amendment, due process, and privacy rights that have been circumscribed in the name of national security. Massive education would probably be necessary as these changes occur since the perceived need for limitations on domestic freedom became almost ingrained in the American psyche during the Cold War.

\textbf{Public Disclosure and Controversy:}

Since the responsibility for covert intelligence operations are under a select number of officials, it is essential that they have a complete understanding of the kind of animal they are dealing with. Former member of the Church Committee Gregory Treverton believes that there are two primary questions policy makers should ask prior to deciding to implement covert actions: What if the operation becomes public; and what if the first intervention does not succeed.\textsuperscript{179} In relation to the first question, most covert actions were conceived in secrecy and began small so the initial assumption of covertness was reasonable. What does not seem to have been considered is that sometimes operational necessities would require them to grow. That meant more officers visible in foreign lands, more airfields or training bases, more meetings in Washington, more channels for passing money, and more propaganda

\textsuperscript{178}\textit{Ibid.}
assets - all of which diminished the chances that operations would remain secret and unchallenged by opposition on moral grounds.

Major covert actions tend to become public sooner or later, and sometimes even before the operation is over. This was especially true in the post-Vietnam and Watergate era when people were less trusting of government decisions. As paramilitary operations in Guatemala and Angola became larger they began to attract more attention. The utilization of these bases in foreign countries, arms shipments, and training by CIA officers was difficult to keep secret for a long period of time. Inquiries were then made by journalists who received leaked information from participants in the operation. Several brief and smaller interventions did manage to stay secret for some significant amount of time. Many of the operations that took place during the 1950s, for example, remained quiet. For instance, the actions against Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno were not fully disclosed until recently, and details of the CIA's secret war in Tibet are still not completely declassified.

Later operations, such as in Chile and Cuba, were also granted extended periods of secrecy. Track II was not revealed for five years after it happened, and the plots to assassinate Castro stayed hidden for ten. The election operations in Chile were kept secret even though they were large compared to the size of the electorate and the amounts of money spent in the campaign. This intervention was concentrated with much of the advance planning done without diverting from the station's usual activities. By nature, elections can be chaotic allowing for money to be moved around with greater abandon. More difficult was hiding continuing large-scale support for opposition groups. It was easier to observe that opposition groups were much more active than their financial difficulties would have suggested. That was the case even though there were other sources of money for these groups, such as wealthy Chileans and Brazilian capitalists.

In the 1980s, Americans became more skeptical of the government. Many did not believe President Reagan when he first denied that his administration had traded arms for hostages. This skepticism was reinforced, along with other factors, by
investigative journalism in which more media representatives asked harder questions, probed for leaks, and were less likely to take the government for its word. If reporters were more likely to seek information on secret operations, then they were more likely to find what they were looking for. However, government leaks are always present and have become almost routine in Washington. Officials sometimes leak information purposely for their own publicity or for the sake of policy in order to rally opposition or support. Top officials specifically are the ones who know about covert actions and thus are most likely to take their opposition to particular programs into the open.

If the leak does not originate in Washington, the American press overseas may pick up the information. Despite many attempts by some governments to censor and control available information, there may be a more powerful incentive to seek out and reveal a U.S. covert operation. During the 1960s, it would have been easier for the president to induce the editors of a few prominent publications not to go public with the details of such operations. The Cold War atmosphere and the fear of Communism - as well as accusations of being a Communist - could, at that time, entice many to keep their opinions to themselves.

Even without such Cold War considerations, many well-known and respected journalists chose to remain quiet during the Gulf Crisis, although their fears were of a different nature. According to MacArthur's Second Front, many television newscasters were more concerned about not "rocking the [career] boat" than ensuring the accuracy of information, regardless of what they said they knew to be true. This was the case even when they disagreed with their networks carefully designed graphic images and inspiring patriotic musical overtures that sought to present an acceptable war to the public. Unfortunately the loud chants urging the administration not to "spill blood for oil" came from a number of average American citizens rather than one or two widely respected representatives in the media that have the attention of the public as well as some political weight in Washington. Protesters chanting this antiwar slogan suggested that the U.S. government bore considerable responsibility for Iraq's expansionist aggression because Washington had tolerated Saddam's repressive regime
throughout the 1980s when doing so served U.S. interests. Now that the extent of what could clearly be considered moral violations are being discussed, the public, with its short memory for world events, appears to have placed it on the back burner.

Not every exposure has created controversy requiring the government to respond. Some accusations stayed in the tabloids or the back pages of other newspapers. In the instance of Guatemala, the leaks were discredited by a 1954 issue of Time magazine that claimed the disclosures were masterminded in Moscow and designed to divert the attention from Guatemala as the "Western Hemisphere's Red problem-child." In the last decade of the Cold War, covert actions generally became less controversial. Almost half of the forty or so covert actions were the subject of the press, yet only a few of these were controversial enough to result in extended coverage. Most of the rest were open secrets that must have made sense to most members of Congress, reporting journalists, and Americans who were aware of them.

Treverton's second question to be considered by policy makers is what if the first intervention does not succeed. If covert actions are to remain secret, most of the time they will have to be small and their purposes will have to match their scale. If there is no grand purpose, they may be questioned even more by those opposing their use on moral grounds. The events of Vietnam made Americans more skeptical about assertions that every upheaval in the poor countries of the world threaten U.S. interests enough to warrant intervention, covert or overt. The public's ambivalence toward Nicaragua reflected that skepticism as well. On the one hand, the drift of the Sandinista government created some concern, yet there was no conviction that the threat justified risking American lives. CIA intervention was probably preferable to a military commitment, but even that was bound to be controversial.

Throughout the 1980s, terrorists were targets of covert action operations. However, if votes had been possible on secret actions, the American body politic probably would have supported those operations. The media's saturation of negative

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180 Ibid., p. 187.
181 Ibid., p. 188.
publicity toward the Middle East was successful in creating negative images of the region in which the public and Congress could not help itself from supporting Reagan's policies. According to a November 1985 issue of the Washington Post, many were undertaken covertly only because of the sensitivities of U.S. allies and others the U.S. wished to enlist in the effort. For these reasons, Treverton contends, that covert actions against Libya probably could have stood the test of disclosure. The rub, he believes, was that no small operation seemed practicable to the congressional intelligence committees who were also reportedly worried that any plot would involve assassination.

Another aspect of covert operations that could cause an uproar among some Americans concerns the events that occur after an operation takes place. When the mission has finished - successfully or not - there is a potential to dump those individuals or group that are no longer needed. According to Treverton, in 1958, when CIA operations in Indonesia against Sukarno failed, the U.S. abandoned a group of dissident Sumatran colonels it had been supporting. In 1972, the Shah of Iran asked President Nixon for CIA support to Kurdish mountain people fighting Iraq. Three years later, however, the shah settled his differences with Iraq and had no further use for the Kurds. William Colby, the DCI at that time, wrote that CIA cable traffic "suddenly was jammed with requests to help refugee and exiled Kurds of shipping arms and military supplies to them clandestinely." Two other CIA-supported groups were casualties of the American withdrawal from Vietnam. In 1968, when President Johnson stopped American air strikes on North Vietnam, resupply drops to Montagnard tribesmen operating behind North Vietnamese lines also stopped. Some of them died, others were captured. Similarly, the Meo tribemen who fought the secret war in Laos with CIA assistance numbered about thirty thousand at the peak of the war. At the end of the war in 1975, only about one-third of them escaped to Thailand.182

\[182\text{Ibid., pp. 115-117.}\]
Revolutionaries, maybe more aware of such incidents than the American public, learned a few lessons from the manner in which the U.S. is apt to conduct its covert operations. During the Cold War, if the U.S. threatened or tried to impose an arms embargo, the revolutionaries could turn to the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union has taken that option away and left many vulnerable to accepting U.S. impositions. Economic weaknesses especially encourage these countries to be more willing to accept American intervention. They do not necessarily have to replace regimes, only to nudge them in directions more acceptable to the U.S.

A common practice, and one that could occur without the knowledge of the public and many officials, is the placement of key individuals on the CIA's payroll. King Hussein of Jordan is one of the more well known examples. Before 1977, when the press discovered the link and President Carter discontinued the program, secret payments and covert operations with Jordan were occurring to gather and share intelligence on terrorists and the PLO. Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Egyptian preacher of Islamic radicalism accused of arranging the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1992, is another individual publicly known to have CIA connections. Although the CIA initially claimed no connection, it was later discovered that the employee of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum which issued the visa to the sheik in 1990 was an undercover CIA officer.\footnote{C. Dickey and C. Berger, "The Sheik, His Visa and the CIA," Newsweek, July 19, 1993, p. 10.}

Sometimes, other types of relationships are formed which are less deserving of justification for political purposes. One such example is the CIA's involvement in a drug-smuggling deal with Venezuela which was disclosed in a November 1993 article of Time magazine. A shipment of cocaine weighing 453 kg arrived in the U.S. through Miami International Airport in late 1990. It was discovered by officials that the shipment was under the direct supervision of General Ramon Guilien Davila, Venezuela's top drug fighter and a close collaborator with the U.S. counternarcotics operations. A U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigation later uncovered a
scandal in which the CIA helped the Venezuelans run a profitable coke-trafficking operation. The investigation revealed the involvement of CIA officer Mark McFarlin, and the CIA station chief in Venezuela, Jim Campbell.

While the stated purpose of the scheme was to help one of the Venezuelan general's agents win the confidence of Colombia's drug lords, can this act justify to the public the expenditures of U.S. taxpayer money. The plan was said to also aim at helping the CIA gather crucial information about the cartel's methods. The second stated purpose probably could have received greater public acceptance if they believed it would reduce the amount of drugs coming into the U.S. each year. In its execution, Guillen's agents took deliveries of drugs from Colombia and stored them in a truck at the CIA-funded counternarcotics center near Caracas. Several reserves were then flown to the U.S.

The CIA began its own investigations in 1991. One CIA spokesman declared that "there was no evidence of criminal wrongdoing by the agency's operatives, yet," he said, "an internal probe uncovered 'instances of bad judgment and poor management' on the part of some CIA officers involved, and appropriate disciplinary action followed." It is likely that the congressional intelligence committees will investigate the matter further.

While it is justifiable to continue such operations between consenting individuals and governments, other recruitment techniques involving unsuspecting targets is more questionable. Morton Abramowit, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research reported that during the exile of Haiti's Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the country itself was accessible since "so many Haitians reportedly have been on our payroll." This should not be surprising, yet the issue at hand is the manner in which some of these people are employed. Exemplifying this moral questionability is

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the way that former East German espionage chief Markus Wolf recruited an estimated 6,000 agents to work undercover within West German society.

According to one Newsweek article, Wolf was known for utilizing "Romeo agents" who wooed their targets at bus stops and in government cafeterias. One former agent posed as a Danish journalist and seduced a young West German woman who worked as a NATO translator. The two became engaged and he persuaded her to spy for East Germany. As a devout Catholic, the woman apparently became consumed by guilt. The agent took her to visit her supposed future mother-in-law, also a Stasi agent, then brought her to a Catholic church for confession. There, she agreed to continue spying, after being absolved by the priest, another Stasi agent.  

Israel has also been accused of its questionable recruiting techniques. Several American and European Jews studying in Israel were apparently approached by a little known and somewhat mysterious Israeli agency calling itself the Organization for International Cooperation (OIC). Students are asked if they would like to represent the organization abroad by sending in evaluation reports of the political climate in their country or perhaps monitoring attitudes towards Israel. In return, a few would be granted some kind of "scholarship." Foreign diplomats in Israel are reported to believe the OIC is a front for the Mossad, which is seeking to widen its network of agents abroad.

Policy Justifications:

While one of the fundamental principles of U.S. democracy is that the government should rest on the "consent of the governed," those who are governed do not always know what they are consenting to. The details of secret intelligence operations obviously cannot be revealed without jeopardizing their purpose, therefore a delicate balance must be sought between the decision itself and the consequences that may result.

There seems to be little relevance of morality to the issue of whether to employ covert operations in the implementation of foreign policy. While the politically correct words can be used in convincing the public that the government is upholding the nation's moral convictions, their influence on policy decisions appears not to be a serious consideration. Charles Micoleau, former student of Johns Hopkins University, provides the basis for this position during the Cold War. He believes that the nature of the struggle in which we were engaged meant that generally accepted standards of ethical and moral behavior were inapplicable. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson remarked, "A good deal of trouble comes from the anthropomorphic urge to regard nations as individuals and apply to our own national conduct vague maxims for individual conduct - for instance the Golden Rule - even though in practice individuals rarely adopt it. In assessing the value of covert operations, the more pertinent question is whether a particular activity contributes to or detracts from the attainment of a national goal or purpose. This is not to say that one should cynically adopt the principle that the ends justify the means in foreign policy, but rather, as Acheson continued, "that only the end can justify the means."\textsuperscript{187}

Micoleau and other professionals in the field believe the decision to rely on covert intervention in a given situation should be judged solely in relation to its intended objective and to the consequences which would result if were not employed. The use of covert operations to achieve national objectives has been seen among major governments as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy at one time or another. Not only are they typically financially cost-effective, they permit a degree of flexibility not available in other policy options. As one former CIA agent stated in \textit{A Short Course in the Secret War}, covert operations permit

...the pursuit of constructive, progressive policies on the overt level while preserving, on the covert level, the national safety and interest

intact until more idealistic overt policies have produced concrete results.\textsuperscript{188}

Before the U.S. began its formalized implementation of covert action, many other nations were conducting their own operations within America. As described by O'Toole, Germany conducted a significant amount of operations within the U.S. and the western hemisphere just after the turn of the century. Operations were under the general supervision of the German ambassador to Washington, with the responsibility for implementation resting on the military, commercial, and naval attaches working out of New York City.

The first task of the German organization was to recruit agents to carry out the actual sabotage and subversion. They found a number of candidates among resident German aliens and German-Americans, as well as Irish-Americans and other ethnic and political groups whose aims coincided with German war objectives. Their first operation included all three types of covert action - political, psychological, and paramilitary - and intended to cut off the flow of munitions to the Allies from American suppliers. The operation involved buying large quantities of munitions and such strategic materials as chlorine and carbolic acid in order to prevent them from being sold to the Allies, buying up machine tools in order to deny such equipment to American munitions makers, and establishing a dummy munitions company that offered inflated wages in order to cause labor unrest in competing plants. This last component of the operation was done with the assistance of the Austrian ambassador, as well.

During 1915 and 1916, explosive and incendiary bombs were placed in munitions plants, storage facilities, and aboard cargo ships carrying munitions bound for Allied ports. One of the most well known incidents was the Black Tom Explosion which occurred on July 30, 1916 destroying approximately two million pounds of munitions awaiting shipment to Russia. The Germans also targeted other types of

\textsuperscript{188}Ibid., p. 77.
facilities. Apparently there were at least two unsuccessful plots to blow up the Welland Canal which links Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and one failed attempt to blow up a Canadian Pacific Railway tunnel in British Columbia. The international railroad bridge at Vanceboro, Maine was blown up in January 1915, and an attempt was made to blow up the Elephant-Butte Dam on the Rio Grande in 1917.

Ambitious political operations were also attempted. One was aimed at starting a revolution in Mexico in order to restore President Victoriano Huerta to power and instigate a war between Mexico and the U.S. to divert U.S. attention from the war in Europe. This particular plan failed due to penetration by agents of British intelligence. Seemingly more successful were the German psychological operations seeking to win sympathy for the Central Powers and keeping the U.S. from active participation in the war on the Allied side. Like modern day practices, a public relations man was hired as a propagandist, pro-German books were subsidized, a German-American writer secretly purchased the Mail and Express, a major New York daily newspaper, and many political organizations were formed in order to sway Americans away from supporting the Allies. Some of these groups included the American Truth Society, American Women for Strict Neutrality, and the American Humanity League.

To counter German sabotage operations and encourage American support for the Allies, British intelligence also conducted a number of operations in the U.S. As O'Toole describes, the British also ran their operations under the official cover of their delegation in Washington. Although the ambassador was aware of British covert operations run from the embassy, the extent of his participation in them is obscure. The day after Britain entered the war, a British ship cut the submarine telegraph cable that linked Germany directly to the western hemisphere. Along with the subsequent severance of an alternate transatlantic cable route via West Africa and Brazil this put Britain in control of all wire service dispatches from Europe to the U.S. This was a tremendous advantage to the British propaganda against the Germans in America.

By mid-1915, the British Naval Intelligence Department had acquired several German cryptosystems and was intercepting and reading most of the German
diplomatic intelligence. Selected items were passed on to the American embassy in London where they were delivered to both the American foreign service officer responsible for liaison with British intelligence and to the American ambassador. In this way, British intelligence was able to help American law enforcement and counterintelligence work against the German sabotage and subversion campaigns and to expose German secret diplomatic moves contrary to American interests. The result was anti-German sentiment within the U.S. administration.

After the U.S. declared war on Germany in 1917, the first espionage statute was passed. The Espionage Act sanctioned up to 20 years imprisonment for anyone divulging information concerning national defense, obstructing recruitment or promoting insubordination in the armed forces, refusing military duty, or otherwise aiding the enemy. The following year, and again in 1940, statutes were passed that criminalized specific acts of sabotage. With Cold War concerns over Communist subversion, the Eisenhower administration called for the strengthening of the nation's internal security laws. In 1954, the Espionage and Sabotage Act updated and broadened U.S. laws against enemy intelligence activities. The measure increased the allowable punishment for peacetime espionage to death or life imprisonment and removed existing statues of limitations for espionage offenses. The act made sabotage laws effective during national emergencies as well as wartime and extended the definition of sabotage to include the use of radioactive materials or biological and chemical agents.

Despite these laws, incidents of covert actions within the United States continued. One such violation that occurred recently is known as the Pollard Spy Case. In 1985, Jonathan J. Pollard, a civilian intelligence analyst with the U.S. Navy was seized outside the Israeli embassy in Washington and charged with selling classified information to Israel. His wife was arrested as an accomplice the next day. Further investigation revealed that the American couple had been part of an Israeli intelligence operation and had furnished hundreds of secret documents to Israeli agents. The Pollards pleaded guilty to espionage charges in June 1986. Jonathan
Pollard was sentenced to life in prison, while his wife received a five-year term. Four Israelis were named as unindicted conspirators in the case, including senior intelligence officer Rafael Eitan and Israeli Air Force officer Aviem Sella.

The fact that covert activities are deemed preferable to direct confrontations of power also explains why their use has traditionally received the tacit approval of the major powers. Moreover, it also helps to explain the once time strict observance of another established custom. A covert hostile act which has been exposed can be ignored by the victimized state only so long as the government responsible cooperates. It was essential, therefore, that a nation conducting a covert mission disclaim any knowledge or participation once it has been uncovered. However, this notion of plausible denial has not always been available. For this reason, critical examination of covert action as a policy instrument must continually be appraised. Although we must appreciate the uniqueness of America's attempt to bring democracy to intelligence, if secret power is allowed to run free of supervision it has the capacity to turn against the liberties of an open society. The enduring irony of intelligence is its potential to destroy as well as to guard democracy.

Several critics of U.S. intelligence activities have claimed that those responsible for their conduct have overestimated the capabilities of covert actions. One of these critics is Paul Blackstock, who charged in The Strategy of Subversion, that "in the crusading ideological atmosphere of the Cold War, this instrument of policy was eagerly seized upon and used with little understanding of its effectiveness or its limitations." He also argued that U.S. officials have misunderstood the nature of the forces at work in many of the emerging nations of the world. He saw a tendency to underestimate the importance of real social and political grievances in these societies and to attribute the existence of instability, violence, and demands for radical change to subversion and political intrigue. Concluding that covert intervention offers a lasting solution to the difficult and complex problems which these countries face can be a mistake, as was witnessed by Vietnam.

189 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
The continued use of covert political operations by the U.S. will undoubtedly pose troublesome questions of conscience. Yet while overt diplomatic instruments are probably preferable, it is unrealistic to expect the government to abstain from the use of covert intervention when no alternative exists simply on the basis that it is unethical. More fundamental problems, such as how to assure that covert operations are conducted effectively, realistically, and in a manner as consistent as possible with our form of government, seem to take precedence over the issue of morality. For the public, in order for the operations to be successful, there must be an increased recognition of the reasons for conducting covert operations, greater confidence in the competence of the intelligence services, and an awareness of why they must be kept secret. A deeper appreciation of the role which covert actions play in U.S. foreign policy would serve to prevent ill-informed and purely emotional criticism in the event of failure. More importantly, according to Micoleau, it would encourage the tacit, but essential public support.
CHAPTER IV

Conclusion

While the primary forces creating the impetus for the institutionalization of covert action in U.S. foreign policy have disappeared with the USSR, the key word for the role of covert action in the new era is change - not elimination: Changes in the international environment, a new focus for interventionism, changing foreign policy objectives, and changing attitudes towards the morality of such operations.

One of the broadest criteria in determining the manner in which nations define their relations is the prevailing structure and priorities of the world order. Changes in this order have broken down some primary rationales that have formed and supported U.S. policies justifying the use of covert action. One of the most significant causes of such an effect is the disappearance of an established enemy. Without Soviet strength, massive Cold War defense budgets, restrictive legislation, excessive intervention, and complacency built on the fear of communism are no longer widely justified by the government or accepted by the public. This newness of the current era must, however, be kept in perspective. As the character and structure of world politics have been radically altered, this new era should be seen as a transitional period since it will take time for the consequences to be absorbed. The lasting characteristics are more likely to be known from tomorrow's history books than established in today's immediate environment.

For now, the priorities appear to be in the economic sphere rather than the military. While some suggest that the new world order will be built on U.S. hegemony resulting from the disappearance of one of the two superpower poles, scholars such as
Joseph Nye, Lawrence Freedman, and Loch Johnson argue that the increasing attention on global problems shared by all nations will not sustain a unipolar world since more than one government will be needed to address these problems. They contend that a more complex multipolar world is more likely to emerge. With other nations possessing a great amount of economic power and influence, the U.S. is faced with new challenges of widening its scope rather than maintaining its previously narrow attention on Soviet military strength. The question does not appear to be whether or not to use covert types of operations in this new climate, but rather where and how to direct them.

Regardless of which new order stands the test of time, several new target areas for the intelligence agency's use of secret operations will replace the Soviet threat. These areas include commercial, and industrial activities in attempts to establish and safeguard U.S. superiority in the economic realm. This poses another challenge for the U.S. since it will have to target more developed countries with which it competes, yet considers friends and allies to depend upon in times of crises. In an atmosphere of cooperation and interdependence, conducting secret activities against "friends" could place the U.S. in an awkward and embarrassing position. The exposure of operations could result in greater consequences such as the retraction of agreements made for more open trade practices. This could lead to world-wide protectionism, destroyed relations, less cooperation, and eventually isolation, which is directly contrary to U.S. liberal capitalist aims.

While the military element is not as prevalent, it is still an important consideration. Covert action operations will still target less developed countries for both political and military purposes. Former Soviet clients in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa may need to turn to a greater power for assistance without the continued support of the Soviet Union. Rather than emphasizing security arrangements as the carrot for the further development of democracy, economic incentives for building infrastructures, developing economies and improving general health and living conditions may prove more effective in some of these areas.
Covert action for environmental reasons has even been suggested, yet has not received the same respect and consideration due to its secondary nature to principal U.S. interests. Multinational and international organizations would be more effective in accomplishing these types of operations. So much so, that some political analysts have suggested establishing an international intelligence agency through the U.N. In a true multipolar world, this would signify the recognition of the value of a shared response mechanism. Under U.S. hegemony, this agency could fall mercy to the desires of the U.S. utilizing the information for its own unstated purposes under the auspices of international will.

It is generally agreed by intelligence specialists that this new international environment calls for changes in the intelligence apparatus as well. Adjustments will not only change the primary focus of operations but fundamental changes will also have to be made in the organization itself and the manner in which operations are carried out. Reduced military threats have resulted in reduced budgets, therefore requiring the use of more man power, less expensive equipment, and the combining of tasks. To continue the CIA's capabilities for carrying out covert operations, new possibilities are being considered. Former DCIs argue for increasing the authority of the position to decrease conflicts of interests imposed by higher level officials and to make the agency more responsive to their commands. The McCurdy and Boren bills proposed to Congress widespread reorganization to meet the new demands and constraints. Not only was the budget and the organizational structure of the CIA addressed, so too was a suggestion for a new analysis agency and the function of the NSC in meeting the new needs of the state and defense departments. Because of the new international environment, this reorganization and redefining of duties will be drastically different from those undertaken during the previous period.

While foreign policy objectives are sometimes drastically different from one administration to another, Cold War presidents had the common elements of Soviet power and Communist ideology to serve as a basis for their stated aims. Although the president is the individual ultimately responsible for setting these objectives, the CIA
assumed the initiative in defining the ways covert operations could be used in this regard. With this close connection and the widening circle of individuals knowledgeable of covert operations, Cold War consensus between the executive and legislative branches was virtually a necessity for operational success. Evident in this study were patterns suggesting how intelligence issues were influenced by the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. The most notable areas of change were in covert action usage and application, secrecy of operations, oversight, accountability, and the implementation of major reforms. Periods of détente and cooperation were accompanied by greater oversight mechanisms, movements for intelligence reforms, limits on covert activities, and demands for more accountability; while periods of hostility coincided with increased secrecy and permissiveness in covert actions, and fewer impositions of restrictions, audits, and controls.

While a new presidential doctrine will most likely be enunciated before the end of the current administration's reign, it appears that one defining a more crusading, interventionist role in world affairs is developing. The success of this role will not only be determined by national incentives, but also by the international community's acceptance - or acquiescence - of such a position. During the initial period of declining Soviet power, studies revealed that Americans still believed the U.S. should take an active role in foreign affairs. The primary issues considered 'very important' foreign policy goals were worldwide arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, reducing the international trade deficit, improving the environment, and protecting American business interests abroad. However, after the total collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans called for the government to turn its attention to more domestic responsibilities such as improving health care, creating and protecting jobs, and the national economy.

Once Americans feel the effects of international interventions at home, they tend to become more aware of where their tax dollars are going and more apt to raise questions in opposition of such an active role for America. Policymakers - especially in an election year - will have to be careful in their responses to these public concerns
and demands. This may cause policymakers to publicly champion one set of policies, while carrying out another. Typically, this involves pacifying the public to allow the administration to carry out its own agenda.

Evidenced by inconsistencies in choosing where to intervene, interests and objectives other than those publicly stated are obviously being sought. With the lack of an enemy equal in size as the Communist scare of the Cold War period, justifications for these actions will be more difficult to swallow. The general mood of the nation will, therefore, have to be adjusted in order to accommodate more open interventions. While the government will have to be more selective, the interventions that are chosen must take on a new character to enlist American approval. Stating a purpose of 'humanitarian intervention' is ideal for the new era. Supplementing reasons for intervening in the affairs of others with sympathetic pleas will probably prove effective regardless of the number of Americans who will undoubtedly opt for a more isolationist posture. This approach fits well within the general framework of the American psyche known for its attitudes of exceptionalism and superiority.

Even in a time of greater public awareness, underlying objectives can still be attained without the support or approval - or even the knowledge - of the people. In this way, the risk of negative reactions and opposition is significantly reduced. If, however, there is a need to carry out the intervention through more open means, a significant amount of propaganda must be employed in the U.S. to convince Americans of the need for U.S. involvement. Not only sympathy, but explanations of possible threats to order in the new world are likely to be used to justify greater interventionism. In some cases, the amount of propaganda needed to shift the focus back to the international arena may not be so significant. Americans, in general, tend to accept the images shown on their television screens without questioning the pictures that are not shown and the comments that are not made.

Issues of morality may also lend support to interventionist policies. Along with sympathy and renewed security threats, believing it's the 'right thing to do,' can be a powerful motivation. This need not apply in all circumstances. In questioning the
morality and unethical nature of implementing covert action, the motivation is not as strong - and in some cases, nonexistent. The moral issue of covert operations in an open democratic society seems to arise only after operations have taken place and have been disclosed. Policymakers are more likely to raise moral considerations in relation to the potential consequences should the operation be exposed, rather than in relation to the act itself.

Questions of conscience will inevitably arise at one time or another. However, the utilization of covert actions has been a part of international politics long before America came on the scene. The U.S. did not initially make the rules but it has certainly been able to ensure their survival. Through the continued tacit approval of such tactics in international politics, the U.S. has had the capability to virtually perfect the utilization of covert activities - hiding them from both the public and other government institutions.

There is no question as to the contradiction of covert actions and secrecy in American society. However, even as the political culture grows more suspicious of covert action and secrecy, the applicability of the constitutional basis for moral considerations appeared insignificant in choosing covert action as a means to accomplish foreign policy prerogatives. Opposition to U.S. policy on moral grounds is unlikely to carry much weight from a generally naive and trusting population. There have been proposals to limit the most blatant areas of constitutional violations such as the secret nature of the budget supporting clandestine operations; the classification system which limits access to information; and even the secret existence of the agencies themselves.

A more important factor identified was whether or not the activity contributes to or detracts from the attainment of national goals. Actively pursuing a policy of covert intervention is strangely inconsistent with a government who professes to base its foreign policy not only on the principles of the Constitution, but also on the principles of international law, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of conflict. However, the decision to rely on covert intervention in a given situation is
judged most importantly in relation to its intended objective. The issue of morality is only applied when it reinforces an already established intent. The question then returns to the age-old dilemma of the ends justifying the means. For some, unethical means are not forgotten by accomplishing desired outcomes. However, it is those few decision makers and diplomats who encourage operations of a covert nature that reap the benefits of success and are less apt to recognize the validity of moral considerations. Despite a few outcries of covert activities corrupting the moral fiber of the nation, they will most likely continue to be disregarded as a necessary function of government - even in the most open societies.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

There are many opportunities for further research of covert action as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. While several variables have been identified and discussed in the current research, the broad nature of the subject and the potential for critically effecting the outcome of world events provides a multitude of topics for continued examination. Covert action, and intelligence in general, can be approached from a number of angles from comparisons of geographical targets and regional differences, to the study of individual operatives and operations.

One suggestion for further research is the study of other nation's intelligence apparati and use of covert operations and their subsequent relation to U.S. methods. This could include identifying the priorities of their own domestic circumstances, foreign policy aims, and capabilities for implementation. The researcher may want to focus on changes in the utilization of covert operations by foreign nations with the United States as a target. The ways in which actual methods of carrying out operations could also be examined. The study could concentrate on scientific and technological advances such as those that directly influence changes in cryptology and other communication devises.
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