

Terrorism and Saudi Arabia

by

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
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Abstract

It is obvious that the events of September 11, 2001, triggered disputes about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism. But there is still no unified or “universal” definition for terrorism. Such disputes will not result in an agreeable consensus and will make no notable benchmark towards the understanding of terrorism.

This work tends to shed light on patterns, current trends and future threats of terrorism worldwide while stressing on the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the negative and drastic effects and consequences it produces locally, regionally, and internationally.

First, a general overview of the definition of terrorism shows it as an instrument of ideological struggle and draws patterns of government and Wahhabi politics in Saudi Arabia.

The second chapter explores Al Saud’s authority and power. It reveals how this legitimacy is based on the success of the rulers’ military conquests in the 1920s and the 1930s and on their alliance with the religious authorities. Promoting the diversification of the economy and democracy is not positively assessed by the religious establishment, which breeds internal dissent.

The third part of this work looks into the political economy of terrorism and the relationship between globalization and terrorist financing before examining the ways to counter terrorism.

In the last decade, fundamentalism has evolved and countering terrorist groups or networks thus requiring the adaptation to new fronts. International

cooperation is imperative. Freedoms and good governance are a necessity for Muslim societies if they were to escape Islamist threats.

This thesis relied on the study of relevant literature on Terrorism in Saudi Arabia in order to analyze the developing conceptualization of terrorism with its different and various causes and consequences.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to my father Joseph, my mother Rose, and my sister Rita for their endless, love, sacrifices, support, and consistent encouragement to achieve my best. I promise you that the best is yet to come.

To my brother Mario, my soul mate: Neither the space on this page nor the space of time will be sufficient for me to show you my gratitude and appreciation for standing next to me along the path of my life. You have always made sure to lift my spirit up and make me believe that time is never a barrier.

I would also like to thank Lucy for showing me that the true happiness in life lays in its simplicity. A special thanks to Aziz, Eliane, Joelle, Ray, Samer and Marie-Chantale for all their friendship, support, and patience throughout the course of this thesis.

Finally, I wish to thank all the members of my committee: Dr. Labaki, Dr. Nehme, and Dr. Kairouz for their support and taking the time to read my thesis and provide their valuable input.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved Lebanon who has suffered for so long from the terrorism of his own people against each other and that of others on its holy land. You have taught me that every rise of the Phoenix rests in its power of forgiveness.

This work is also dedicated to the martyrs of the Lebanese Army lost in the Nahr El Bared war in 2007 and all the victims of terrorism around the world.

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1. Introduction

In the last decades, nationalist terrorism has long become a serious foreign and domestic security threat. It has drawn international attention to ongoing conflicts such as the Palestinian quest for a state of their own. A modern trend is towards religiously motivated terrorism. The year 1979 was a pivotal for radical Islamic fundamentalism. On January 16, 1979, the Iranian Revolution forced the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, into exile and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power. On November 20, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was besieged for two weeks by fundamentalist dissidents opposing the Saudi regime. The third major event took place on December 20 when the Soviet Union deployed its Army in Afghanistan, in an attempt to suppress a growing Islamic rebellion. The U.S. response toward the 9/11 attacks and thus international terrorism was to launch military operations in Afghanistan ending with a war in Iraq. This in return triggered radical reactions from the Muslim world and propelled Al Qaeda's instigations on the front of the scene. According to Michael Sheuer, the following goals can be identified:

- End all U.S. aid to Israel; eliminate the Jewish state and create an Islamic Palestinian state;
- Force the U.S. and Western military forces to withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula and all Muslim territories;
- End all U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq;
- End the U.S. support for the oppression of Muslims by the Chinese, Russian, Indian and other governments;

- Restore full Muslim control over the Islamic world's energy resources and end the impoverishment of Muslims caused by oil prices set by the Arab regimes to placate the West;
- Replace the U.S. protected Muslim regimes by ones that govern according to Islam.¹

Alan Krueger claims that terrorists are drawn from society's elites, not the dispossessed. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which have produced terrorists, are economically well off but lack civil liberties. Poorer countries where civil liberties are protected express their political, social and religious motivations in less violent ways.² But the popular support is essential to Al Qaeda and similar terrorist networks. It allows rallying recruits who have been deceived by the corruption and stiffness of their local regimes of the decadence and hypocrisy of the Western countries. The political utopia that bin Laden largely infused is represented by the Taliban rule in Afghanistan.

Comparing Khomeini's impact to bin Laden's, it is obvious that Sunni Islam has reached ways beyond the Shiite Revolution, which was merely exported to areas dominated by Shiites. It is upon Al Qaeda's instigations that the Islamic grudges towards the West were bluntly asserted and exported beyond borders and across the Islamic world. Among Muslims, the Sunni are predominant. Yet, all Muslim radicals, be they Sunni or Shiites, are deeply anti-semitic and anti-american. The presence of non-Muslim troops in proximity of the Holy Shrines of Mecca and Medina during the Gulf war reinforced the

1- Sheuer, Michael. Imperial Hubris. Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror, Washington DC: Brassey's, 2004, p. 210-212.

2- Krueger, Alan B. "Cash rewards and poverty alone do not explain terrorism", The New York Times, May 29, 2003, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E6D91E31F93AA15756C0A9659C8B63&scp=2&sq=terrorism+alan+b+krueger&st=nyt>

feelings of hatred towards an imperialistic power violating Muslim soil. It was heretical in the eyes of Islamist critics. Islam is thus being a double-edged sword for the rulers of Saudi Arabia among others. Al Saud had undeniably based their authority on Islamic values but these ideals are the ones menacing the regime's stability.

Since religious terrorism has become global, it is vital to maximize international cooperation and support. The war against global jihadism will not be won tomorrow but it has become the West's "duty".³ The question of how to combat incitement to terrorism still has no definite answer. Is coercion the answer? Or is it diplomacy? Will governments be able to cut back on financial backing and sponsorship of terrorist activities? Is draining the pipelines and cutting off the resources enough to halt the spread of Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks?

3- Wehner, Peter. "The War against Global Jihadism", Real Clear Politics, January 8, 2007, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/the_nature_of_our_enemy.html

2. Terrorism & Wahhabism – converging or diverging patterns?

2.1. Historical Background

When addressing the issue of terrorism one inevitably portrays in the mind the image of a long bearded Arab or Muslim fundamentalist ready to blow himself just to fight and destroy the “unfaithful”. Indeed, it is surprising to discover the number of scholars who share this perception as almost all provided somewhat the same description of this stereotyped impression. Throughout the research for this thesis, I realized how deep the media impact on our perceptions is. Some might call it brain washing, others might call it war on terrorism; however this perception is definitely not global since various agencies of a same government – the USA for example – have different definitions of terrorism⁴, whereas historians and sociologists reflect on terrorism from diverse angles.

Therefore, before tackling the empirical definitions of terrorism, be it historical or sociological, terrorism can be applied to any number of social groupings: men terrorizing women; adults terrorizing children; humans terrorizing animals, etc. ...⁵

As for the notion of terrorism as a political concept, Bruce Hoffman⁶ describes terrorism as “fundamentally and inherently political. It is also

4- Singh, Ajit. World Terrorism Today: US Reactions, Jaipur: Book Enclave, 2005, pp.31-33.

5- Bergesen, Albert J. and Omar Lizardo. “International Terrorism and the World-System.” Sociological Theory, Vol.22, No.1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium (2004), p. 38.

6- Pr. Bruce Hoffman has been studying terrorism and insurgency for thirty years and is currently a tenured professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC. He

ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power; and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus a threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of a political aim”.⁷

Terrorism in this sense has been documented since the 1st century AD with Zealots-Sicarii (in reference to the dagger they used to hide under their clothes), a Jewish group involved in assassinating and poisoning Romans occupying Palestine, as well as with the Assassins, who operated in 11th- to 13th-century in Persia and Syria, assassinating political and religious leaders.⁸

The word terrorism was first popularized during the French Revolution. Back then, terrorism had a positive connotation as the system of terror or *Régime de la Terreur* of 1793–94 was adopted as a means to establish order during a period of turmoil and upheaval following the uprisings of 1789, “therefore terrorism here is an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established state, which goal was the creation of a “new and better society” in place of a fundamentally corrupt and undemocratic political system”.⁹ The revolutionary leader Robespierre¹⁰ executed some 40 thousand so called “traitors” by guillotine until he met the same fate. It was his death that

previously held the Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation and was also Director of RAND’s Washington, D.C. Office, <http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/brh6/?PageTemplateID=81>

- 7- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, pp.13-14.
- 8- Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston: Little Brown, 1987, p. 15.
- 9- Hoffman, p. 15.
- 10- Maximilien François Marie Isidore de Robespierre (6 May 1758–28 July 1794), disciple of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the best-known leaders of the French Revolution, studied at College of Louis-le-Grand in Paris and became a lawyer. His supporters called him “The Incorruptible.” He was an influential member of the Committee of Public Safety and was instrumental in the period of the Revolution commonly known as the Reign of Terror that ended with his arrest and execution in 1794.

ended The Reign of Terror. Subsequently, “terrorism” became a term associated with the abuse of office and power and with overt “criminal” implications.¹¹

From then on, the number of terrorist attacks increased for political liberation purposes: The Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (IRB) – vs. Britain, Russian activists – the Narodnaya Volya – against Czarist rule, Armenians vs. Ottoman Empire... These terrorist actions were in the account of liberation from an imperial rule or a tyranny, giving by then a new meaning for the word terrorism.

With the Fascist and Nazi regimes of the 1930s in Germany and Italy, terrorism became a state-sponsored phenomenon directed against undesirable elements of the population such as Jews and communists who were declared “enemies of the state”. In that same line of state-sponsored terrorism, Stalin’s “Great Terror” aimed to seize total power by terrorist action. Ruling by violence and intimidation, the right-wing military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile and Greece during the 1970s exercised what is generally termed “terror”.

The Post Second World War nationalist and anti-colonial movements emerging in Asia, Africa and the Middle East helped countries like Israel, Cyprus, Kenya and Algeria achieve their independence through “wars of liberation” acting as “freedom fighters”, not as “terrorists”. For instance, and in an effort to give a voice to the large number of Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964. The original PLO Charter declared the establishment of Israel “illegal, null and void” and outlined goals to “liberate the homeland” via armed struggle. But it wasn’t till a decade later (1974) that this group was recognized as the

11- Hoffman, *op. cit.*

"sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."¹² The organization and its various factions are still perceived today as terrorist groups by Israel.¹³

The early 1980s witnessed the emergence of a new terrorism phenomena destined to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy conducted by the Kremlin, then, after the fall of the Soviet Union, by rebel foreign governments such as rogue regimes in Iraq, Iran and Libya. *"Terrorism thus became associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare whereby weaker states could confront larger more powerful rivals without the risk of retribution."*¹⁴ It is in this category that the Hezbollah attack on the US Embassy in Beirut (April 1983) can be classified. Associated with Islamic fundamentalism, this kind of militant group and/or state-sponsored terrorism prevailed as the most lethal and worldwide spread causing massive destructions and by far the largest number of casualties during the 9/11 attacks on the US World Trade Center.

In 1992, Dr. Benjamin R. Barber (a political scientist) claimed in his famous article "Jihad vs. McWorld" (which became a book in 1995 and was re-edited in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks) that the clash of the two axial principals of our age, tribalism and globalism, will lead to the destruction of democracy as we know it. In Dr. Barber's work, "Jihad" refers not only to the Islamic holy wars, but to all wars waged by tribal groups or religious fundamentalists, whereas "McWorld," refers to global capitalism. In the same period, Samuel

12- Al Madfai, Madiha Rashid. Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991, Cambridge Middle East Library: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 21: *"On 28 October 1974, the seventh Arab summit conference held in Rabat designated the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and reaffirmed their right to establish an independent state."*

13- --, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), The Jewish Virtual Library, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/Terrorism/plo.html>

14- Hoffman, *op. cit.*

Huntington (another political scientist) develops his theory of the “Clash of civilizations”¹⁵ as a reaction to Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” ideas. Huntington, largely inspired by the orientalist Bernard Lewis, reduces the internal dynamics and plurality of civilizations to Islam vs. West. To which Edward Said, University Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, replies with “The Clash of Ignorance” in 2001, asserting that “similar distortions and zealotry occur in the "Jewish" and "Christian" universes of discourse”.¹⁶ Thus the revision of the sociological interpretation of terrorism appears to be a necessity.

As a matter of fact, even before September 11, terrorism was nearly always purposely equated with Islamic or Islamists terrorism. This assessment has some plausibility, as many extremists Islamists themselves justify their attacks by making extensive reference to their religion. The picture is simple: the so-called *Jihad* or “Holy War” of Muslims against American “Imperialism” is a protest against continuous support of Israeli expansionist policy in the Palestinian territories and towards sovereign states such as Syria and Lebanon. As terrorism is more automatically and naturally treated as synonymous with Islamic terrorism, the conviction of Western double standards towards Muslims and that the real aim of the global war on terror is not the defeat of terrorism,

15- Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993: *It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.*

16- Said, Edward. “The Clash of Ignorance”, The Nation, October 22, 2001 <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said>

but has its hidden agenda as a war against Islam and against the entire Muslim world is constantly gaining ground¹⁷ (see Fig. 1).




Figure 1 Source: Pew Research Center, 2004

Petra Weyland, in her *Proposal to Come to Terms with the Nexus of Islam and Security*, claims that the growing conviction that Islam is facing a death threat from an overwhelming military power has many serious repercussions. As a counter-reaction, Islamic identity is stressed all the more. This becomes a serious issue when it is linked to an increasingly hostile anti-Western stance. An even more dramatic result is that a growing number of people express their understanding, appreciation, and respect for terrorists even if they reject as un-Islamic the horrific methods they use. Terrorists find admiration because they are ready to sacrifice nothing less than their lives in the face of what more and more Muslims have come to perceive as a deadly threat to their religion.¹⁸

17- See Corman, Steven, Aaron Hess and Z. Justus. "Credibility in the global War on Terrorism: Strategic Principles and Research Agenda", Report #0603, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, June 2006, pp. 3-4.

18- Weyland, Petra. "Islam - Islamism - Islamist Terrorism? A Proposal to Come to terms with the Nexus of Islam and Security." The Quarterly Journal, Vol.3, No.3 (2004), p. 80.

This paradigm of the political and scholarship discussion will be addressed in the following chapters, whereas the latter explanation is a mere introduction to the dynamic of Islamic and Islamist fundamentalism. The sociological interpretation of terrorism will somewhat elucidate the perception of scholars and theorize the concept of terrorism in the light of the expansionist Islamic fundamentalism.

2.2. Sociological Theory

According to Donald Black, *“terrorism in its purest form, is self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians. Pure sociology explains terrorism with its social geometry – its multidimensional location and direction in social space”*.¹⁹

Anthony Oberschall, professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, defines terrorism as an *“extreme, violent response to a failed political process engaging political regimes and ethnic and ideological adversaries over fundamental governance issues”*.²⁰

Jack Gibbs in contrast, proposes a considerably different definition: *“terrorism is illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or nonhuman objects.”*²¹ According to Gibbs this definition would be valid provided that the violence fulfills 5 essential requirements:

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- 19- Black, Donald. “The Geometry of Terrorism.” Sociological Theory, Vol.22, No.1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium (2004), p. 14.
 - 20- Oberschall, Anthony. “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory.” Sociological Theory, Vol.22, No.1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium (2004), p. 26.
 - 21- Gibbs, Jack P. “Conceptualization of Terrorism.” American Sociological Review, Vol.54, No.3, (1989), p. 330.

1. It was undertaken or ordered with a view to alter or maintain at least one putative norm in at least one particular territorial unit or population;

2. It had secretive, furtive, and/or clandestine features that were expected by the participants to conceal their personal identity and/or their future location;

3. It was not undertaken or ordered to further the permanent defense of some area;

4. It was not conventional warfare and because of their concealed personal identity, concealment of their future location, their threats, and/or spatial mobility, the participants perceived themselves as less vulnerable to conventional military action; and

5. It was perceived by the participants as contributing to the normative goal previously described by including fear of violence in persons other than the immediate target of the actual or threatened violence and/or by publicizing some cause.²²

On the other hand, adopting Laqueur's definition: "*terrorism is the use of covert violence by a group for political ends*"²³, Oberschall's classification emphasizes four attributes of terrorism:

1. it is a collective action, not individual;
2. it is political, not criminal;
3. it is covert, not conventional warfare; and
4. it is of course violent.

22- *Ibid.*, p. 330.

23- Laqueur, p. 72.

He argues that the political ends claimed by terrorism are usually a “just cause”, even legitimate; however, the problematic lies in the means and not the ends. The violence, an essential attribute of terrorism, is lead by a covert group striking without warning and often indiscriminately victimizing, even purposely targeting, innocent bystanders.²⁴

Oberschall then clarifies the 4 imperative dimensions of a collective action applied to terrorism, regardless of the aim of the action – be it insurgency, social movement, dissident or social guerilla²⁵: 1) discontent, 2) ideology-feeding grievances, 3) capacity to organize, and 4) political opportunity. “A positive value on each dimension is necessary for collective action.”²⁶

Between Pure Terrorism (Black) and Collective Action Terrorism (Oberschall), the target is significantly different. Donald Black adopts the definition of Senechal de la Roche and Ganor: “*Pure terrorism is self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians*”.²⁷ Thus, according to these norms, “*the September 11 attack partially deviated from pure terrorism because one target – The Pentagon – was military rather than civilian.*”²⁸ Furthermore, this theory alienates all actions undertaken by indigenous populations in colonial societies during the 20th century notably in Africa and Asia where several actions were undertaken against British, French

24- Oberschall, pp. 26 – 27.

25- *Ibid.*, p. 27.

26- *Ibid.*, p. 27.

27- See Senechal de la Roche, Roberta. “Collective Violence as Social Control.” Sociological Forum Vol. 11 (1996), p. 101 – 105, and Ganor, Boaz. Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom? N/A: Herzliyya: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 1998, and Ganor, Boaz. Terrorism: No Prohibition Without Definition. N/A: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2001.

28- Black, p. 17.

and Dutch officials. Whereas by other norms these actions are considered terroristic, “*yet because few European civilians lived in the colonies, close enough to kill, terrorism was mostly absent. Millions lived in Europe, but for all practical purposes were too far away to attack. How could African tribesmen or Asian peasants go to Europe to kill civilians? It was largely impossible. No civilians, no terrorism.*”²⁹ Ironically, technology is making terrorism easier and possible.

Now regardless of all the empirical definitions of terrorism, their concordance and divergence, terrorism is a social phenomenon, and therefore defined according to peoples’ and societies’ perceptions. In this perspective, how can one dissociate terrorism from Islamic fundamentalism and what are the reasons behind this form of terrorism?

Segell explains terrorism within the context of hegemony and explicates the Islamic terrorism by the rise of the Western hegemony versus the fall of the Islamic hegemony leading to a desperate act by the latter to drag the rival down since that the gap between them is bound by extreme technological evolution and political constraints against development of arms, weapons and nuclear power.³⁰ Other authors add the gap of culture and legal and religious beliefs. According to Bernard Lewis, “*Muslim fundamentalists are those who believe the troubles of the Muslim world result not of insufficient modernization but excessive modernization i.e. imposing and importing infidel ways on Muslim peoples. The task is to remove [modernizing] rulers and expel their foreign*

29- Black, p. 21.

30- See Segell, Glen M. “9/11: Wahabism/Hegemony and Agenic Man/Heroic Masculinity”, *Strategic Insights*, Vol. IV, No. 3 (2005), p. 1.

patrons and protectors, and return to purely Islamic ways of life in accord with the principles of Islam".³¹

Based on conquest that celebrated soldiers and valorized patterns of "heroic masculinity" typically on the qualities of war; the rise and spread of Islam, like other civilizations, depended in part on conquest by Muslim warriors, bequeathing a legacy of "heroic masculinity" that would endure long after the demise of Islamic hegemony. To gain respect and admiration, one must embody the heroic to become a hero. In the feudal eras, both Christian and Muslim knights were highly esteemed and respected. But the Christian knights were typically elites whereas most Muslims, bound by their Bedouin and nomadic life, derived from a population where every man was a warrior. This element is determining in explaining suicide terrorism as an event for and by "the man the street."³²

According to Segell, conditions of degradation and despair seek dignity and honor when joined with the legacies of the "heroic masculinity" of "warriors." Therefore, the terrorist action of a "heroic warrior" redirects rage to the perceived oppressor and thus empowers the person and restores his/her dignity and honor. Violence to the oppressor is then not only therapeutic, but becomes a mean to overcome political, economic or cultural domination. Projecting resentment outwards, a small number of radical fundamentalists, young, unattached, underemployed males, turned militant and turned to terrorism. And of these, an even smaller number, become suicide bombers, fully

31- Lewis, Bernard. "The Revolt of Islam", The New Yorker, Nov. 19, 2001.

32- *Ibid.*, p. 2.

accepting the belief that fallen warriors, martyred in battle, *shaheeden*, get a special place in heaven.³³

Indeed, this cliché is quite plausible since the Islamic mood in general reflects the anger against the Unipolar world guided by the colonial and Zionist hegemony incorporated by the US policy notably in the Middle East. When such anger is born in a fundamentalist and fanatic environment, its effects are quite predictable. Hereafter, the birth of Islamic terrorist fundamentalism in the light of Wahhabism, the Islamic *madrassa* in Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Petroleum Typhoon shall be discussed.

2.3. The Wahhabi school – Historical perspective

*“Six hundred years ago, the historian Ibn Khaldun observed that a leader who used ‘religious propaganda’ in his bid for royal authority, could strengthen the ‘asabiya or group feeling of his followers, and counteract the naturally anarchic tendencies of the Bedouin. In this process, wrote Ibn Khaldun, political change was marked by transition from the ‘desert life’ to ‘sedentary culture’.”*³⁴

The religious realm of Saudi Arabia owes much to Wahhabism, the revivalist movement founded by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), a Najdi *Sheikh* who became a scholar of the Hanbali³⁵ School (*madrassa*).

33- See *Ibid.*, p. 5.

34- Colman, Ronald. “Review of Ibn Sa’ud’s Warriors of Islam: the Ikhwan of *Najd* and Their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 1910-1930 by John Habib”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol.104, No.2 (1984), pp. 388 – 389.

35- “Hanbali is one of the Madhhabs within Sunni Islam. It is also a school of aqeedah (creed) in Sunni Islam. It was started by the students of Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal (d.855). Hanbali jurisprudence is predominant among Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula, although students of Islam throughout the world study and may choose to

Concerned by the proliferating decadent religious practices in the Arabian Peninsula as well as the growing moral decline of the society, ‘Abd al-Wahhab preached the return to the practice of the original Islamic community and denounced many popular Islamic beliefs and practices as idolatrous.

Offending the Najdi *Ulema* by his convictions, ‘Abd al-Wahhab left for the holy cities of *Hijaz* where he studied and became influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taimiyya.

Wahhabi doctrine became then the puritanical Sunni Islam encouraging the return to the pure and orthodox practice of the “fundamentals” of Islam, as in the Quran and in the life of the prophet Muhammad. The doctrine emphasized the struggle against idolatry (*shirk*) denouncing any kind of intercession with God, such as saint worship, visitation of graves, or erections of tombs. Wahhabism opposed some practices associated with mystical teachings and Sufism, and struggled against unrepentant Muslims.

‘Abd al-Wahhab’s movement was a literal interpretation of Islam with a distinctive political dimension: “*From Ibn Taimiyya, he [‘Abd al-Wahhab] took the notion that religion and state are indissolubly linked. Without the coercive power of the state, religion is in danger, and without the discipline of revealed law, the state becomes a tyrannical organization.*”³⁶

Hence, Taimiyya’s political theory consisted of a collaboration between the *Ulema* and a temporal ruler (amir) in order to secure the proper implementation of the *shari’a*. “*The amir, who became imam in the Saudi-*

observe its conclusions about Islamic practice.” See --, Hanbali, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanbali>, May 2008.

36- Hopwood, Derek. “The Ideological Basis: Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s Muslim Revivalism.” (ed.), Tim Niblock. State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia. London: Croom Helm, 1982, p. 33.

Wahhabi terminology, was expected to uphold the shari'a and to instill respect for the system of orders and prohibitions which regulates the life of the Muslims."³⁷

In return, the *Ulema* assumed the role of the guardians of the Word. Their responsibility was to supervise and guide the *imam* toward the Islamic path. This cooperation between *imam* and '*Ulema* was consecrated in 'Abd al-Wahhab's mutually beneficial alliance with Muhammad Ibn Saud in 1744 which marked the emergence of the first Saudi state.

The Wahhabism scriptural norms consecrated this *madrassa* as the nominal Islam of the Book. According to David Long, a specialist of Saudi Arabia, Saudi political culture is strictly Islamic. It entails a sense of inevitability and fate that echoes Fatima Mernissi's depiction of the obedience-revolt paradigm: "*Saudis tend to accept situations as inevitable far more quickly than people from Western cultures. Conversely, if they are convinced that a situation is not God's will, they will persevere against it long after Westerners would give up.*"³⁸

He adds that Saudi politics have been the logical outcome of Wahhabism: "*One must use care, however, in looking at 'Abd al-Wahhab's revival movement as a political ideology. It has no ideology independent of Islam.*" In Long's

37- In this peculiar context, *imam* means both leader of payer and political leader: it embodies the fusion of religion and politics. For a good comparison between the concepts of *amir* and *imam*, see Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty. London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, pp. 89-90.

38- Long, David E. "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." Long, David E. and Reich, Bernard. The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. 3rd. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 77.

discourse, Islam has a transcendent political essence that Wahhabism could obscure but not obliterate: Wahhabism is Islam.³⁹

Despite the un-exhaustiveness of the Wahhabi political theory, it resulted in an Islamic state where the *shari'a* is enforced by an *imam*, supervised by the *Ulema* who were significantly important political actors. Indeed, the *Ulema* played this role at the time of the first Saudi state. While Wahhabism survived the 18th century, yet its political dimension altered. Islam and the *Ulema* became subordinate the political pragmatism of Ibn Saud who exploited the religious feelings and cause of the Najdis as well as the Islamic institutions in order to ensure his political superiority.

In opposite to most rival families/clans in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Saud had the benefit of being upheld by religion since the 18th century. In 1902, following Ibn Saud's reconquest of Riyadh from the al-Rashid family, he took the title of *imam* after his father.⁴⁰ In his new aptitude to make political and religious resolutions, Ibn Saud obtained another tribal leadership which enabled him to get the support and the loyalty of the people. "*This alternate potential of legitimacy was critical since Al Saud was neither the most powerful family of Najd nor the most noble in terms of its tribal origin.*"⁴¹ However, between 1902 and 1913 when Ibn Saud ruled most of *Najd* and al-Hasa, religion had a small role in his rise to power while he relied on his family's traditional use of Islamic taxes.

39- *Ibid.*, p. 78.

40- Al-Farsy, Fouad. Modernity and Tradition: The Saudi Equation, London: Kegan Paul International, 1990, p. 17. Al Saud had lost control of Riyadh in 1891.

41- Lauzière, Henri. On the Origins of arab Monarchy: Political Culture, Historiography, and the Emergence of the Modern Kingdoms in Morocco and Saudi Arabia, Simon Fraser University, 2000, p. 30.

Since the 18th century, Al Saud had used the *zakat* – the fixed contribution tax raised on Muslims – as a fiscal tool to expand their rule. Consequently, the *zakat* was claimed from recently dominated urban and tribal groups.⁴² Early in the 20th century, Ibn Saud still used the *zakat* as a political tool. The tax was without a doubt a contractual settlement: paying the *zakat* was more than an act of giving; it was an act of loyalty to the family of Ibn Saud who collected it. In return, the Saudi family vowed to protect the contributor. In this case, the title of *imam* allowed Ibn Saud to take more advantage of this tax, one of the five pillars of Islam, linking by then the *zakat* and its political connotations with the wholesomeness of the Muslims' faith.

Supported by Najdi *Ulema*, Ibn Saud declared that, refusing to pay the tax was equal to refusing Islam and God's representatives on earth.⁴³ Commitment through the *zakat* was, nevertheless, insufficient. Ibn Saud's growing ambitions soon required a religious justification for his military expansion. Meanwhile, he realized the necessity of exploiting the Bedouins' fighting skills in order to suppress his opponents – were they the Rashidis, the Ottomans, or Sharif Husayn of Mecca.⁴⁴

Up till then, the Bedouins had been undependable fighters as several of them fled the battlefield at will, or joined the enemy's forces during combat.

42- Helms, Christine Moss. The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, London: Croom Helms, 1981, p. 151.

43- *Ibid.*, p. 99.

44- Ibn Saud had uncertain and changing relationships with the Ottoman Empire until he ensured British support in 1915. The Ottomans supported the Rashidi family upon their call, but wished to avoid unnecessary deployment of their armed forces in the Arabian Peninsula by reaching an agreement with Al Saud. Diplomatic reconciliation took place; a treaty was drafted in 1914, but historians disagree whether it was disregarded or never ratified by Ibn Saud. See, Anscome, Frederick E. The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 154 – 159.

Therefore, the essential part of Ibn Saud's armed forces was composed of townsmen. Bedouins were considered merely a secondary support.⁴⁵ This *status quo* changed after the first *Ikhwan* or brotherhood agreement was initiated around 1913.

The conception of the *Ikhwan* affected a tremendous progress in Ibn Saud's armed forces power.⁴⁶ John Habib defined the *Ikhwan* as Bedouins who "converted" to Wahhabism by renouncing nomadic life and living in settlements called *hujar*.⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, Ibn Saud realized that nomads could not be dominated ad infinitum by either financial compensations or force alone. Therefore, the *Ikhwan* was a means to settle the Bedouins and to make stable military units out of them: as a combating force, the *Ikhwan* had the mobility of the Bedouins and the allegiance, stability, and commitment of the sedentary.⁴⁸ While nomads and townsmen were still fighting side by side in battles, the various groups of *Ikhwan* became Al Saud's spearhead troops.⁴⁹

It is hard to dissociate the inception of the *Ikhwan* movement from religion. The settlement of the Bedouins was undeniably accomplished through religious means of persuasion. Ibn Saud's strategy of forced settlement in the *hujar* – the *Ikhwan*'s agricultural-military colonies – was justified as a *hijra*. The term *hijra* refers to the Prophet's immigration from Mecca to Medina and

45- The origins of the *Ikhwan* movement are clouded in mystery. Some authors claim the *Ikhwan* dated back from the first Saudi state, while others claim it first appeared in the 20th century. For further discussion see Silverfarb, Daniel. "The Philby Mission to Ibn Sa'ud, 1917-18", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.14, No. 2 (1979), pp. 269 – 286.

46- Colman, p. 390.

47- *Ibid.*

48- Kelly, J. B. "Review of The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936. From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State by Joseph Kostiner", The English Historical Review, Vol.111, No.444 (1996), p. 1345.

49- Al-Rasheed, p. 65.

the obligation of the Muslim community to follow him. While the meaning of *hijra* differs from one school of law to another⁵⁰, it alternates between physical resettlement and the Muslims' duty to distance themselves from evil and disbelief.⁵¹

On their ends, Al Saud and the Wahhabi *Ulema* attributed to the term *hijra* a convenient connotation which directed the Bedouins toward permanent settlement. On one hand, the Bedouins' life in the Sahara was portrayed as un-Islamic as their traditional law and unreliability toward the *imam*, in particular, were pointed out by the Wahhabi *Ulema*. On the other hand, the *hijra* was presented as a crucial solution to stay away from the evils of Bedouin life. In this sense, *hijra* was more than a migration; it was a transition from one lifestyle to another. Consequently, settlement in the *hujar* was considered by the *Ulema* as the only way to live by the *shari'a* and God's will.⁵²

Once established, the *Ikhwan* were intended to act according to Ibn Saud's needs. In order to guarantee the support for Saudi expansionist plans, the concept of *hijra* became closely related to *jihad*. The *Ulema* declared that part of the *Ikhwan's* religious responsibility was to conduct physical *jihad*, not only against non-Muslims, but against non-Wahhabis (*mushrikin*) as well.⁵³ Thus, Ibn Saud found the ideological medium that enabled him to engage in war against his Muslim rivals. Furthermore, the *Ikhwan's* expressed their religious zealotry during military battles as they believed that killing non-Wahhabis was rendering a service to Islam while bringing them closer to their own salvation,

50- There are five major Sunni schools of law or jurisprudence (*madh'hab*): the Maliki, Hanafi, Sha'fi'i, Hanbali and Wahhabi schools.

51- Helms, p. 180.

52- *Ibid.*, p. 181.

53- Silverfarb, p. 281.

whereas those who died were believed to be admitted directly into heaven. Consequently, the *Ikhwan* gave a considerable boost to Ibn Saud's conquests as he relied so heavily on them so as to ordering all Najdis, in 1916, to join the *Ikhwan* movement.⁵⁴

Then after, Ibn Saud's primary concern was to orient the *Ikhwan's* feverous war against those he considered "the right enemies". As a matter of fact, Ibn Saud rise to power was challenged by his, a priori, most serious rival, Sharif Husayn – from sharifan descent, whose family controlled Mecca since the 10th century. However, the two opponents, Husayn and Ibn Saud had both their rule strongly legitimized by Islam. Ibn Saud was the Wahhabism promoter, and took Islamic revivalism for a cause. Hussein's family, the Hashemites, Muhammad's direct bloodline from his daughter Fatima and his cousin Ali, were the protectors of the holy shrines, abided by the *shari'a* in every situation and asserted that the Quran was the sole constitution of *Hijaz*.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, the non-Wahhabi *Sharif* was regarded as a *mushrik* by the *Ikhwan* who saw it rightful to declare a *jihad* against him. Paradoxically, the non-Muslim British, with whom Ibn Saud had expansionist interests, were held in higher regard than their Muslim opponents. In fact, Ibn Saud strove to protect the British from the *Ikhwan's* fanaticism. For whom he began to receive subsidies from His Majesty, Ibn Saud persuaded the *Ikhwan* that they were Islamic *jizya*, the poll tax required from non-Muslims in a Muslim society.⁵⁶

54- Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, pp. 80 – 85.

55- Voll, John Obert. Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 2nd edition, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994, p. 56.

56- Oberschall, p. 30.

To enforce Wahhabi principles in the city of Riyadh as well as consolidating his rule, Ibn Saud created several committees and integrated them into the state institutions. As these committees were headed by *Ulema*, the local field officers (*mutawi'a*) were often allocated to the more illiterate Wahhabis.⁵⁷ The *mutawi'a*, operating in both *hujar* and cities, had rather undefined duties. They enforced Islamic ethics in general: their tasks varied from guaranteeing the severance of men from women in public spaces, preventing unacceptable entertainment, and enforcing the prevention of alcohol and tobacco. "They also made sure residents attended prayers at the mosque, and that shops were closed during these periods. Finally, they were entitled to arrest, bring to trial, imprison, and sometimes punish the infringers."⁵⁸ Through these committees, Ibn Saud was able to control closely the masses.

The collaboration of the *Ulema* was indispensable to ensure religious legitimacy. At many instances, Ibn Saud requested *fatwas* which helped him in his rule and decisions. In 1924, when he planned to take over the *Hijaz*, Ibn Saud requested a *fatwa* that accredited his war which aim was to guarantee the rights to perform religious duties as the Hashemites had prohibited the *Ikhwan* from performing the hajj. This *fatwa* was a green light to lead an attack on Sharif Husayn's provinces, Mecca and the Holy Shrines.⁵⁹

On another hand, and in order to strengthen his rule, Ibn Saud had to contain the fanaticism of the *Ikhwan*, as the movement had taken such a radical religious stance that it became a double-edged sword in the hands of the future king. Hence, in 1919, Ibn Saud requested a *fatwa* which aimed at controlling

57- Moss, *op. cit.* p. 131.

58- *Ibid.*, p. 140.

59- Anscome, p. 60.

the *Ikhwan's* excesses. This *fatwa* affirmed that "Ikhwanist" Islam was not superior to common Wahhabi practice.⁶⁰

Following the subjugation of *Hijaz*, at a time when Ibn Saud undertook the securing of political stability, some *Ikhwan* tribes declared their own *jihad* against the Hashimite kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq. Consequently, with the blessing of the *Ulema*, Ibn Saud annihilated his obstinate co-religionists. Therefore, Islam was first and foremost a political means, as it was used by Ibn Saud to gain political ascendancy, to fuel, and to legalize his military expansionist aspirations.

Clearly, Ibn Saud manifested that the founding of his kingdom was of greater significance than any Wahhabi crusade. According to Christine Helms, the "imam legend" was broken. To be sure, the title of *imam* was gradually disregarded and, in September 1932, Ibn Saud opted for king of Saudi Arabia.⁶¹ Encouraged by experts of political Islam, many historians underline the formula *din wa dawla*, the union of religion and state. However, some of those scholars claim that *mulk* (Kingdom) is not an Islamic institution as according to the Quran, it is an attribute of God and God alone. The title *malik* has more of a *jahiliyya* connotation unless it is attributed to God (*al-malik*, the King).⁶² Nevertheless, *din wa mamlaka* proved to be a successful combination in Saudi Arabia, whereas Saudis were no less Muslims.

Using Islam as a political tool is a time honored practice: in so far as beliefs and legitimacy are linked, a leader who validates his rule according to the masses beliefs is likely to gain greater support. Legitimacy, in sequence,

60- *Ibid.*, p. 73.

61- *Ibid.*, p. 75.

62- Plessner, M. "Mulk." *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (n.d.), pp. 546-547.

leads to authority. Therefore, in the political process, Islam is only a political asset which, depending on its interpretation, can promote any regime.⁶³

To be sure, Ibn Saud decided on the title of king (*malik*) for power motives that are linked to international factors. Ibn Saud first chose to call himself king in 1926 while he had already borne the titles of *imam* and *sultan*. In Saudi Arabia, though, the term *malik* had no strong local significance. It was nonetheless favored as it was intended to make a certain impact on the foreign diplomatic representatives. As Roger Owen stipulated, the title was probably not intended to impress the people as much as Britain.⁶⁴


As he became able to rule new territories, Ibn Saud gradually let go of his religious titles. The conversion occurred in compliance with his legalization strategy towards Britain. In order to claim territories ruled by *Sharif* Husayn, Ibn Saud frequently underscored his family's historical rights and considered legitimate his taking over the lands of the "first Saudi state". However, since his rival was a Hashimite, Ibn Saud hardly ever formulated this claim in religious terms. Moreover, Ibn Saud's Islamic status on the international level has never had a noteworthy advantage. As far as Britain was concerned, *Sharif* Husayn outranked Ibn Saud. With the intention of guaranteeing international recognition, 'Abd al-Aziz decided to highlight secular assets such as ancestral rights. Consequently, king became more suitable than his earlier titles. On one hand, it was not religious. On the other hand, Ibn Saud believed that such a title

63- Beetham, David. The Legitimation of Power, London: MacMillan, 1991, pp. 10- 11.

64- Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 57.

would augment his authority and legitimacy in the eyes of British diplomatic agents.⁶⁵

65- Moss, *op.cit.* pp. 109 – 110.



3. Politics of terrorism or terrorism of politics: the Saudi Arabian case

3.1. Legitimacy of Al-Saud's reign

With Islam's rise in the 7th century, the tribes of Arabia were united into a singular Arab Muslim religious polity. The Arab Empire expanded from Spain to the Indus River and from Central Africa to the Persian frontier. But with Muhammad's death in 632, the first disputes over political and religious leadership started and led to the schism in the Muslim community between the Sunnis and the Shiites. Arabia, which was the center of Islam, was soon shut off from the rest of the world. It did not take part in the Crusades' Battles, the Byzantium Empire's rise and fall, the Turks' conquest. The Bedouins' lives were untouched by the Ottoman rule.⁶⁶

It wasn't until Prince Muhammad Ibn Saud, ruler of Diriya and Riyadh, took the religious reformer Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab of Banu Tamim under his protection (1740s) that things started to change. Many scholars see Ibn Abd Al Wahhab as a fanatic, preaching the Faith in its original simplicity and aiming to cleanse Islam from practices of heresy.⁶⁷ According to Delong-Bas, Ibn Abd Al Wahhab was a *hadari* (city-dweller), a defender of women's rights and a modernist whose teachings are "relevant not only for reforming and

66 - Armstrong, Harold Courtenay. Lord of Arabia. A Biography of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, Beirut: Khayat Book & Publishing Co., 1954, p. 3.

67- According to Ibn Abd Al Wahhab, the ten reasons to being declared apostate are: "Polytheism (associating others with God in worship); Using mediators for God (for example, praying to saints), Doubting that non-Muslims are disbelievers; Judging by non-Islamic laws and believing these are superior to divine law; Hating anything the Prophet Mohammed practiced; Mocking Islam or the Prophet Mohammed; Using or supporting magic; Supporting or helping non-believers against Muslims; Believing that someone has the right to stop practicing Islam; and Turning away from Islam by not studying or practicing it". See Addwesh, Abdulaziz. "The Ten Nullifiers of Islam", IslamBasics Online Library, <http://www.islambasics.com/view.php?bkID=64&chapter=1>

rejuvenating his own society, but also for the revival and reinterpretation of Islam in the twenty-first century as Muslims seek methodologies for the rejuvenation of Islamic practice and the Islamization of modernity".⁶⁸

By the power of the sword and preaching, Muhammad Ibn Saud (known as *The Great*) and Ibn Abd Al Wahhab established their rule over the deserts, submitting the tribes, one after the other. By capturing Mecca and Medina in 1802, the Wahhabis threatened the dominance of the Ottoman Empire as they did not recognize the suzerainty of the Caliph of Istanbul over the Holy Cities.⁶⁹ In response, ottoman armies, led by Tosun Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Viceroy of the Sublime Porte in Egypt, left for the *Hijaz* by sea and reconquered Arabia.⁷⁰ Abdullah Ibn Saud, fourth and last leader of the first Saudi State, sent to Istanbul, was decapitated in Constantinople. Lacking a unifying leader, the Arabs split once more into quarrelling tribes. This was the end of the first Saudi polity that had dominated Arabia by controlling most of the *Najd* Plateau from 1744 to 1818. Once again, Arabia turned into a land of bloodshed and strife.

A few years later, in 1824, the Saud family returned to power, forming the Second Saudi State. This period lasted till 1891 and was marked by less territorial expansion and religious zealotry. Saudi leaders nevertheless kept their *Imam* title and still employed Wahhabi scholars. Ruthless internal conflicts within the Saudi family eventually led to the downfall of the dynasty in 1891, marked by the battle of Mulayda between forces loyal to the last Saudi

68- Delong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 281.

69- Hourani, Albert. Histoire des peuples arabes. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993, p. 342.

70- Hodgson, William Brown. "An Edited Biographical Sketch of Mohammed Ali, Pasha of Egypt, Syria and Arabia", PeterForce, Georgetown, March 1835, <http://www.sunnah.org/history/mhdalip.htm>

Imam Abd Al-Rahman Ibn Faisal Ibn Turki and the Al Rashid dynasty of Ha'il. The Saud clan was exiled to Kuwait, from where they later recaptured Riyadh, their ancestral capital, in 1902. The rest of the *Najd* Plateau and the *Hijaz* followed between 1913 and 1926.⁷¹

In May 1927, the United Kingdom recognized the Kingdom of *Hijaz* and *Najd* of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman Ibn Faisal Al Saud by the Treaty of Jeddah. Since the establishment of the current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the ruling family of Al Saud had set up very close ties with the Wahhabi religious clerics. The *Amir* of all *Najd* was at the same time *Imam* of the Wahhabis. Ibn Saud rose to power with the help of the militant religious brotherhood of the *Ikhwan*; yet these Bedouin tribes who felt that their nomadic life was incompatible with the strict conformity of Islam, rebelled against their ruler when he forbade them to raid into neighboring states. In addition, the alliance of the Bedouin warriors with the founder of the modern Saudi kingdom, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, led to political confrontations with Sunnis in Western Arabia and Shiites in southern Iraq. Their rebellion was thus crushed at the Battle of Sabilla in 1930 and they were incorporated into the Saudi Arabian National Guard.⁷²

Furthermore, and despite the considerable power that is vested in the king, his legitimacy remained dependent on the consensus of the bastion of the Islamic faith, the religious leadership (*Ulema*). While the *Ulema* should not be considered king-makers in Saudi Arabia, they are invested with considerable

71- --, "Unification of Saudi Arabia", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unification_of_Saudi_Arabia, May 2008.

72- --, "Ikhwan", <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ikhwan>, May 2008.

societal power and their support is essential.⁷³ The *Ulema* spoke against the introduction of new technologies into the Kingdom such as wireless telegraphy, telephones and motor-cars. They didn't approve of Ibn Saud's soft dealings with unbelievers and his friendship with the English. However, the *Ulema* knew they owed their influence to Ibn Saud and he carefully consulted with the Wahhabi leaders. Consequently, they didn't protest too much when he overrode their decisions. Therefore, the *Ulema's* influence was declining and the skillful leader, Ibn Saud, had to stimulate his family's strong ties with the people in order to outwit his dependence upon the *Ulema's* authority. With pragmatism, Ibn Saud planned a modern state and adopted technical means that were viewed by some clerics as heretic. Islam being the centre of its political and religious legitimacy, the Saudi regime established the *Ulema* as the arbiter between state and society. The balance of power between the state and the *Ulema* was such that the latter checked the Islamic content of state policies and at the same time, recognized the limits placed upon them by their political leaders, bearing a resemblance to how things worked in medieval Europe.⁷⁴

The royal family's political authority and its legitimacy are based on a "mix of religion, rentierism, patrimonialism and tribalism".⁷⁵ Undeniably, the first and second Saudi states were undermined by the "wrong mix" that lowered the degree of legitimacy of the Saud family. Consequently, and in order to

73- In 1964 the royal family and ulama, responding to public discontent, deposed Saud and appointed his half-brother Faisal as king, in http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_profiles/2004-2005/Saudi_Arabia.htmlhttp://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_profiles/2004-2005/Saudi_Arabia.html

74- Quilliam, Neil and Kamel, Maggie. "Modernising Legitimacy: Saudi Strategies", in *Alternatives. Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2003, <http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number2/kamel.htm>

75- *Ibid.*

prevent an erosion of legitimacy, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, aware of his predecessor's failures, invested considerable energy into forging an alliance with the Al Sheikh kin, direct descendants of Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab. He also used Islam to mobilize the various tribes and extend his influence throughout the Arabian peninsula. Unlike in urbanized countries such as Egypt or Syria, consulting with the tribal chief remains important in Saudi Arabia. In fact, if consultation is a central part of the traditional Islamic order⁷⁶, the element of consent remains important. Thus, "the mechanics of [*Al Saud's*] legitimacy consisted of the three basic elements of the Wahhabi ideology:

1. *Wihdat Ul Ummah* (the unity of the nation – *Ummah* here meaning the Muslim world), and its functional course is *Al Tawheed* (unification).

2. The *universality of Wahhabism*, being the function of *Al Tawheed*, i.e., the spread of the belief through unification.

3. *Al Ukhuwwa* (brotherhood among the believers, with the brothers in Wahhabism called *Al Ikhwan*)".⁷⁷

In 1948, Saudi Arabia participated in the first Arab-Israeli war. In 1953, following the death of King Abd Al Aziz Al Saud, his son Saud succeeded and reigned for 11 years (1953-1964) until he was deposed in favor of his half-brother Faisal. King Faisal, stressing on economic development, pursued

76- Lewis, Bernard. "Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East". *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2005: *The traditional system of Islamic government is both consensual and contractual. The manuals of holy law generally assert that the new caliph -- the head of the Islamic community and state -- is to be "chosen." The Arabic term used is sometimes translated as "elected," but it does not connote a general or even sectional election. Rather, it refers to a small group of suitable, competent people choosing the ruler's successor. In principle, hereditary succession is rejected by the juristic tradition. Yet in practice, succession was always hereditary, except when broken by insurrection or civil war; it was -- and in most places still is -- common for a ruler, royal or otherwise, to designate his successor.*

77- --, The Free Online Library, "Saudi Arabia III - The Ruling Structure", 2004, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Pax+Americana+Is+Changing+-+Part+15C+-+Saudi+Arabia+III+-+The+Ruling...-a0116389958>

modernization, and introduced western technology and increased public education. His reign that lasted till his assassination in 1975 witnessed increasing diplomatic complexity within the Arab world and beyond. Though Saudi Arabia sent forces to help the Jordanians in the Six-Day War between Arab and Israeli forces (1967), it did not participate militarily in the Yom Kippur conflict (1973). Still the Kingdom joined the Arab oil boycott of the United States.⁷⁸

External turmoil was coupled with internal strife. After the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of Kuwait, inside and outside opposition movements started challenging the foundations of the conservative Saudi regime more and more. In order to contain its dissidents, the Saudi state had to design its reactions, according to the protests it wished to absorb. Although the government could use coercion against the protestors, its cultural tendency to consensus pushed it rather to label them as ‘foreign agents’ consequently making them disloyal to Islam and thus to Saudi Arabia. In doing so, the Saudi regime accommodates its opponents but in reality, it doesn’t concede any of its power. For instance, during the 1980s, the Saudi state, extending its sphere of influence to Central Asia, encouraged Jihad outside of Saudi Arabia and “exported” ideological Islamists to Afghanistan. This allowed the regime to give a boost to its legitimacy in the name of spreading Islam. Religion is hence a means to regulate society and a mechanism to generate legitimacy. Islam assists in shaping public discourse⁷⁹, thus producing a more radical society by

78- --, “History of Saudi Arabia”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Saudi_Arabia, May 2008.

79- For instance, the *Ulema* served the interests of the state by issuing a fatwa to support the decision inviting the U.S. military to be present in Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf war. See Al-Fahad, Abdulaziz H. “From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal

the way of Islamic traditional policies in compensation of the non-Islamic foreign policy.⁸⁰

With the oil shocks of the 1970s and the 1980s, oil revenues sky rocketed and awarded the Saudi state an additional major source of legitimacy. It helped the state provide extensive welfare services in terms of healthcare and education and establish a substantial infrastructure throughout the country. Ironically, the surplus of wealth institutionalized the patrimonial system that existed and the Saudis became rentiers. Furthermore, the Saudi population perceived welfare as a *right to citizenship rather than the happy consequence of a boom period*.⁸¹ When the recession of 1986 hit, the regime resources were running low. As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia had been supporting Iraq's war against Iran (USD 20 billion) and it shared the cost of the liberation of Kuwait (USD 55 billion).⁸² But rather than initiating structural reforms, the government adopted deficit financing. The recession persisted. The rulers of Saudi Arabia had *used oil revenues to eliminate the old economic elites of one region and create in another an entirely new class of entrepreneurs directly dependent on*

and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism", NYU Law Review, Vol. 79, Nr. 2, May 2004, pp. 485-519.

80- "After 'Utaibi's seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979, the state reinforced a number of societal restrictions, which included the following: Obliging migrant workers to observe the Islamic values of society, passing regulations that prohibited girls from continuing their education abroad, closing down video stores, closing down women's hairdressing salons and clubs, dismissing female announcers from television, despite their modest appearance, temporarily recalling Saudi students studying abroad in the middle of the academic year". See Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia, New York: NYU Press, 2000, p. 397.

Upon petitions voicing liberal concerns, King Fahd had to proclaim that the liberalization requested by some Saudis *may be premature*. See Mordechai, Abir. Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 187.

81- Okruhlik, Gwenn. "Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States", Comparative Politics, April 1999, p. 301.

82- Krimly, Rayed. "The Political Economy of Adjusted Priorities: Declining Oil Revenues and Saudi Fiscal Policies," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 257-258.

*the favor and the financial support of the government.*⁸³ Now, the political legitimacy of Al Saud was at stake. As a result, the government cut down on public expenditures, reduced subsidies on oil products, electricity, telephones, and domestic airline flights and tried to generate new revenues from imposing levies on expatriate work permits.⁸⁴

It is important to note, that even though Islam is an essential corner stone of the Kingdom, its Shiite minority (around 10% of all the Saudi population⁸⁵) has been systematically discriminated by its puritan clerics and also by the state's institutions (few employment opportunities in the government, the army and professional careers). This attitude of the majority towards the minority lies within the fear of conspiring with Iran, especially since Khomeini was promoting the export of his Islamic Revolutionary ideals. Furthermore, the Shiite community has always considered the Al Saud to be illegitimate. In the 1980s, the Shiites' organized protests against state policies. The uprising was rapidly crushed. The Saud regime considered it had the duty to cleanse Saudi Arabia of Islamic unwelcomed sects. As a response, the exiled Shiite opposition published reports about corrupt practices of the royal family and human rights abuses from London. These reports worried the regime, especially as they became less confrontational but focused more on issues that drew international concern. Consequently, the regime invited the opposition back to Saudi Arabia in 1993, provided the publication of these reports would end. This didn't prevent the regime from closing celebration halls (*Husayniah*) or prohibiting

83- Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. The Price of Wealth: Economics and Institutions in the Middle East, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 34-37.

84- Krimly, pp. 257-265.

85- Armanios, Febe. "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites", CRS Report for Congress, February 2004, p.6.

the Shiites' call for prayer. This line of action differs from the cultural inheritance and the traditions of the Arab tribes and Islam. In fact, reprisals are sought as a last resort. Ironically, in the case of the Shiite opposition, the latter had to accommodate the state in order to convince *it to amend its coercive strategy in exchange for compliance and loyalty*.⁸⁶

The new world era that started with the fall of the Soviet Union and consequently communism forecasted a period of turbulences on the global scene. As a matter of fact, events like the Second Gulf war and the U.S. war on terrorism couldn't but distress the relationship between the Arab states and their societies. The outbreak of the second intifada, the failure of the peace talks along with Israel's incursions into Palestinian territories also irritated the Arab populations, whose feeling of prejudice arose with resentment towards Israel and the U.S. It is in this context that the rejoicing and satisfaction expressed by some Arabs over the September 11 attacks is to be perceived. Nevertheless, the relations between the U.S. administration and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were seriously destabilized.

3.2. Al-Saud's power: source and evolution

It was the English Crown, who recognized Ibn Saud as an independent king, although creating a ring of states around Saudi Arabia.⁸⁷ From World War I and through World War II, Ibn Saud remained on the Allies' side. Harry St. John Bridger Philby, who notably influenced Ibn Saud, was sent by the British government to improve Ibn Saud's relations with Hussein and Sheikh Salim of

86- Quilliam, N. and Kamel, M. *Op. Cit.*

87- Clayton, Gilbert. "Arabia and the Arabs", Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1., January 1929, pp. 8-20.

Kuwait.⁸⁸ Only Philby secretly favored Ibn Saud over Sherif Hussein, and his position diverged from the British policy on Arab affairs. The British had indeed promised their support to the Hashemite dynasty in the post-Ottoman world. But with the Balfour declaration and the Skykes-Picot Agreement, Philby could feel the nuisance about Jewish immigration to Palestine. He was valued by Ibn Saud who appointed him as his adviser on dealing with the British Empire and the western powers. Philby, who had already converted to Islam in 1930, was put in charge of arranging Ibn Saud's coronation as king in 1932.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, Ibn Saud had great territorial aspirations. Still, he was aware of his limitations and wished to keep his friendship with the English and his contacts with the French. And so he quickly came to an agreement with Faisal of Baghdad to respect the frontier between them. He had it tougher with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. In fact, Abdullah had taken up the family quarrel and swore he would not rest until he had chased Ibn Saud out of the *Hijaz*. He had much of the obstinacy of his father Hussein. Eventually, a treaty of friendship was concluded. Now the Kingdom has secured peace on its north and western borders. There remained the danger of the independent principality of Yemen, ruled by the *Imam* Yahya. The *Imam* was beaten by Ibn Saud's armies and finally made peace without further argument.⁹⁰

The raids between tribes had been a way of subsistence to the Bedouins and were considered as "a wasteful redistribution of stock conducted with the amenities of a sport". However, they were put down by Ibn Saud as they could

88- Silverfarb, pp. 269-286.

89- --, "St. John Philby", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St._John_Philby, May 2008.

90- Armstrong, pp.196-206.

deteriorate into serious regional threats with the creation of orderly governments under the mandate of Western powers.⁹¹ In order to consolidate his power, Ibn Saud had to build effective state institutions, especially in the fiscal and military spheres. But the changes in the kingdom were constrained by financial and human resources. Ibn Saud continued the practice of collecting the religious tithe (*zakat*) and taxed trade through the Red Sea and Gulf Ports. As a protector of the Holy Cities and because it supervised the pilgrimage, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had revenues from taxes on pilgrims. In their World War I efforts, the British also paid for Ibn Saud's support in subsidies. Nevertheless, Ibn Saud had negligible sums at his disposal to provide the kingdom's peace by bribing the nomadic tribesmen with gifts in order to ensure they wouldn't rise up against him. Concerning military forces, up until the late 1920s, Ibn Saud relied on a blend of tribal auxiliaries and the *Ikhwan*. When he conquered *Hijaz*, he offered the defeated Iraqi and Syrian officers of the Hashemite army positions in permanent military units, and when he formed a directorate of military affairs, many of these officers filled important positions.⁹² By 1935, Saudi Arabia had the core of a ministry of defense, which took definitive form in 1946. It was the discovery of petroleum and its large-scale exploitation after World War II that transformed the country and allowed a more robust approach to state-building.⁹³

91- Toynbee, Arnold J. "A Problem of Arabian Statesmanship", Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4., July 1929, pp. 367-375.

92- Vassiliev, p. 308.

93- Commins, p. 100.

Already in May 1933, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) had negotiated a 60-year contract with Philby⁹⁴ for the exclusive exploration and extraction of oil in the Hasa region. The British influence was declining and Philby advised Ibn Saud to grant American companies a substantial authority over Saudi Arabia's oil fields. In 1936, having still not located any oil, SOCAL had to sell 50% of its concession to Texaco. With the discovery of oil in the Dammam area in 1938, around 1.500 barrels per day were produced. In 1944, the California-Arabian Standard Oil Company became Arabian American Oil Company or Aramco. Ibn Saud threatened to nationalize Saudi Arabia's oil facilities in 1950 but it wasn't till 1973 that the government acquired 25% of Aramco, increasing the share to 60% in 1974 before controlling all the company in 1980. Eight years later, Aramco was renamed Saudi Arabian Oil Company or Aramco.⁹⁵

Saudi Arabia's oil revenues were of course appropriated by the state. The Saudi regime allocated its new wealth according to existing patrimonial linkages within society and thereby, it was able to cultivate bonds of loyalty based on an excess of wealth, in addition to Islamic piety. Oil revenues gave the monarchy an additional source of legitimacy flowing from *the just distribution of Allah's wealth*. The monarch was suddenly invested with considerable riches, distributed according to tribal affiliation, loyalty and expediency. Instead of building influence only through intermarriage, war and favors, the Saud family was now able to dispense financial favors; the former patrimonial system became institutionalized and took on the characteristics of rentierism. Except

94- After his resignation from his post with the British, Philby had settled in Jeddah. See, "St. John Philby", *op.cit.*

95- --, "Saudi Aramco", <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARAMCO>, May 2008.

since the mode of distribution was based more on patrimonial benefits than merit and productivity, the Saudis started taking welfare for granted. The top elites to exercise political and economic power were and still are the families of the rulers, the merchants and the sheikhs. These groups are challenged by the bureaucratic elite, and the emerging middle class but their key function remains *to protect the status quo: the ruling families through politics and commerce, the merchant families through commerce leading to politics, and the shaikhly families evolving from their role of traditional tribal leadership into politics and commerce.*⁹⁶

The governing structure that has been in place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is highly centralized and rests on the following:

- The King and his *Diwan* (office): it is important to note that the monarch heads the legislative and executive branches, rules by decree and is also the Prime Minister ;
- The Crown Prince is, since 1992, the King's deputy in his absence. He cannot automatically become King though. He has to be elected by a collegiate of 500 princes ;
- The Council of Ministers, headed by the King, consists of a Prime Minister, the First Prime Minister, twenty Ministers, (of whom the Minister of Defense also is the Second Deputy Prime Minister), two ministers of state, and a small number of advisers and heads of major autonomous organizations. Meetings are held weekly. There are two

96- Peterson, J.E. "Rulers, Merchants and Shaikhs in Gulf Politics", in The Gulf Family. Kinship Policies and Modernity, SAQI in association with London Middle East Institute SOAS, 2007, pp. 21-36.

deputy ministers, one who is also the commander of the National Guard and the other one who holds the Ministry of Defense and Aviation ;

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ;
- The Ministry of Interior
- The Shura Council is an advisory appointed by the King.

Its members are prominent academics, businessmen and religious scholars. Its power is limited and it advises on matters within a framework set by the regime.⁹⁷

Lawmaking is done by resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council. New laws have to be ratified by royal decree, and must be compatible with the *Shari'a*. Justice is administered according to the *Shari'a* by a system of religious courts whose judges are appointed by the king on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council, composed of 12 senior jurists. The law protects the independence of the judiciary. The king, who has the power of pardon, also acts as the highest court of appeal. Access to high officials (usually at a *majlis*, or public audience) and the right to petition them directly are well-established traditions.⁹⁸

The oil revenues set the modernization process in motion, and hence, made administrative expansion both possible and desirable. Saudis acquired technical training and expertise overseas. The institute of Public Administration was created in 1961 on the recommendation of a United Nations consultant on

97- --, "Saudi Arabia III - The Ruling Structure", The Free Online Library, 2004, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Pax+Americana+Is+Changing+-+Part+15C+-+Saudi+Arabia+III+-+The+Ruling...-a0116389958>

98- --, "Background Note: Saudi Arabia", Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, February 2008, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm>

administration, to train a corps of civil servants.⁹⁹ During the same period, the influence of secular political trends in the Arab world was growing and a technocratic segment emerged. But the cultural divergence between this emerging technocratic segment and the Wahhabi was unmistakable. In 1966, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, then president of Medina's Islamic University wrote an essay alleging the geocentric perspective of the universe and condemning the secular Riyadh University for teaching the Copernican view.¹⁰⁰

While engaging in the development of a modern administration, Saudi domestic politics started reflecting those of the wider Arab world. The Palestine issue was central to the Saudi rulers from its origins. Unfortunately, the U.S. disregarded the Saudi position and this caused an increasing tension between the two countries, despite the fact that a special relationship had developed as a result of oil and the revenues it generated. Modern politics cornered the regime and the rulers had to clamp down on sources of dissent. For instance, they rather blamed the 1953 demonstrations on foreign ideologies such as communism and Arab nationalism than identifying without bias the revolting conditions of the workers. As a result, the government restricted the number of authorizations to study abroad. It also expelled many Arab workers, alleged of dissident political activity. Besides, perking up the Committees for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, the government banned women driving.¹⁰¹

99- Al-Sadhan, Abdulrahman M., "The modernization of the Saudi bureaucracy", in Willard A. Belling (ed.), *King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, p. 82.

100- Holden, David and Johns, Richard. The House of Saud: the Rise and Rule of the most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World, Austin: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 1981, p.262.

101- Buchan, James. "Secular and religious opposition in Saudi Arabia", in Tim Niblock (ed.), *State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,

Another aspect of modernity emerged in the Kingdom, the mass media. Although newspapers came out in the *Hijaz* in the late Ottoman period, print media did not reach the *Najd* until the early 1950s. Saudi Arabia suffered from a low level of literacy and that's why the demand for newspapers and periodicals stayed limited till the 1960s. During King Faisal's reign, the number of daily newspapers rose from three to seven and quadrupled in circulation.¹⁰² As in other modern sectors of Saudi society, a central role was assumed by foreign Arabs, such as Egyptian journalists in the case of newspapers. It was therefore no surprise that Saudi newspapers would praise Abdel Nasser. This situation was extremely sensitive when Saudi Arabia and Egypt had diverging opinions about the 1962 revolution in Yemen. It was that same year that the Saudi government created the Ministry of Information. This was followed by a code to regulate the press by setting the standards the newspapers had to meet in 1964. Radio and television broadcasting turned out to be much more of an issue with Wahhabi *Ulema* opposing the radio broadcast of a woman's voice.¹⁰³ On the other hand, Saudis who were educated abroad and returned appreciated the development of modern media. In order to tame hostility from the clerics and the fanatics and consequently to prevent the new medium from dividing society, King Faisal dedicated a large portion of broadcast time to religious programs and allowed only a gradual increase of the ratio of the secular ones. Another point in introducing television to counter Nasserist radio propaganda

1982,
pp. 108-112.

102- Rugh, William A., "Saudi mass media and society in the Faisal era", in Willard A. Beling (ed.), *King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 125-127.

103- *Ibid.* pp. 126-134; Holden and Johns, p. 261.

and since the government controlled all the information. The television became a means to transmit the regime's positions on regional and local matters.¹⁰⁴

Modernization did also touch the religious institutions. In the 1950s, Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Abd Al-Latif, member of Al al-Sheikh, supported the creation of a unified judiciary system. Up till then, cases were settled without any written recording and the courts of *Najd* and *Hijaz* functioned separately. In 1957, the courts were unified under a Higher Judicial Council that supervised procedures and judicial appointments. Then, in 1963, followed the creation of a special office to issue *fatwas*, called *Dar al Ifta*, which was presided by Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim as grand mufti. This Directorate is of central importance as Saudi Arabia is governed on basis of the *shari'a*. It is true that the King appoints the members of the Fatwa Directorate but the clerics regard more the principles of Hanbali jurisprudence than royal preference. *Dar al Ifta*'s functions are to examine unprecedented legal questions that come before the Saudi government and to give religious bodies formal administrative shape.¹⁰⁵ With the rise of secular Arab nationalism and the Saudi youth considering the older generations to be reactionary, both the Saudis and Wahhabism were undermined. Consequently, Sheikh Muhammad convinced the government to counter that dangerous trend by creating centers for teaching Islamic sciences and Arabic and attracting students from abroad. A new Islamic Sciences college as well as a new university in Medina trained instructors, religious court judges and teachers to go on mission outside of Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim also supported the creation of the World

104- Rugh, pp. 132-133.

105- Al-Yassini, Ayman. Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, p.71.

Muslim League in its efforts to revive Islam and to dispatch Saudi-sponsored proselytizers to combat Sufism and religious innovations. And while Sheikh Muhammad supported a modern form of religious institutions, he was utmost conservative on Wahhabi positions. He nevertheless approved the decision to open schools for girls.¹⁰⁶ After Sheikh Muhammad's death in 1969, the government established a Ministry of Justice, which included the Presidency of the Judiciary. But in the 1970s, issuing *fatwas* fell under the authority of the Directorate of Religious Research, Fatwas, Propaganda and Guidance. And the Ministry of Pilgrimage was in charge of appointing religious teachers and prayer leaders. Although modern practices meant to build up bureaucracy and propagate standardized regulations, the Wahhabi establishment was not weakened. On the contrary, the Saudi state found ways to incorporate religious norms and at the same time kept the balance of power between the *ulema* and the rulers.¹⁰⁷ It is worth noting that, since the late 1990s, a Saudi Islamic lecturer and author, Sheikh Muhammad Saleh Al-Munajjid, manages a website, called "Islam, Question and Answer" (<http://www.islam-qa.com>), where Muslims and non-Muslims can inquire about any *fatwa* or topic. To reach the maximum audience possible, this website is available in seven languages. This is an additional step in bringing Saudi Arabia into the 21st century, while keeping it away from secularism, preserving its traditions and spreading Wahhabism. All external and internal disturbances pushed the royal family to live up to the challenges, strengthen its legitimacy and assert its power. In stressing on modernization, the Al-Saud opened the door to "democratic

106- Vogel, Frank E., Islamic Law and Legal Systems: Studies of Saudi Arabia, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 93.

107- Commins, pp. 111-113.

reforms” and at the same time enabled the rise of the religious discontent of the Wahhabi establishment.

3.3. Reforms and Democracy

By launching the modernization of government structure, the royal family contributed to a growing political complexity. But economic and technical improvements were not accompanied by the implementation of a democratic structure in the political system. Reforms had to be implemented. And they could not be postponed for much longer. The question revolved around the means and practices.

In March 1992, the political reforms’ program, proposed by King Fahd, outlined the procedures concerning the royal succession. The monarch also issued several decrees determining the basic statutes of government. Taking the edge from the Sunni had also required the creation by King Fahd of the National Consultative Council. Sixty members were appointed in 1993. They had advisory powers to review and give advice on issues of public interest. The council expanded to ninety members in 1997. To appease the Shiite minority as well, three additional Shiites were appointed in 1997 to join the one originally designated in 1993. The membership of the *Shura* Council was again expanded to 120 members in 2001 and another time to 150 members in 2005. In February, March and April 2005, all Saudis, except women and male members of the military, were called upon to vote for the country’s first municipal elections since the 1950s. According to Phebe Marr’s¹⁰⁸ records, choosing municipal

108- Member of the department of Arabic-speaking scholars and political reporters created by Aramco, Phebe Marr hold a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern history from Harvard University and a master's in Middle East studies from Radcliffe College. She is a

councils by vote began as early as 1954 and continued at least till the early 1960s.¹⁰⁹ In 2006, King Abdullah announced the establishment of an Allegiance Commission that will be in charge of selecting the future Crown Prince, who has to be a male descendant of Abd Al Aziz. In December 2007, a royal decree appointed the members of this Commission.¹¹⁰

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is serious about planning and executing reform plans that were launched in 1993 but it still has a long way to reach democracy. In fact, there are no political parties or national elections. Women still aren't allowed to drive or work except in women's shops or factories. Going beyond the historical injustices against them and their inequitable treatment, which is not specific to Saudi Arabia but is a common attitude towards women in the Arab world, will allow progressive leaders to adopt affirmative action in order to expand the participation of women in society. For instance, in the 1990s, only 48% of women were literate in comparison to their male counterparts (73%). The Saudi regime is allocating billions from its yearly budgets to its education system but fewer resources are dedicated to women's higher education than to men's. Women can't study engineering, journalism or architecture because of sex-segregation practices. Moreover, the fact that women are not allowed to travel without a male chaperon discouraged many from studying abroad.¹¹¹

prominent historian of modern Iraq,
<http://www.usip.org/specialists/bios/archives/marr.html>

109- Lippman, Thomas. "...And Saudi Votes That May Count", Middle East Institute – Washington DC, November 16, 2003, <http://www.mideasti.org/scholars/editorial//and-saudi-votes-may-count>

110- --, "Background Note: Saudi Arabia", *op. cit.*

111- --, U.S. Library of Congress, "Saudi Arabia. Education", <http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/31.htm>

Although the Ministry of Interior is responsible for internal security, the religious police (*Mutawwa'in*) are semi-autonomous and monitor public behavior. And if the government controls the security forces, these often commit human rights abuses. According to the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia (CDHR), the kingdom is currently *an incubator for intolerance and terrorism* and that the *absolute monarchy encourages the oppression of women and religious minorities*. In order to reverse the current situation, Saudi Arabia should be democratized by creating *a responsible, accountable and productive society, ruled by laws created by its members, not by leaders who invoke fear and resentment*.¹¹² Consequently, the opposition is not only calling for political reform. It is also requesting religious freedom, rights for women and minorities and demanding more economic improvements.

On the religious level, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia does not allow the free practice of any religion other than Islam. Furthermore, it considers Shiites, who constitute around 10% of the Saudi population, “enemies of the state”. Abdul Rahman Al Barak, a top Saudi cleric, wrote in a *fatwa*: *By and large, rejectionists (Shiites) are the most evil sect of the nation and they have all the ingredients of the infidels*. Yet, with a Sunni-Shiite conflict taking shape in the region, the regime isn't making a move to nullify the public anti-Shiite rhetoric. It was though following a historic meeting between King Fahd and Shiite clerics in 1993 that the exiled Shiites were invited to return to Saudi Arabia and political prisoners were freed in exchange for their allegiance. Sunni clerics still meet with Shiite leaders away from the headlines, because of the

112- --, “The Center for Democracy & Human Rights in Saudi Arabia”, <http://www.cdhr.info/Main/HomePage>

conservative majority. The Shiites are allowed to celebrate Ashura¹¹³ for instance and the situation of this minority did improve since the late 1970s as they can now hold better jobs.¹¹⁴ In addition to the Sunni-Shiite issue, it is to be noted that worship for Muslims in Saudi Arabia is obligatory. All shops, restaurants, radio and television stations generally close during prayer times. Those who do not comply can be punished. Punishment can go from detention to flogging. Non-Muslims i.e. Hindus, Jews, and Christians, if caught practicing their faiths in public, can be imprisoned under harsh conditions without charge or due process. If religious prisoners come before a court, they face a judicial system staffed by Wahhabi conservative judges, who consider religious minorities and non-Muslims to be infidels. If they are foreigners, they are often deported to their native countries.¹¹⁵ According to Human Rights Watch's Middle East Director, Sarah Leah Whitson, Saudi Arabia has to stop convicting people for alleged insults to religion. Since the country has no penal code, crimes of "insulting Islam" or "cursing God" are not precisely defined. The

113- *Ashura is an Islamic holiday observed on the 10th of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic year. The word Ashura means "10," denoting the date of the holiday. Shortly after the Hijira in AD 622, Muhammad designated Ashura as a day of fasting from sunset to sunset, perhaps patterned on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). Traditionally, Ashura commemorates two events: the day Nuh (Noah) left the ark and the day Musa (Moses) was saved from the Egyptians by Allah. When Jewish-Muslim relations became strained, however, Muhammad designated Ramadan the Muslim month of fasting, making Ashura a voluntary fast, as it has remained among Sunnis. Among Shi'ites, however, Ashura is a major festival, the tazia (ta'ziyah). It commemorates the death of Husayn (also spelled Hussein), son of Imam 'Ali and grandson of Muhammad, on the 10th of Muharram, AH 61 (October 10, 680), in Karbala, Iraq. The event led to the split between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam, and it is of central importance in Shia Islam. www.ashura.com*

114- Farrell, Michael B., "Saudi Arabia casts wary eye on its Shiites", *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 18, 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0118/p06s01-wome.html>

115- --, "The Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia", <http://www.cdhr.info/Main/HomePage>

Saudi government has to acknowledge that it cannot permanently silence its critics by violating a fundamental right of free speech.¹¹⁶

In its latest report on human rights abuses against women in Saudi Arabia, Human Rights Watch denounces the position of women, who are still deprived of their basic rights since they are considered “legal minors” and are granted very little authority over their own lives and well-being. This precarious situation will be maintained as long as the government and the clerics believe granting the legitimate rights to women will endanger the social fabric and social cohesion of Saudi Arabia. In addition, the practice of sex-segregation and male guardianship deeply restricts women right to education, employment, health, equality before the law, freedom of movement and equality in marriage. Many scholars see the Saudi restrictive laws as obsolete and rather related to a political will to leave things unchanged. The efforts of the Saudi regime should not be overseen in terms of literacy, but they are still negligible in general. Women are still denied the right to think and act for themselves, in whatever part of their everyday life. Their male legal guardian is responsible for that. The sex-segregation makes things very sensitive. Whenever they take the public bus, women still have to ride in the back, even if the bus is empty. Also, in 2002, a fire in an elementary school caused the death of 15 girls because they were not allowed to leave the premises without their headscarves. This was naturally denied by the Ministry of Education, but journalists and

116- --, “Saudi Arabia: Stop Trials for ‘Insulting’ Islam. Charges Violate Precepts of Law, Freedom of Expression”, Human Rights Watch, New York, May 13, 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/13/saudia18816.htm>

eyewitnesses concur in their reports of the event.¹¹⁷ In addition, article 153 of the Saudi Policy on Education indeed states that “a girl’s education aims at giving her the correct Islamic education to enable her to be in life a successful housewife, an exemplary wife and a good mother.” The fact that Saudi Arabia ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2001 suggests that the regime is willing to end discriminating women.¹¹⁸ Unfortunately, and until now, domestic abuse and gender based violence as well as other violations of basic rights continue. Such is the case of the “Girl of Al Qatif”, a gang rape victim sentenced to 200 lashes and a prison term. Her lawyer was threatened to be disbarred for defending her. Eventually, and after much uproar on the international level, King Abdullah “pardoned” her.¹¹⁹ On January 22, 2008, Alarabiya.net reported that the Saudi *Shura* Council might lift the ban on women driving by the end of the year.¹²⁰ Alas, even if *part of the ruling elite now acknowledges the necessity for a revision of Wahhabism [...] this ideological shift cannot go without a radical change in age-old domestic political alliances.*¹²¹ In other words, change in women’s conditions is not for tomorrow...

117- --, “Saudi Arabia: Religious Police Role in School Fire Criticized”, Human Rights Watch, New York, March 15, 2002
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/03/15/saudia3801.htm>

118- --, “Perpetual Minors. Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia”, Human Rights Watch, April 2008, pp. 14, 16, 34-40.

119- See Amnesty International:
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE23/003/2008/en> and
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/saudi-arabia-lawyer-must-not-be-punished-defending-gang-rape-victim-2007>

120- --, “Saudi to lift lady-driver ban this year: report”, Alarabiya.net, January 22, 2008,
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/01/22/44568.html>

121- Lacroix, Stéphane. “Post-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia?”, ISIM Newsletter n°15, March 2005, p. 3.

As for economic reforms, the state's lawmaking elite intends to support the economic growth. The capital markets law and the insurance law were recently issued. A Supreme Economic Council was created to fast-track economic decisions. More recently, a tourism authority is working on promoting tourism as a new investment in Saudi Arabia. Different areas are open to foreign and domestic investments. Privatization of industries such as power and telecoms are an additional attempt to promote growth. In an effort to diversify its economy, Saudi Arabia launched the new King Abdullah Economic City in December 2005. The city is to include the largest port of the kingdom, and also petrochemical, pharmaceutical, tourism, finance, education and research areas.¹²² Another five cities are planned in different areas to promote economic diversification for each region. They should be completed by the year 2020 and are estimated to contribute 150 billion to the GDP.¹²³ Besides, some incentives have been granted to small and medium-size enterprises in order to create more jobs and hence deal with high unemployment rates (20 to 25% of male adults) and the reliance on 7 million foreign workers.¹²⁴ Charities remain normally under government supervision. Thus the question of how credible is the Saudi regime in combating terrorism financing? Is it doing it efficiently? After the 9/11 attacks, the Saudi government and numerous prominent Saudi citizens were accused of,

122- See <http://www.kingabduhcity.com/en/>

123- --, "Construction Boom in UAE and Saudi Arabia: Opportunities for Hong Kong", Hong Kong Trade Development Council, August 2, 2007, http://professional.hktdc.com/content.aspx?data=Professional_content_en&contentid=917452&w_sid=194&w_pid=836&w_nid=10993&w_cid=917452&w_idt=1900-01-01&w_oid=181&w_jid=

124- --, "How to Reform Saudi Arabia Without Handing It to Extremists", Saudi-US Relations Information Service, Washington DC, September 16, 2004, <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-09-19c.html>

directly or indirectly financially supporting international terrorist groups. Can fundraising by charitable Islamic groups and foundations, linked to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization, be then imputable to the Al Saud? How serious are the Kingdom's measures in fighting terrorism? This and more will be tackled in the next chapter.

4. Financing terrorism

4.1. Islamism and globalised causes of terrorism

Scholars have different perceptions of Islamism. Pascal Ménoret notes that Islamism is not a religious movement, it is a political one. The opposition of Saudi Arabia's Islamists is based on their view of how the drive to modernity in the kingdom has become culturally and financially corrupted. *Thus Saudi Islamism should be seen not as an upsurge of obscurantism but as a 'revolt of reason'*.¹²⁵ Ménoret adds that *whereas the "secular" movements of the 1950s and 1960s were partly integrated through the redistribution of national wealth (more extensive workers' rights, greater prioritization of public services), it was not possibly to solve the problem of Islamism by means of economic prosperity, since it was precisely a revolt against the skewed distribution of oil wealth.*¹²⁶

DeLong-Bas also believes that Osama bin Laden¹²⁷ and Ibn Abd El Wahhab are not to be associated: "It is clear that unlimited violence and jihad on a global scale are not inherent to Ibn Abd Al Wahhab's writings and that his writings vary significantly, in terms of both methodology and content, from

125- Ménoret, Pascal. *The Saudi Enigma: A History*, London: Zed Books, 2005, p. 129.

126- Ménoret. *Op. cit.* p. 117.

127- Osama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Laden (or Usama bin Laden) was born in 1957. He is believed to have founded the jihadist organization Al Qaeda (literally "the base") in 1988. His father was a prestigious and wealthy Yemeni businessman, with very close ties to the Saudi royal family. After leaving college in 1979, bin Laden joined Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and the *mujahidin* to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1990, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a jihad hero. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, he offered to help defending the kingdom but Saudi Arabia turned to the U.S. military. This led to bin Laden's harsh criticism of the monarchy. The government attempted to silence him and he moved to Sudan in 1991. In 1994, his activities made the Saudi government revoke his passport and freeze his assets in Saudi Arabia. In 1996, bin Laden was forced to relocate back to Afghanistan. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_bin_Laden#cite_note-44 and Peterson, J.E., "Saudi-American Relations after September 11 2001", *Asian Affairs*, Vol.33, Part 1, February 2002, pp. 102-114.

those of contemporary militants".¹²⁸ As a matter of fact, bin Laden and Al Qaeda's ideology is not Wahhabi. It is part of the contemporary jihadist tendency that evolved from the teachings of Sayyid Qutb.¹²⁹ Furthermore, Al Qaeda contradicts the Wahhabi doctrine on two essential points:

1. The call to overthrow Al Saud's family ;
2. The call for jihad against the West.

The dichotomy between Al Qaeda and the Wahhabi religious establishment actually resides in the legitimacy of the Al Saud family. While the rulers have secured their legitimization by the *Ulema*, the Saudis of Al Qaeda consider them apostate. The polarity is inherent between the forces of reform and those of resistance to any change.¹³⁰ On the one hand, the traditional conservative clerics call for the rule of the *shari'a*, and demand to force out Westernization and its corrupting ways. On the other, pragmatic secular regimes, in their modernization's quest, think the clerics would be needed if there is to be a victory over Israel. Consequently, and like in the times of Ibn Taimiyya, when converted Mongols still followed the Yasa¹³¹ legal code of Genghis Khan rather than the *shari'a*, the killing of other Muslims during a

128- DeLong-Bas. *Op. cit.* p. 243.

129- Born in 1906, Sayyid Qutb is an Egyptian Islamist theoretician, central to the development of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. He is especially renowned for his books *Social Justice* and *Milestones*. Islamists consider him a martyr because of his execution by Nasser's government in 1966. Qutb believed that Muslims needed to protect the family as an institution and prevent Western freedom from destroying their societies, without necessarily rejecting Western technical advances. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayyid_Qutb

130- Aarts, Paul and Nonneman, Gerd. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, London: C Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd, 2005, p. 12.

131- Secret written code of law written by Genghis Khan, see <http://www.coldsiberia.org/webdoc9.htm>

period of jihad was legitimized.¹³² This in return justifies the 1995 and 1996 attacks in Riyadh and Khobar as defensive reactions to humiliation, oppression and poverty. In this condition, the Muslim's duty is to perform Jihad and to liberate his land from American occupation.¹³³ As Professor Bernard Lewis explains, Islam is not only a matter of faith and practice, it is also an identity and a loyalty – for many an identity and loyalty that transcends all others.¹³⁴

Bin Laden became familiar with the Qutbist ideas while studying at King Abd Al-Aziz University in Jeddah. It is there that he met the ideologue Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a highly influential Palestinian Sunni scholar and theologian and Sayyid Qutb's brother Muhammad, who was a professor of Islamic studies.¹³⁵ During the 1980s, Osama bin Laden cooperated with Saudi Arabian intelligence to support the Afghan jihad. In order to raise funds and recruit foreign mujahidin, Azzam and bin Laden created the Maktab Khadamat al Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK), known as the Afghan Services Bureau in 1984.¹³⁶ This organization was responsible for funneling funds from several Western sources to finance the jihad in Afghanistan as well as the transportation, training, and housing of the warriors. In addition to those services, *Bin Laden realized that there was little documentation to give to the families of those missing in Afghanistan; to solve this problem, he set up Al Qaeda to track those*

132- Parman, Russell and Korobkov, Andrei. "Terrorism in a Unipolar World", McNair Research Review, Middle Tennessee State University, Summer 2006, p. 96-107.

133- Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad", Middle East Policy, Vol. 8, Issue 4, 2001, p. 34-35.

134- Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, New York: The Modern Library, 2003, p.17.

135- Sheuer, Michael. Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam & the Future of America, Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2003, pp. 84-85.

136- After Azzam's assassination in 1989, bin Laden assumed control of MAK and the organization became absorbed in Al Qaeda. See "Maktab al-Khadamat", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maktab_al-Khadamat

who were full-fledged Mujahideen.¹³⁷ MAK had also close ties to the Pakistani government, particularly the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The warriors saw Bin Laden as a true Muslim and glorified him for leaving his life as a millionaire to fight in the *jihad* against a superpower; Undermining that few years ago their archenemy had the support of Washington in Afghanistan. Back then, the Cold War with the Soviet Union was raging and required such measures. The “Afghan Arabs” were considered by the West as freedom fighters for they fought the Soviet Union.

Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia a decade later and didn't quite welcome the presence of U.S. and other foreign troops on Saudi “holy soil”. And so Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for arming Somali factions who battled and killed 18 U.S. special operations forces in Mogadishu in October 1993. The 9/11 Commission report also indicates that Al Qaeda might have had a hand in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, although FBI officials have attributed that attack primarily to Shiite Saudi dissidents working with Iranian agents.¹³⁸ In August 1996, the first *fatwa* declaring war on the United States was proclaimed.¹³⁹ In February 1998, bin Laden announced the creation in Pakistan of the World Islamic Front for the Struggle against the Jews and the new Crusaders (WIF). This organization established a council which aims to increase the effectiveness between Al

137- Bergen, Peter. Holy War Inc. Inside The Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, Free Press, 2001, p. 59.

138- Katzman, Kenneth. “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment”, CRS Report for Congress, February 10, 2005, p. 5.

139- See bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html

Qaeda and other Islamists groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.¹⁴⁰ With his close associate Ayman al Zawahiri¹⁴¹ bin Laden endorsed a second *fatwa* calling on every Muslim to kill Americans and their allies, be they civilian or military.¹⁴²

The threats were implemented with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. And it didn't stop here. In October 2000, the USS Cole was bombed at Aden harbor (Yemen). Yet the culmination of these declarations of war was with the tragic events on September 11 in 2001. It was with those attacks that Al Qaeda's terrorist actions caused the Muslim World more than mere rhetorical verbal attacks. What's more, Osama bin Laden was presumed to be the mastermind behind the attacks, and 15 of 19 hijackers of the airliners were allegedly Saudis. Consequently, Saudi Arabia's role in supporting terrorism was repeatedly and overtly questioned. This chronology of events threatened the Saudi-American relations. The September 11 attacks had pushed the U.S.A. to launch the Global War On Terror... and thus on Islamic fundamentalist groups distorting the image and spirit of Islam.

As Fareed Zakaria put it, *Arab rage at America is relatively recent. In the 1950s and the 1960s, it seemed unimaginable that the United States and the*

140- Karmon, Ely. Coalitions between Terrorist Organizations. Revolutionaries, Nationalists and Islamists, Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005, pp. 316-319.

141- Dr. Ayman Muhammad Rabaie al-Zawahiri is a prominent leader of Al Qaeda, and was the second and last "emir" of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, having succeeded 'Abud al-Zummar in the latter role when Egyptian authorities sentenced al-Zummar to life imprisonment. Al-Zawahiri is a qualified surgeon, and is an author of works including numerous Al Qaeda statements. In 1998, he formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad into Al Qaeda. He has worked in the Al Qaeda organization since its inception and was a senior member of the group's shura council. He is often described as a "lieutenant" to Osama bin Laden. See --, "Ayman al-Zawahiri", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayman_al-Zawahiri

142- See bin Laden, Zawahiri and others, "Declaration of Jihad against the West and Israel", http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html

*Arab world would end up locked in a culture clash.[...] Britain and France were fading, hated empires. The Soviet Union was 5,000 miles away and the ideology of communism was an anathema to the Muslim religion. But America emerged from World War II richer, more powerful, and more appealing than ever. To understand the roots of anti-American rage, we need not plumb the past 300 years, but the past 30.*¹⁴³ Indeed, the American foreign policy during the Cold War era failed to understand the Arab frustrations. It is obvious that any group that has been subjected to frequent colonialism of the European powers, as the Arab populations were, will be increasingly sensitive to any attempt to influence their domestic affairs. On the other hand, various reasons make the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of utmost importance to Western interests. First, it is one of the world largest oil exporters, and the United States have continuously tried to appease national interests in order to secure a dependable energy source. Second, the Kingdom is a moderating force in the Arab world and enjoys a moral status of a leader of the Islamic world. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is the pivot and the dominant power of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.).¹⁴⁴

The causes for what Huntington designated as a “Clash of civilizations” take roots in the following: U.S. policy and strategy have created a credibility gap between words and action within the Muslim World. While the USA talks about promoting democracy, it has established strong ties with monarchies and dictatorships in the Muslim countries. These rulers are the more despised as they are considered to betray the tradition of the *Umma* (community of Islam)

143- Zakaria, Fareed. “The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?”, Newsweek, October 15, 2001, http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/101501_why.html

144- Peterson, J.E. “Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 348, 2002, p. 5.

of sharing all the resources of the community by hoarding all wealth and power unto themselves. The United States' double standards infuriates the Arab world especially when it comes to its support to Israel, while it vehemently condemns Hamas and the Hezbollah for similar actions. Muslims tend to believe that the West is seeking to oppress and exploit their people and their resources. Certainly, terrorism breeds on a sense of injustice. Hence, small but very determined groups like Al Qaeda use the *Umma's* general perception of exploitation by the West to create an ideologically based global insurgency.¹⁴⁵

Ideologically, Muslims believe Islam is the one true religion and some consider it should be spread by force to bring peace to the world. This is called *offensive jihad* in Islamic jurisprudence. Its functions are to promote the spread of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*), enlightenment, and civility to the *Dar al-Harb* (domain of war). In most contemporary interpretations, the offensive jihad can only be waged under the leadership of the *caliph* (successor to the Prophet), and it is tempered by truces and various reciprocal agreements between the Islamic state and non-Muslim governments, such as guaranteed freedom of worship for Muslim minorities. Today, very few Islamists focus on this form of jihad. The *defensive jihad*, however, is a widely accepted concept that is analogous to international norms of self-defense and Judeo-Christian just war theory. According to most Islamic scholars, when an outside force invades Muslim territory it is incumbent on all Muslims to wage jihad to protect the faith and the faithful. Mutual protection is seen as a religious obligation intended to ensure the survival of the global Muslim community. At the root of defensive jihad is a theological emphasis on justness, as embodied in chapter 6, verse 151

145- Dobrot, Laurence A. "The Global War on Terrorism: a religious War?", Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, November 2007, pp. 6-9.

of the Qur'an: *Do not slay the soul sanctified by God except for just cause.* Defending the faith-based community against external aggression is considered a just cause.¹⁴⁶

These radical groups developed a *culture of global jihad [which] reflects the solidarity of variety of movements, groups, and sometimes ad hoc groupings or cells, which act under a kind of ideological umbrella of radical interpretations of Islam.*¹⁴⁷ The radical Islamist elements operate in all Muslim states at different levels of intensity. U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Stephen P. Lambert observes three categories among Islamists:

The *Revolutionary Islamic Vanguard* consists of small groups of individuals who organize, train for, and carry out violent acts with the objective of establishing a new unified Islamic state. This category is the most orthodox and dangerous. Al Qaeda's network is one example of this category.

The second group is larger than the Vanguard and harder to identify. It is made of people who are not committed to the cause but still are willing to provide financial and moral support to the goals of the Vanguard.

The third group is made of states and large organizations that either support the Vanguard or its objectives. Saudi Arabia is the largest supporter of Sunni groups. Although it can no longer support Al Qaeda like it did during the Afghan-Soviet war, it spent billions of USD on building mosques and providing fundamentalist teachings. The *madrasas*¹⁴⁸ built during the Afghan-Soviet conflict still indoctrinate many who become part of the Vanguard.¹⁴⁹

146- Wiktorowicz, Quintan. *A Genealogy of Radical Islam*, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 83.

147- Paz, Reuven. "Middle East Islamism in the European Arena", *MERIA Journal*, Vol.6, No.3, September 2002, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a6.html>

148- *Madrasas* are religious schools providing a religiously-based education. These schools, supported by private donations, offer free education, room and board to their students.

The Muslims who do not fall into one of the above mentioned categories are targeted with various means. As-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media Publication is the media production house of Al Qaeda and relays the organization's views to the world. In the Internet era, potential warriors are rallied on blogs and various web sites. Using the Internet to gather support and spread the message of bin Laden is not new to Al Qaeda. Terrorism experts at West Point say there are as many as 100 English language sites offering militant Islamic views. It is clear from a review of extremist material and interviews that militants are seeking to appeal to young American and European Muslims by playing on their anger over the war in Iraq and the image of Islam under attack. Recruitment tracts are issued in multiple languages, like a 39-page, electronic, English version of a booklet urging women to join the fight against the West.¹⁵⁰

This is what also Malika El Aroud, born in Morocco and brought up in Belgium from a young age does. On the instigation of bin Laden, her husband carried out a bombing in Afghanistan that killed the anti-Taliban resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud.¹⁵¹ Being the widow of a martyr, El Aroud says

See Blanchard, Christopher. "Islamic Religious Schools, *Madrasas*: Background", *CRS Report for Congress*, updated January 23, 2008, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf>

149- Lambert, Stephen P. "Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct", *Joint Military Intelligence College*, 2005, pp. 92, 129-148.

150- Moss, Michael and Mekhennet, Souad. "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers", *The New York Times*, October 15, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html>

151- Ahmad Shah Massoud was born in 1953 in Jangalak / Panjsher (Afghanistan) as son of police commander Dost Mohammad Khan. He is ethnically a Tajik, the second largest ethnic group of the country. In the 1980s, during the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets, he survived many plots to defeat him, earning the nickname "Lion of the Panjsher". He became Defense Minister of Afghanistan in 1992 under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Following the collapse of Rabbani's government and the rise of the Taliban regime, Massoud headed the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, also known as the Northern Alliance. Massoud, who was arguably the most brilliant practitioner of guerrilla warfare in the late 20th century, was assassinated

her words are her weapon and thus she gained many sympathies and prominence among Muslim radicals. She has since used her status to encourage women and men alike, to rally for global jihad, broadcasting her message of hatred towards the West on her internet forum.¹⁵²

4.2. Terrorism, money and the pipeline

After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the nations of the world and some of their most powerful organizations created a system of coordinated measures to apprehend the responsible. Whereas funds destined for money laundering typically result from criminal activity such as drug trafficking, terrorist funding is often not derived from illegal means and is destined for a specific purpose. Many countries were touched by the global investigation into bank accounts linked to terrorist cells spearheaded by bin Laden. Hence, the finance ministers of the G-7 met in Washington on October 7, 2001 recommending that all nations freeze the assets of known terrorists and urged the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)¹⁵³ to expand its mission beyond money laundering while focusing its energy and expertise on the world-wide effort to combat terrorist financing.¹⁵⁴ On October 11, 2001, the U.S. Treasury

by Al Qaeda agents in September 2001. He remains a national hero to many Afghans. See <http://www.massoudhero.com/English/biography.html>

152- Sciolino, Elaine and Mekhennet, Souad. "Al Qaeda Warrior Uses Internet to Rally Women", *The New York Times*, May 28, 2008.

153- Created in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF is therefore a "policy-making body" working to generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. It has published 40 + 9 Recommendations in order to meet this objective. See --, "Financial Action Task Force (FATF)", http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

154- In taking forward its Plan of Action against terrorist financing, the FATF intensified its cooperation with the FATF-style regional bodies and international organizations and

Department and 102 countries had committed to helping disrupt terrorist assets by alerting financial institutions to persons and organizations the U.S. says are linked to terrorism. Uncovering the roots of terrorist financing has become one of the biggest challenges facing the world today. Consequently, international standards are implemented in order to prevent terrorist financing. One target is organizations that operate as charities but whose primary goal is to finance terrorism.¹⁵⁵

Financing and fund-raising are difficult topics for research when dealing with organizations in general, to say nothing of clandestine ones.¹⁵⁶ Such issues are generally kept private and far from public eyes. For example, the real estate sector is attractive for potential misuse by money launderers or terrorist financiers. But the international nature of the real estate market makes it often extremely difficult to identify real estate transactions associated with terrorist financing. Basic methods made use of to misuse the real estate sector for terrorist financing schemes can be the recourse to complex loans or credit finance, the manipulation of the appraisal or valuation of a property, the use of

bodies, such as the United Nations, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the G-20, and International Financial Institutions, that support and contribute to the international effort against money laundering and terrorist financing. See --, "Terrorist Financing",

http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236947_1_1_1_1_1.00.html

155- --, "AML Basics VI - Terrorist Financing",
<http://www.redwellconsultants.com/Suspicious.htm#Terrorist>

156- The *Hawala* remittance system, widely spread in Africa and Asia, commonly involves the transfer of value between countries outside the legitimate banking system. It is often designated as "underground banking". Born centuries before the Western financial systems, this method is still used today by immigrants who want to send small amounts to their homelands and avoid bank fees for wire transfers. The *hawala* "banker" arranges for the funds to be available for withdrawal from another "banker" in another country. The two bankers settle accounts later. Because *hawala* operates without any governmental supervision and leaves very little paper trail, the system has become more appealing to money launderers and terrorists. For more details, see Jost, Patrick M. and Sandhu, Harjit Singh. "The hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money laundering", [Interpol General Secretariat](http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp), Lyon, January 2000,
<http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp>

monetary instruments or mortgage schemes. Criminals and terrorists frequently use non-financial professionals such as notaries, registrars, or real estate agents, in order to access financial institutions and hence be eligible for a mortgage or open bank accounts. Contracting financial products this way gives the deal a greater credibility. Cash transactions from terrorist sources can be used to buy, build or renovate a property. And when the improved property is sold, it is often very difficult to relate it to a specific individual or criminal activity. To curb these patterns, suspicious activities have to be reported to national financial intelligence units (FIU) to ensure enough transparency and help the authorities to apply counter terrorist laws.¹⁵⁷

Terrorist organizations are not all alike and their financing requirements are not limited to funding specific terrorist operations. Indeed, financing has to meet the broader organizational costs of developing and maintaining their networks and to create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their infrastructure. To raise money, terrorists use a wide variety of methods. Funds can derive from legitimate sources, ranging from legitimate businesses or self-financing by the terrorists themselves. Money can also originate from criminal activities such as organized fraud or narcotics smuggling, or from state sponsors and activities in safe havens¹⁵⁸, or from extortion and kidnapping.

The phenomenon of diverting legal funds for terrorist purposes is known as “black-washing”. Charities are one of many ways to raise funds from legitimate sources. They enjoy the public trust and some even have a global presence global presence that provides a framework for national and

157- --, “Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing through the Real Estate Sector”, FATF/OECD, Paris, 2008, pp. 4-18.

158- --, “Terrorist Financing”, FATF/OECD, Paris, 2008, p. 4.

international operations and financial transactions. They usually have access to considerable sources of funds. And most importantly, they are exempted of taxes. Three forms of abuse can be determined:

1. A person in the charity fraudulently diverts the donations or part of them to fund terrorists.
2. An entire charity can pose as a front organization to disguise terrorist financing activities.
3. Charitable organizations raise funds for recipients in a third country who are part of an organizational structure that includes paramilitary violence.¹⁵⁹

The religious element makes the Islamist groups benefit from a high consideration since charity is one of the most important duties in Islam¹⁶⁰ and is used as the primary means to disguise financial activity. Moreover, Islamic movements and organizations receive support for political, social, or cultural reasons. They have succeeded in convincing the Muslim societies of a global conspiracy against Islam as a religion. In addition, most of these movements developed out of the perceived need to return to the fundamental sources of Islam and base their views on Islamic scholars like Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taimiyya or Ibn Abd Al Wahhab. Islamic movements like Hamas or Hezbollah raise funds in their resistance to the Israeli occupation. They operate hospitals and schools, oversee charities and run in local elections. They are nationalist Islamic

159- --, "Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003-2004", FATF/OECD, Paris, 2004, pp. 7-14.

160- *Zakat* committees collect funds paid as a religious obligation, since the voluntary charitable tithe is one of the five pillars of Islam. See "Central *Zakat* Committee. Local collection and distribution of *Zakat*", <http://www.zakatchicago.com/new/> and "5 Guidelines for the Distribution of *Zakat* funds", <http://www.soundvision.com/Info/poor/committeetips.asp>

movements whereas Al Qaeda is a transnational revolutionary movement. The charities do not openly request money for violent activities. Most of them represent moderate Islamic interests and just try to help others in need.¹⁶¹ In the case of Saudi Arabia, wealthy individuals donate a lot of money to Islamic social projects, associations, charities and institutes in the Middle East, the Balkans, Central and Southern Asia. Many of these bodies serve as front organizations for groups that engage in terrorism. In most cases, the donations come from officials or even members of the royal family.¹⁶² In 1962, Muslim religious figures founded the Muslim World League (*Rabitat al-'alam al-Islami*).¹⁶³ Financed by various Muslim countries but essentially by the Saudi government, the MWL is one of the largest NGOs seeking to promote cooperation among Muslim states, and mobilize the Muslim world to oppose the state of Israel. MWL thus promotes “Islamic unity” by:

- Upgrading the productivity of the Mass-Media,
- Propagating Islamic education and culture,
- Bringing intellectuals and opinion leaders together during the pilgrimage season with the aim of fostering closer relations among them, and urging them to develop practical methods of raising the standard of Muslims in the world,

161- Looney, Robert. “The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: The Case of Islamic Charities”, Strategic Insights, Vol. V, Issue 3, March 2006, p. 3.

162- Paz, Reuven. “Targeting Terrorist Financing in the Middle East”, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Paper presented at the International Conference on Countering Terrorism through Enhanced International Cooperation, Italy, September 2000, <http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=119&lang=en&act=page&id=5231&str=the%20afghan%20alumni>

163- Novikov, Evgenii. “The World Muslim League: Agent of Wahhabi Propagation in Europe”, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. III, Issue 9, May 6, 2005, pp. 8-10.

- Promoting activities that aim at spreading the Arabic language among Arabs and non-Arabs,
- Setting up branch offices as well as Islamic centers to serve the purpose of Islam,
- Extending urgent relief to Muslims affected by war and natural disasters.¹⁶⁴

In the mid 1980s, anxious to curtail Iranian ambitions that had pushed Shiite Islamism at the forefront of the global Islamic movement, Saudi Arabia began to openly support and finance the ideological export of Wahhabism. The MWL has been paying emphasizing the role Saudi Arabia has played in assisting Muslims and promoting Islam in Europe, considered a promising area for further Islamization. Saudi Arabia officially permits the dissemination of MWL's propaganda, which is often radical and vehemently anti-American. Since the mid-1970s billions have been spent on building mosques and religious schools to export the Wahhabi ideology into Muslim and non-Muslim countries alike.¹⁶⁵

Dr. Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, states that, while publicly stressing on the cooperation of Saudi Arabia and on its shared concern regarding the financing of terrorist organizations, the U.S. still suspect specific Saudi organizations and individuals to fund terrorist activities through charities. By the end of 2001, when NATO forces raided the Saudi High

164- See Muslim World League Homepage, www.muslimworldleague.org/mwlwbsite_eng/index.htm

165- Kaplan, David E. "The Saudi Connection. How billions in oil money spawned a global terror network", *U.S. News & World Report*, December 7, 2003, <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031215/15terror.htm>

Commission for Aid to Bosnia, founded by Prince Selman Abdul-Aziz and supported by King Fahd, USD 41 million of the commission's operating funds were found missing as well as links to Al Qaeda's operational commander then, Abu Zubayda.¹⁶⁶

Various organizations, while closely linked to the Saudi government and the royal family, also have documented links to international terrorism. For instance, the now defunct Muwafaq Foundation, run by Yassin al-Qadi, was a rich Saudi fund to Islamic extremists and to Bosnia fighters through an alleged bin Laden charity front. At the trial of men convicted of being involved in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, a former Al Qaeda member named several charities as fronts for the terrorist group, including the Mercy International Relief Organization (MIRO), a Saudi-sponsored humanitarian organization. Documents demonstrated that Mercy smuggled weapons from Somalia into Kenya, and that Abdullah Mohammad, one of the Nairobi bombers, delivered false documents and passports (among other items) of convicted Al Qaeda operative Wadi el-Hage's belongings to Mercy's Kenya office. It was also brought to light, that the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a subsidiary of the Muslim World League, whose Philippine office was headed by bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, channeled funds to terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda, including Abu Sayyaf. Consequently, the assets of the Muslim World League member organizations, including the

166- Levitt, Matthew. "Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia", PolicyWatch #609, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 11, 2002, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1487>

Rabita Trust¹⁶⁷, suspected of funding terrorism, were frozen by the Treasury Department.

The list does not end here. The Saudi World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is also cited as funding terrorist groups and militant Islamists in Kashmir and the Philippines. Its treasurer is none other than Osama bin Laden's brother, Abdullah bin Laden. A Saudi opposition group, the Saudi Information Agency, states that WAMY also disseminates hateful literature, including books "that encourage religious hatred and violence against Jews, Christians, Shi'a and Ashaari Muslims." And in 2002 the Romanian Intelligence Service identified WAMY as a Hamas front operating there.¹⁶⁸

Helping those afflicted by wars was the public mission of Lajnat al-Birr al-Islamiah (LBI), renamed Benevolence International Foundation (BIF)¹⁶⁹ in the early 1990s. In fact, the alleged nonprofit charitable trust based in Jeddah was a front to support the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan, and for the Abu Sayyaf group. Another key structure, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation endorses charity but the accounts of two of its offices in Bosnia and Somalia were linked to the

167- Formed in 1988 during the term of the then President Ziaul Haq (founding Chairman), with the aim of organizing the repatriation and rehabilitation of stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh, the Rabita's Trust's Secretary General is Jeddah-based Saudi businessman Wael Hamza Jalaidan, reported to be a founding member and chief of logistics of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Rabita_Trust.htm

168- Levitt, Matthew. "The Network of Terrorist Financing", PolicyWatch #646, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 6, 2002, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1524>

169- In the late 1980s, Adel Batterjee founded Lajnat al-Birr al-Islamiah (Islamic Benevolence Committee), in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. LBI provided financial and operational support to *mujahideen* elements in Afghanistan and around the world. LBI was affiliated with Maktab Al-Khadamat (MAK). LBI later joined al Qaida upon the dissolution of MK. In the early 1990s, LBI began operating under the name Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) in an effort to widen its appeal to the general public and increase its credibility with other governments. BIF and LBI remained one organization with interchangeable assets under Batterjee's control. See "U.S. Treasury Designates Two Individuals with Ties to al Qaida", JS-2164, Office of Public Affairs, December 21, 2004, <http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js2164.htm>

Al Qaeda-associated Egyptian *Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya* and Somali *Al-Itihad Al-Islamiyah*, respectively. The Saudi authorities' effort to curb Al-Haramain's operations didn't last long. Soon the suspicious activities were expanding (according to the Saudi press). And when arrested in Indonesia in June 2002, Omar Al-Farouq, Al Qaeda's point man in Southeast Asia reported that a branch of Al-Haramain funded Al Qaeda operations in the region.¹⁷⁰

4.3. Fighting terrorism in Saudi Arabia

Theoretically, countering terrorism can be either repressive or conciliatory. Responding to terrorism through repressive operations other than war and paramilitary strikes includes a number of options. Intelligence collection and analysis are extremely useful in understanding the dynamics of terrorist environments. New technologies can be used against terrorist movements: interception of electronic financial or other records can compromise terrorist actions. Enhanced security refers to the hardening of targets to deter or prevent terrorist attacks. Economic sanctions usually restrict trade and are used to pressure states who sponsor terrorism. As for the conciliatory options, policymakers can resort to diplomacy to negotiate an acceptable resolution to a conflict with the terrorists. Social reform can also be an attempt to address the grievances at stake by resolving the underlying problems that caused the terrorist environment to develop. Nations have also developed legal protocols to promote the rule of law and prosecute the suspected terrorists.¹⁷¹ This necessitates international cooperation. And since

170- Levitt. PolicyWatch #646, *op. cit.*

171- Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism. Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues. California: Sage Publications, 2003, pp. 348-380.

fighting terrorism by force alone is insufficient, the social and economic conditions that breed it should as well be seriously tackled.

Terrorists often use national borders to stay one step ahead of investigators. As reported in the Times Magazine in 2001, and according to a French parliamentary report on terrorist funding, *it only takes five minutes to deposit 1 million French francs in a Dutch account and another five minutes to transfer that to an account in Britain. [...] But for the judge investigating the origins and movement of that money, it will take six months to get a court warrant authorizing inspection of the account in the Netherlands, a year to get one in Britain, six months more for clearance in Switzerland--all to discover that the suspicious funds have been withdrawn and the account closed.* Consequently, cutting off terrorists' access to funding can be an important part of hindering their operations.¹⁷²

Some analysts believe that bin Laden's power is mainly symbolic, and that killing him would only *enshrine him*, making a *martyr* out of him, and thus an *even more powerful* "evil genius". True, *the damage has been done. Militant Islam is on the march.* However, pursuing bin Laden is a matter of justice. *It is a source of legitimacy, of strength and spirit.*¹⁷³ Except Al Qaeda is not like a state whose regime one can remove in order to disable it. Al Qaeda is said to be structured like a modern corporation. Although it has no single standard operation procedure, it does have a well developed manual for its operations.

172- Cohen, Adam. "Following the Money". TIME Magazine, October 8, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1000947-1,00.html>

173- Robbins, James S. "No Substitute for Victory. Taking Osama down matters", National Review Online (NRO), January 12, 2005, <http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YWQ0ZTU4MTg1NjI3Zjk0YTRhNWUzNWlxYzY2MGIxNDg=>

This makes it extraordinarily flexible and its structure can be adapted to all circumstances.¹⁷⁴

Several principal backers of Al Qaeda being wealthy Saudis, the intensive cooperation of Saudi Arabia on the international level is very decisive in freezing the suspected assets and thus making the global economy less hospitable to terrorist financing. Countering terrorism has been on the Saudi government's agenda shortly after the 9/11 attacks, and the Kingdom has taken multiple administrative actions on the national and international levels. In October 2001, Saudi Arabia announced it would implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, which called for freezing terrorist-related funds. It wasn't till mid 2003 that the Saudi government became convinced of the seriousness of terrorist threat and its financing. The May 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh killed 34 people. On November 2003, an attack on a residential compound in Riyadh killed 17 people and wounded 122. Those events gave an added impetus to Saudi reformers in expanding counter-terrorist efforts, and at the same time showed clearly two diverging tendencies within Saudi Arabian politics. As a matter of fact, Crown Prince Abdullah and his half-brother Prince Nayef, the interior minister, represented two distinct political communities: a westernized elite of liberal reformers seeking rapprochement with the United States on one side and an anti-American Wahhabi religious establishment that shares many goals with Al Qaeda on the other.¹⁷⁵

174- Cronin, Audrey K. "Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict", CRS Report, May 23, 2003, pp. 4-5.

175- Doran, Michal Scott. "The Saudi Paradox", Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83105/michael-scott-doran/the-saudi-paradox.html>

Shortly after the May 2003 attacks, the Saudi government set up a joint task force with the United States to identify the perpetrators and investigate terrorist financing.¹⁷⁶ This group includes agents from the F.B.I. and the Internal Revenue Service and aims at sharing intelligence and financial information. In addition, Saudi Arabia shuttered charitable organizations suspected of terrorist ties; passed laws on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing (which it lacked prior to 2003); banned cash collections at mosques; centralized control over some charities; closed unlicensed money exchanges; and scrutinized clerics involved in charitable collections. As instructed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA)¹⁷⁷, Saudi banks established self-supervisory committees to closely monitor and fight terrorist threats. In April 2003, SAMA had issued a circular entitled “Rules for opening Bank Accounts & General operational Guidelines” setting procedures to which all charitable organizations must comply. A month later, SAMA updated and issued a circular entitled “Rules governing Anti-Money Laundering and combating Terrorist Financing” first issued in 1995. These circulars also introduced new banking regulations prohibiting private charities and relief groups from transmitting funds overseas until further regulations could be instituted to ensure that the money would not be channeled to terrorist organizations.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, these new banking regulations do not restrict the operations of “multilateral”

176- --, “After the War; U.S. and Saudis Join in Antiterror Effort”, The New York Times, August 26, 2003,

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E0DC1339F935A1575BC0A9659C8B63&&scp=1&sq=U.S.%20and%20Saudis%20Join%20In%20Antiterror&st=cse>

177- The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, established in 1952, is the chief regulatory body for Saudi Arabia’s banks and financial institutions (central bank), <http://www.sama.gov.sa>

178- Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. “Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Implements New Regulations Regarding Charities,” June 12, 2003, <http://www.saudiembassy.net/2003News/Press/PressDetail.asp?cYear=2003&cIndex=99>

charitable organizations based in Saudi Arabia, such as the Muslim World League (MWL), the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), or the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which actively raise funds among the Saudi population. *It is possible, for example, for an IIRO official in Saudi Arabia to advise IIRO branches in country X and country Y to transfer money to each other, outside of Saudi regulatory reach.*¹⁷⁹ Saudi officials have stated that in spite of the regulatory exclusion, in practice these charities are being subjected to identical levels of scrutiny as all Saudi charities. Yet, this issue still concerns the officials from the Defense Department and Treasury Department.¹⁸⁰

In September 2003, Saudi Arabia's legal and regulatory system was found largely compliant with most of the FATF recommendations on terrorist financing. Three issues had still to be addressed: Terrorist financing should be clearly defined to make sure that *it is an offence if the funds are intended for terrorist use, or derived from a legal source; all law enforcement requests for information from financial institutions must be routed via SAMA, which delays unduly the process of providing effective legal assistance in inquiries or prosecutions; it is necessary to strengthen customer identification measures for non-bank financial institutions and to require transmission of originator information on wire transfers throughout the payment chain.*¹⁸¹ American officials have often complained in the past that the Saudis haven't disclosed all

179- Blanchard, Christopher and Prados, Albert. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues", CRS for Congress, updated September 14, 2007, p.19.

180- See Testimony of Stuart Levey, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, July 13, 2005, <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2629.htm>

181- See FATF , "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Executive Summary FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism", Annex C, pp. 21-31, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/31/35396215.pdf>

the information they had and have been slow to take action against organizations and entities implicated in terrorist financing. Furthermore, and according to the 9/11 Report, before September 11, 2001, the Saudi government had *turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda's fundraising activities*.¹⁸² But it has since made serious efforts to combat terrorist financing.¹⁸³

In February 2004, King Fahd approved the creation of the Saudi Non-Governmental Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad.¹⁸⁴ Once the Commission is operational (which still is not the case), Saudi charities with overseas operations reportedly will either be dissolved or have their assets consolidated under the control of the new Commission. Saudi Arabia also signed various bilateral agreements with non-Arab countries on security matters, including money laundering and terrorist financing. The Kingdom participates regularly in G-20¹⁸⁵ meetings and has worked on implementing the recommendations issued by the G-20 related to terrorist financing such as freezing terrorist assets, promoting the implementation and compliance with International Standards (UN convention on the Suppression of the Financing of

182- --, "The 9/11 Commission Report", US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 2004, p. 171.

183- See Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, "A Report on Initiatives and Actions taken by Saudi Arabia to combat Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering", April 2004, pp. 4-7, 11-13.

See also Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Initiatives and Actions taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism", December 2006, pp. 13-16.

<http://www.saudiembassy.net/ReportLink/KSA%20WOT%20Report%20Dec06.pdf>

184- --, "New agency to oversee charitable donations abroad", SAMIRAD, February 28, 2004, <http://www.saudinf.com/main/y6804.htm>

185- The Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was established in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy. The inaugural meeting of the G-20 took place in Berlin, on December 15-16, 1999, hosted by German and Canadian finance ministers. See www.g20.org

Terrorism signed in 2004)¹⁸⁶ and establishing a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)¹⁸⁷ to exchange information.

Nevertheless, the survival of Saudi Arabia depends on its ability to deal with the growing discontent with its regime. It cannot ignore internal dissent as it jeopardizes its relations with the West and the USA in particular. At the same time, disagreements within the ruling family and with the people call for constant adjustments in order to keep the system from imploding. The question remains will Saudi Arabia keep on combining tradition and modernity and move towards a more secular and democratic state? And is democracy really the answer?

186- Charalambous, Lorys. "MENAFATF Launched In Bahrain", LawAndTax-News.com, December 02, 2004, http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/MENAFATF_Launched_In_Bahrain_xxxx18130.html

187- See Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Saudi actions to crack down on terrorist financing", October 18, 2002, <http://www.saudiembassy.net/2002News/Press/PressDetail.asp?cYear=2002&cIndex=55>

5. Conclusion

Terrorism is no longer exclusively traditional. It has become less centralized, more self-financed and based on international networking. Links between different terrorist groups have been extended as far as the possibilities of training and technology transfer are concerned. Future patterns are shaped by ongoing regional conflicts and new technologies. State-sponsored terrorism is a feature used by authoritarian states as domestic policy and by aggressive regimes support proxies to indirectly confront their adversaries. Religious terrorism has become a global issue and organizes semi-autonomous cells across national boundaries. A number of Islamic organizations engage in social and communal activities alongside their terrorist activities, like Hezbollah, Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. These entities enjoy public support and sympathy for their efficiency in assisting the public. They perform better than their governments in providing basic socio-economic services and hence threaten to become a state within the state.

Countering terrorism after the 9/11 attacks requires the adaptation to new political and economic measures. These new fronts entail new patterns that would block the specter of potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the negative use of information technologies. In fact, the possible use by terrorist groups of nuclear, chemical, biological, and cyber weapons has become a major topic in discussions on security. Moreover, the Internet is a useful communication tool and it facilitates networking between groups and cells. Information technology allows propaganda to be spread widely and efficiently. Cyber terror is one of the future trends of terrorism. As stated by Ian Lesser: *A variation on the theme of terrorism as an asymmetric strategy*

goes further to suggest that [...] unconventional terrorist attacks on the sinews of modern, information-intensive societies will become the norm, replacing conventional conflicts over the control of territory or people.

Cooperation between security forces against terrorist organizations on the international and regional levels is perceived by Islamist terrorist groups as a direct threat and giving them a strong incentive to form coalitions. It is therefore very important that politicians curb the terrorist threats without disrupting society. Without legitimacy, governments lose their public support and hand their authority over, which can lead to chaos and anarchy. Terrorism within national borders implies the existence of a political or ideological schism within society, in Saudi Arabia's case the pro-western modernists on one side and the fundamentalists Wahhabists on the other. Islam proved to be a double edged sword for the Saudi rulers. It legitimized their power but is slowing down modernization. It cannot be completely separated from the politics since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is ruled according to the *Shari'a*.

Therefore, I believe that since those two phenomena are inseparable, the solution lies in a gradual reform injection starting with Education. The educational curriculum in Saudi Arabia can be the best starting point for protecting the new upcoming Saudi generations from the fundamentalist brainwashing or terrorist breeding. The curriculum can put restraints upon teachers or clergies who cross the lines of rationale as they teach Islam in conformity with their own personal desires and perceptions of the religion. Furthermore, the Saudi government since the reigning of King Abdullah has implemented in a challenging manner many reform policies that affected the women rights issues like allowing women to drive their own cars and shopping

without male escorts in designated areas of the Kingdom, which is considered a breakthrough in the history of the Kingdom. So, further reforms in this area are definitely recommended because freedom is the stimulator of people to move forward and be productive in their societies.

In addition to that, the word “terrorism” must be put in a certain frame or in other words must be universally identified under fixed terms and definitions because the world can not bear the further exploitation of the term according to the interests, beliefs, or desires of a particular group over the other.

In this prospective, internal terrorists are usually allied ideologically or politically with some segment of their society and therefore enjoy some measure of popular support. Hence, they have to be confronted by means of social justice, economic opportunities and effective management of relations between all social groups in order to create a sense of identity. Furthermore and despite the wide acceptance that *the roots of Al Qaeda lie in the poverty and educational deficiencies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, and that these deficiencies were caused by the authoritarian nature of those states and can be combated only through democratization*, I believe that democracy does not come with international standards, but is rather formed according to the measurements of the country at hand, and in this sensitive case, Saudi Arabia, a Kingdom that is chained with a never resting clash of time between the past and the future, and where the present is the victim of compromise and the exhaustive birth of symmetry.

In order to reach real democracy and prevent the fundamentalists from seizing power, the ruling parties should encourage the political activities of more liberal groups. It is therefore imperative to provide political, social and

economical support to “moderate Muslim” societies to improve the capacity guaranteeing freedom through good governance and the achievement of higher moral human goals of justice.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Historical Chronology (till 2002)

Source: *J.E. Peterson, second edition, 2003*

- B.C. -

4th mill. Settlements belonging to al-'Ubayd culture appear in eastern Arabia

3rd mill. Trading settlement established on Tarut Island in the Gulf

2nd mill. Middle: Walled town-complexes are built at al-Quriyat, Daydan (modern al-'Ula), Tayma' and Ha'il

1st mill. Dumat al-Jandal (modern al-Jawf) emerges as first known independent Arabian state

9th cent. Settlements established at Thaj and Najran; al-Faw flourishes until 2nd century B.C.

c. 750 Sabaean civilization of South Arabia appears and flourishes until c. 115 B.C.; Minaean civilization appears a few decades later and flourishes until 3rd century B.C.

1st mill. Middle: Mada'in Salih established as Minaean outpost

7th cent. Lihyanite civilization appears with its capital at Daydan (modern al-'Ula) and flourishes until 3rd century B.C.

4th cent. Early: Nabataeans establish a state with its capital at Petra and dominate northwestern Arabia for the next four centuries

c. 115 Himyaritic state supplants Sabaean and Minaean civilizations in South Arabia and flourishes until c. A.D. 300

24 Roman army under Aelius Gallus invades Arabia

- A.D. -

106 Petra becomes a Roman province

c. 500 Quraysh tribe establishes control over the trading center of Makkah

570 The Prophet Muhammad is born into Quraysh tribe at Makkah

- 622** July 16: Prophet Muhammad and his Muslim followers leave Makkah for Yathrib (now al-Madinah); this event (*hijrah*) marks beginning of Islamic calendar
- 624** Muslim forces of al-Madinah defeat superior army of Makkah at Battle of Badr
- 625** Makkah forces defeat Muslims at Battle of Uhud outside al-Madinah
- 630** Makkah submits to the Muslims
- 632** Prophet Muhammad makes his farewell *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Makkah and dies later that year
- 635** Jawatha Mosque established in al-Ahsa' oasis, making it the oldest mosque in eastern Arabia
- 8th cent.** Pilgrims' way of Darb Zubaydah is built across the northern Arabian Peninsula to Makkah
- 899** al-Qaramitah (Carmathians) establish a state based on al-Hufuf
- 930** al-Qaramitah raid Makkah and bring the sacred Black Stone to al-Qatif; it is returned to Makkah in 951
- c. 1446** Village of al-Dir'iyah is founded in southern Najd by Mani' bin Rabi'ah
- 1541** Portuguese attack Jiddah
- c. 1541** Najdi town of Buraydah is founded
- 1550** Ottomans capture al-Hufuf during course of their expansion into perimeter of Arabian Peninsula
- 1669** Bani Khalid tribe ousts Ottoman forces from eastern Arabian Peninsula
- 1703** Islamic reformer Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab is born in al-'Uyaynah
- 1727** Muhammad bin Sa'ud bin Muqrin becomes first independent Saudi ruler of al-Dir'iyah
- 1744** Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab is forced to leave al-'Uyaynah and is welcomed at al-Dir'iyah by Imam Muhammad bin Sa'ud Al Sa'ud, who subsequently accepts Wahhabism
- 1762** Imam Muhammad bin Sa'ud Al Sa'ud dies and is succeeded by his son 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Sa'ud

- 1773 Forces of Al Sa'ud capture Riyadh
- 1792 Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab dies
- 1794 Al Sa'ud forces capture al-Ahsa'
- 1798 Saudi forces defeat Sharif Ghalib of Makkah near al-Khurmah
- c. 1801 Saudi forces attack Karbala and strip tomb of Caliph al-Husayn; Saudi forces subsequently capture Makkah
- 1803 Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Sa'ud Al Sa'ud is assassinated and is succeeded by his son Sa'ud bin 'Abd al-'Aziz
- 1805 Saudi forces capture al-Madinah
- 1814 Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt, captures al Hijaz from the Al Sa'ud
- 1814 Imam Sa'ud bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud dies and is succeeded by his son 'Abdullah
- 1818 Muhammad 'Ali's son Ibrahim Pasha destroys Al Sa'ud capital at al-Dir'iyah; Imam 'Abdullah bin Sa'ud is taken to Istanbul where he is executed
- 1819 G. F. Sadleir becomes the first European to cross the Arabian Peninsula
- 1824 Turki bin Sa'ud, a cousin of previous Imam 'Abdullah, assumes leadership of Al Sa'ud and eventually recaptures Riyadh
- 1824 Al Khalifah of Bahrain seize al-Dammam and hold it for 17 years
- c. 1830 Idrisi family settles in Sabya
- 1834 Imam Turki bin Sa'ud is assassinated; his son Faysal defeats the assassin and becomes Imam
- 1835 'Abdullah bin Rashid of 'Abdah Shammar tribe is appointed governor of Ha'il by Imam Faysal bin Turki Al Sa'ud, thus beginning Al Rashid dynasty
- 1838 Egyptian forces invade Najd a second time and take Imam Faysal to Cairo
- 1840 Direct Ottoman rule is reimposed on al-Hijaz
- 1843 Imam Faysal escapes from Cairo and regains control of Najd, thus marking beginning of Second Saudi State

- 1845** Saudi forces capture al-Buraymi oasis
- 1858** A massacre of Christians in Jiddah provokes a British naval bombardment
- 1864** Imam Faysal dies and dynastic squabbles ensue until 1889
- 1865** Col. Lewis Pelly, the senior British official in the Gulf, travels to Riyadh
- 1865** Saudi raids extend deep into Oman
- 1866** Anglo-Saudi agreement reached
- 1868** Appointment of Midhat Pasha as Governor-General of Baghdad generates Ottoman expansionist phase in Arabian Peninsula; Ottomans extend their control over eastern Arabia and capture 'Asir from local Al 'Ayid dynasty
- 1871** Muhammad bin Rashid Al Rashid captures al-Ahsa' from Al Sa'ud
- 1874** Imam Sa'ud bin Faysal Al Sa'ud dies of wounds received in battle and is succeeded briefly by his brother 'Abdullah
- 1884** Al Rashid dynasty of Ha'il consolidate their control over most of Najd and capture Riyadh
- 1889** 'Abd al-Rahman bin Faysal, son of Imam Faysal, assumes uncontested leadership of Al Sa'ud and temporarily rejects Al Rashid control of Riyadh
- 1891** Muhammad bin Rashid Al Rashid captures Riyadh and Imam 'Abd al-Rahman is forced to flee, eventually settling in Kuwait
- c. 1900** Idrisi family establishes independent dynasty in Sabya
- 1900** Work begins on al-Hijaz Railway, linking Syria with al-Madinah
- 1902** **January:** Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz bin 'Abd al-Rahman captures Riyadh from the Al Rashid, thus marking beginning of Third Saudi State
- 1905** A small Ottoman garrison is posted in al-Qasim
- 1908** Ottoman-built al-Hijaz railway reaches al-Madinah
- 1908** Husayn bin 'Ali al-Hashimi becomes Sharif of Makkah
- c. 1908** Saudi sovereignty is extended over al-Qasim
- 1910** Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, becomes the first Englishman to meet Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz

- 1910** Sharif Husayn of Makkah sends an army to capture al-Qasim but is repulsed by Saudi forces
- 1912** First Ikhwan settlement is founded at al-Artawiyah
- 1913** Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz captures al-Ahsa’
- 1913** **29 July:** Anglo-Ottoman Convention establishes the "Blue Line" as the eastern Arabian boundary between the Ottoman and British empires
- 1914** **May:** Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz signs a treaty with the Ottomans
- 1915** Captain Shakespear is killed during the Battle of Jarrab between the Al Sa‘ud and the Al Rashid
- 1915** **26 December:** Anglo-Saudi treaty provides British recognition of Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman
- 1916** **5 June:** Sharif Husayn of Makkah proclaims the Arab Revolt
- 1916** **29 October:** Sharif Husayn of Makkah adopts the title of King of al-Hijaz
- 1916** **5 November:** Sharif Husayn of Makkah proclaims himself King of the Arabs
- 1918** **May:** Al-Khurmah is scene of first clash between forces of Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud and King Husayn al-Hashimi and the oasis falls to the Al Sa‘ud in the following year
- 1920** The Al Sa‘ud occupy mountainous areas of ‘Asir
- 1920** Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz concludes Saudi-Rashidi agreement which places foreign relations of the Al Rashid amirate and control of Shammar tribe under Saudi control
- 1920** The Ikhwan under the leadership of Faysal al-Duwish rout Kuwaiti Shaykh Salim and his forces at al-Jahrah
- 1921** Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz annexes the Al Rashid amirate and becomes Sultan of Najd
- 1922** **5 May:** Representatives of Najd and Iraq sign Treaty of Muhammarah on common borders but the treaty is rejected by Imam ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
- 1922** **December:** Al-‘Uqayr Protocol fixes Najdi-Iraqi and Najdi-Kuwaiti borders and creates Najdi-Iraqi and Najdi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zones
- 1923** Major Frank Holmes secures oil concession for al-Ahsa’

- 1923** Ikhwan raids into Transjordan and Iraq result in numerous deaths
- 1923** **17 December:** Kuwait Conference convenes to deal with Saudi-Hashimi border problems and to settle provisions of Treaty of Muhammarah; conference continues until April 1924
- 1924** **3 March:** Turkey abolishes Islamic caliphate and it is taken up by King Husayn of al-Hijaz on March 5
- 1924** **August:** Saudi forces invade al-Hijaz and Ikhwan capture of al-Ta'if degenerates into looting and a massacre
- 1924** **3 October:** King Husayn of al-Hijaz abdicates and leaves for al-'Aqabah; he is succeeded by his son 'Ali; Saudi forces enter Makkah unopposed less than a week later
- 1925** **January:** Saudi siege of Jiddah begins
- 1925** **November:** Sir Gilbert Clayton negotiates Haddah and Bahrah Agreements with Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz
- 1925** **December:** Al-Madinah and Yanbu' surrender to forces of Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz; Saudi army enters Jiddah on 19 December and ex-King 'Ali sails for Iraq on 22 December
- 1926** Tribal heads of the Ikhwan meet in al-Artawiyah to discuss their grievances against Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz
- 1926** **8 January:** Notables of al-Hijaz proclaim 'Abd al-'Aziz King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and Its Dependencies
- 1926** **February:** Britain recognizes 'Abd al-'Aziz as King of al-Hijaz
- 1926** **October:** King 'Abd al-'Aziz and Idrisi leader of 'Asir sign Treaty of Makkah
- 1927** Soviet Union recognizes Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz as King of al-Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and sends a minister to Jiddah
- 1927** **20 May:** Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jiddah supersedes that of 1915; the British government recognizes full independence of Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz while the Saudi leader acknowledges the British treaty relationships with the shaykhdoms of the Gulf
- 1927** **October:** The Ikhwan massacre Iraqis at al-Busaya police post, which leads to hostilities between Britain and 'Abd al-'Aziz lasting into following year

- 1929** **The Ikhwan kill an American missionary in his car on road between Basra and Kuwait**
- 1929** **30 March: King 'Abd al-'Aziz defeats the Ikhwan at the Battle of Sibilah**
- 1929** **Late: Bertram Thomas becomes the first European to cross al-Rub' al-Khali desert (the Empty Quarter), frustrating H. St. John B. Philby's ambition to be the first**
- 1930** **January: Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz breaks back of Ikhwan rebellion in Battle of Shu'ayb al-'Awjah; Ikhwan leaders subsequently surrender in Kuwait and are turned over to 'Abd al-'Aziz**
- 1930** **22 February: Meeting between Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz and King Faysal of Iraq lays foundations for amicable relations between Al Sa'ud and al-Hashimi families**
- 1930** **First British minister arrives in Jiddah**
- 1930** **Ministry of Foreign Affairs is established**
- 1930** **November: King 'Abd al-'Aziz annexes 'Asir**
- 1931** **Council of Deputies is established for al-Hijaz**
- 1931** **February: Charles Crane visits King 'Abd al-'Aziz at Jiddah and sends Karl S. Twitchell to conduct the country's first geological survey**
- 1932** **Ministry of Finance is established**
- 1932** **May: Bin Rifadah, a tribal shaykh of northeastern Arabia, revolts against Imam 'Abd al-'Aziz**
- 1932** **22 September: Name of the country is changed to Saudi Arabia and 'Abd al-'Aziz adopts title of King of Saudi Arabia**
- 1932** **October: Idrisi Amir revolts against King 'Abd al-'Aziz**
- 1933** **April: King 'Abd al-'Aziz and King 'Abdullah of Transjordan recognize each other's regimes**
- 1933** **May: King 'Abd al-'Aziz grants al-Ahsa' oil concession to SOCAL**
- 1934** **March-May: Saudi-Yemeni war takes place; the two countries sign the Treaty of al-Ta'if (Yemen) in June**

- 1935** **April:** King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz presents Britain with his "Red line" border proposal; Britain counters in November with the "Riyadh Line"
- 1936** Petroleum Concessions Ltd. receives al-Hijaz oil concession
- 1936** Saudi Arabia signs treaties with kingdoms of Iraq and Egypt
- 1936** Britain and Saudi Arabia agree to revised Treaty of Jiddah
- 1938** **March:** Oil discovered at Well No. 7 at Dammam Dome
- 1939** Oil pipeline is laid from Dhahran oil field to new oil terminal at Ra’s Tanurah
- 1942** British government initiates war subsidy to Saudi Arabia of £3 million
- 1942** United States legation is established in Jiddah
- 1944** Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company is renamed Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO)
- 1945** First Saudi university graduates return from abroad
- 1945** **February:** King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz meets US President Franklin Roosevelt aboard the USS *Quincy* in the Suez Canal
- 1945** **March:** Saudi Arabia becomes a founding member of the League of Arab States
- 1946** Ministry of Defense is established
- 1946** American air base is established at Dhahran
- 1947** British Military Mission arrives at al-Ta’if
- 1948** ARAMCO discovers giant al-Ghawar oil field
- 1948** United States legation in Jiddah is upgraded to an embassy
- 1949** Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone oil concession is awarded to Getty Oil
- 1950** Deep-water port is opened at al-Dammam and TAPLINE oil pipeline is built from Eastern Province to Mediterranean ports
- 1951** Ministry of Interior is established
- 1951** Railroad is built between al-Dammam and Riyadh

- 1952** Capital of al-Ahsa' Province is moved to al-Dammam and province is renamed the Eastern Province
- 1952** Saudi Arabia and Britain discuss boundaries between the kingdom and the British-protected states of the Gulf at al-Dammam Conference, but without success
- 1952** **October:** Armed Saudi detachment occupies village of al-Hamasah in al-Buraymi oasis
- 1953** Ministries of Agriculture and Water, Communications, and Education are established
- 1953** First strike of ARAMCO workers takes place
- 1953** **9 October:** Royal decree establishes first Council of Ministers; but death of King 'Abd al-'Aziz delays council's first meeting until March 1954
- 1953** **November:** 'Abd al-'Aziz bin 'Abd al-Rahman (Bin Sa'ud) dies in Riyadh and is succeeded as King by his son Sa'ud bin 'Abd al-'Aziz
- 1954** Ministry of Health is established
- 1955** **11 September:** Al-Buraymi Arbitration Tribunal convenes in Geneva but is soon suspended
- 1955** **26 October:** The Trucial Oman Scouts expel the Saudi garrison from al-Buraymi oasis
- 1956** **June:** Strikes directed against King Sa'ud occur amongst ARAMCO workers
- 1956** **August:** King Sa'ud meets with the Soviet Ambassador to Iran in Tehran
- 1956** **November:** Arab-Israeli (Suez) War provokes demonstrations in Dhahran and Riyadh; Saudi Arabia breaks diplomatic relations with Britain and France
- 1957** King Sa'ud University, Saudi Arabia's first, opens in Riyadh
- 1957** King Sa'ud visits the United States and wins sympathy for plight of his polio-stricken young son
- 1958** **March:** King Sa'ud's plot to assassinate Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir is revealed by Syrian intelligence
- 1958** **24 March:** King Sa'ud hands over executive powers in foreign and internal affairs, including fiscal planning, to his half brother Faysal

- 1960** Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources is established
- 1960** **January:** Oil production begins in Japan Oil Company concession offshore of Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone
- 1960** **September:** OPEC is formed with Saudi Arabia as a charter member
- 1960** **December:** King Sa'ud regains control over government from Crown Prince Faysal
- 1961** Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is established
- 1961** **January:** King Sa'ud appoints a new Council of Ministers, including representatives of the "Liberal Princes"
- 1961** **September:** Saudi military units arrive in Kuwait as part of Arab League peacekeeping force to deter Iraqi invasion; they remain in Kuwait until January 1963
- 1961** **September:** King Sa'ud's cabinet reshuffle sends "Liberal Princes" into exile
- 1962** Ministry of Hajj Affairs and Awqaf is established
- 1962** American air base at Dhahran reverts to Royal Saudi Air Force
- 1962** **March:** Prince Faysal is restored as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to substitute for King Sa'ud who is in the US for medical treatment
- 1962** **September:** Diplomatic relations are resumed with France, as a result of Evian accords which bring an end to Algerian war
- 1962** **26 September:** An attempted revolution in Yemen plunges that country into civil war; Egyptian support for the new republic provokes Saudi Arabia to support the ousted Yemeni Imam and his royalist followers
- 1962** **October:** The Al Sa'ud family forces King Sa'ud to appoint Crown Prince Faysal as Prime Minister again, and to appoint Faysal's half brother Khalid as Deputy Prime Minister
- 1962** **November:** Prince Faysal, as Prime Minister, announces a 10-point plan for reform, including promises to issue a constitution, establish local government, and form an independent judiciary
- 1963** Ministry of Information is established
- 1963** Diplomatic relations are reestablished with Britain

- 1964** **23 March:** *Fatwa* by 'ulama' proclaims that King Sa'ud is unfit to rule
- 1964** **2 November:** A royal proclamation, signed by 68 princes, transfers power from King Sa'ud to Crown Prince Faysal; deposed as king, Sa'ud goes into exile in Greece; King Faysal's half brother Khalid becomes Heir Apparent
- 1965** Central Planning Organization is created
- 1966** **November to February 1967:** Underground opposition groups set off bombs inside Saudi Arabia
- 1967** **June:** Third Arab-Israeli War ends with Israeli occupation of Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and Jerusalem and the West Bank; token Saudi forces participate in war while action by ARAMCO workers temporarily disrupts oil exports
- 1967** **August:** Khartoum summit of Arab leaders leads to settlement of Egyptian-Saudi differences over Yemen and commits Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing states to provide financial subsidies to Arab frontline states
- 1969** **September:** Rapprochement is achieved with Egypt
- 1969** **September:** Discovery of putative plot against government sets off wave of arrests lasting into 1970
- 1970** Ministry of Justice is established
- 1970** First Five-Year Development Plan is inaugurated
- 1973** **October:** Fourth Arab-Israeli War begins with Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal; talks between OPEC states and oil company representatives in Vienna end inconclusively and are followed by unilateral price rises by Gulf producers; Arab oil producers, including Saudi Arabia, announce a mandatory cut in exports as result of the war and institute an embargo on exports to the United States and the Netherlands (later extended to Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa)
- 1974** **March:** Decision is taken to end Arab oil embargo against United States
- 1974** **June:** Visit of Second Deputy Prime Minister Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz to Washington results in creation of Saudi-US joint commissions
- 1975** **25 March:** King Faysal bin 'Abd al-'Aziz is assassinated in Riyadh by his nephew, Prince Faysal bin Musa'id, who is subsequently beheaded; Faysal's half brother Khalid succeeds him as King; half brother Fahd is appointed Heir Apparent

1975 October: Council of Ministers is reorganized, with 20 ministries headed by ministers and three ministers without portfolio; King Khalid bin 'Abd al-'Aziz heads Council as Prime Minister, Heir Apparent Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz becomes First Deputy Prime Minister, and 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz becomes Second Deputy Prime Minister

1975 Ministries of Higher Education, Industry and Electricity, Municipalities and Rural Affairs, Planning, Public Works and Housing, and Posts, Telephones, and Telegraphs are established after death of King Faysal

1976 March: Diplomatic relations established with South Yemen

1978 May: US Congress approves sale of F-15 combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia

1979 Antigovernment demonstrations by Shi'ah elements take place in Eastern Province, inspired by the Iranian revolution; more demonstrations occur in 1980

1979 21 November: Neo-Ikhwan group, led by Juhayman bin Muhammad al-'Utaybi seizes Great Mosque of Makkah; control is not regained until 5 December and after the loss of many lives; Juhayman and other surviving dissidents are subsequently executed

1980 ARAMCO becomes 100% Saudi-owned, with ownership backdated to 1976

1980 Carter Doctrine is announced, by which Washington signals its intention to intervene in the Gulf when necessary to protect oil supplies

1981 United States sells five AWACS radar-aircraft to Saudi Arabia after narrow vote of approval in US Congress

1981 19 May: Two bombs explode in Riyadh, killing one and wounding three

1981 25 May: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is inaugurated in Abu Dhabi at summit of rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman

1982 King Khalid bin 'Abd al-'Aziz dies and is succeeded by his half brother Fahd: Fahd's half brother 'Abdullah is recognized as Heir Apparent and a full brother Sultan is recognized as next in line to the throne

1984 June: Royal Saudi Air Force shoots down an Iranian F-4 fighter invading Saudi airspace

1984 April: Minister of Health Ghazi al-Qusaybi is dismissed after he publishes a poem critical of the royal family

- 1985** Saudi Arabia places order for British Aerospace Tornado combat aircraft in al-Yamamah-I deal
- 1986** King Fahd Causeway is opened, connecting Eastern Province to Bahrain
- 1986** **October:** Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources Ahmad Zaki Yamani is dismissed
- 1987** **31 July:** Iranian demonstration in Makkah during *hajj* gets out of control and more than 400 people are killed in ensuing melee between demonstrators and Saudi police
- 1987** **15 August:** Explosion rips through natural gas plant in Eastern Province
- 1988** Saudi Arabia and Britain sign al-Yamamah-II deal for military equipment and construction of air bases
- 1988** **March:** United States government protests Saudi acquisition of Chinese ballistic missiles; in response, Riyadh declares US Ambassador Hume Horan persona non grata
- 1988** **March:** Explosions set off at refinery in Ra's Tanurah and at petrochemical plant in al-Jubayl; four Saudi Shi'i nationals are executed in September 1988 for the acts
- 1990** **21 July:** Diplomatic relations are established between Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic of China
- 1990** **2 August:** Iraq invades Kuwait, following the breakdown of talks over border and oil issues
- 1990** **17 September:** Saudi Arabia formally reestablishes diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, suspended since 1938
- 1991** **16 January:** Operation Desert Storm air offensive begins against Iraq; on January 30-31, an Iraqi offensive against al-Khafji is contained; the Operation Desert Storm ground campaign begins against Iraq and occupied Kuwait on February 24; on February 27, Kuwaiti armed forces enter Kuwait City and a cease-fire in the war is announced on February 28
- 1991** **26 March:** Diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran are reestablished; in June, Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal becomes first senior Saudi official to visit Tehran since Iranian revolution of 1979
- 1992** **1 March:** King Fahd announces institution of a Basic Law for the kingdom and establishment of a 60-member Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) within six months

1992 17 September: Justice Minister Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Jubayr is appointed Speaker of proposed Majlis al-Shura

1992 30 September: Saudi forces attack a Qatari border post, killing at least one; Egypt's mediation defuses dispute in December and Qatar withdraws its threat to boycott the GCC summit

1992 21 December: King Fahd in speech criticizes religious extremists in Saudi Arabia and their foreign backers; this follows dismissal of seven members of the Supreme Authority of Senior 'Ulama'

1993 9 March: A riot in an Iraqi refugee camp inside Saudi Arabia's northern border results in 13 deaths

1993 13 May: Newly formed Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights is declared illegal and its members removed from their jobs

1993 11 July: Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz is appointed Mufti of Saudi Arabia

1993 21 August: King Fahd appoints the 60 members of the long-promised Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council)

1993 13 September: Lone gunman fires at gate of King Fahd's palace in Jiddah

1993 4 October: Saudi Arabia contributes \$100 million to the \$2 billion international fund for Palestinian development established after the Israeli-PLO accord

1994 17 May: Saudi diplomat Muhammad al-Khilawi defects to the United States and is granted political asylum; a second diplomat, Ahmad al-Zahrani, defects to Britain two months later

1994 September: Security forces arrest more than a hundred Islamic dissidents, many of them in the central region of al-Qasim; among them are Shaykh Salman al-'Awdah and Shaykh Safar al-Hawali

1995 2 January: As part of an austerity budget, the Saudi government announces price increases for water, telephone charges, gasoline, and domestic air travel

1995 May: The flogging of an Egyptian schoolteacher in Saudi Arabia as punishment for an alleged crime provokes a brief crisis between Egypt and the kingdom

1995 19 June: Saudi Arabian Airlines announces the purchase of 61 commercial aircraft from US manufacturers Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in a deal worth more than \$6 billion

1995 5 July: Details of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan for 1995-2000 are published; the plan emphasizes austerity to match declining government revenues and economic diversification away from dependence on oil; nearly \$258 billion is expended during the plan's life

1995 2 August: The most extensive reshuffling of the cabinet in two decades is announced, including new appointments for the ministries of petroleum and finance

1995 13 November: A car bomb explodes at a National Guard facility in Riyadh used by American military personnel; seven were killed and 60 were injured. Four Saudis confessed to the act on Saudi television on 22 April 1996, claiming they had been influenced by the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights and Usamah bin Ladin; they were executed on 31 May 1996

1995 22 November: A powerful earthquake across the Middle East strikes the northwestern corner of Saudi Arabia, killing several

1996 27 March: Three Saudi tribesmen hijack an Egyptian aircraft to Libya

1996 1 April: The Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Dr. Ghazi al-Qusaybi, warns the British government that it must expel Saudi dissident Dr. Muhammad al-Mas'ari or risk losing millions of dollars in trade with the kingdom. A British court subsequently overturns the British government's deportation order

1996 26 June: A truck bomb at a US military housing complex in al-Khubar kills 19 Americans and injures nearly 400 individuals of various nationalities; the identity of the perpetrators remained unknown six years later but speculation focused on Saudi Shi'ah assisted by Iran

1996 5 July: French President Jacques Chirac visits Saudi Arabia and discusses payments for French arms sales to the kingdom

1996 11 August: King Husayn of Jordan meets King Fahd in Jiddah, the first time the rulers have met since 1990 because of Saudi displeasure with Jordan's apparent support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

1996 17 November: Unexpected rainstorms and gale-force winds kill at least three people in southern Saudi Arabia and cause \$24 million in damage

1997 12 March: Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and National Aviation Prince Sultan bin 'Abd al-'Aziz makes the first official visit to Britain by a senior Saudi official since 1989

- 1997 16 April:** A cooking-gas cylinder ignites a fire in the pilgrims' camp during the annual *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Makkah, killing 343 pilgrims
- 1997 6 July:** The Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) is reconstituted for a second term, with the retention of 30 members and the appointment of 60 new members
- 1997 7 September:** Former Minister of Oil 'Abdullah al-Tariqi dies in Cairo
- 1997 10-11 December:** Heir Apparent Prince 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz holds talks with Iranian President Muhammad Khatami during Prince 'Abdullah's presence at the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Tehran
- 1998 21 February:** Former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani begins a 10-day visit to Saudi Arabia, the first by a senior Iranian official since the 1979 revolution
- 1998 9 April:** The official death toll from a stampede during the annual *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Makkah is put at 118 pilgrims
- 1998 13 May:** King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz names his youngest son 'Abd al-'Aziz as a minister of state without portfolio; 'Abd al-'Aziz makes an official visit to the United States on his father's behalf two months later
- 1998 16 May:** Iranian President Muhammad Khatami begins three-day visit to Saudi Arabia, the first by an Iranian leader since the 1979 revolution
- 1998 15 September:** Heir Apparent Prince 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz starts a lengthy international tour by meeting British Prime Minister Tony Blair in London. Subsequent stops on his tour include France, the United States, and China
- 1998 22 September:** Saudi Arabia announces it is recalling its chargé d'affaires from Afghanistan in response to the ruling Taliban government's failure to hand over Saudi-born dissident Usamah bin Ladin to the Saudi government
- 1998 26 September:** Heir Apparent Prince 'Abdullah meets US oil company executives in Washington to invite US businesses to invest in Saudi Arabia's oil and gas industries
- 1998 15 October:** Saudi Heir Apparent Prince 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz meets Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Beijing in first high-level Saudi visit to China. President Jiang Zemin returns visit in October-November 1999
- 1998 7-9 December:** GCC summit in Muscat elects Jamil al-Hujaylan of Saudi Arabia to a three-year term as Secretary-General of the GCC, effective 1 April 1999

1999 15 March: As part of an accord among OPEC and other international oil exporters, Saudi Arabia agrees to cut its crude oil output by 585,000 barrels per day, dropping its total production below 8 million barrels per day for the first time in nearly a decade

1999 13 May: Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin 'Abdullah bin Baz, Mufti of Saudi Arabia, dies and is replaced by Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin 'Abdullah Al al-Shaykh

1999 17 June: The cabinet is reshuffled

1999 29 July: A fire engulfs a wedding-party tent in a village of the Eastern Province, killing at least 46 people

1999 24 October: New Pakistani ruler General Pervez Musharraf makes his first foreign trip as ruler to Saudi Arabia

1999 29 October: Kamal Adham, prominent businessman, brother-in-law of King Faysal, and former head of Saudi intelligence, dies in Egypt

2000 28 February: Japan's Arabian Oil Company loses its 40-year concession for the Saudi share of the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone; operations are taken over by an ARAMCO subsidiary

2000 17 March: Shots fired from a moving car wound a guard at the Russian consulate in Jiddah; the Saudi government denies that the attack was because of Russia's campaign against Chechen rebels

2000 17 April: Higher Organization for Tourism is created as part of a policy of economic diversification, in conjunction with the issuing of guidelines for the country's first tourist visas

2000 29 May: Women are allowed to attend a session of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) for the first time

2000 14 June: Formation is announced of a council of the Royal Family composed of 18 senior princes with Heir Apparent 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz at its head; its purpose is apparently to bring the widespread family together and to arrange family affairs

2000 28 August: Ministry of Planning announces approval of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan for 2001-2005, with spending set at \$200 billion, concentrating on economic reforms, the diversification of income away from oil, and promotion of the private sector

2000 14 October: Four Saudi dissidents hijack a Saudi Arabian Airlines plane to Baghdad, where they were given sanctuary

2000 17 November: A British man is killed and his wife wounded when a bomb blows up their car in Riyadh. Subsequent explosions take place on 22 November and 15 December, all with British victims. Four Europeans confess on Saudi television on 4 February 2001 to the attacks, in what the Saudi government claims is a dispute over illegal alcohol smuggling in the kingdom. Questions regarding their guilt and punishment continue into 2002

2000 18 December: Saudi government announces a balanced budget for 2001, following a surplus for 2000, the first budget surplus in 19 years

2001 5 March: The second fatal stampede in three years during the annual *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Makkah kills 35 pilgrims

2001 17 April: Iran and Saudi Arabia sign a security pact intended to combat organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration

2001 14 May: The Ministry of Health reports that an outbreak of Rift Valley fever in southern Saudi Arabia has killed 124 people since September 2000; dozens more die in adjoining regions of Yemen

2001 24 May: The membership of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) is expanded to 120 in preparation for its third four-year session; of these, 62 members are new

2001 8 September: Prince Turki al-Faysal, Director of General Intelligence since 1968, is replaced by his uncle, Prince Nawwaf bin 'Abd al-'Aziz

2001 11 September: Fifteen Saudis are among the 19 hijackers of four American domestic airliners, which are then used to destroy the World Trade Center in New York and damage the Pentagon in Washington; the Saudi government condemns the attacks and their presumed mastermind, Saudi-born dissident Usamah bin Ladin; US-Saudi relations are strained by American media attacks on the kingdom and perceived Saudi slowness to join US President George W. Bush's declared "war on terror"

2001 25 September: Saudi Arabia severs all diplomatic relations with Afghanistan's ruling Taliban government for its support of Usamah bin Ladin and al-Qa'idah organization

2002 18 January: Interim President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai arrives in Saudi Arabia on his first trip abroad as president, seeking aid for his war-torn country; the kingdom provides \$20 million in initial aid and pledges an additional \$200 million at the Tokyo donors conference a few days later

2002 24 January: Shaykh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Jubayr, the Chairman of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) dies; he is replaced by Dr. Salih bin 'Abdullah bin Humayd

2002 February: Heir Apparent 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz announces his Arab-Israeli peace plan to a visiting journalist, proposing the normalization of Arab relations with Israel in exchange for Israel's withdrawal to its 1967 borders; the rough plan attracts international attention and is adopted in a more complete form by an Arab League summit on 28 March 2002

2002 11 March: At least 15 girls are killed during a fire at their school in Makkah, apparently because the *mutawwi'in* (religious police) prevented them from leaving the school because they are not properly dressed

2002 21 March: 'Abdullah bin 'Awad bin Ladin, head of the wealthy bin Ladin family and uncle of the estranged Usamah bin Ladin, dies in al-Madinah

2002 2 April: Amnesty International announces that Saudi Arabia executed at least 79 people in 2001, ranking it third in the world and slightly surpassing the United States

2002 5 April: Several thousand people demonstrate in Dhahran in protest against Israeli actions against West Bank towns. A subsequent Saudi telethon on 12-13 April raises more than \$100 million for Palestinian relief

2002 12-15 April: Torrential rains and flash floods in western and southern Saudi Arabia kill more than 12 people

2002 25 April: Heir Apparent 'Abdullah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz visits US President George W. Bush at his Texas ranch in an attempt to mend bilateral relations after September 2001 and to ask for the US to exert pressure on Israel to stop its attacks on Palestinian towns; the visit follows the cancellation of an earlier visit scheduled for May 2001 because of Saudi objection to US support for Israel

2002 Early May: An empty missile tube from a Soviet-made SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launcher is discovered outside the Prince Sultan Air Base, used by United States aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over Iraq; 13 men, including 11 Saudis, are arrested a few weeks later on charges of having been involved in the attempt on behalf of al-Qa'idah

2002 11 May: An Iraqi government minister attending an Arab meeting enters Saudi Arabia in the first such visit since the Kuwait War

2002 20 June: A British banker is killed by a car bomb explosion in Riyadh; bombs attached to the cars of two other expatriates are discovered a few days later

2002 Late June: A Saudi government team visits Guantánamo Bay in Cuba to check on the approximately 100 Saudi nationals being held there on suspicion of having links to terrorism

2002 5 July: Prominent Saudi businessman Sulayman al-'Ulayan dies

2002 23 July: Prince Ahmad bin Salman Al Sa'ud, son of Prince Salman bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, Governor of Riyadh Prince, dies of a heart attack six weeks after a horse he owned won the Kentucky Derby

2002 25-29 July: King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz undergoes two eye surgeries in Geneva amid concerns that his health was continuing to worsen

2002 19 September: The Saudi ambassador to the United Kingdom Ghazi al-Qusaybi is recalled to Riyadh and appointed Minister of Water

2002 30 September: A German employee of an electronics company is killed by a car bomb explosion in Riyadh

2002 1 October: The United States government introduces a policy of registration and fingerprinting of Saudi Arabian males entering the United States

2002 15 October: A Saudi unsuccessfully attempts to hijack a Saudi Arabian Airlines plane on a flight from Khartoum to Jiddah

2002 3 November: Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal says that Saudi Arabia will not allow the United States to use its facilities for any attack against Iraq even if a strike was sanctioned by the United Nations. He clarifies his remarks on the following day to note that Saudi Arabia would be obligated to cooperate with the United Nations if Iraq refuses to implement UN resolutions but that it would not mean that the kingdom would join any fighting.

2002 18 November: Saudi securities forces wound and apprehend a terrorist suspect in Riyadh


2002 20 November: Minister of Interior Prince Nayif bin 'Abd al-'Aziz says that Saudi Arabia holds more than 100 Saudi nationals on suspicion of ties to al-Qa'idah. On the same day, a gunman fires shots in an American fast-food restaurant in al-Kharj and is later arrested

2002 3 December: Saudi Arabia announces that former head of intelligence Prince Turki al-Faysal is to be appointed ambassador to the United Kingdom


Appendix 2 Maps

Source: Wikipedia


2.1. Age of the Caliphs



2.2. First Saudi State




2.3. Current borders



2.4. Demographic Distribution Estimates in the Middle East

Source: Armanios, Febe. "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites", CRS Report for Congress, RS 21745, February 2004, p.6



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K. Yancey 2/02/04)

Notes: Figures in this map indicate the percentages of Sunni and Shiite Muslims in the population. They do not always total 100% since they exclude Christians and other minorities. In many countries, particularly where Shiites constitute a significant religious minority, there are no reliable or exact statistics of the percentage of these groups in the broader population. For instance, the most recent official census in Saudi Arabia, conducted in 1999, did not count the number of Shiites. For Iraq, it is widely acknowledged that there has been no reliable census in decades. Existing indicators of religious affiliation in Iraq as reported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), are only estimates. In Lebanon, no census has been conducted since 1932. These complications, in addition to general shortcomings in the gathering of reliable statistical information about the region, must be considered when examining this map.

Statistics on Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Pakistan are taken from CIA *World Factbook* (2003). Statistics on Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen are taken from the Department of State *International Religious Freedom Report* (2003). Statistics on Lebanon are from *Lebanon's Political Mosaic*, published by the Directorate of Intelligence of the CIA, NESA 92-10020, LDA 92-13537, August 1992. Not all Lebanese agree with the CIA figures. The Turkish government is a secular government and does not produce official statistics on any religious or ethnic group in Turkey. For Syria, "non-Sunni Muslims" include Twelvers, Seveners, Alawites, and Druzes.

Appendix 3 Terrorist Lists

Source: U.S. Department of State, July 20, 2006,

http://www.homelandsecurity.ohio.gov/DMA_Terrorist/terrorist_exclusion_list.pdf

3.1 List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Ansar al-Islam
5. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
6. Asbat al-Ansar
7. Aum Shinrikyo
8. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
9. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
10. Continuity Irish Republican Army
11. Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
12. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
13. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
14. Hizballah (Party of God)
15. Islamic Jihad Group
16. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
17. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
18. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
19. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
20. Kahane Chai (Kach)
21. Kongra-Gel (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
22. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
23. Lashkar i Jhangvi
24. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
25. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
26. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
27. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
28. National Liberation Army (ELN)
29. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
30. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
31. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)
32. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
33. al-Qa'ida
34. Real IRA
35. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
36. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
37. Revolutionary Organization 17 November
38. Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
39. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
40. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
41. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JTJ, al-Zarqawi Network)
42. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

3.2 Terrorist Exclusion List

1. Afghan Support Committee (a.k.a. Ahya ul Turas; a.k.a. Jamiat Ayat-ur-Rhas al Islamia; a.k.a. Jamiat Ihya ul Turath al Islamia; a.k.a. Lajnat el Masa Eidatul Afghania)
2. Al Taqwa Trade, Property and Industry Company Ltd. (f.k.a. Al Taqwa Trade, Property and Industry; f.k.a. Al Taqwa Trade, Property and Industry Establishment; f.k.a. Himmat Establishment; a.k.a. Waldenberg, AG)
3. Al-Hamati Sweets Bakeries
4. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)
5. Al-Manar
6. Al-Ma'unah
7. Al-Nur Honey Center
8. Al-Rashid Trust
9. Al-Shifa Honey Press for Industry and Commerce
10. Al-Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia (a.k.a. Wafa Humanitarian Organization; a.k.a. Al Wafa; a.k.a. Al Wafa Organization)
11. Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
12. Anarchist Faction for Overthrow
13. Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) (a.k.a. Interahamwe, Former Armed Forces (EX-FAR))
14. Asbat al-Ansar
15. Babbar Khalsa International
16. Bank Al Taqwa Ltd. (a.k.a. Al Taqwa Bank; a.k.a. Bank Al Taqwa)
17. Black Star
18. Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (a.k.a. CPN; a.k.a. the United Revolutionary People's Council, a.k.a. the People's Liberation Army of Nepal)
19. Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) (a.k.a. Continuity Army Council)
20. Darkazanli Company
21. Dhamat Houmet Daawa Salafia (a.k.a. Group Protectors of Salafist Preaching; a.k.a. Houmat Ed Daawa Es Salafiya; a.k.a. Katibat El Ahoual; a.k.a. Protectors of the Salafist Predication; a.k.a. El-Ahoual Battalion; a.k.a. Katibat El Ahouel; a.k.a. Houmate Ed-Daawa Es-Salafia; a.k.a. the Horror Squadron; a.k.a. Djamaat Houmat Eddawa Essalafia; a.k.a. Djamaatt Houmat Ed Daawa Es Salafiya; a.k.a. Salafist Call Protectors; a.k.a. Djamaat Houmat Ed Daawa Es Salafiya; a.k.a. Houmate el Da'awaa es-Salafiyya; a.k.a. Protectors of the Salafist Call; a.k.a. Houmat ed-Daaoua es-Salafia; a.k.a. Group of Supporters of the Salafiste Trend; a.k.a. Group of Supporters of the Salafist Trend)
22. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (a.k.a. Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party; a.k.a. ETIM; a.k.a. ETIP)
23. First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) (a.k.a. Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Premero De Octubre)
24. Harakat ul Jihad i Islami (HUJI)
25. International Sikh Youth Federation
26. Islamic Army of Aden
27. Islamic Renewal and Reform Organization
28. Jamiat al-Ta'awun al-Islamiyya
29. Jamiat ul-Mujahideen (JUM)
30. Japanese Red Army (JRA)
31. Jaysh-e-Mohammed
32. Jayshullah

33. Jerusalem Warriors
34. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET) (a.k.a. Army of the Righteous)
35. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
36. Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
37. Makhtab al-Khidmat
38. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (a.k.a. GICM; a.k.a. Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain)
39. Nada Management Organization (f.k.a. Al Taqwa Management Organization SA)
40. New People's Army (NPA)
41. Orange Volunteers (OV)
42. People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
43. Red Brigades-Combatant Communist Party (BR-PCC)
44. Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
45. Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (Pakistan and Afghanistan offices — Kuwait office not designated) (a.k.a. Jamia Ihya ul Turath; a.k.a. Jamiat Ihia Al- Turath Al-Islamiya; a.k.a. Revival of Islamic Society Heritage on the African Continent)
46. Revolutionary Proletarian Nucleus
47. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
48. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
49. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
50. The Islamic International Brigade (a.k.a. International Battalion, a.k.a. Islamic Peacekeeping International Brigade, a.k.a. Peacekeeping Battalion, a.k.a. The International Brigade, a.k.a. The Islamic Peacekeeping Army, a.k.a. The Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade)
51. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
52. The Pentagon Gang
53. The Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (a.k.a. Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, a.k.a. Riyadh-as- Saliheen, a.k.a. the Sabotage and Military Surveillance Group of the Riyadh al-Salihin Martyrs, a.k.a. Riyadus Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Shahids (Martyrs))
54. The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (a.k.a. the Islamic Special Purpose Regiment, a.k.a. the al-Jihad-Fisi-Sabililah Special Islamic Regiment, a.k.a. Islamic Regiment of Special Meaning)
55. Tunisian Combat Group (a.k.a. GCT, a.k.a. Groupe Combattant Tunisien, a.k.a. Jama'a Combattante Tunisien, a.k.a. JCT; a.k.a. Tunisian Combatant Group)
56. Turkish Hizballah
57. Ulster Defense Association (a.k.a. Ulster Freedom Fighters)
58. Ummah Tameer E-Nau (UTN) (a.k.a. Foundation for Construction; a.k.a. Nation Building; a.k.a. Reconstruction Foundation; a.k.a. Reconstruction of the Islamic Community; a.k.a. Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah; a.k.a. Ummah Tameer I-Nau; a.k.a. Ummah Tameer E-Nau; a.k.a. Ummah Tameer-I-Pau)
59. Youssef M. Nada & Co. Gesellschaft M.B.H.

3.3. Designated Charities and Potential Fundraising Front Organizations

1. Makhtab al-Khadamat / Al Kifah (formerly U.S.-based, Pakistan)
2. Al Rashid Trust (Pakistan)
3. Wafa Humanitarian Organization (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates)
4. Rabita Trust (Pakistan)
5. Ummah Tameer E-Nau (Pakistan)
6. Revival of Islamic Heritage Society – Pakistan and Afghanistan Branches (Kuwait, Afghanistan, Pakistan)
7. Afghan Support Committee (Afghanistan, Pakistan)
8. Al Haramain Foundation (Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania, Bosnia, Somalia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Albania, Ethiopia, Netherlands, Comoros Islands, and United States branches)
9. Aid Organization of the Ulema (Pakistan)
10. Global Relief Foundation (United States)
11. Benevolence International Foundation (United States):
12. Benevolence International Fund (Canada)
13. Bosanska Idealna Futura (Bosnia)
14. Stichting Benevolence International Nederland (Netherlands)
15. Lajnat al Daawa al Islamiyya (Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan)
16. Al Akhtar Trust (Pakistan)
17. Taibah International (Bosnia)
18. Al Haramain & Al Masjed Al Aqsa Charity Foundation (Bosnia)
19. Al Furqan (Bosnia)
20. Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA) / Islamic Relief Agency (ISRA) (Sudan, United States and 40 other branches throughout the world)
21. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (United States)
22. Al Aqsa Foundation (United States, Europe, Pakistan, Yemen, South Africa)
23. Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (France)
24. Association de Secours Palestinien (Switzerland)
25. Interpal (Palestinian Relief & Development Fund) (United Kingdom)
26. Palestinian Association in Austria (Austria)
27. Sanibil Association for Relief and Development (Lebanon)
28. Elehssan Society (Palestinian territories)
29. Aleph (Aum Shinrikyo/Aum Supreme Truth)
30. Rabbi Meir David Kahane Memorial Fund (Kahane Chai and Kach) American Friends of the United Yeshiva (Kahane Chai and Kach) American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir (Kahane Chai and Kach) Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva (Kahane Chai and Kach)
31. Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association (Real IRA)
32. Socorro Popular Del Peru/People's Aid of Peru (Sendero Luminoso/Shining Path)

Appendix 4 UN Resolutions

4.1. United Nations, "International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism", (1999)

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

Preamble

The States Parties to this Convention,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among States,

Deeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

Recalling the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, contained in General Assembly resolution 50/6 of 24 October 1995,

Recalling also all the relevant General Assembly resolutions on the matter, including resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994 and its annex on the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, in which the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirmed their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States,

Noting that the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism also encouraged States to review urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects of the matter,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, paragraph 3, subparagraph (f), in which the Assembly called upon all States to take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drug dealing and racketeering, including the exploitation of persons for purposes of funding terrorist activities, and in particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to prevent and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist purposes without impeding in any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to intensify the exchange of information concerning international movements of such funds,

Recalling also General Assembly resolution 52/165 of 15 December 1997, in which the Assembly called upon States to consider, in particular, the implementation

of the measures set out in paragraphs 3 (a) to (f) of its resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 53/108 of 8 December 1998, in which the Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 should elaborate a draft international convention for the suppression of terrorist financing to supplement related existing international instruments,

Considering that the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole,

Noting that the number and seriousness of acts of international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain,

Noting also that existing multilateral legal instruments do not expressly address such financing,

Being convinced of the urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. **Funds** means assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.
2. **A State or governmental facility** means any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State, members of Government, the legislature or the judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public authority or entity or by employees or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official duties.
3. **Proceeds** means any funds derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence set forth in article 2.

Article 2

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:

(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or

(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

2. (a) On depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a State Party which is not a party to a treaty listed in the annex may declare that, in the application of this Convention to the State Party, the treaty shall be deemed not to be included in the annex referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (a). The declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as the treaty enters into force for the State Party, which shall notify the depositary of this fact;

(b) When a State Party ceases to be a party to a treaty listed in the annex, it may make a declaration as provided for in this article, with respect to that treaty.

3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b).

4. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

5. Any person also commits an offence if that person:

(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article;

(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article;

(c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraphs 1 or 4 of this article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:

(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article; or

(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 3

This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis under article 7, paragraph 1, or article 7, paragraph 2, to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of articles 12 to 18 shall, as appropriate, apply in those cases.

Article 4

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary:

(a) To establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in article 2;

(b) To make those offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of the offences.

Article 5

1. Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.

2. Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offences.

3. Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance with paragraph 1 above are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions.

Article 6

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of this Convention are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

Article 7

1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 when:
 - (a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State;
 - (b) The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft registered under the laws of that State at the time the offence is committed;
 - (c) The offence is committed by a national of that State.
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such offence when:
 - (a) The offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), in the territory of or against a national of that State;
 - (b) The offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including diplomatic or consular premises of that State;
 - (c) The offence was directed towards or resulted in an offence referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act;
 - (d) The offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State;
 - (e) The offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the Government of that State.
3. Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Convention, each State Party shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established in accordance with paragraph 2. Should any change take place, the State Party concerned shall immediately notify the Secretary-General.
4. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2 in cases where the alleged offender is

present in its territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties that have established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2.

5. When more than one State Party claims jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 2, the relevant States Parties shall strive to coordinate their actions appropriately, in particular concerning the conditions for prosecution and the modalities for mutual legal assistance.

6. Without prejudice to the norms of general international law, this Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.

Article 8

1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture.

2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture of funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 and the proceeds derived from such offences.

3. Each State Party concerned may give consideration to concluding agreements on the sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-by-case basis, of the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article.

4. Each State Party shall consider establishing mechanisms whereby the funds derived from the forfeitures referred to in this article are utilized to compensate the victims of offences referred to in article 2, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) or (b), or their families.

5. The provisions of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 9

1. Upon receiving information that a person who has committed or who is alleged to have committed an offence set forth in article 2 may be present in its territory, the State Party concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary under its domestic law to investigate the facts contained in the information.

2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory the offender or alleged offender is present shall take the appropriate measures under its domestic law so as to ensure that person's presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition.

3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 2 are being taken shall be entitled to:

(a) Communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which that person is a national or which is otherwise entitled to protect that person's rights or, if that person is a stateless person, the State in the territory of which that person habitually resides;

(b) Be visited by a representative of that State;

(c) Be informed of that person's rights under subparagraphs (a) and (b).

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the offender or alleged offender is present, subject to the provision that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 are intended.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be without prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b), or paragraph 2, subparagraph (b), to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the alleged offender.

6. When a State Party, pursuant to the present article, has taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify, directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the States Parties which have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraph 1 or 2, and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States Parties, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant that person's detention. The State which makes the investigation contemplated in paragraph 1 shall promptly inform the said States Parties of its findings and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

Article 10

1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in cases to which article 7 applies, if it does not extradite that person, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.

2. Whenever a State Party is permitted under its domestic law to extradite or otherwise surrender one of its nationals only upon the condition that the person will be returned to that State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender of the person was sought, and this State and the State seeking the extradition of the person agree with this option and other terms they may deem appropriate,

such a conditional extradition or surrender shall be sufficient to discharge the obligation set forth in paragraph 1.

Article 11

1. The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States Parties before the entry into force of this Convention. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be subsequently concluded between them.

2. When a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State Party may, at its option, consider this Convention as a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 2. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 2 as extraditable offences between themselves, subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

4. If necessary, the offences set forth in article 2 shall be treated, for the purposes of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territory of the States that have established jurisdiction in accordance with article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2.

5. The provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements between States Parties with regard to offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention.

Article 12

1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings in respect of the offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings.

2. States Parties may not refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the ground of bank secrecy.

3. The requesting Party shall not transmit nor use information or evidence furnished by the requested Party for investigations, prosecutions or proceedings other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested Party.

4. Each State Party may give consideration to establishing mechanisms to share with other States Parties information or evidence needed to establish criminal, civil or administrative liability pursuant to article 5.

5. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 in conformity with any treaties or other arrangements on mutual legal assistance or information exchange that may exist between them. In the absence of such treaties or arrangements, States Parties shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their domestic law.

Article 13

None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a fiscal offence. Accordingly, States Parties may not refuse a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance on the sole ground that it concerns a fiscal offence.

Article 14

None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.

Article 15

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite or to afford mutual legal assistance, if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition for offences set forth in article 2 or for mutual legal assistance with respect to such offences has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person's position for any of these reasons.

Article 16

1. A person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one State Party whose presence in another State Party is requested for purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offences set forth in article 2 may be transferred if the following conditions are met:

(a) The person freely gives his or her informed consent;

(b) The competent authorities of both States agree, subject to such conditions as those States may deem appropriate.

2. For the purposes of the present article:

(a) The State to which the person is transferred shall have the authority and obligation to keep the person transferred in custody, unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State from which the person was transferred;

(b) The State to which the person is transferred shall without delay implement its obligation to return the person to the custody of the State from which the person was transferred as agreed beforehand, or as otherwise agreed, by the competent authorities of both States;

(c) The State to which the person is transferred shall not require the State from which the person was transferred to initiate extradition proceedings for the return of the person;

(d) The person transferred shall receive credit for service of the sentence being served in the State from which he or she was transferred for time spent in the custody of the State to which he or she was transferred.

3. Unless the State Party from which a person is to be transferred in accordance with the present article so agrees, that person, whatever his or her nationality, shall not be prosecuted or detained or subjected to any other restriction of his or her personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is transferred in respect of acts or convictions anterior to his or her departure from the territory of the State from which such person was transferred.

Article 17

Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in the territory of which that person is present and applicable provisions of international law, including international human rights law.

Article 18

1. States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 2 by taking all practicable measures, *inter alia*, by adapting their domestic legislation, if necessary, to prevent and counter preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their territories, including:

(a) Measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons and organizations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the commission of offences set forth in article 2;

(b) Measures requiring financial institutions and other professions involved in financial transactions to utilize the most efficient measures available for the identification of their usual or occasional customers, as well as customers in whose interest accounts are opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity. For this purpose, States Parties shall consider:

(i) Adopting regulations prohibiting the opening of accounts the holders or beneficiaries of which are unidentified or unidentifiable, and measures to ensure that such institutions verify the identity of the real owners of such transactions;

(ii) With respect to the identification of legal entities, requiring financial institutions, when necessary, to take measures to verify the legal existence and the structure of the customer by obtaining, either from a public register or from the customer or both, proof of incorporation, including information concerning the customer's name, legal form, address, directors and provisions regulating the power to bind the entity;

(iii) Adopting regulations imposing on financial institutions the obligation to report promptly to the competent authorities all complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or obviously lawful purpose, without fear of assuming criminal or civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information if they report their suspicions in good faith;

(iv) Requiring financial institutions to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international.

2. States Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of offences set forth in article 2 by considering:

(a) Measures for the supervision, including, for example, the licensing, of all money-transmission agencies;

(b) Feasible measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the freedom of capital movements.

3. States Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 2 by exchanging accurate and verified information in accordance with their domestic law and coordinating administrative and other measures taken, as appropriate, to prevent the commission of offences set forth in article 2, in particular by:

(a) Establishing and maintaining channels of communication between their competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of offences set forth in article 2;

(b) Cooperating with one another in conducting inquiries, with respect to the offences set forth in article 2, concerning:

(i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons in respect of whom reasonable suspicion exists that they are involved in such offences;

(ii) The movement of funds relating to the commission of such offences.

4. States Parties may exchange information through the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

Article 19

The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall, in accordance with its domestic law or applicable procedures, communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit the information to the other States Parties.

Article 20

The States Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

Article 21

Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and other relevant conventions.

Article 22

Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State Party the exercise of jurisdiction or performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its domestic law.

Article 23

1. The annex may be amended by the addition of relevant treaties that:
 - (a) Are open to the participation of all States;
 - (b) Have entered into force;
 - (c) Have been ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by at least twenty-two States Parties to the present Convention.
2. After the entry into force of this Convention, any State Party may propose such an amendment. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the depositary in written form. The depositary shall notify proposals that meet the requirements of paragraph 1 to all States Parties and seek their views on whether the proposed amendment should be adopted.
3. The proposed amendment shall be deemed adopted unless one third of the States Parties object to it by a written notification not later than 180 days after its circulation.
4. The adopted amendment to the annex shall enter into force 30 days after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of such amendment for all those States Parties having deposited such an instrument. For each State Party ratifying, accepting or approving the amendment after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument, the amendment shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State Party of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.

Article 24

1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If, within six months from the date of the request for arbitration, the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, by application, in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation.
3. Any State which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 25

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States from 10 January 2000 to 31 December 2001 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall be open to accession by any State. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 26

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 27

1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which notification is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 28

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall send certified copies thereof to all States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 10 January 2000.

Annex

1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on 16 December 1970.
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 23 September 1971.
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973.
4. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979.
5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted at Vienna on 3 March 1980.
6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988.
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988.
8. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988.
9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997.

4.2. United Nations – Security Council, Resolution 1373, (2001)

United Nations

S/RES/1373 (2001)



Security Council

Distr.: General

28 September 2001

Resolution 1373 (2001)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on
28 September 2001**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001.

Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts.

Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security.

Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001).

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.

Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism.

Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,

Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,

Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

01-55743 (E)



1. *Decides* that all States shall:

- (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
- (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
- (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
- (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;

2. *Decides also* that all States shall:

- (a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
- (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
- (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
- (d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
- (e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
- (f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
- (g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;

3. *Calls upon* all States to:

(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;

(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;

(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;

(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;

(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);

(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;

(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;

4. *Notes* with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard *emphasizes* the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

5. *Declares* that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

6. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and *calls upon* all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;

7. *Directs* the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;

8. *Expresses* its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter.

4.3. United Nations - Security Council, Resolution 1617, (2005)

United Nations

S/RES/1617 (2005)



Security Council

Distr.: General
29 July 2005**Resolution 1617 (2005)****Adopted by the Security Council at its 5244th meeting, on
29 July 2005***The Security Council.*

Recalling its resolutions 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, 1363 (2001) of 30 July 2001, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1390 (2002) of 16 January 2002, 1452 (2002) of 20 December 2002, 1455 (2003) of 17 January 2003, 1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004 and 1566 (2004) of 8 October 2004, and the relevant statements of its President,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed; and reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban — and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities — for ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the death of innocent civilians and other victims, destruction of property and greatly undermining stability,

Expressing its concern over the use of various media, including the Internet, by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban, and their associates, including for terrorist propaganda and inciting terrorist violence, and urging the working group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004) to consider these issues,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in leading and coordinating this effort,

Emphasizing the obligation placed upon all Member States to implement, in full, resolution 1373 (2001), including with regard to the Taliban or Al-Qaida, and any individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, who have participated in financing, planning, facilitating, recruiting for, preparing, perpetrating, or otherwise supporting terrorist activities or acts, as well as to facilitate the implementation of counter-terrorism obligations in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions,

Stressing the importance of clarifying which individuals, groups, undertakings and entities are subject to listing in light of information regarding the changing

05-44660 (E)

0544660

nature of, and threat from, Al-Qaida, particularly as reported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team ("Monitoring Team"),

Underscoring the importance of Member State designations pursuant to relevant resolutions and robust implementation of existing measures as a significant preventive measure in combating terrorist activity,

Noting that, in giving effect to the measures in paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1267 (1999), paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002), full account is to be taken of the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1452 (2002),

Welcoming the efforts of the International Civil Aviation Organization to prevent travel documents from being made available to terrorists and their associates,

Encouraging Member States to work in the framework of Interpol, in particular through the use of the Interpol database of stolen and lost travel documents, to reinforce the implementation of the measures against Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban, and their associates,

Expressing its concern over the possible use by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, or the Taliban, and their associates of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), commercially available explosives and chemical, biological, radiation or nuclear weapons and material, and encouraging Member States to consider possible action to reduce these threats.

Urging all States, international bodies, and regional organizations to allocate sufficient resources, including through international partnership, to meet the ongoing and direct threat posed by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them.

Stressing the importance of meeting the ongoing threat that Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, and individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them represent to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that all States shall take the measures as previously imposed by paragraph 4 (b) of resolution 1267 (1999), paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000), and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 (2002) with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list created pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) (the "Consolidated List"):

(a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly, for such persons' benefit, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory;

(b) Prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process

or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) ("the Committee") determines on a case-by-case basis only that entry or transit is justified;

(c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, to these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activities;

2. *Further decides* that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking, or entity is "associated with" Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban include:

- participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of;
- supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to;
- recruiting for; or
- otherwise supporting acts or activities of:

Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof:

3. *Further decides* that any undertaking or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, such an individual, group, undertaking or entity associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban shall be eligible for designation:

4. *Decides* that, when proposing names for the Consolidated List, States shall act in accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution 1526 (2004) and henceforth also shall provide to the Committee a statement of case describing the basis of the proposal; and further encourages States to identify any undertakings and entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the proposed subject;

5. *Requests* relevant States to inform, to the extent possible, and in writing where possible, individuals and entities included in the Consolidated List of the measures imposed on them, the Committee's guidelines, and, in particular, the listing and delisting procedures and the provisions of resolution 1452 (2002):

6. *Decides* that the statement of case submitted by the designating State referred to in paragraph 4 above may be used by the Committee in responding to queries from Member States whose nationals, residents or entities have been included on the Consolidated List; decides also that the Committee may decide on a case-by-case basis to release the information to other parties, with the prior consent of the designating State, for example, for operational reasons or to aid the implementation of the measures; decides also that States may continue to provide additional information which shall be kept on a confidential basis within the Committee unless the submitting State agrees to the dissemination of such information:

7. *Strongly urges* all Member States to implement the comprehensive, international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) Forty

Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to increase cooperation between the United Nations and Interpol in order to provide the Committee with better tools to fulfil its mandate more effectively and to give Member States better tools to implement the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above;

9. *Urges* all Member States, in their implementation of the measures called for in paragraph 1 above, to ensure that stolen and lost passports and other travel documents are invalidated as soon as possible and share information on those documents with other Member States through the Interpol database;

10. *Calls* on all Member States to use the checklist contained in annex II of this resolution to report by 1 March 2006 to the Committee on specific actions that they have taken to implement the measures outlined in paragraph 1 above with regard to individuals and entities henceforth added to the Consolidated List, and thereafter at intervals to be determined by the Committee;

11. *Directs* the Committee to encourage the submission of names and additional identifying information from Member States for inclusion on the Consolidated List;

12. *Calls upon* the Committee, working in cooperation with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (the "Counter-Terrorism Committee" or "CTC") to inform the Council of specific additional steps that States could take to implement the measures outlined in paragraph 1 above;

13. *Reiterates* the need for ongoing close cooperation and exchange of information among the Committee, the CTC, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), as well as their respective groups of experts, including enhanced information sharing, coordinated visits to countries, technical assistance, and other issues of relevance to all three committees;

14. *Further reiterates* the importance of having the Committee follow up via oral and/or written communications with Member States regarding effective implementation of the sanctions measures and provide Member States with an opportunity, at the Committee's request, to send representatives to meet the Committee for more in-depth discussion of relevant issues;

15. *Requests* the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chairman and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution and resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003) and 1526 (2004);

16. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chairman, at least every 120 days to the Council on the overall work of the Committee and the Monitoring Team, and, as appropriate, in conjunction with the reports by the Chairmen of the CTC and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), including briefings for all interested Member States;

17. *Reminds* the Committee of its responsibilities as outlined in paragraph 14 of resolution 1455 (2003) and paragraph 13 of resolution 1526 (2004), and calls

upon the Committee to provide the Council no later than 31 July 2006 with an update of the written assessment referred to in paragraph 13 of resolution 1526 (2004) of actions taken by Member States to implement the measures described in paragraph 1 above;

18. *Requests* that the Committee continue its work on the Committee's guidelines, including on listing and delisting procedures, and implementation of resolution 1452 (2002) and requests the Chairman, in his periodic reports to the Council pursuant to paragraph 16 above, to provide progress reports on the Committee's work on these issues;

19. *Decides*, in order to assist the Committee in the fulfilment of its mandate, to extend the mandate of the New York-based Monitoring Team for a period of 17 months, under the direction of the Committee with the responsibilities outlined in annex I;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General, upon adoption of this resolution and acting in close consultation with the Committee, to appoint, consistent with United Nations rules and procedures, no more than eight members, including a coordinator, to the Monitoring Team, taking into account the areas of expertise referred to in paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004);

21. *Decides* to review the measures described in paragraph 1 above with a view to their possible further strengthening in 17 months, or sooner if necessary;

22. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I to resolution 1617 (2005)

In accordance with paragraph 19 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and shall have the following responsibilities:

(a) To collate, assess, monitor and report on and make recommendations regarding implementation of the measures, to pursue case studies, as appropriate; and to explore in depth any other relevant issues as directed by the Committee;

(b) To submit a comprehensive programme of work to the Committee for its approval and review, as necessary, in which the Monitoring Team should detail the activities envisaged in order to fulfil its responsibilities, including proposed travel, based on close coordination with the CTC's Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to avoid duplication and reinforce synergies;

(c) To submit, in writing, three comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, the first by 31 January 2006, the second by 31 July 2006, and the third by 10 December 2006, on implementation by States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation of the measures and possible new measures, as well as reporting on listing, de-listing, and exemptions pursuant to resolution 1452 (2003);

(d) To analyse reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1455 (2003), the checklists submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of this resolution, and other information submitted by Member States to the Committee as instructed by the Committee;

(e) To work closely and share information with the CTC's Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the 1540 Committee's group of experts to identify areas of convergence and to help facilitate concrete coordination among the three Committees;

(f) To develop a plan to assist the Committee with addressing non-compliance with the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution;

(g) To present to the Committee recommendations, which could be used by Member States to assist them with the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution and in preparing proposed additions to the Consolidated List;

(h) To consult with Member States in advance of travel to selected Member States, based on its programme of work as approved by the Committee;

(i) To encourage Member States to submit names and additional identifying information for inclusion on the Consolidated List, as instructed by the Committee;

(j) To study and report to the Committee on the changing nature of the threat of Al-Qaida and the Taliban and the best measures to confront it;

(k) To consult with Member States, including regular dialogue with representatives in New York and in capitals, taking into account comments from Member States, especially regarding any issues that might be contained in the Monitoring Team's reports referred to in paragraph (c) of this annex;

(l) To report to the Committee, on a regular basis or when the Committee so requests, through oral and/or written briefings on the work of the Monitoring Team, including its visits to Member States and its activities;

(m) To assist the Committee in preparing oral and written assessments to the Council, in particular the analytical summaries referred to in paragraphs 17 and 18 of this resolution;

(n) Any other responsibility identified by the Committee.

Annex II to resolution 1617 (2005)**1267 Committee Checklist**

Please provide to the United Nations 1267 (Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions) Committee by XXX date information on the following individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities added in the last six months to the Committee's Consolidated List of those subject to the sanctions described in Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) and successor resolutions.

This information is provided by the Government of _____ on XXX date.

- | | YES | NO |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----|----|
| 1. Mr. Doe (Number ____ on Consolidated List) | | |
| A. Name added to visa lookout list? | | |
| B. Any visas denied? | | |
| C. Financial institutions notified? | | |
| D. Any assets frozen? | | |
| E. Arms embargo ban implemented? | | |
| F. Any attempts to purchase arms? | | |
| Additional information, if available: | | |

- | | YES | NO |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----|----|
| 2. The Doe Corp. (Number ____ on Consolidated List) | | |
| A. Financial institutions notified? | | |
| B. Any assets frozen? | | |
| C. Arms embargo ban implemented? | | |
| D. Any attempts to purchase arms? | | |
| Additional information, if available: | | |

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