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
**Faculty of Political Science, Public Administration &
Diplomacy**

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND WORLD ORDER

M.A. Thesis

by

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Iran's Nuclear Program and World Order

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


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Abstract

Iran's Nuclear Program and World Order

by

Hanadi Kayrouz

Iran is a major power in the Middle East and does play a major role in the region. It is the center of Shiism. It exerts its influence either as a supporter of militias and 'terrorist group' such as "Hezbollah" in Lebanon, Palestinians and others. It had historical feud with Iraq especially under the Sunni President Saddam Hussein. Presently this unfriendly conflict could change with the formation of an Iraqi Shiite government. By contract, Iran's anti western stands are unchanged since the Khomeini revolution.

With its militant regime following the demise of the Shah, Iran aims at becoming a superpower at best in the region, a leader of militant Islam and a member of the nuclear club.

The major question in this research revolves around: why does Iran who claims to be a peaceful nation and has plenty of oil, need nuclear weapons? This thesis will focus on the nuclear energy and its importance on one hand, and the quest of Iran to acquire it for military purpose. The research is divided into six chapters:

The first chapter is an introduction that describes historical information about Iran. It covers the republic, the economy and the importance of oil, then the Khomeini revolution underlying all the changes that include the political regime and its implications on the different classes of the Iranian society.

Chapter two highlights the importance of Iran's role in the Middle East from a cultural, political and military point of view, focusing further on Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Israel.

The third chapter explains the importance of nuclear energy, its use and dangers. Also, it will outline the needs of nuclear energy by some countries for peaceful means by contrast to military ones. It will attempt to explain why countries insist on having nuclear weapons in spite of the threats they cause and the costs they have to incur. It centers on Iran's needs for WMD. It also describes the role of Iran in the Arab Israeli conflict, international terrorism and its effects regionally and internationally. It will focus on Iran as a leading Muslim country developing nuclear power in violation of international laws and treaties.

Chapter four will analyze the UN role in curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and impossible use of nuclear energy, international rules and regulations, as well as the reactions to violators by different countries such as the Europeans, the US, Russia, and China.

Last but not least, the conclusion summarizes and offers suggestions for future policies.

In undertaking this research I had to rely on both the qualitative, analytical method and the quantitative one to include books, articles in refereed journals, internet, newspapers and some interviews of university professors.

I used the MLA style.

Chapter 1

Introduction

A. Historical Overview

1. The Republic of Iran: Geopolitical Setup

According to available international statistics, the population of Iran is about 68.9 million inhabitants or 42 individuals per square kilometer, with 89% belonging to the Shiite sect while 10% are Sunni, and 1% to include Zoroastrian, Jews, Christians, Armenians, Assyrians, and finally Baha'i minorities. Tehran the capital is itself inhabited by twelve million people. The mortality range is 35 per 1,000 births, compared with 5 in Canada.

The major cause of death and health problems lies in the pollution in major cities, where for example in Tehran the yearly death toll exceeds 5,000 persons due to pollution alone. The average life expectancy in general is 70 years (Sherman, 3).

The Iranian population includes different ethnical minorities accounting to less than half the population, such as Turkish-speaking groups, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Baluchis, and other small groups.

As for literacy, it is about 76% (71% women, and 81% men). Most women can read and write and the majority has completed high school. Many also are professionals but none are in a position of political power (Sherman, 3).

Iran has important cities for Shiite religious education such as the holy city of Qom where students come from all over the Middle East for education and training (Iqbal, 1).

Iran, furthermore, enjoys a special geopolitical role. It has two strategic locations, on the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, two maritime routes, especially important for the movement of its oil (Iqbal, 1).

Under the Shahs' rule, Iran was a major military power. In 2002 the census showed that 11 million were fit for military service. Among them were 800,000 above 21 years of age. Already, in 2000, the government had spent more than \$ 9.7 billion on equipping its military (constituting about 3.1% of its total GDP) (Iqbal, 1).

The gross national income (GNI) per capita is \$1,710 as compared to Turkey's \$2,500 and Canada \$22,300. Its monetary unit is the rial. Its main exports revolve around: crude oil, carpets, fruit, and nuts, especially pistachio, being the world's number one producer. The US sanctions imposed against Iran in May 1995 brought a run on the Iranian rial whereby on the market a US dollar was exchanged against 7.000 rials. Today the Iranian economy faces different challenges, the most important of which are extensive state intervention, unprofitable and unproductive organizations controlled by religious groups, multi-tier exchange rates, capital control, price control and finally weak financial support. With oil export earnings reaching over 70% of national budget revenues, the Iranian economy has maintained its dependence on ascending international oil prices. Iran faces many difficulties such as Article 44 of its constitution that restricts capital growth, the bonyads (a religious group) having privileged access to foreign exchange and credits from the state and operating outside market disciplines of financial viability. They were initially created to take over organizations succumbing to bankruptcy after the fall of the Shah, with their owners exiled abroad (Toksoz, 208-209).

2. Economics: Annual Imports

During the first 5-year plan (1989-1994) the liberalization policy ended as the rapid growth of imports and the short-term external debt could no longer be financed because oil prices fell to a lower level (Toksoz, 208-209). Consequently, liberalizing trade and unifying the exchange rate combined with the liberalization of price controls failed when last tried in 1993. Another plan to unify exchange rates for the year 2002 was conceived but became difficult to implement as oil prices then reached in 1999-2000 high peaks (Toksoz, 208-211).

Annual Imports:

Official Iranian Information shows that:

The annual imports from 1986 to 1987 amounted to \$ 163 million (18% of Iran's non oil exports). While the annual imports in 1992 to 1993: amounted \$ 400 million. Iran bought

US goods through the UAE instead of going directly to the USA, since it lacked friendly relationship (Askari, 7). Total value of Iran's annual imports stood at some \$ 35 billion, a member of Majlis Planning and Budget Commission said on December 4, 2005 ("Iran Annual", 1).

As for Iran's labor force, the women employment, on the social and labor market levels, showed that the female labor in relation to the total employment in Iran peaked in the mid-1970's reaching just fewer than 20%, to fall back in the 1980s to 8%. This decrease was prompted by the Islamic Revolution and Iranian Islam's definition of the women's role as childbearing, reproduction and family matters. It followed that the outlawing of birth control led to a baby boom in the early 1980s. A slight increase in the employment of women took place in the mid-1990, when it reached 12% of total employment. Several forms of gender segregation were also taking place in different domains especially medical services. Iran's employment of women is estimated at one third when compared to different Islamic middle-income countries such as Malaysia and Turkey (Toksoz, 208-211).

In the banking domain, Iranian and European Banks and companies signed a major \$ 600 million agreement in Brussels for the construction of a steel plant in Bandar Abbas on March 14th 2005 according to IRNA. Deputy Minister of Mines and Industries and Chairman of the Iranian Mines and Mining Industries Development and Renovation Organization (IMIDRO) Mostafa Moazenzadeh described the project as a very important step that will increase the steel production in Iran by 1.5 million tons per annum. Moazenzadeh claimed that 50% of the project was foreign financed and 50% Iranian. He confirmed that an Italian insurance firm and a German insurance group Hermes are supporting the project. The Fortis Bank has also arranged with two Western banks, the German KFW and the Italian MCC (Mediocredito Centrale), an amount of 320 million dollars loan for the financing of the steel production ("Hormuzgan", 1).

Here is a table of some economic values (Table 1):

| <u>Data</u> | <u>Value Numeric</u> | <u>Year</u> |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| Population | 68,017,860 | July 2005 est. |
| GDP (purchasing power parity) | \$551.6 billion | 2005 est. |

| | | |
|---|-----------------|-----------|
| GDP (official exchange rate) | \$182.5 billion | 2005 est. |
| GDP - real growth rate | 4.8% | 2005 est. |
| GDP - per capita (purchasing power parity) | \$8,100 | 2005 est. |
| GDP - composition by sector: | | 2005 est. |
| <i>agriculture:</i> | 11.8% | |
| <i>industry:</i> | 43.3% | |
| <i>services:</i> | 44.9% | |
| Labor force (shortage of skilled labor) | 23.68 million | 2005 est. |
| Labor force - by occupation: | | |
| Agriculture | 30% | |
| industry | 25% | 2001 est. |
| services | 45% | |

("Iran". CIA-The World Fact Book. January 10, 2006. 16 February, 2006)

3. Oil: Reserves and Supplies

Rather than prepare the public to accept a backing away from nuclear technology, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of the Expediency Council the driving force behind the nuclear program since the late 1980s, fueled nationalist resistance. He proclaimed that Iran was willing to apply unprecedented monitoring and control on its nuclear activities, but the United States rejected this because Washington truly aimed to stop Iran from becoming a developed country. Oil will run out soon, he argued, and countries like Iran will need nuclear technology in order to continue their development. Washington's attempt to deny this is a form payback for its dependence on Persian Gulf oil (Perkovich, 1).

Iran is an oil producing state, a member of OPEC. It is ranked as the 2nd or 3rd largest producer among all other members of the organization causing it to be self-sufficient in oil. The decision-making in the petroleum sector is presently largely supervised by President Ahmadinajad as before by former president Khatemi ("Iran-Part 4", 1). Decision-makers seek to bring reliable foreign and national firms into this sector, especially those with abundant capital and advanced technology. Like every aspect of Iranian socio-economic and political life, the oil sector is controlled by religious

principles. The traditionalists, under Khamenei, favor a free market under Iranian control but unfriendly to the West; while the reformers under Khatami opt for closer ties to the West, while remaining in favor of state control over major different economic sectors (“Iran-Part 4”, 1).

Khatami inherited a council in his fifth presidency term, beginning 1997, combining technocrats and traditionalists. He was practically the highest decision-maker in the petroleum sector as head of the Supreme Economic Council, the SEC, with Bijan Namdar Zanganeh as minister of oil since 1997. The main Iranian oil companies are the National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), the National Iranian Gas Co. (NIGC), the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Co. (NIORDC), and the National Petrochemical Co. (NPC) (“Iran-Part 4”, 2).

Each one of these companies is headed by a director called a deputy oil minister. Zanganeh’s most immediate objectives are to secure an OPEC agreement to cut oil production quotas, to protect oil prices especially that Iraq is now in the market which could cause a possible fall in pricing below \$25/b; especially if Iraqi oil exports exceed 2m b/d, and if the production quotas are not reduced. It is ironic that oil prices today have reached the \$70/b level. With US companies in the lead, Iraq’s oil production capacity may rise to exceed 3m b/d in few years hopefully influencing the oil price stabilization. However, being a member of OPEC Iraq is expected to abide by the production quota (“Iran-Part 4”, 2-3). That would give oil production and prices more stability.

Furthermore, since Iran borders countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, both having the largest oil reserves in addition to the Gulf States, it has been seeking to formulate a common policy on oil production and prices. According to Xinhua the Chinese News Agency, on March 8, 2005, Iran discovered two new oil and gas fields in the South. One in Khuzestan that is estimated to have 5.7 billion barrels of oil and, 242 billion cubic meters of gas; while the other in South Pars estimated at a capacity of 168 billion cubic meters of gas and 183 million barrels of gas condensate. Iran was previously considered to be in the second global place, regarding oil reserves, having 133 billion barrels of oil and 26,800 billion cubic meters of gas in reserves.

With 133 thousand million barrels in reserve, Iran stands as the third largest after Saudi Arabia and Iraq. It produces 4081 thousand barrel per day while it consumes 1551

thousand barrels per day. Its refining capacity is 1624 thousand barrel per day, and its revenues from oil are estimated at \$130 billion per year.

Here are some values of oil variances (Table 2):

| <u>Data</u> | <u>Numeric Value</u> | <u>Year</u> |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| Oil production | 3.979 million bbl/day | 2005 est. |
| Oil consumption | 1.425 million bbl/day | 2003 est. |
| Oil exports | 2.5 million bbl/day | 2004 est. |
| Oil imports | NA | 2001 |
| Oil proved reserves | 133.3 billion bbl | 2005 est. |
| Natural gas - production: | 79 billion cu m | 2003 est. |
| Natural gas - consumption: | 72.4 billion cu m | 2003 est. |
| Natural gas - exports: | 3.4 billion cu m | 2003 est. |
| Natural gas - imports: | 4.92 billion cu m | 2003 est. |

("Iran". CIA-The World Fact Book. January 10, 2006. 16 February, 2006)

B. The Khomeini Revolution and Aftermath

1. The New Political Regime

After 1979, the rule of clerics in national affairs was enforced by the establishment of the Council of Guardians, under the supreme leader who, in his turn, is responsible for the control of the armed forces, the judiciary branch, and the Revolutionary Guards. He is also empowered to annul any elections' results if he deems it necessary. The Council of Guardians can also review the eligibility of candidates for public office and also supervise the conformity of parliamentary legislations with religious beliefs. Institutions such as the presidency, the parliament, and the local councils were to be chosen by the public following the Shari'a guidance and rules. Although the clerics' power was unlimited, it had to balance between the divine law and the popular demand to survive and remain in power. With the ascendancy to power by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in 1979, the difference of opinion between the clergy and the peoples was scarcely

noticeable. The clergy supported him as well and popular elections gave him full legitimacy. Despite this fact, Khomeini's policies for democratic reforms were none as he rejected both dissent and legalized basic human freedom (Takeyh, 3). By the end of the 1980s two major events, that had taken place by the end of the long eight years war with Iraq and the death of Khomeini, led to public demand for more freedom following a long period of oppression. The rise of new reformist movements in universities and the street called for a new wave of reform, characterized by the coming of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to power. This decade witnessed the participation by students in debating political issues and publicly the rise of the new thinker, Abdol Karim Soroush, who proclaimed that the rigid Islamic regime created a new generation opposed to both the regime and fundamentalist Islam. He argued that the regime and religion should both evolve and adhere to modernity. He further declared that religious interpretation made by imperfect men was not "sacred and therefore can be criticized, modified, and redefined" (Takeyh, 4-5).

He perceived a political system whereby pluralistic secular views could harmonize with religious dogmas. He believed that to be a true Muslim man has to be democratic at the same time. Consequently, he suffered persecution as his lectures were disrupted by his enemies and his journal *Kian* was forbidden.

The larger generation following the 1979 Revolution clearly followed its taught religious belief that the regime would be legitimate only when its sole source of power was God and the Sharia'a. While a minority proclaimed that the source and legitimacy of political power was the public who is to be served and cared for its welfare. In this controversial stand between both groups Hojjat-al-islam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami was elected to the presidency in 1997.

He was the minister of culture who broke away with the Rafsanjani administration because it did grant readily licenses for publications and plays defying the fanatic regime. Khatami won the presidential election with 69% of the votes based on his proclamation that: "State authority cannot be attained through coercion and dictatorship. Rather it is to be realized through governing according to the law, respecting the rights of the people and empowering them to participate while ensuring their involvement in decision-making" (Takeyh, 7).

With his coming to power the accountability of the state institutions and public servants became possible. The Khatami rule was not easy; it faced many adversaries. Reform strategies were called for under “pressure from the peoples and rejections from the top (fundamentalist elite)”. The president was very careful and avoided direct clashes with the conservatives. He answered to pressure from street, by licensing publications, loosening censorship, and issuing permits for peoples’ gatherings while he had to appease and please the conservative and fundamentalist clerics (Takeyh, 8).

His main reforms focused on:

- Expanding of institutional power base, and independence;
- Taking full advantage of the opportunities accorded by provisions of limited democracy under the Islamic constitution to bring political competition into the public arena;
- strengthening the reformers cause by establishing new media outlets;
- Creating political parties, notably the Islamic Participation Front.

These strategies did produce some limited results, while broadening the democratic participation practice, leading to

- The elections in 1998 for the constitutionally permitted local councils which were held for the first time since the Khomeini revolution;
- The parliamentary elections in 2000, during which the reformers captured 189 out of 290 seats;
- The capitalization on institutional gains by developing diverse political parties aiming at mobilizing different mass constituencies;
- The reaffirmation of the Parliament’s prerogative to examine organizations by laws and practices under the Supreme Leader’s jurisdiction. Institutions such as the Ministry of Intelligence, the state broadcasting authority, the semi-governmental economic foundations, and even the armed forces were for the first time subjected to parliamentary scrutiny;
- In foreign policy, an open door policy toward the West and in particular the United States was reviewed promising some forms of rapprochement (Takeyh, 9).

Nevertheless the Khatami's strategy of increased reform was too shy and short of meeting the local and international expectations, consequently it failed to lead to the desired democratic evolution. When the Khatami's team started breaking the ice wall erected by the old regime, they were confronted with the hard-liners (the conservatives) who reacted by resorting to selective use of violence intimidating and creating division among Iranians. The judiciary mainly clergy members was used along with the Council of Guardians, to block genuine reforms. Through the sarcastic use of their institutional powers, the conservatives closed down hundreds of publications, imprisoned many reformist intellectuals, journalists and officials, and brutally broke up peaceful student gatherings and demonstrations.

Among the new elite reformist faces were the brother of the president, Mohammad Reza Khatami, the cleric Mohsen Khadivar, and students' leaders Ali Afshari and Akhbar Mohammadi. They rejected the strategy of totalitarian rule whether divine or secular and chose the policies of positive and civilized confrontation. The youth demanded radical changes in every aspect of their lives beginning with the dress to job opportunities and even moral codes. A small minority of the educated and skilled labor force entered the job market each year, while half remained jobless. The use of the internet played a major role to include more reformists in the society.

To avoid direct confrontation, the reformists opted to change their strategies. They tried to force the conservatives to change their views. Many conservatives became aware that their retention of power was based solely and in the long run on public approval. They were willing to work for more youth integration in politics and for the well-being of the state. Any rebellion attempt in favor of the hard-liners was doomed then because the Revolutionary Guards themselves had voted for President Khatami. Many conservatives felt that if they want to remain in their posts, they should adjust and evolve in their thinking and actions. In recent days, we see a new category of the moderate conservatives who warned that "the failure to find effective solutions to the socio-economic and political problems of the people would have grave and tragic consequences, which have been so far accumulating like a devastating flood behind the dam and would threaten the country and the life of the nation at any moment" (Takeyh, 14). These new pragmatists

insisted upon important radical changes in the political and economic system at all levels. The educated elite thought to engage young free and educated Iranians as they condemned the traditionalist segment of Iran's conservatives, referred to as the bazaar, for its economic backward views and narrow visions.

The moderate conservatives tried to bring about some initial and basic reforms, but the supreme divinely totalitarian leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had the authority to invalidate any elections results, appoint the heads of the security services, the leaders of the armed forces, the directors of the state media, and the judiciary members. He could also use the veto power over any parliamentary legislation. Khamenei addressed the moderate conservatives to have them follow his righteous path with his argument stating: "the main characteristic of a new thought is its ability to regenerate itself to bring itself up-to-date with changing needs and circumstances, and provide political and social solutions for a contemporary society" (Takeyh, 16). The key factor remained as the total obedience to the absolute divine laws as interpreted and declared by the supreme religious leader meaning himself.

The days where some collaboration on the part of a few conservatives were possible in the field of judicial and economic reforms seem unreachable like a dream. Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani in their article on February 23, 2004 in the Wall Street Journal, interestingly compared Iran's case to that of Poland in 1981 before the fall of the Soviet Union. Interesting points were outlined as common, such as both having an organized society, hostile to the regime, pro-democratic and pro-American. While the Iranian leaders like their Polish counterparts twenty years ago, had no legitimacy, are corrupt and ready to use any means to stay in power, the main difference remained in the US support and attitude towards the Polish people in contrast to their indifference and inability to support the minorities in Iran. The pro-democracy group in Iran argues that the US is not benefiting from its positive approach to the regime in Iran to reach short-time goals as fighting terrorists and stopping the production of weapons of mass destruction. They believe they should have a strategic role supported by the U.S. just like what happened in Poland twenty years ago, when the US backed up the revolution helping to end the cold war (McFaul, 1).

2. The Students' Role and Participation

The date of July 9th is designated to commemorate the protesting students massacred in 1999. In 2003, protesters in the streets chanted slogans against the clerics' power and against President Khatami, who seemed to be out of reach, and ignoring the calls of the streets to initiate changes in his policies. On July 10th of that year, the Iranian satellite TV broadcasted from Los Angeles, speeches by Iranian leaders in exile such as Shahram Homayoun, encouraging such freedom movements to rise and act free (Timmerman, 23). Unfortunately, the results ended with a bleeding confrontation, assaults by national guards, murders and torture of young demonstrators whose crime was: "wanting to be free". A poll conducted by the Expediency Council, headed by Rafsanjani, in 2003 showed that:

- 45% of Iranians wanted changes in the regime even if that required foreign intervention;
- 26% wanted managerial change, such as improvement of performance and efficiency by public officials and institutions;
- 13% supported the current regime by the clerics based on the absolutist principle of divine power.

Analysts felt that the first two percentages were underestimated. Some claim that 90% of Iranians today want changes (Timmerman, 26).

This desire for change was the major reason for the election of a man from the people Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a president who would combat corruption, modernize his country and push for real and effective reforms on all levels.

3. Human Rights and Freedoms

In Iran, religion is the supreme law in people's private lives. Police often, in the name of God conspire against dissidents and falsely accuse them, violating Article 37 of the Iranian Constitution which calls for the presumption of innocence of the accused till proven guilty. Laws cannot contradict the Shari'a, therefore most international recognized human rights laws are not accepted in Iranian policies, consequently the

regime uses two means to keep an eye and control on the public violating its signing and adoption of the UN Charter's articles on human rights.

- Legalized inquisition of any public or private individual or group who profess or call for reform outside the literal and verbal teaching of Sharia'a;
- The obligation and strict application of the rule to enjoin good and forbid evil as stated in the Qur'an with no clarification of what constitutes good and evil in the clerics' views (Kar, 829).

Ironically, the inquisition was used by Christian fanatics during the dark Middle Ages. Iran legalized inquisition driving itself into the darkest ages of human-religious totalitarianism. If you are an Iranian and you want to register a political party or cultural organization or obtain a license to publish a newspaper, you must submit to an inquisition court (inquiry on one's private convictions and practices). The authorities will inquire about your past, your family affiliations, your beliefs, how much of a devout you are, etc. If you are running for office and there is evidence that you are not accepted by the *velayat-e faqih* (rule by the clergy), you are automatically rejected and considered as evil. Those who are suspected of evil because of their lack of fidelity to the clerics' teachings are called 'infidels' and they are constantly spied on in their phone lines and in their own private lives.

As for the religious minorities such as Christians, Jews, or Zoroastrians, they are denied freedom to publicly practice their own religion. If a Muslim however opts to convert to a different religion, he/she is put to death. The executioners are innocent of any crime and will be well rewarded by Allah as His faithful servants. The Bahais for example are constantly watched and if they are ever killed they are denied their own natural right to justice. Article 226 of the constitution describes them as "ought to die" (*mahdour al ahdam*) (Kar, 829).

The second means is "the obligation to enjoin good and forbid evil". The Islamic Shari'a is sacred. It has full control over people's lives from birth to schooling to marriage, to drinking alcohol, to holding parties and the right to assemble (article 8). All these rights are subject to 'the obligation to enjoin good and forbid evil'. The punishment of women, who refuse to wear the 'hijab' for example, is either imprisonment or a fine (article 638). The father of the bride has to give approval for a wedding to be legal. If he does not it is

null (article 1143). A man can marry as many as four wives (article 942), which shows the highest privileges and superiority granted to men over women. An Iranian woman wanting to marry a Muslim foreigner has to secure beforehand a permit from the government (article 1060).

Even sexuality is controlled by the government (article 1106). A woman has to satisfy her Husband's sexual needs; otherwise she is punished (article 1108). Her own psychological and sexual needs are never taken into consideration. She is simply the slave. Sexual relations outside marriage are a crime (article 88). A non-Muslim having relations with a Muslim woman is put to death and if the woman happens to marry a non-Muslim she will be stoned. Homosexuality and lesbianism are punished heavily by lashing and repetition can lead to the death penalty (Kar, 829).

4. Elections and Representation

Recently, the Guardian's Council disqualified 2,000 reformist candidates during February 2005 from parliamentary elections. Khatami and Khomeini reacted negatively on this issue, claiming that such discrimination is unfair. These procedures were implemented before the presidential elections on June 2005. Although Khatami was banned from running for election for a third term, he did nevertheless try to protect the reformists against unjust policies and practices.

A major national issue, that played also a role in the last elections, was Iran's nuclear program that was used to enflame the people's emotion and divert their attention from local-economic, social and political reform.

According to George Perkovich, if you want to experience nationalism wrapped in nuclear power, this is the place. Officials, professors, and taxi drivers all would tell a visitor that Iran does not want "the bomb", but only "nuclear technology" or "the fuel cycle" – needed to run power reactors. Indeed, nuclear weapons would make Iran vulnerable and isolated, insist officials and regime opponents alike. Iranians want nuclear technology to show the world that their nation is advanced, fully developed, and strong – that Shiite Iran is the greatest society in Southwest Asia. Enriching uranium and

generating electricity within the rules of the international nonproliferation system satisfies these objectives better than bombs (Perkovich, p.1)

Chapter 2

Iran's Role in the Middle East Region

A. Cultural-Religious Role

Iran has experienced throughout the Centuries a very important cultural experience influenced with its entourage, the Mediterranean for on part, and the Indo-China world on the other. The outcome was a rich mixture of coexistence between cultures and civilizations. It is useful to find out how this mixture of civilizations contributed to the development of Iran offering a precious wealth from the days of Persia to the Byzantine and Islamic period.

Iran is the only powerful non Arab Shi'i Islamist state in a sea of Arab-mostly Muslim Sunni, with Shiite minorities in the Gulf States, Syria and Lebanon and a majority in Iraq. The Shiites make 27% of overall Muslims in the world. Iran's laws, administrating economic and social policies as well as foreign policy are subject to an ideology based on religious principles. Its national and international objectives can be summarized as follows:

- Protection of Shiites co-religionists whenever they might be when abused and help the Shiites minorities in the countries where they live to grow and even take control whenever possible;
- Destruction of the State of Israel. Iran's hard-liners (the extremists) depict themselves as the merciless enemies of the "Zionist" state in Palestine. This frantically expressed Iranian hatred toward Israel is a tool for achieving political and economic control over the Arab radical groups and states such as Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. Its aims revolve around establishing a Shiite security belt stretching from Iran via Iraq, Syria to Lebanon. In actuality Iran's involvement in Lebanon has been viewed by many as a new form of hegemony over that country through Hezbollah and the Amal parties;

- Hatred and enmity towards America refusing any normalization of relations. Since the Iranian revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian regime replunged the country into the Seventh Century laws, regulations and taboos, under the simplistic claim of serving Allah and fighting the infidels who in Iran's view are led by the United States. The failing conservative and fanatic leadership had to create a foreign enemy to blame for Iran's failure to democratize its society and care for the welfare of its peoples through development and modernization. The U.S. is the perfect first choice to be blamed followed by Europe and Israel (Nass, 41).

The Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 was the result of popular support following the Khomeini revolution success. The newly established Islamic republic expanded supported by the Soviet-backed Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

Ayatollah Khomeini in turn reinstated Iran's independence in its foreign affairs by adopting verbally the stand of "neither East nor West" (Ehteshami, 183).

On June 3, 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini died, succeeded in the same year, by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani who publicly announced his new cabinet avoiding the inclusion of fundamental extremists known for their involvement in the 1979 holding of the 444 American hostages and for the creation and support of Hezbollah (Timmerman, 71).

B. Political-Ideological Role

1. The Structure of the Iranian Government

Iran, as well as most Islamic countries, calls for the reestablishment of Islamic governments based solely and strictly on the Shari'a teachings.

According to Imam Khomeini, a body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor. For this reason, God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the *shari'a*), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institutions (Khomeini, 18).

The scope of the Islamic government as proposed by Khomeini opens up before the Muslim people the real path of Islamic ideological struggle with non-Muslim cultures, and gives greater intensity to the struggle of devout militant and committed Muslims both within the country and abroad. Iran cleansed itself from the dust and impurities that accumulated during the Shah's rule by foreign Western ideological influences, returning to authentic intellectual Islamic doctrines and international living norms. Its missions and duties are to establish an ideal and model society on the basis of Islamic laws and traditions. The result of such policies lies in the realization of the holy government upon earth (in accordance with the Qur'an verse "*And we wish to show favor to those who have been oppressed upon earth, and to make them leaders and the inheritors*" [28:5]) ("Iran-Constitution", 1995). The Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine law over men (Khomeini, 29).

Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed that: "in Islam, government has the sense of adherence to law that alone rules over society. Even the limited powers given to the Most Noble Messenger (Mohammad) and to those exercising rule after him have been conferred upon them by God. Whenever the Prophet explained a certain matter or issue a certain order, he did so in obedience to divine law, a law that everyone without exception must obey and follow. Divine law in turn, will obtain peace and happiness both for the leader and the faithfuls; consequently, the sole law that is valid and imperative to be applied is the law of God. Popular obedience to the Prophet (s) is divinely decreed by God as He ordered: "...and obey the Messenger" (The Holy Qur'an, 4:59). Obedience to those entrusted with authority is also based on and a part of the divine decree: "...and obey the holders of authority from among you" according to the Qur'an verses 4:59. As for individual opinion, even if it be that of the Prophet (s) himself, it cannot supercede in matters of divine law. All humans are subjects to the will of God" (Khomeini, 30). In his book Khomeini insisted upon the necessity for establishing Islamic governments, on the following basis:

- Divine precepts are to be enforced perpetually; God enacted them not only for the time of the Holy Prophet but for all times and conditions. They are not subject to modification or unorthodox interpretations for they are perfect and eternal.

- The nature and characteristic of Islamic laws and regulations like fiscal, national defense, legal and penal precepts are such that they are not executable without a government (Khomeini, 5).

The following is an example of the traditions relating to the Imams, quoted from Khomeini by Imam Rida in support of the forming of a government endowed with divine authority Machiavellian style

“A further reason is this: were God not to appoint over men a solicitous, trustworthy, protecting, reliable leader, the community would decline, religion would depart, and the norms and ordinances that have been revealed would undergo change. Innovators (moderates) would increase and deniers would erode religion, inducing doubt in the Muslims. For we see that men are needy and defective, judging by their differences of opinion and inclination and their diversity of state. Were a trustee, then, not appointed to preserve what has been revealed through the Prophet (s), corruption would ensue in the manner we have described. Revealed laws, norms, ordinances, and faith would be altogether changed, and therein would lie the corruption of all mankind” (Khomeini, 25-26).

In 1989, the Expediency Council (EC) was created to resolve inter agency disputes. The Expediency Discernment Council of the System (EDCS) is an establishment in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran. Its purpose is to resolve differences or conflicts between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians, and also to serve as a consultative council to the Supreme Leader (“Expediency”, 1).

The functions of the EDCS focus on:

- Making decisions in cases where the ratifications of the Islamic Consultative Assembly are not confirmed by the Council of Guardians, and where the deputies insist on the implementation of the ratifications.
- Providing consultation in those matters referred thereto by the Leader himself.
- Selecting a faqih (clerical Islamic jurist) and a member of the Council of Guardians of the Constitution to act as a member of the Leadership Council, in accordance with Article 111 of the Constitution (“Military”, 2).

The presidency provides the most efficient vehicle for debate, supported as it is by the powerful National Security Council. But in the policy discussions and process, the views

of the Majlis, the Council of Guardians, and the Expediency Council (EC) are taken into consideration (Ehteshami, 181).

The EC exercises power over both domestic and foreign policy matters. As a result, the Iranian political elite is divided and factionalized, since factionalism affects every aspect of Iran's public and foreign policy.

There are three important elements in the Government, according to the Iranian Constitution approved by Ayatollah Khomeini

- The judiciary is of vital importance in the context of safeguarding the rights of the people in accordance with the principles followed by the Islamic movement, for the prevention of deviations within the Islamic nation. The Leader shall appoint a just and honorable man, well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing wisdom and administrative abilities as the head of the judiciary power for a period of five years. He shall be the highest judicial authority (Article 157). His duties include:
 - Establishing of the necessary structure to serve justice while corresponding to the provisions and spirit of under Article 156.
 - Drafting judiciary laws appropriate for the preservation of the Islamic Republic.
 - Employing fair and worthy judges, subject to the dismissal, appointment, transfer, assignment to particular duties, promotions, and carrying out similar administrative duties, in accordance with the law.
- The executive power and main responsibility must focus on the creation of an Islamic society.
- As for the Guardian Council it is to be formed from:
 - 1- Six religious men, conscious and fully aware of the present national needs and issues of the day, to be selected by the Leader; and
 - 2 - Six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power (Article 91 of the Constitution).All in all, the clerics are in full control of the citizens' lives and welfare
- The Nation's Exigency Council shall meet at any time the Guardian Council judges call for to review a proposed bill by the Islamic Consultative Assembly

when it conflicts with the principles of Shari'a or the Constitution (Article 112) ("Iran-Constitution", 1995).

This branch of government includes also the Council of Ministers:

The Ministers are appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. The number of Ministers and the jurisdiction of each will be determined by law, according to Article 133 and 134 of the Constitution.

The President is the head of the Council of Ministers. He supervises the work of the Ministers and takes all necessary measures to coordinate decisions by the government. With the cooperation of the Ministers, he determines the program and policies of the government and implements the laws.

In the case of differences or interferences in the constitutional duties of the government agencies, the decision of the Council of Ministers at the request of the President shall be binding provided it does not call for an interpretation of or modification in the laws considered divine and not subject to changes or questions.

In turn, the President is responsible to the Assembly for the actions of the Council of Ministers ("Iran-Constitution", 1995).

Each of the Ministers is responsible in his duties to both the President and the Assembly, but in matters approved by the Council of Ministers as a whole, he is also responsible for the actions of the others applying the principle of collective responsibility (Article 137). The Iranian Constitution left no room for any political opposition under a democratic process based on human rights. For example, the issue of restoring relations with the US was vital for the reformists, while the conservatives viewed the US as the "great Satan" and accused any pro-American of high national treason to Islam and the state. The elected new President must take the following oath and affix his signature to it at a session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, in the presence of the head of the judicial power and the members of the Guardian Council:

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, I, as President, swear, in the presence of the noble members of parliament and the people of Iran, by God, the Exalted and Almighty, that I will guard the official religion of the country, the order of the Islamic Republic, and the Constitution of the country; that I will devote all my capacities and abilities to the fulfillment of the responsibilities that I have assumed... I will guard, as a pious and selfless trustee, the authority

vested in me by the people as a sacred trust, and transfer it to whomever the people may elect after me (Article 121) (“Iran-Constitution”, 1995).

According to Khomeini, since the Islamic government is a government of law, knowledge of the Islamic law Sharia’a is necessary and imperative for the ruler, as has been laid down in tradition. Indeed such knowledge is necessary not only for the ruler, but also for anyone holding a public post or exercising some governmental function. For him, the sole matters relevant to rule are those that were mentioned and discussed in the time of the Most Noble Messenger Mohammad, and the Imams, and were, as a result, unanimously accepted by the Muslims. They include:

- The knowledge of the ruler or caliph, of the provisions and ordinances of Islam, and
- The sense of justice, meaning a deep stand in Islamic beliefs and morals (Khomeini, 31-32).

The President may have deputies assisting him in the performance of his constitutional duties. With his approval, the first deputy shall be vested with the responsibilities of administering the affairs of the Council of Ministers and coordinating the functions of other deputies according to Article 124 (“Iran-Constitution”, 1995).

In an interview with Lally Weymouth, the elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinajad, insisted that, even though he is a conservative, he is young and he likes reforms (Ahmadinajad, 45). He did not specify or clarify the type of such reforms.

According to Khomeini’s teachings, the view of the Shi’ah concerning government and the nature of the persons who should assume rule was clear from the time following the death of the Prophet down to the beginning of the Occultation (the absence of the 12th Imam or an individual deputy named by him). It is specified that the ruler should be foremost knowledgeable of the laws and ordinances of Islam, and just in their implementation (Khomeini, 33).

In its present conservative, possibly fanatic system of government Iran does in one form or another affect the entire Middle Eastern region pushing the Sunni leadership in the same direction toward fundamentalism and instability. This trend could be interrupted should a religious war erupts between Shiites and Sunnis.

2. Iran's Relations with its Arab Neighbors

A regional dialogue is warranted and must include and address the full range of regional security. Iran fears Turkey, a pro-Western Muslim Sunni state. It fears Pakistan, a Sunni nuclear state that dislikes the majority Shiite of Iran. It also has Arab countries it tries to control and compete with such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf States. Iran with its diplomacy, intelligence and religion, plus its terrorist contacts throughout the region, has a lot of potentialities. It is involved in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Lebanon. It is fully aware and capable of turning the whole Middle East into a ball of fire.

a- Relations with Afghanistan and Tajikistan

Having problems with Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban government and the subsequent fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, Tehran felt cornered and threatened along its borders. During the dark years of the Taliban rule, Iran supported the Northern Alliance which was the military spearhead of the anti-Taliban campaign. A weak Afghanistan had a direct bearing on Iran's relations with Central Asia as well and in particular with its poorest and only Persian-speaking neighboring country, Tajikistan.

b- Iran's and Israel

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at Israel's nuclear installation near Dimona, shocked the world with his claims that Israel had stockpiled 200 nuclear warheads (Edwards, 8). Iran embarked, subsequently, to develop its own nuclear program and weapons. The Pro-Israeli activists pressured the U.S. to make the Iran regime-give up its nuclear program priority policy, through diplomatic means. Others called for an international military intervention. The hawks favored an air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities for complete destruction. It is reported that some Israelis are encouraging destabilization among Kurdish regions in Iran and are training some in the deserted areas of Kurdistan to collect intelligence information on Iran's nuclear facilities (Rozen, 25).

Iran's position raised the question of UN inspection of Israeli weapons for equal treatment and as a precondition for any future negotiations. "Tehran does not want to give up its nuclear arsenal unless the Middle East is declared a free zone of mass destruction weapons", claim Iranian leaders. The prospect that Israel would alter its policy of maintaining its nuclear program is null. Resolving the Israeli nuclear arsenal is not best solved by arming other countries. The Israelis feel secure by maintaining nuclear arms to protect them against what they consider an imminent threat to their existence from existing Syrian chemical weapons, possible Iranian nuclear arms, and potential nuclear weapons programs in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Israeli Intelligence fears that Iran, taking advantage of the increase in the uncontrolled and high oil price, is threatening the security of Israel, and it claims that Iran's oil revenues are estimated at \$130 billions per year. Part of that money is spent on developing its nuclear program (Shehadeh, 1). Furthermore, the present regime in Iran did not hesitate in widening this rift of mistrust by adopting a clear, hostile and violent policy defying all norms of ethics and diplomacy. It refuses to recognize the state of Israel. "We will never negotiate with that state," said the new president Mahmoud Ahmadinajad (Ahmadinajad, 45). In fact, he even made very alarming statements that "Iran wants to wipe Israel from the world map" and that the "Holocaust in Europe was a myth": He shocked the entire world and openly unveiled his aggressive and belligerent character and behavior. The US, pushed in part by concerns for Israel's security and also for prevention of international economic and military catastrophe, keeps urging the free world to adopt more aggressive action towards Iran's nuclear program (Dickey, 36).

The fact that Iranians could acquire a nuclear bomb is so worrisome for Israel that it does not rule out a preventive Israeli military strike. Such an option today would be presently more difficult to put into effect than the one directed in 1981 against the Osirak facility in Iraq. Diplomatic efforts could gain pace should the Israelis commit to a scheduled of total disarmament of the region (Kaye, 4).

The Israelis, after developing in secret their own nuclear weapons, feel sure to know what the Iranians are up to. An Israeli official in Jerusalem declared: "Israel is convinced that Iran uses three separate sources for developing nukes:

- A camouflaged civilian program.

- A military program based on the civilian one.
- Last, a separate military program” (Dickey, 36).

According to Khomeini’s teachings, he blames the Western “imperialists” powers for Iran’s poverty. “Through the political agents”, he declared, “they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed”. He further added that the scholars of Islam (ulamas) have a duty to struggle against all attempts by the oppressors to establish a monopoly over Iran’s sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while the West robs and seizes the sources of wealth and lives in wealth. As Commander of the Faithful he declared:

“I have accepted the task of government because God, Exalted and Almighty, has exacted from the scholars of Islam a pledge not to sit silent and idle in the face of gluttony and plundering by the oppressors, on the one hand, and the hunger and deprivation of the oppressed, on the other” (Khomeini, 24-25).

In Islam, the economy is a means, and all that is required of it as a means is that it should be an efficient factor contributing to the attainment of the ultimate goal. From this viewpoint, the economic program of Islam consists of providing the means needed for the emergence of the various creative potentials of the human being (“Iran-Constitution”, 1995).

Furthermore, since the establishment of a government and the administration of society necessitate, in turn, a budget and some taxation, the sacred legislator Khomeini has specified the nature of the budget and the taxes that are to be levied, such as *kharaj*, *khums*, *zakat*, and so forth (Khomeini, 33).

c- The on-Going International Sanctions over Iran

Countries rich in oil are less than others endangered and affected by sanctions. Iran is located on top of the world’s second largest oil reserves in a sea of world oil riches.

The most palpable sanctions proved so far to be ineffective, although direct trade between the U.S. and Iran has dropped lately. But, that foreign direct investment (FDI) looks like having little impact in the future because of the expansion of the world trade organization

(WTO) causing a decrease in the impact of sanctions on most countries. Sanctions may be seen as a means to compel countries to comply with international policies and rules. Sanctions are also intended to help resolve conflicts without going to war and causing loss of lives and material. The question lies in understanding the reasons why countries refuse cooperation and provoke sanctions' implementation against them? The UN Security Council lists basic criterion to determine such punitive actions revolving around the case of Iran:

- Iran's abuse of human rights by its totalitarian regimes. The record of Iran is full of such violations, many journalists, scientists, public officials, students and women have been jailed for years because they spoke against the government.
- Its development of nuclear, biological and chemical offensive weapons in violation of international norms and rules.
- Iran's support of terrorism under the pretext of wars of liberation and self defense against Israel and Western powers, i.e. the Palestinian and Lebanese militias.
- The unlawful military engagement against its neighbors at as it seized the lands from the UAE and keep on publicly threatening Iraq, Israel, the GCC countries, and even Europe and the US.
- The violation of international laws and treaties relating to trade, finance, copyright and patent policies (Askari, 7).
- Its defiance of the UN treaties (NPT) and the Security Council resolutions.

Sanctions are used as an enticement for countries to change their policies. As a result the guilty leadership finds itself either harassed and obliged to change policies or subjected to a coup d'etat to install a government complying with the international community rules and regulations. The sanctions can include:

- Imposing an embargo by UN members by cutting drastically exports and imports from and to that country in question. Historically, this type has proven to be less effective since there will always be countries that would defy it and fail to comply.
- Freezing the country's financial and non-financial assets. This type of sanctions will not be effective against the oil producing countries since their commodities are much in demand and essential to economic development.

- Reducing the cash flow into the violating country. This is only applicable to poor countries and has proven only partially successful.
- Stopping international corporations from doing business in the country. Here again such action has a very limited effect. It sometimes produces the opposite result. Since it will compel the sanctioned country to develop its own technology and resources.
- Sanctioning third countries that refuse to implement the UN sanctions on the concerned country (the Iran-Libya Sanction Act (ILSA)).
- Blocking the movement of people in and out of the country, by prohibiting flights in and out of the sanctioned country (Askari, 7).

Fearing the application of such sanctions, Iran has recently shifted its assets from US dollars to EUs as a precaution any possible measures adopted by the US because of its nuclear program.

In the case of Iran, additional sanctions besides freezing its assets could include:

- Restriction on US-Iran trade (by halting all Imports and Exports).
- The prohibition of US companies from investing in Iran (or countries that support Tehran).

The main question facing any unfriendly diplomatic methods remains whether Iranian threat and use of the oil shortage as a weapon will affect efficiency of economic sanctions noting that the export of fuel—principally crude petroleum--has been in the range of 70 to 90% of Iran’s total exports. The following table shows non fuel exports.

Table 3:

| Non Fuel Exports | Amount | Year |
|------------------|--------------------|---|
| Goods | 11.71 million tons | A period of 9 months starting from March 20, 2004 |
| Value | US\$5.09 billion | |
| Rise | 9.9 % | same |
| Weight and Value | 10.8% | same |

(“Iran Non-Oil Goods Exports up”. Persian Journal. 1. 4 Jan., 2005. 24 Feb., 2006)

During the period of 1993-1995 Iran’s ability to service its external debt deteriorated because of low oil prices, depreciation of the dollar and a rush in imports. Iran gave

highest priority to creating jobs to reduce unemployment which reached in 2002, 15.7% while the labor force was for the same year 20 million ("Iran". Maps, 1).

It also maintained various policies to attract foreign investment in gas extraction and some industries (Nass, 42). In 2005, foreign investment (gross fixed) reached 30.5% of GDP ("Iran", CIA-The World Fact Book, 8).

Although, the regime had never given up its efforts to seize the former Shah's assets, it resorted to legal mean during the early days of the revolution and won judgments in Germany giving it control over the Shah's 25% share holding in Krupp AG, the huge German industrial and weapons – manufacturing conglomerate (Timmerman, 176). Presently, Iran's influence in the international market will suffer a hit if Iraq emerges as one of OPEC's primary producers.

With "the Khomeini revolution" carrying a high price mark in terms of Iran's foreign policy options, one has to be asked how long the Iranian people are prepared to pay the price for a strategy which blocks the fulfillment of their daily needs and broader socio-economic and cultural aspirations.

The 1990s debate about attracting direct foreign investment, establishing foreign free trade zones, and strengthening economic relations with the West were the objectives of a moderate Iran's foreign policy especially when the main international concern and fear revolve around whether the oil exporting countries of the Middle East will use the huge profits they derive to acquire modern offensive arms or maybe increase their support for terrorism.

C. Iran's Military Role

According to Ayatollah Khomeini, the orders pertaining to preserve the Islamic system and defend the territorial integrity and independence of the Islamic ummah were important duties of a government. He ordered his followers to prepare for war in these words cited from the Qur'an: "Prepare against them whatever force you can master and horses tethered" (Qur'an, 8:60). This enjoins the preparation of as large armed defensive force as possible and orders the Muslims to be always on the alert and readiness, even in time of peace (Khomeini, 22).

Also, by 1982, Sabzevar Rezai, the regime’s chief procurement officer and military commander of the Revolutionary Guards, had concluded several arms deals with North Korea that the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) listed, in its annual review of the arms trade, North Korea as Iran’s single largest arms supplier (Timmerman, 63). When, in January 1987 the first SCUD-B prototype was test-launched in North Korea, in June of the same year, North Korea and Iran signed a \$500 million contract that covered the delivery of ninety to one hundred SCUD-B missiles with a range of 300 km (Elert, 1).

Furthermore, Iran’s largest ballistic missile plant was built by the North Koreans near Isfahan, where the Swedish firm Bofors had also built a huge, state-of-the-art explosives factory (Timmerman, 65).

In 1989 Rafsanjani made a deal to buy Soviet weapons for \$1.9 billion, including a squadron of MiG-29 fighters.

By 1991, Germany had become Iran’s largest supplier of licensed but controlled technologies, with annual sales worth \$1.8 billion. Those technologies were potentially applicable to the production of a variety of weapons programs.

Iran under Khomeini was determined to become a military power. It did not even spare its youth from military indoctrination.

Timmerman, in his book “Countdown to Crisis”, describes that during the Iraqi-Iran war, tens of thousands of teenage boys were being sent off to the war front with Iraq, armed with little more than a plastic key they were told would open the gates of heaven if they were martyred on the battle field (Timmerman, 51).

Iran’s missile arsenal as of 2003 stands as follows:

Table 4: Different missiles and ranges

| Weapons | Nick Name | Range |
|---------|-----------|----------|
| SRBM | | 1,100 km |
| SS-1 b | Scud-A | 130 km |

| | | |
|--------|--------|------------|
| SS-1 c | Scud-B | 300 km |
| SS-1 d | Scud-C | 575-600 km |
| SS-1 e | Scud-D | 700 km |

(Elert, Glenn ed. "Range of a Scud Missile". The Physics Fact Book. 1. 2003. 26 Feb., 2006)

With North Korean, Chinese and Soviet assistance as well as the large sums of revenues from oil sales, Iran decided to embark upon building its nuclear facilities to ultimately produce the Atomic bomb as the start of its nuclear program along with long range delivery arsenal.

Table 5:


| Data | Numeric Value | Year |
|---|---|------------------------------|
| Military branches: Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh): Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, IRGC): | Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force (includes Air Defense) Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, Qods Force (special operations), and Basij Force (Popular Mobilization Army) | Law Enforcement Forces: 2004 |
| Military service age and obligation: | 18 years of age for compulsory military service; 16 years of age for volunteers; soldiers as young as 9 were recruited extensively during the Iran-Iraq War; conscript service obligation - 18 months | 2004 |
| Manpower available for military service: | males age 18-49: 18,319,545 | 2005 est. |
| Manpower fit for military service: | males age 18-49: 15,665,725 | 2005 est. |
| Manpower reaching military service age annually: | males: 862,056 | 2005 est. |
| Military expenditures - dollar figure: | \$4.3 billion | 2003 est. |
| Military expenditures - percent of GDP: | 3.3% | 2003 est. |

("Iran". CIA-The World Fact Book. 10 January, 2006. 16 February, 2006)

Yadollah Javani, head of the Revolutionary Guards political bureau, said on October 5, 2004 that Iran's Shabab-3 missiles can reach Israel and strike at American forces all over the Middle East ("Dyer: Will", 1)

The following chart shows missile imports from the year 1995 to 2004.

Chart 1:



("Missile Imports". NTI. 1-2. December 2005. 17 February, 2006)

We can see in this chart that the most important three missile exporters to Iran are:

- North Korea
- Russia
- China

The other countries remain with secondary role (France, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Japan, Swiss firms, and Germany). It must be noted that in the beginning of February 2006, China and Russia blocked a proposed condemnation of, Iran's largest suppliers of weapons, North Korea's nuclear arms program by the UN Security Council (Larkini, 5).

France, along with Britain and Germany worked closely with Iran to come up with a series of measures meant to encourage the Islamic Republic to drop its nuclear program. But the negotiations have been so far fruitless.

Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise. Today, Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest and deadliest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs): including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8), as well as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already self-producing Scud SRBMs, Iran further announced that it had begun production of the Shahab-3, MRBM, and a new solid-propellant, SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It officially declared that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor although it later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Tehran's policy is to pursue development and production of longer-range ballistic missiles regardless of the regional and international consequences ("Attachment", 1).

Chapter 3

Iran's Nuclear Program

A. The Program: Definition and Purposes

Few countries are maintaining their nuclear research program and production of nuclear weapons such as the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel.

North Korea and Iran's insistence upon producing such weapons caused the failure of the May 2005 conference to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Europe has dropped its traditional and dangerous nuclear program for plutonium mixed with uranium to make mixed oxide fuel (MOX) are used in thirty reactors. Japan plans to use such technology in 2010.


The US undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, voiced in 1946 that "there is no prospect for security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements where the process of developing atomic energy for peace and for war are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent" (Edwards, 6).

1. Uranium Enrichment

It all began in Iran before the 1979 Revolution when West Germany helped Iran in constructing two nuclear reactors in Bushehr ("Iran-August", 1). These reactors were soon used for uranium enrichment which increases the concentration of U235 isotope to produce low enriched uranium for civilian use as nuclear reactor fuel. By contrast, highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used for nuclear weapons production. Uranium conversion can also produce uranium compounds from uranium oxide. As a result, uranium can be used for either peaceful research and for all types of nuclear weapons' production.

According to the *Uranium Information Center (UIC)* the following is a table showing the use of nuclear technology for electrical power production.

Table 6:



("What is Uranium?" UIC. 5. Jan., 2002. 26 Feb., 2006)

Enriching uranium increases the amount of “middle-weight” and “light-weight” uranium atoms. Since not all uranium atoms are the same, when uranium is mined, some consist of heavy-weight atoms (about 99.3% of the mass), other of middle-weight atoms (0.7%), or even light-weight atoms (< 0.01%). These are the different isotopes of uranium, which means that they all contain 92 protons in the atom’s center producing uranium. The heavy-weight atoms contains 146 neutrons, the middle-weight contains 143 neutrons, while the light-weight have just 142 neutrons. To refer to these isotopes, scientists add the number of protons and neutrons and put the total in classifications such as:

uranium-234 or U-234, uranium-235 or U-235, and uranium-238 or U-238.

The fuel for nuclear reactors has to have a higher concentration of U-235 that exists in natural uranium ore. This is because U-235 is the key factor that starts a nuclear reaction and keeps it going. Normally, the amount of the U-235 isotope is enriched from 0.7% of the uranium mass to about 5%. Gaseous diffusion is the only process being used in the United States to commercially enrich uranium. Gas centrifuges can also be used to enrich uranium (“Uranium Enrichment”, 1).

They can produce civilian nuclear reactor fuel as well as highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapon use (Kerr, 33).

2. Peaceful Purposes of Uranium

Eighty-nine countries so far agreed to keep a closer watch on the movement of nuclear materials. Along these lines at the summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in the beginning of July 2005, the G8 countries renewed their promise to raise \$ 20 billion over the next ten years to help Russia deal with its stockpiles inherited from the Soviet-era fissile material and dismantle its excess of nuclear submarines (Edwards, 6).

3. Costs

International Statistics estimate that there are 1900 tons of uranium, and 1855 tons of plutonium in the world today; an amount sufficient to produce 100,000 nuclear bombs. Even if all countries were to dismantle existing arsenals, the danger of stockpiles remains

a reality. The world’s nuclear arsenal stands at 27,000 bombs; most of these are far more powerful than those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

Nine countries possess nuclear weapons today and twelve have nuclear materials, they could turn into bombs (Edwards, 6).

There are currently five states considered to be “nuclear weapons states”, an internationally recognized status conferred by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are: the United States of America, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China. Since the formulation of the NPT, two non-signatory states of the NPT have conducted nuclear tests—India and Pakistan. Israel is also strongly suspected to possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons although it has never confirmed or denied it. Reports indicate that over 100 nuclear weapons might be in its inventory. This claim is not formally recognised by international bodies. None of these three countries is currently signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. South Africa was once a nuclear weapons state but has since destroyed its arsenal. North Korea has publicly declared itself to possess nuclear weapons though it has not conducted any confirmed tests and its ultimate status is still unknown. Iran has been accused by Western nations of attempting to develop uranium enrichment technology for weapons purposes (“List of Countries”, 1).

Table 7:

| Country | Warheads | Year of first test |
|--------------------|----------|--------------------|
| United States | 10,656 | 1945 |
| Russia | 10,000 | 1949 |
| United Kingdom | 200 | 1952 |
| France | 350 | 1960 |
| China | 400 | 1964 |
| India | 60-90 | 1974 |
| Pakistan | 28-48 | 1998 |
| North Korea | 0-18 | none |
| Israel (suspected) | 300-400 | - |

(“List of Countries with Nuclear Weapons”. [Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia](#). 1. 24 January 2006. 25 January, 2006.)

In Iran, the responsibility for nuclear energy has passed out of the hands of pragmatic Hassan Rohani into the hands of extremist conservative Ali Larijani ("News", 9 August, 2005). The latest election of a new hard-line Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in June 2005 raised more questions about how far Iran can be trusted with its nuclear programs.

It has been reported that the Mujahedin-e-Khalq claimed that the Revolutionary Guards spent more than \$300 million to build secret uranium-enrichment labs since 1987 that were filled with equipments imported from France, Germany, and Italy (Timmerman, 112).

In 1989, to free the hostages held in 1979 in Lebanon (the United States, France, Germany, and South Korea were involved), with Rafsanjani who sought to conclude deals. For instance, in exchange for the release of French hostages he demanded shipments of enrichment uranium (Timmerman, 71).

In 1991, Mehdi Karrubi, an ally of Rafsanjani, went to Pakistan with a down payment of \$50 million to thank Pakistan for its assistance in building Iranian nuclear facilities. In that same year, Akbar Rafsanjani inaugurated a nuclear medical research center in Karaj, North of Tehran. The new center was used to produce radioactive isotopes for medical and agricultural research. It was funded by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. All of that, as publicly "declared" by the IAEA denotes Iran's real intention extended beyond the peaceful use of nuclear technology. This was reinforced by many declaration by Iranian public officials.

"Because the enemy, has nuclear facilities, the Muslim states, too, should be equipped with the same capacity," Iranian vice president Ayatollah Mohajerani declared in the *Abrar daily*, on October 23, 1991.

In that same year, following the discovery that Iraq was planning on developing nuclear programs, the nuclear "haves", driven by their desire to secure a profitable export markets, were willing to turn a blind eye to proliferators such as Iraq and Iran who gratefully were willing to play the game allowing the IAEA inspectors to visit them occasionally without showing them the real plants, instead they led them to inspect bogus ones (Timmerman, 99).

Even the US Department of Commerce admitted then to have exported to Iran high nuclear technology worth \$59 million during the year 1990-91. It included processor computers, from the Digital Equipment Corporation and NCR to the Sharif University in Tehran, and the Revolutionary Guards training place. There is no doubt then that the US government policy makers were misled by few so-called exports on Islam and the Middle East, and who simplistically believed in policy of appeasement and misleading democratic principles in the service of peace and utopia perfect world. Similar computers from Sun Microsystems were delivered to the Amir Kabir University of Technology, and the renamed Nuclear Research Center of Tehran University (Timmerman, 81).

“We should acquire the technical know-how and the industrial facilities required to manufacture nuclear weapons, just in case we need them. This does not mean that we currently want to build them or that we have changed our defense strategy to include a nuclear program”, declared Rafsanjani’s scientific adviser Homayoun Vahdati quoted in *Die Welt*, on January 27, 1992. Actually these grey statements confused a somewhat gullible Western world.

Iran admitted to receiving offers from foreign suppliers for building the centrifuges. Furthermore, Tehran indicated interest in acquiring thousands of additional magnets, suggesting it intends to mass-produce centrifuges (Kerr, 29).

When Libya decided to disclose its nuclear program on March 5, 2004, it was doubtful how much the world knew about Iran’s nuclear energy and atomization. If Libya were able to secure blueprints for the bomb, is it possible that Iran was unable to follow? The revelation about Iran’s nuclear program came in August 2002 from an exiled group, Al Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), while the superpowers intelligence proved incompetent to do so.

Iran’s cover-up has been very deceptive since the secretive facility at Natanz was being set to accommodate 50,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium, and which was discovered in 2002 (Dickey, 36).

South African President Thabo Mbeki met Hassan Rowhani on August 11, 2005, to discuss a proposal that would involve shipping South African uranium yellowcake to Iran for conversion into uranium hexafluoride gas to be returned to Saudi Arabia and enriched into nuclear fuel (“Press”, August 11, 2005).

Ali Larijani, an Iranian politician, the secretary of the High Council of National Security of Iran since August 14, 2005 and a successor to Hassan Rowhani declared on October 7, 2005: "What is important is that Iran possesses the nuclear fuel cycle and that it is not diverted to atomic weapons rather within the framework (of the IAEA) to which we can give the necessary guarantees" ("Russia", 7). Lately, on December 5, 2005, Iran proclaimed it was ready to build a new nuclear plant at Bushehr to generate electrical power.

It is estimated that Iran's electricity consumption would reach 56,000 mw by 2021 while the country total energy output would be 70,000 mw of which 7,000mw --about 10%-- will be produced from nuclear power plants.

B. Transfer of the Nuclear Technology to Iran

The network of Abdul Qadeer Khan in Pakistan started with European middlemen in Iran in 1987 but stopped its activities during the 1988 war with Iraq. Russia later stopped in and promised to finish at least one centrifuge ("Iran-August", 1). According to Mohamed El Baaradei, the Director General of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran carried on most of uranium conversion between 1981 and 1993 at Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) (Baaradei, 3). Other activities were carried out in early 2002.

The characteristics of the facility UCF (Uranium Conversion Facility) and some of its processes included:

- Several conversion lines (i.e. converting UOC- uranium ore concentrate - to UF₆).
- Annual design production capacity of root uranium as UF₆.
- UF₆ to be sent to the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz to be enriched up to 5% U-235.
- The product then returned to UCF is to be converted into low enriched UO₂ and depleted uranium metal leading to the production of natural and enriched (19.7 %) uranium metal and natural UO₂.

- Natural and enriched UO₂ (5% U-235) to be sent to the FMP (Fuel Manufacturing Plant) at Esfahan, where it will be processed into fuel for a research and power reactors (Baradei, 3).

Some analysts argue that the production of an Iranian nuclear bomb has been delayed by the interruption of international assistance to Tehran; even though Israelis officials argue that by 2005 the bomb might be ready in a very short time not exceeding a year or two. It is useful to define for the reader the status of the uranium enrichment in Iran.

According to Baradei's report the recent uranium conversion development Chart 2 adopted and achieved by Iran runs as follows:

- In March 2004: Iran began conversion of UOC into UO₂ (5% U 235) and UF₄ into UF₆ with the characteristics of the UCF facility as explained above.
- In June 2004: 40-50 kg of UF₆ were produced.
- In August 2004: 37 tons of yellowcake were converted into UF₄.
- In October 2004: 22.5 t of the 37 t of yellowcake were fed into the process and 2 t of UF₄ as well as 17.5 t of uranium as intermediate products and waste were produced. No UF₆ were then produced (Baradei, 4).

Simultaneously, in July 2004 Iran started the operation with the mill hot-testing producing a quantity of 40-50 kg of yellowcake. Since it expected to reach 21 t of uranium per year Iran explored two potential uranium production methods:

- The extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid at TNRC plant.
- The production of yellowcake using percolation leaching (Baradei, 3).

According to El Baradei's report, Iran intends to use 37 metric tons of U. oxide for the nuclear test. This uranium would allow the production of enough U. hexafluoride to produce HEU for 4-5 crude nuclear weapons, an IAEA official certified before the *Arms Control Today* Journal on September 22, 2004 (Kerr, 29).

In the meantime, a shipment of 90 tons of enriched uranium from Russia was expected to arrive at Bushehr in May 2005. It must be noted that only 3% of the enriched are used for fuel, instead of 90% enrichment required for nuclear weapons production.

Iran had also two main sources of U-235:

- 54% U-235 came from Pakistan.
- 36% U-235 came from URSS to Iran via China and Pakistan (Kerr, 37).

Baradei confirmed that Iran had also acquired in the 1980's the gas centrifuge technology system in the following chronology:

- In 1985 Iran initiated its efforts in gas centrifuge enrichment.
- In 1987 it acquired through a clandestine supply network drawings for a P-1 centrifuge.
- In 1988 gas centrifuge R and D testing began at TNRC, and continued until 1995.
- Between 1994 and 1996 Iran received design drawings for a P-2 centrifuge.
- In 1999 it assembled and tested P-1 centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company where it fed UF₆ gas into a centrifuge for the first time.
- In 2002 it fed nuclear material into a number of centrifuges (up to 19 machines) (Baradei, 6).

C. Iran's Needs for Nuclear Technology

"We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task," declared Ali Akbar Hahsemi-Rafsanjani addressing the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards on October 6, 1988. Timmerman described how, since 1991, the Mujahedin e-Khalq claimed that the Revolutionary Guards had a special "atomic weapons" branch that had established a secret nuclear weapons center near the city of Qazvin (Timmerman, 110).

In the same reference, it is stated that the German investigators came to believe that both Karim Ali Sobhani, an Iranian intelligence officer, and a German supplier of nuclear technology were trying to import into Iran a vacuum melting furnace labeled Leybold via India known to be used only by those who plan to produce nuclear weaponry. The same Leybold, in person, did export the furnace to Pakistan through A. Q. Khan during 1979. This network of export/import included stages starting in France, then Liechtenstein and last in the Middle East. The Leybold Company exported to different countries including Iran (Timmerman, 74-77).

James Swanson, a commander in the U.S. Navy, recalls that the Navy uncovered certain clues and a Plan of Iran missiles and Nukes while searching among diagrams and numbers. Sharif University has been the place where Iran's Revolutionary Guards could teach and train other Dr. Khans (Timmerman, 80).

The spectacle of Saddam Hussein's rapid and crushing defeat by US forces in 2003, on one hand, coupled with Bush's listing Iran as an "axis" target in 2002, did most probably inspire Iran to hurry the development of its nuclear deterrent force.

Iran felt, on the other hand, it is not being treated fairly by the international community when compared to Israel. Hassan Mashadi, Iran's delegate to the Chemical Weapons Convention in The Hague, voiced that complaint. Iran has signed all the treaties, the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, whereas Israel has not.

Furthermore, the fear of Israel launching an attack on its nuclear facilities drove Iran to develop long-range missiles to deter any possible Israeli aggression, proclaimed Hassan Mashadi. The Iranian facilities were also part of the nuclear weapons target system set by the US military strategies, as were some 800 similar targets in China, Pakistan, India and North Korea. This US strategy is known as "active counter-proliferation", wrote Bruce Blair a member of the Brookings Institution and a former strategic nuclear planner (Timmerman, 181).

Iranian leaders were quick to change roles swinging from moderation to fundamentalism in an attempt to create confusion and disparities.

"While I do not believe Iran is actively seeking nuclear weapons," Mashadi addressed the conference, "at the same time Iran is not going to renounce that option." Hassan Mashadi was speaking in September 1995 at the Italian Riviera resort town of Castiglioncello at a conference on nuclear proliferation sponsored by the Union of Scientists for Disarmament.

Asked if Iran's nuclear know-how constitutes a threat to the West, the Iranian President replied that it should be more worrisome for the world to look at those who violate international law. The new President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, argues on one hand, that it is forbidden according to religious Muslim law to develop nuclear weapons and Iran can ensure its security by different other means (Ahmadinejad, 45). This type of Iranian

argument is very far from the truth and filled with such impudence and despise to the world community: governments and peoples. The Shiite government of Iran is a master user of 'Takiyah', a religious behavioral practice allowing it to lie to the opponent in time of weakness until it becomes powerful enough to face the enemy with its true colors and realities. God allows such practice and will not punish the Muslim Shiite even if he denies God himself under these circumstances. Iran does not specify which religious law forbids the production of nuclear weapons! Pakistan is a Muslim country and it did produce nuclear weapons, one must not forget that. Muslim leaders met in Lahore in 1973 and agreed to produce the bomb they named then as the "Islamic bomb". The Iranian president felt very comfortable in playing the "cha cha" game with world leaders hoping to keep them balancing on a thin rope of diplomatic wishful thinking that Iran will give up its nuclear plans and renounce its threat and blackmail thus avoiding any unpleasant resolution by the UN Security Council. The argument that religion does not allow the production of nuclear weapons must be based on certain religious laws or verses from the Qur'an which are non-existent. It is ironic that a religion would glorify wars, terrorism, and the killing of the civilians by conventional weapons through "Jihad" but forbids it when it becomes nuclear.

On the other hand, he has clearly defied the UN International law, norms and rules openly calling for a nuclear and independent Iran. He even went so far as to rewrite history as he sees it and interpret international genocidal crimes as fictitious.

Iran's Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani, by contrast declared that in mid-November 2004 the Iranians were going to mass produce nuclear weapons ("The Nuclear", 52).

On August 9, 2005, Iran continued its uranium enrichment despite Washington warnings that the case may be taken to the Security Council. Tehran's argument was that to exchange energy for politics and trade would be like exchanging jewelries for candies. Iran's nuclear program is lawful and moral ("News", 9 August, 2005).

Ali Shamkhani, Iranian Minister of Defense, argued that Iran signed the NPT and opened its sites to international Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, because Iran wants a Middle East free of nuclear arms. Furthermore, since the US exported Nuclear Weapons to Israel, it consequently instituted a threat to Iran itself which gives Iran the right to protect itself

and defend its security by any available means. To soften world public opinion, Iran persists in proclaiming that its nuclear energy is for peace only (“Possession”, 1).

The main question in this entire matter should be simply stated: does Iran need nuclear energy to develop economically and if so what is Iran’s economic program for peace?

When cornered by its critics, Iran argues that it has the right under NPT obligation to enrich uranium for military purposes on an equal basis with all the nuclear powers. It refers to North Korea which, in February 2005, announced it had produced nuclear weapons (Haass, 66).

In 1998, India tested five nuclear bombs and two weeks later Pakistan followed with six of its own. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s former chief nuclear scientist, was put under house arrest in early 2004 for operating a clandestine network which sold weapons-grade uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. His arrest did not solve the problem. His argument was that: “there is no logic or common sense in having a few countries monopolize the advanced technology while others live in fear under hegemony”. He further added that: “This is humiliating and insulting to the majority of us who live outside the West”. He worked for Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEL) in the 1970’s, and developed Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program in 1976 (Edwards, 6). On July 9, 1991, during a visit of Iran’s commander Major General Mohsen Rezai to Islamabad, General Mirza Aslam Beg, army chief of staff, and a radical Islamist, openly declared, that he supports and believes in nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and other Muslim countries, including Iran (Timmerman, 105).

D. Iran and Terrorism/ Fundamentalism

The academic definition of terrorism is the use or threat to use violent force against non-combatants innocent civilians in order to spread fear and so cause political change (Malik, 10). So far the world community has failed to clearly define terrorism and its scope as it happened during the last UN session of 2005.

The media have used different vocabularies. The Afghans fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan were called “mujahideen” (freedom fighters). The Kashmiris, Sikhs, Chechens and East Timorese attacking regular troops are described as militants,

insurgents and guerillas. Palestinian Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah are labeled as terrorists.

The UN Resolution calling for governments to punish those who incite to terrorist acts fell through in the UN General Assembly mainly because the US and UK opposed clauses that would legitimize "resistance against all types of occupation" opening the legality to use force and violence wide open without calling for the close examination of the "root causes" of such acts. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers in New York were performed by Muslims and consequently encouraged a large number of Muslim groups to plan and commit acts of terror in an attempt to polarize the East against the West in the service and name of "Allah" (Malik, 10).

1. Shiite Ideology

Some scholars consider that the Islamic Jihad gained momentum and importance among Muslims, to spread the ideology of Jihad to other societies which thought that Muslims needed help to stand up, defend Allah and defeat the infidels (Bergen, 3).

Others offer a different point of view. Author Martin Woolf believes that there is no connection between Islamic terrorism and faithful Muslims. Lord Dsay compares modern Islam to a revolutionary ideology. From this point, Islam could be similar socially and psychologically to communism. It promises a heavenly paradise to faithful Muslims while Leninism promised an earthly paradise to the proletariat.

The Mujahideen are called upon to fight against the West and repressive Muslim governments allies of the West, instead of the bourgeoisie in communism, and to lead the rest of the Muslim people to the delights of paradise. It provides a certain sense of belonging, as it recruits from the younger generations. Muslim "ulamas" preach the primacy of Shari'a, and the spread of Islam with violence when possible to all different corners of the world (Woolf, 19). This is the essence and basis of the new fundamentalist ideology of the East.

The September 11 hijackers and Al-Qaeda planners had been in constant contact with senior Iranian officials and intelligence officers before September 11, according to

Zakeri's testimony, an ex- Iranian bodyguard. Zakeri's officer, who reported that he took them to the former US embassy in Tehran, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council (IRCG) keeps its main computers for training. "They have a special place there for teaching transmission and codes." Zakeri himself was responsible for the security of the people attending the meetings. "Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama Bin Laden's chief deputy, and several of his men were talking disclosing their 'plans for the future' as like the Iranians they identified the 'same enemy'", namely the United States, Israel and European countries.

Inside the meeting, the young son of Bin Laden, Saad, met for nearly three hours with all five members of the Leadership Council comprising

- the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei
- Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the Expediency Council
- Mohammad Yazdi, head of the Council of Guardians
- Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the Judiciary chief
- and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, the head of the Assembly of Experts, the group that elects the Supreme Leader.

Zakeri believes it was at this meeting, on May 4, 2001, that Iran's leaders learned the specifics of Bin Laden's plans for the September 11 attack and agreed to provide operational assistance (Timmerman, 15).

Western Military intelligence analysts suspect that Iran's leaders are plotting new attacks on the West with Osama Bin Laden, whom they are sheltering inside Iran. Similar intelligence information are revealed in the book titled "Countdown for Crisis", where Timmerman implicates top Iranian officials for being directly involved in the 9/11 plot (Timmerman, 3).

The conventional international intelligence community by contrast naively felt that Shiite Iran clerics could not possibly work together with a Sunni Osama Bin Laden because they belong to bitterly opposed sects of Islam. This is a simplistic stereotype and short-sighted concept that could have deadly consequences on the West and torture world peace.

In an attempt to avoid a near nightmare of a terrorist nuclear attack, experts from around the globe met in Vienna, Austria, to draw up the Convention on the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Material that has been in force since 1987 and revive its stipulations. The eighty-nine states that signed the amended convention are legally bound to protect all nuclear facilities including storages and materials against any possible theft or act of terrorism (Edwards, 6), since the ultimate danger lies if a terrorist group becomes able to acquire a nuclear bomb (El-Baradei, 9 October, 2005).

President Bush proclaimed that Muslim radicals are attempting to “enslave whole nations and intimidate the world.” He particularly referred to Syria and Iran as “allies of convenience” where radical fundamentalists prepare to deliver a fatal blow to the US. “The influence of Islamic radicalism is also magnified by helpers and enablers. They have been sheltered by authoritarian regimes, like Syria and Iran, and use terrorist propaganda to blame their own failures on the West, and in particular America and on the Jews”. The US thinks that Iraq is a ‘vital bulwark’ against a global terror threat and that any premature American withdrawal would hand the terrorists an enormous victory (Knowlton, 2). President Bush referred to the recently elected president of Iran as a member of Iranian radicals who attacked the US embassy and held hostages for 444 days. This allegation was denied by Mahmoud Ahmadinajad who dodged the issue by looking into the real problem behind such acts, which is in his opinion the untruthfulness of the United States (Weymouth, 45). Terrorists are aided by bogus charities that direct money to terrorist activities in different nations such as Iran and Syria, according to Bush, who calls them “allies of convenience” who back up terrorists.

2. Iraq

Although, Iran viewed the US as the evil of the West, they had after all a neighboring enemy, Iraq, to keep under permanent watch.

British diplomats in naïve and simplistic terms informed journalists at a meeting after a trip to Southern Iraq early in 2005 that “Iran is being very helpful in the political process. It has an interest in the stability in Iraq”. They failed however to qualify the type, form and costs of that stability.

How did they collect such information, from whom and how credible remain the basic questions. Western and Arab intelligence by contrast confirm that they possess evidence that Iran has a long-term plan to control the South of Iraq (Darwish, 8-10).

Will the Supreme Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), founded in Iran by Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in 1980, represent a meaningful allied force with Tehran? This is a question Iran has to answer. While Tehran openly pretends to wish for a democratic and open Iraq it still has a list of important and tangible issues it needs to discuss with the future government of Iraq, e.g. if Iraq does act as an ally to the United States such action will have a negative impact on Iran's security and future?

What will Iraq's position be on the Najaf status, on the relationship between state and religion that would not compromise Qom's position in Iran as well as the intellectual sponsor of political Shi'ism, propounded by Ayatollah Khomeini? (Ehteshami, 183)

The Muslim Mullahs also feared its youths, being supported by the US, to revert to a counterrevolution. This explains why they supported the chaos in Iraq keeping it weak and divided favoring the Shiite relative majority in government which responds favorably in support of Tehran.

On October 7, 2005, Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari was quick to denounce accusations from neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia that Iran was interfering in Iraq. Indeed, the fall of Iraq in 2003, was a bitter-sweet experience for Iran. However, the fall of the enemy Iraq was not very satisfying especially that it was replaced by a critical and most powerful state, supported by the US. American troops nearby in Baghdad as well as the southern shores are considered as the beginning of many problems and a test for Iran's diplomacy and internal cohesion (Ehteshami, p. 188). Responding about the insecurity of Iraq and Iran's responsibility for it, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replied that the security of its neighbors constituted a priority for Iran's security. Once everything is settled and security assured, Tehran would require American troops to withdraw or an imminent danger of a civil war would tear apart the country (Ahmadinajad, 45).

3. Palestine

Iran fears also that the situation in Palestine might worsen, because of the perpetrated Israeli occupation of Arab territories. As for peace, even if it is realized, Tehran feels that it might not last forever (Ahmadinajad, 45).

Iran consequently, should be prepared for the worst and should possess all kinds of weapons including the atomic bomb for the following reasons:

- To complete and realize the Shiite political and military crescent stretching from Iran via Iraq and Syria ending in Lebanon as one Shiite Republic or power.
- To maintain its supports of Hezbollah, a sworn military group determined to destroy Israel, create a Shiite Islamic Republic in Lebanon and be the Shiite front spreading international terrorism against the West.
- To strengthen its supports of Al-Qaeda by protecting it against any Western retaliation and by supplying it with offensive weapons if needed.
- To continue to backup certain militant groups with military hardware; (i.e.: the Karine A vessel that carried fifty tons of explosives and other military materials sent to the PLO in 2002).
- To keep anti American and Israeli Muslim peoples feelings and hatred high and potentially flammable.

4. Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia

Iran claims to have Syria as its primary ally as well as Egypt and the Palestinian militant group such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Middle East since they all call for the nuclear disarmament of the region including Israel.

On June 16, 2005, Maged Abdel Aziz, the permanent representative of Egypt to the UN affirmed that one can not ask countries to give up their nuclear weaponry program, unless Israel was asked to do so too. The Egyptian and Arab concerns over the Israeli nuclear arsenal must be addressed although the Israelis sought American and European assurance that such an issue will not be raised until the peace process has been reached and implemented in full normalizing the economic and political problems between the Arabs and Israelis (Kaye, 10).

In October 6, 2005 *As-Safir*, daily Lebanese newspaper, published that Ali Larijani, the top Iranian nuclear negotiator, had paid a visit to Syria on the previous day, and both him and the Syrian president, Bashar Al Assad, had discussed regional and international affairs as well as the Western pressure on these two countries and agreed on further and closer cooperation (“Assad”, 1).

In the meantime, the country profiting most from the increase of fuel prices is Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter of fuel in the world. An Israeli military intelligence report expressed its fear about the expansion of Saudi Arabia arsenal to balance Iranian threat and its fear about any change of regime in the kingdom by extremist Islamic groups who would resort to acquiring non offensive weapons and follow a policy of violence and fundamentalism.

According to intelligence reports, the net profit resulting from the increase of oil prices from \$ 30 a barrel to \$ 65 in less than a year has generated several hundreds billion US dollars as additional revenues more to the oil producing countries.

According to Tehran, the Syrian-Iranian coordination is important against their common enemy, Israel and the West and even some other Arab countries (“News”, 9 August, 2005).

Tehran leadership has been publicly inciting through words and deeds the Palestinian radical and militant armed groups to step up violent clashes with Israel. They reject all peace proposals with Israel as though they are the self appointed ‘god fathers’ of the Arab-Israeli conflict in spite of the fact that they are not Arabs rather a long time enemies of the Arab countries. They occupy by force three islands belonging to the United Emirates and they had a long and devastating war with Iraq over Shatt Al-Arab, an Arabian port in the Gulf. As for Hezbollah in Lebanon, they finance with about \$ 400 million a year, train and arm under the cover up of “The Resistance” against Israel. Iranian military personnel have been training Hizbollah in Lebanon itself. They even claim and advertise that thanks to their efforts and assistance Israel was defeated in South Lebanon and withdrew out of fear. Consequently they created a sort of political and military ‘puppet’ to defend their interests and maintain their hegemony over Syria and Lebanon.

5. Lebanon

Hezbollah was created in Lebanon by Shiites after the Israeli invasion in 1982. It is financed, trained, and affiliated with Iran adopting the teachings of Khomeini, and calling for violent actions against what it terms as “Western imperialism”.

Iran appears to help Hezbollah to maintain tension with Israel in South Lebanon (“The Nuclear”, 52).

Presently, Hezbollah position in Lebanon as a strategic factor has been affected lately by the Resolution 1559, adopted on 2 September 2004 by the UN Security Council, as it calls for the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese Militias.

Israel strongly protested against a recent meeting between EU, French and Italian ambassadors in Lebanon with Hezbollah. It requested that the latter be included in the EU list of terrorist organizations. It has refused to acknowledge Hezbollah political role in Lebanon and branded it as an illegal and dangerous terrorist militia.

Chapter 4

Iran's Conflict with the International Community

A. Iran and the UN

1. UN Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The UN proliferation treaty opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968, and came into force in 1970. Since 1960s more than twenty countries have opposed nuclear weapon programs. The most recent is Libya. Iran, itself, signed the treaty on July, 1, 1968. It was deposited on February 2, 1970 with the United States of America, on February 10, 1970 with the Russian Federation, and on March 5, 1970 with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (“NPT”, 1).

The NPT main provisions, signed in 1968, include:

- Article I: Nuclear weapons states (prior to 1967) pledge not to transfer nuclear explosive devices to any non-nuclear weapon states.
- Article II: The non-nuclear weapons states pledge not to acquire such devices.
- Article III: Non-nuclear weapon states also agree to accept IAEA inspection (created in 1957) on all of their nuclear facilities.
- Article IV: They pledge support for international cooperation regarding peaceful nuclear energy use and production within international norms and rules.
- Article VI: They called for “good faith” efforts toward nuclear disarmament by the existing weapons states (Klare, 138).

By 1997, NPT membership reached 185 countries, while India, Pakistan and Israel remained as non signatories.

Kenneth Timmerman asked a participant at the conference on nuclear proliferation in 1995, Mr. Hassan Mashadi, if Iran would withdraw from the NPT once it felt an

imminent threat to its security; Mr. Mashadi answered that “Iran does not believe it should renounce that option if its survival is at stake” (Timmerman, 181).

Since the Non-proliferation treaty has been effectively undermined by the narrow self interest of the nuclear industry, it must be viewed as it has failed to be honored by some of its signatories, viewed Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington DC (Edwards, 6).

The nuclear “have-nots” point to violations of the Treaty ethics by the nuclear “haves”, principally the US as nuclear powers are reluctant to put a permanent ban on nuclear-weapon testing of any kind and in any location. (Graham, 46)

The NPT itself allows countries like Iran to develop nuclear capabilities up to the point of manufacturing weapons. It does not however address the difficulty of distinguishing the border lines between peaceful and military application of such industry. Modifications of the treaty are surely and immediately needed. Unfortunately such amendments will be difficult to pass and secure implementation as long as India, Israel and Pakistan stay out of it and refuse to strictly abide by its provisions especially at a time when the international supervision instrument is almost non-existent (Klare, 6).

The NPT tried, however to transform the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state from the status of national pride in 1960 to an act of worldwide disturb once bringing condemnation to this act that contradict international law.

The treaty was reinforced in 1995 when 173 countries agreed to commit to rejecting nuclear weapons if the five “nuclear weapons states” allowed under the treaty- the US, the UK, France, China and Russia- would vouch to eliminate their arsenal (Edwards, 6). The Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in the 5th Point underlines this issue. Furthermore, the Security Council resolution 984 (1995) provided a collective, global and concrete response to that problem (“1995 Review”, 1).

2. Limiting Weapons of Mass Destruction

In December 1991, the American Senator, John Glenn, proposed of a legislation limiting the proliferation of nuclear arms whereby giving companies such as Leybold, the German

company, to choose between selling their product to the U.S. or the rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, etc...This law was supported by the majority of U.S. legislators in 1991 (Timmerman, 77). The main problem lied in the application and implementation.

A key step toward diminishing the diffusion of nuclear arms and reinforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is for those states already possessing nuclear technology to improve their 'lackluster disarmament' record, has been recommended by nuclear scientists. Among the proposed actions to be taken to disarm is for the nuclear powers such as China, Russia, the UK, the US and France to make a solemn international pledge not to use nuclear weapons in any form or shape against any country. In the event of a breach of such a pledge, the UN will take "collective action" against the guilty one.

Although such a proposal appears attractive and promising in its prima facie theoretical presentation, it is unrealistic however and history proved that its enforcement is unlikely, since the superpowers have their own interests and will not commit self-suicide in order to safeguard any other member of the international community. The family of nations has so far failed to even properly define and combat terrorism with conventional weapons, how could it resolve the issue of nuclear armament?

In the war against terrorism, Islamabad was somewhat forgiven by the West for its exports of illicit nuclear technology and know-how to countries like Iran and North Korea. The much-criticized director of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, winner of the Nobel Prize, offered a way out of the Iran's mess at the May Nonproliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference by calling upon all states to halt new enrichment activities for five years until a more suitable inspection regime can be forged. This would compel all countries to stop such enrichment. Violators will automatically be heavily punished (Ferguson, 7). Yet, the international response was one of indifference and apathy. Although the total number of nuclear warheads worldwide has fallen to 38,000 since 1986, through arms reduction treaties between the superpowers who have helped reducing the nuclear arsenal and outlawed the chemical and biological weapons, these weapons are being manufactured clandestinely by states and terrorist organizations in full defiance of the UN due to the weak international enforcement agency. Non-proliferation in the Middle East seems presently illogical and impossible without Israel cooperation and compliance.

Furthermore, due to the limitations in the treaty (NPT) itself, the Agency's (IAEA) ability to record serious violation by uncooperative states is null. It has had no jurisdiction over Israel, Pakistan or India, which are not signatories. It lost jurisdiction over North Korea when the latter pulled out of the treaty. It missed Saddam Hussein secret efforts to build a bomb in the 1980's. All these examples are used by Iran as justification for it to further its nuclear program totally ignoring and defying international sanctions. As the U.N. and the superpowers fail to resolve their conflict with Iran, the U.N. will be weakened further as other states may follow in full defiance. Already India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel succeeded. The future nuclear candidates will be: Syria, Libya, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and others. The future for humanity seems indeed bleak if the present international leadership does not join forces and adopt firm and unquestionable policies to stop this nuclear madness. The time of warning and flexing muscles is gone. What is needed is a clear and unbeatable action.

The IAEA and the UN should stop inquiring and begin earnest investigation.

3. UN Involvement and Iran

On December 3rd, 2005, Iran threatened to block all inspections if its case was referred to the Security Council. It argued that it has the right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, a right acquired by the NPT which it will not give up (Karimi, 1). Peaceful purposes for Iran could well mean nuclear weapons thinking that it will enhance its security and peace and create a mutual balance of terror.

Furthermore, economic sanctions are likely to have little impact at a time when record oil prices are bringing the Iranian Regime over 140 billions U.S. dollars in windfall revenues per year. To prevent slippage in the nonproliferation international regime a number of policy recommendations are offered for consideration:

- Stopping Iran and North Korea from becoming nuclear weapon states.
- Strengthening alliances between Europe, the U.S., Russia and China in matters relating to MDW.
- Raising clear and strict barriers to nuclear acquisition by discouraging independent fuel cycle capabilities.

- Securing fissile material in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere from being sold on the market.
- Strengthening verification and intelligence in part by wider adherence to the IAEA for verification and applying penalties and sanctions against violators.
- Following a long-term strategy to devalue the role of nuclear weapons in the international system and dismantle nuclear facilities and weapons all together (Graham, 48).

4. The IAEA Safeguards

The 35-nation IAEA Board of Governors convened a regular meeting in the Agency's Vienna Headquarters on Monday, 6 March 2006. Director General Mohamed ElBaradei opened the meeting with an introductory statement, declaring that at the start of its nuclear program Iran was focusing on the civilian and peaceful use of the technology.

"Everything that we have seen is for the peaceful application of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation", confirmed IAEA safeguards director Jon Jennekins, after an inspection tour in Iran, February 14, 1992 (Timmerman, 103).

Timmerman claims that from 1982 to 1989, Iran received some \$2,452,900 in aid from the Agency, based on IAEA reports. That included \$400,000 for a study of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, \$312,000 in "procurement assistance"; of equipments and materials with an additional \$1,667,700 for nuclear research programs during that same period from the United Nations Development Program, UNDP (Timmerman, 69).

By contrast, Mohamed El Baradei, the director general of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described the May 2005 conference on 'Nuclear Fears' as a total failure. He declared that it was "disheartening" since no final agreement emerged from that conference (Ewards, 10).

Baradei had already proclaimed in September 2004 that "forty countries or more have now the know-how to produce nuclear weapons" (Graham, 46). On October 9, 2005, *Al-Jazira* published an interview with Mohammad El-Baradei, after having won the Noble Prize; that the international community had lost patience with Iran. He added that if

terrorist group acquires the bomb, it would be terrible for the whole world (El-Baradei, 9 October 2005).

The Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference scheduled to be held every five years convened from May 2 to May 27, 2005. There was no consensus on any clear policy between nuclear weapon states (France, US, UK, China and Russia) and their counterparts the non nuclear weapon states. They were unable to realize an accord with visionary goals, namely creating a world without nuclear weapons. There was no useful outcome. The Conference President Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil affirmed on June 9 that: “the State parties are progressively drifting apart on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues”. He cautioned that if this trend continued, the future of the treaty would be cast into doubt (Boese, 22).

In Tehran, consequently, the top Iranian nuclear negotiator took advantage of such international discord. Ali Larijani, repeated that his country’s nuclear facilities were not subject for concessions, and insisted Tehran would not deal with countries demanding they be dismantled (“Russia”, 7). Iran, in such a behavior, placed itself above the international world order and community. It qualified the IAEA as a watchdog that fulfills its masters’ wishes and orders, meaning the Western rulers (Dickey, 36).

According to the new president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinajad, during the past two years, Iran has been subjected to

- More than 1,200 inspections that have taken place.
- 1,030 documents have been given to the IAEA.
- All cameras were fixed on the facilities and the IAEA supervisors could control every action. Iran has been fulfilling its duties toward the IAEA (Weymouth, 45).

In August 2002, the inspectors took “environmental samples” to be analyzed by the IAEA’s lab at Seibersdorf outside Vienna. In March 2003, they were allowed to visit part of the Kalaye Electrical Co. in Tehran; but not to take samples. In August 2003, they came back to Kalaye to find it reshaped. They took samples and the result proved conclusively the traces of existence of uranium enrichment. In October 2003, the international community threatened to cut relations and trade backed by France, Germany and Britain. The Iranian response was that Tehran promised to make public all information about its nuclear program. The result proved that Iran was secretly hiding its

nuclear activities (Dickey, 36). Furthermore, the Agency and Iran were communicating on different levels. The Agency was comparing assessments of Iran's statements to view and study their credibility while Iran was offering so many explanations by taking sometimes a conciliatory stand, another obstinate and provocative one. Its main strategy was based upon buying more time to complete its bombs, thus putting the entire world before an accomplished fact. In February 2003 Iran admitted that, in 1991, it had imported natural uranium in different forms, and had used it without informing the agency (Baradei, 4). Furthermore, Iranians have bulldozed suspected sites to camouflage their real program and intentions by refusing to allow access to inspectors to some military areas. As the international concern became more evident and under heavy international pressure in 2005, the Iranians produced one page of key documents on how they acquired designs when they started their enrichment program in the 1980's, such document was for inspectors to look at, but would not turn it over (Dickey, 36). On September 18, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted resolution GOV/2004/79 that contained the following major stipulations:

- It urged Iran to clarify all its enrichments uranium in response to IAEA safeguards and findings.
- It called upon Iran to ratify the treaty's Additional Protocol (of the NPT).
- It regretted that Iran's implementation of enrichment suspension requests fell short of scope of commitments (Baradei, 1).

According to the same report Iran refused on March 2003 members of the agency permission to take environmental samples in the Kalaye Electric Company. It also claimed that no nuclear material was involved in testing the assembled centrifuges (February 2003) (7).

In November 2004, Iran's hard-liner leaders called on Iran not to suspend all enrichment activities even though the IAEA had postponed a decision on whether to refer Iran to the Security Council (Kaye, 4).

In the meantime the Agency (IAEA) carried out the following visits:

- On 17 July 2004 it visited Gchine, the uranium mine, South of Iran, near Bandar Abbas with estimated production of 21 t of uranium per year.

- On 6 October 2004 it inspected the Saghand Mine, and
- On 7 October 2004 it inspected the Ardakan yellowcake production plant (Baradei, 3).

All international pressures, complaints and calls did not deter nor enticed Iran to comply; it began to build a heavy-water plant at the town of Arak. Officials such as Asadollah Sabouny, Vice President for nuclear power plants at the Atomic Energy of Iran, are upset by international restraints as he called for ignoring all negotiations and completing the program: “We are wasting our time now”, he proclaimed. This belligerent and uncooperative attitude of Iran caused many countries concerned with the war against international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and Islamic fundamentalists, to join together in preventing Iran and other countries especially the less developing ones from acquiring nuclear and other offensive weapons. The World needs peace not destruction. Iran’s nuclear weapons program will not defend Iran, rather cause tension in the Middle East and a possible threat to international peace. Among the most staunch opposed powers is the United States.

B. Iran and the US

1. Diplomatic Relations

Relations with the West have deteriorated since the Khomeini revolution. Lately, they became worse especially after the arrival of hardliners to power.

While the official policy called for “dual containment”, the US pursued an ambiguous policy concerning economic relations with Iran, the reality was that the US continued to trade with Iran, and US oil companies continued to purchase Iranian oil and sell it on the world market (Sokolski, 105-106).

The first years of Khatami’s rule were raising hopes of better relations with the US. From what is known of the record, Iran’s behavior during the Iraq War in 2003 was relatively cooperative (Sokolski, 108).

The reasons for the severance of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran are caused by several factors:

- Human Rights abuse by Iran, especially in the US hostage affair in 1979.
- Contradiction with the policies of the Supreme Leader Khomeini by the U.S.
- Iran's support of terrorism in particular the Hezbollah group in Lebanon.
- Zionist anti-Iran lobbying with the U.S. Congress (Nass, 42).

A civilian of the Pentagon, Michael Rubin, urged the American policy planners to make the Iran's regime change its priority (Rozen, 22).

According to Darwish, the Americans could launch air attacks, targeting Iran's flying missiles, or impose a maritime blockade (Darwish, 10).

Iran favors the withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq in the near future, and their replacement by international troops if needed ("Croatia", 1). As Washington accused Iran of trying to build a nuclear arsenal under the cover of a civilian one, the Iranian response came on February 10, 2006:

"We are not afraid of attacks by the United States or by other countries on Iran's nuclear installations because we have nothing to hide, we have no installations to produce nuclear weapons", Iranian Vice-President Esfandiyar Rahim Mashae said after meeting with his Indonesian counterpart ("Iran Dismisses", 1).

The Iranian position escalated when referred to the U.N. Security Council on 4 February 2006 over its nuclear program. Senior Iranian officials have warned that a referral to the Security Council would bring "an end to diplomacy" as well as tough international inspections ("Iran Dismisses", 1). The Bush administration has been divided over just how strongly it should encourage political change in Iran. In the first weeks of the year 2006 it has increased the number of appearances by senior U.S. officials on media, like the BBC Persian service, which broadcast to Iranians (Giacomo, 1).

Republican Rep. Mark Kirk of Illinois said the Congressional Working Group urged Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns to consider quarantine on gas sales to Iran and forgo "lighter" sanctions like withholding visas for Iranian leaders. This would envision

Lloyd's of London lifting insurance contracts on tankers transporting gas to Iran. Burns did not discuss specific sanctions but was receptive to a suggestion that U.S. satellites be used to support wider and more effective broadcasts to Iran, explaining to the people the consequences of the policies adopted by their government as well as educating them to be free and democratic.

“Obviously there is increasing interest both on Capitol Hill and in the American administration in seeing what actually could be done to strengthen the civil society in Iran”, said a British diplomat (Giacomo, 1).

In his State of the Union speech of February 2006, President George W. Bush expressed the hope that one day the United States would be “the closest of friends with a free and democratic Iran,” though he did not spell out any concrete initiatives.

U.S. and European officials proclaim that the people of Iran are unaware of a proposal put forward by Britain, France and Germany that would provide Iran with economic and political benefits if it abandons its weapons-related nuclear activities (Giacomo, 1-2).

Iran's nuclear plants are dispersed and camouflaged underground. The potential to world peace are threats pushing the West to get tougher with Tehran before the arms race gets even more heated.

After years of opposition, Russia and China are reluctant about sending the Iran nuclear file to the Security Council. Moscow and Beijing demanded that the United States, France and Britain agree to let the Iran issue rest until the end of March 2006 when the IAEA board meets to review the agency's investigation of Iran's nuclear program and its compliance with board demands to renounce enrichment of uranium (“Iran's President”, 2).

Iran may continue to proclaim that it will reconsider its membership in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if it felt its enemies opt to unfairly pressure it, declares President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on 11 February 2006. He added: “You have deprived our country of spare parts for passenger planes for 27 years. What's the guarantee you will provide our nuclear fuel tomorrow?” (“Iran May”, 1)

On February 16th, 2006, high-level talks on the Russian proposal begun in Moscow without yet receiving any answer from Tehran.

The proposal consists of shifting large-scale enrichment operations to Russian territory in an effort to alleviate suspicions that Tehran is pursuing to develop nuclear weapons. The Bush administration supported the proposal. In the meantime, Iran's president rejected on February 11, 2006 the US and European proposal to freeze the country's nuclear program (Karimi, 1).

Iran has long maintained that it wanted to enrich uranium to generate nuclear power for civil use, not to produce a bomb. This disclosure constitutes the basis Washington and its allies need to send Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions, a measure the IAEA's board of 35 member nations already approved on 4 February 2006 in a 27 favorable votes to 3 vote (Syria, Cuba, Venezuela), with five abstentions including (Indonesia, Algeria, Belarus, South Africa, Libya) (Shannon, 1).

The US in turn, continues to place Iran on the "axis of evil" list that would necessitate a policy of preemption.

Fortunately, the U.S. is able to influence its counterparts: Russia and the Europeans to view the real danger in Iran procurement of the bomb (Sokolski, 111).

Covert U.S. Action

Covert action would probably be the most politically expedient way for the United States to disrupt Iran's nuclear program. It might include one or more of the following technical and action measures:

- Harassment or murder of key Iranian scientists or technicians;
- Introduction of fatal design flaws into critical reactor, centrifuge, or weapons components during their production, to ensure catastrophic failure during use.
- Disruption or interdiction of key technology or material transfers through sabotage or covert military actions on land, in the air, or at sea.
- Sabotage of critical facilities by U.S. intelligence assets, including third country nationals or Iranian agents with access to key facilities.
- Introduction of destructive viruses into Iranian computer systems controlling the production of components or the operation of facilities;

- Damage or destruction of critical facilities through sabotage or direct action by U.S. Special Forces (Sokolski, 121-122).

Overt U.S. Action

By contrast to covert operation, overt action is politically problematic. It could prompt an anti-American backlash among formerly friendly Iranians, strengthen the hand of hard-liners, and prompt the regime to retaliate against U.S. interests in the Gulf or elsewhere. For this reason, should overt military action be deemed necessary, Washington would be wise to make a serious effort to alleviate a possible backlash by explaining that its actions derived from a desire to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of the hard-liners who are despised by many Iranians for their involvement in repression at home and terrorism abroad. The US should take also steps to deter and/or disrupt Iranian attempts to retaliate through verbal and written warnings, military demonstrations, preventive arrests of Iranian agents, and other measures (Sokolski, 123).

Iran's Retaliatory Capacity

Should it choose to retaliate, Iran has several options: it could disrupt oil shipments from the Persian Gulf; attack U.S. Naval assets in the region; or engage in subversion and terrorism against U.S. allies and interests.

According to a recently published U.S. defense intelligence assessment, "Iran's navy . . . could stem the flow of oil from the Gulf for brief periods by employing a layered force of diesel-powered KIL0 submarines, missile patrol boats, naval mines, and sea and shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles." It is unclear, however, what Iranian objectives would be served by this course of action since such steps would likely invite reprisals against Iran's oil production infrastructure and exports via the Strait of Hormuz (which accounts for about 85 percent of Iran's foreign exchange earnings), causing grave harm to Iran's economy, which is the "Achilles' heel" for the clerical regime. This is an option of last resort for Iran, to be used only if denied the use of the strait, or if other vital interests were threatened (Sokolski, 124).

Successful U.S. prevention would require exceptionally complete intelligence data and reports near flawless military execution; and well thought post-strike diplomacy to mitigate an anti-American nationalist backlash, deter any form of retaliation, and, most importantly, ensure that military action does not eradicate the pro-American sentiment in Iran and the region, or disrupt the movement for governmental change in Iran. The complex, intimidating, and somewhat contradictory nature of these challenges necessitates and emphasizes the importance of exhausting diplomatic options before resorting to serious military action (Sokolski, 125).

2. Economic Relations

The Presidential decision to ban US imports of Iranian goods in 1987 had little impact on Iran's exports of oil. The estimated impact of sanctions on direct US-Iran trade indicates that sanctions caused

- A decrease in US exports to Iran from a high of \$5.2 billion in 1985 to a low of \$ 2.9 billion in 1994, second
- Imports from Iran were reduced from a maximum of \$ 5.6 billion in 1986 to a low of \$3.1 billion in 1993 and 1994 (Askari, 7).

Presently, there is no direct trade between Iran and US. But goods pass from the US to Iran through third parties, via a more expensive route, and vis versa. Actually, US sanctions on Iran have gone through various changes over the last twenty years. They were imposed to change Iranians policies, including:

- Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process.
- Its support to Hamas and Hizbullah.
- The acquisition of nuclear and ballistic weapons.
- Its support for terrorism.
- Open hostility to the US (Askari, 7).

In 1995, the US considered imposing unilaterally an embargo on Iran, but did not receive international backing and support.

As for Iran's response to international pressures, it may be seeking to overcome its impasse at home and its continuing difficulties with the US through the introduction of a

new social contract, in which reform would be reconfigured into the provision of social liberties and economic opportunities at the cost of limiting political freedoms (Ehteshami, p. 188).

3. Nuclear Energy

“We had intelligence reports that Iran had secret facilities, but the intelligence community refused to release the information so we could act on it and warn exporters”, recalls Michael Maloof, an operations officer in the United States Defense Trade Security Administration (DTSA) (Timmerman, 82).

The United States has been targeting suspected Iranian weapons producing plants--in particular, nuclear facilities--since the mid-1980's, confirmed Bruce Blair, a former strategic nuclear planner from the Brookings Institution (Timmerman, 181).

Washington concerns revolve Iran's three so-called “sins”:

- Its WMD programs.
- Its support for international and in particular Islamic Fundamentalism and terrorism.
- Its interference and opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process (Ehteshami, 189).

It is not surprising therefore to find both Washington and Tehran distrusting each other's motives, strategies for regional cooperation and efforts at confidence-building.

In his article “Iran – EU Nuclear Negotiation begins”, Kerr asserts that Washington has pushed many times for resolutions to impose sanctions on Iran (Kerr, 31).

One of these sanctions could be for example holding away aircrafts parts from Iran or rejecting its admission to the WTO. The Bush administration has proven that it desires to resolve the question of nuclear proliferation in Iran and in North Korea through the change of the regime. Should diplomatic means fail the relations between Iran and the U.S. would worsen and lead possibly to a clash.

According to an interview with the new president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a brilliant international interlocutor, he wished the relations with the US to be on a basis of equals, like US relations with other countries rather than classifying Iran as a part of the ‘axis of evil’. He wished both countries would follow international law as an effective

guideline on the issue of Iran developing a nuclear enrichment cycle (Weymouth, 45). He deliberately ignored the fact that International Law requires adherent members to abide by the provisions of all international treaties and agreement and to pledge themselves to peace not to wars, production, possession, threat and even possible use of offensive mass destruction weapons. Mr. Ahmadinejad has used all techniques and means in violation of international law by blackmailing the international community of states.

He and his team are using all violent and unfriendly means to perpetuate the Middle East Arab-Israeli conflict instead of acting as a true peace leader in the region. Should his intentions be peaceful why did Iran then seize and occupy those islands historically know as UAE territories? Why does it finance the Syrian regime and its ally in Lebanon the Shiite faction? Why doesn't he comply with the U.N. rules and allow the IAEA to properly inspect Iran's covert nuclear installations and activities?

US secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that countries such as Iran that do not have nuclear arms should give up the right to uranium enrichment for the sake of world peace and join the war against terrorism ("Rice", 1).

Iran is accused by many World leaders of supporting terrorism, in Lebanon, the West bank and Iraq. The US strategy has been so far based on the option of diplomacy rather than a military strike. The main fear remains, after all, that nuclear enrichment will ultimately lead to nuclear weaponry production. By then it will be too late to face and solve the problem.

In July 2005, the US announced that it would freeze the assets of any company doing business with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (Dickey, 36).

Washington considers sanctions against Iran more effective while its Europeans partners feel reluctant and unconvinced. It prefers a shorter timetable for imposing them if Iran does not fully comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency demands. By contrast, America's focus on Iran, while remaining uncommitted to global arms control treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has reinforced the impression by the non aligned nations that Washington follows a double faceted principle of "acceptable" and "unacceptable" proliferators (Kaye, 7). Beyond the issue of nuclear weapons, the US accuses Iran and Syria of supporting "terrorist groups". It considers the Iraqi war as necessary to prevent Islamic militants from gaining a foothold with a

sweeping aggressive ideology based on religion mandates war and killing against the non believers, infidels.

The U.S. should be guided by history, overall intelligence, and known facts, instead simply internal politics and secret intelligence.

Strong American leadership like the Bush administration is needed to watch partners and institutions while keeping countries away from the nuclear circle where proliferation has become inevitable and uncontrollable.

C. Iran and Europe

Europe and Russia should be ready to impose meaningful sanctions upon Iran in cooperation with Washington if the former persists in violating International agreements. To counteract this strategy and to gain more time the Iranians insist they are always ready to negotiate with the Europeans as long as it is along the framework of the IAEA. Transatlantic developments are of importance to Iran, for it was the Iranian Leader himself, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who in the late 1990's spoke of the EU as a firm "strategic partner" of the Islamic Republic (Ehteshami, 188).

Furthermore, to counterbalance the Israeli-Turkish cooperation and rapprochement, Iran tried to develop closer relations with Georgia, Armenia, and Greece, although so far no real fruits emerged yet from these alliances (Ehteshami, 189).

In October 2003, the Europeans sought a pledge from Iran to suspend its production of enriched uranium and sign the additional protocol to the NPT. Iran was accused by diplomats in Vienna of having broken IAEA centrifuge seals in Natanz, a nuclear facility located 250 km south of Tehran. This act was seen as a preliminary to Iran's resumption of manufacturing enriched uranium that is essential for the development of nuclear bombs ("European", 513).

European leaders were worried especially when the Iranians accused them of negating their part of the deal calling for the closure of the file leaving Iran free to conduct itself as it sees fit. Iran is aware that a serious breach of the deal with the Europeans would lead to the Security Council, imposing sanctions on Iran like those imposed on Saddam Hussein in Iraq during the 1990's ("European", 513). The Europeans and Americans are in full

agreement that Iran should not be allowed to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle, since it would enable it to produce enough weapons-grade material for a small arsenal within a short time, thus endangering all of Europe and rendering it a hostage to Iran's ambitions and future desires (Kaye, 4).

Western concerns have been heightened by a more than two-year-old IAEA investigation which revealed that Iran did conduct a variety of secret nuclear activities, while the Europeans were simply relying on trusting Tehran leadership's fake assurances. When faced with the facts Iran argues that it is willing to stop nuclear enrichment in return for economic rewards. What kind of economic aids and of what cost remains unclear? For what length of time? Will this economic aid remains the Iranian sword threatening its European victims?

What are the guarantees that while receiving and benefiting from such aides, Iran will not continue to enrich uranium, as it already did, in a clandestine manner until the bomb as a final product is produced? Who will then be the victor? If Iran truly claims that its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful use, why does it insist upon enriching uranium instead of using light water facilities?

Germany, Britain and France have so far failed to diplomatically persuade Iran to suspend enrichment although they have offered to provide assistance in the fields of trade, security and technology and to develop a strictly civilian nuclear program ("EU/Iran", 404). The following provides some indications about the EU's Balance of Trade (BoT) with Iran:

Table 8:

| | |
|--|--|
| The EU's BoT (counting all 25 member states) | €3,7bn. (2004) |
| the BoT (counting the 15 old member states) | €0,6bn (2003) |
| EU25 exports to Iran | 1,23 % of the EU's total exports in 2004 |
| Imports from Iran in 2004 | |
| Energy | (€6bn) |
| extent agriculture | (€401m) |

("The EU's Relations with Iran". EU External Relations. 1. December 2005. 6 February, 2006.)

On May 4, 1991, French Foreign minister Roland Dumas attended the Eurodif uranium enrichment consortium in Tehran. He then declared that “Iran is a market of 55 million inhabitants”. Consequently, he gave his blessing to an expansion of French technology in Iran (Timmerman, 85). French Foreign Trade Minister Francois Loos declared in Paris on November 15, 2004, that Iran ranks first among France Trade partners in the Middle East (Iran is, 1). The stumbling stone between European and Iranian economic relations today is Iran’s nuclear program. On February 16, 2006, France accused Iran of pursuing a secret military nuclear program.

Since October 2003, Iran and three members of the European Union (EU)--Britain, France, and Germany--have engaged in negotiations to ensure that Tehran will not develop nuclear weapons.

Unilaterally, Iran has repeatedly indicated that it intends to break up the terms of a November 2004 agreement between Iran and the EU during negotiations over the long-term fate of its nuclear program in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend all uranium-enrichment activities. Unfortunately, this agreement fell through as both parties were unable to reach permanent and viable solutions.

European negotiators sent a letter on May 11, 2005 to Iran's chief nuclear official, Hassan Rowhani, warning Tehran that if it restarted its nuclear activities, negotiations would end and “the consequences could only be negative for Iran”.

Representatives from the EU countries met in emergency with their American counterparts on August 9, 2005, whereby France and the US proposed referring the case to the Security Council due to Iran’s decision to pursue uranium enrichment (“News”, 9 August, 2005).

Late January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac declared that France could respond with nuclear weapons against any state-sponsored terror attack on France and Europe. The comments were seen by some analysts as a direct reference to Iran and a preventive warning against any future aggressive Iranian plans.

On November 15, 2004, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union (E3/EU), reaffirmed the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement of 21 October 2003 and decided to move forward,

implementing that agreement. There was an accord to suspend all enrichment related activities in Iran, on a voluntary basis (“Communication”, 3).

On January 12, 2006, the British, French and German foreign ministers said that negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program had reached a “dead end” and the Islamic republic should be referred to the U.N. Security Council. The action came two days after Iran broke U.N. seals at an uranium enrichment plant and said it was resuming nuclear research after a two-year freeze (“European”, 1).

Britain, France and Germany formally and officially asked the UN atomic watchdog to hold an emergency meeting on February 2, 2006 to debate Iran’s nuclear program. The ambassadors of the three European countries met in the Vienna-based IAEA headquarters and all signed the letter before it was submitted to their governments and to the UN (“EU”, 1) (See Appendix, 9).

Britain warned Iran on February 4, 2006 that the UN Security Council would almost certainly take action against it if it did not halt its nuclear program, and urged it to take advantage of a breathing space Europe is offering it (“Britain”, 1) (See Appendix, 4).

On February 4, 2006, the French government expressed its regrets that Tehran chose to limit its cooperation with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Authority, and called on it to stop its nuclear activities (“Britain”, 1).

D. Iran and Russia

During early 1995, Russia proceeded with its contract to help Iran build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Tensions rose with Russia when the Clinton administration learned in March–April 1995 that, as part of a secret protocol for the reactor sale contract, Russia had agreed to provide Iran with a gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility. Such a facility, though itself falls under IAEA inspection rights, is dedicated to the production of low-enriched (non-weapons-grade) uranium, but could indirectly enable Iran to build and operate a similar plants clandestinely to produce weapons-grade uranium. The United States was particularly troubled by the arrangements for the disposition of the plutonium-bearing spent fuel from Bushehr. Washington convinced Russia to stipulate to Iran that fuel from the reactor would be returned to Russia for processing (“Iran”. 261-262).

In July 28, 2003 reports by the *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*, showed that Iran was producing mass destruction weapons material with the help of Russia as the latter was assisting it precisely with the production of a Light Water Reactor at Bushehr and that it was committed to supply the fuel needed to run it. Russia claimed to be doubtful of Iran's goals and purposes to produce weapons of mass destruction ("Iran", 1).

Immediately, Iran started to receive fuel from Russia in 2005. Soon however, it decided to produce its own fuel, although it had a ten year contract with Russia for the supply of fuel ("Iran-August", 1). This could give Iran the power and enough time to build the bomb (Dickey, 36).

On February 21, 2006, Russia was hoping to find a solution with Iran, but according to the official Russian news agency ITAR-TASS, the issue seemed impossible as Iranian negotiator Ali Hosseini-Tash ruled out any proposal to relating "a moratorium on uranium enrichment". The Russians were caught between safeguarding their interests in Iran and cooperating with the Euro-American demands.

On one hand, Russia was worried that if it stops to provide fuel and cooperation to Iran other countries would do. As a way to safeguard Russia's interest should cooperation with Iran be continued, Russia would be the first to offer facilities, based on the October 21, 2003 signed memorandum by both countries.

On the other hand, any military strike on Iranian plants is not sure to succeed, because the Iranians may either be hiding their equipments in different areas or they may quietly thereafter rebuild all the destroyed sites. The Iranian population should be aware of what is happening and

should have a say about what is going on (Terrence, 12).

Baradei expressed his optimism that the talks between Iran and the EU negotiators would resume in November 2005. But he believed that a third party was needed to provide a "face-saving" way out of the impasse. Moscow was nominated as the mediator in resolving this impasse. Moscow has been at the center of the dispute since it built an \$ 800 million nuclear reactor in the Iranian city of Bushehr ("Russia and IAEA", 7).

In the meantime, if fuel is diverted from Bushehr plant after it is set online, nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski estimates that Iran could have an arsenal of 50 to 75 bombs by 2006 (Kondracke, 1).

On October 7, 2005, Russia's Foreign Minister dismissed speculation that Moscow might mediate between Iran and European negotiators on Tehran's disputed nuclear program. Sergy Lavrov declared that Russia is ready to make its contributions to this process, "working in parallel to achieve a result that is in everyone's interest" ("Russia and IAEA", 7).

On 13 February 2006, Iran postponed talks with Moscow on a plan that would calm down concerns about Tehran's use of nuclear fuel by enriching Iran's uranium on Russian soil. Moscow had proposed that Iran ship its uranium to Russia, where the latter would enrich it to a level suitable for nuclear reactors. It would then be returned to Iran to be used in its Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. The reactor is due to start up the same year 2006 (Karimi, 1).

E. Iran and China

"Iran's success in achieving a nuclear capability will depend, to a large extent, on the supply policies of Russia and China as well as on Iran's successful illicit acquisition of adequate quantities of weapons-usable fissile material" ("Iran". 255).

The Nuclear Technology Center at Esfahan was founded in the mid-1970s with the French assistance in order to provide training for the personnel who would be working with the Bushehr reactors. This Center currently operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. In 1992, Iran signed an agreement with China for building the reactors in Darkhovin, but the terms of the agreement have not yet been carried out by China who in 1991, provided Iran with uranium hexafluoride, a uranium compound, which is in gaseous state, and used to enrich uranium. This is subject to the IAEA safeguards and inspection. However, Iran recently acknowledged receiving, again in 1991, from China 1,000 kg of natural uranium hexafluoride, 400 kg of uranium tetrafluoride, and 400 kgs of uranium dioxide, without reporting them to the IAEA (Sahimi, 1). Simultaneously, Iran has been trying to acquire delivery vehicles for its future weapons.

Presently, it possesses about 300 Scud-Bs with a 300-kilometer range and 1,000-Kilogram payload; approximately 100 Scud-Cs with a 500-kilometer range. Having

received assistance from North Korean, Iran is now manufacturing its own Scuds. The country also has 200 Chinese-supplied CSS-8 missiles with an estimated range of 150 kilometers and a payload of 190 kilograms, purchased in late 1989 (“Iran”. 255).

For a decade starting in the mid-1980s China was a source of significant military assistance to Iran’s civil nuclear program. It reportedly trained Iranian nuclear technicians and engineers in China under a ten-year agreement for cooperation signed in 1990. China, also supplied Iran with two “mini” research reactors installed at Esfahan. In addition to a calutron, the type of equipment used in Iraq’s electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) enrichment program to separate weapons-grade uranium. Both countries claim that the aid has been used exclusively for peaceful purposes, in line with Iran’s NPT obligations and views (“Iran”. 260).

It was reported that during his visit to Iran in July 7, 1991, the Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China, signed agreements for military, economic, and financial benefits amounting to \$5 billion (Timmerman, 104).

Pakistan, an old friend of China, acted as the mediator between China and Iran, something that China preferred operating via Pakistan instead of directly with Iran regarding the nuclear merchandises. Iran made sure to keep China as a friend and an ally at the UN, since the biggest threat directed against Iran will be on the diplomatic front by taking its case before the Security Council. Iran lost no time and regardless of the price to secure the Chinese veto in the Security Council (Dickey, 36).

Although the Security Council has the power to impose political and economic sanctions on Iran, however due to divisions among its five permanent members — the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China — on how to deal with Tehran; especially when China gets 12 percent of its oil imports from the Islamic Republic. It is no secret that by 1993, China had become a net importer of oil and had begun to seek stable supplies of Middle Eastern crude.

China, by contrast, “doesn’t want to mess up relations with Washington. It is unwilling to irritate the United States by adamantly supporting Iran”, said Yin Gang, a researcher at the School of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at Beijing.

This Chinese cover up gives Iran which nowadays, is full of Chinese workers and companies helping in its development the needed power to defy Western demands and pursue its nuclear program.

This booming economic relationship between China and Iran is one reason why China was so reluctant to vote for referring Iran to the Security Council. China has been asking for patience, diplomacy and negotiation before any sanction would be imposed on Tehran.

Already US sanctions against Iran helped Chinese companies to move in and establish inside filling the western vacuum. China is number two foreign supplier to Iran after Saudi Arabia while Iranian crude reached the rate of 450,000 barrels production each day (Johnson, 2).

The Chinese in the statement of their Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan on a news conference on January 26, 2006 supported the Russian proposal to enrich uranium on Russian soil and qualified it as a good attempt to break this stalemate (Buckley, 1). “We hope all sides will use their wisdom to provide new proposals that will create conditions for reviving negotiations”, Kong said (Buckley, 2).

Russia and China are calling for peaceful solutions before turning Iran’s file over to the Security Council. China agreed to referring Iran’s case to the Security Council on the one condition that no decision would be taken until March 2006 following the meeting of The International Agency (IAEA).

In the meantime, China is seeking to sign a contract allowing Chinese companies to develop an Iranian oil field, as well as a 25-year deal to buy up to 100 billion dollars of Iranian natural gas (“China Urges”, 1).

To avoid public debate of Iran’s nuclear program and possibly a showdown at the UN, on 21 February 2006, China urged Iran to end its uranium enrichment activities and to focus on making progress on talks with Russia to solve the issue. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao stated that: “Now that we see difficulties in seeking a solution to this issue, we are willing to stay in close contact with all parties concerned so as to continue to seek the resolution of this issue within the framework of the IAEA” (“China Urges”, 1).

Chapter 5

World Security

A. Nuclear Iran and World Security

1. International Terrorism

Terrorist attacks have increased in this decade. The threat to New York is very credible and real following the last subway incident on October 06, 2005. Al-Qaeda terrorists oppose Western democracy trends in Muslim countries especially the Arab World. By definition, terrorism has no nationality, nor religion; it is beyond geographical and social borders.

In Europe, for example, the enemy is from within, made up of young men often born of foreign parents and raised in working-class neighborhoods in the suburbs or the industrial cities. Consequently, urban terrorists proceed to master the knowledge of how to make hand bombs and how to carry out suicide operations.

It is reported that in a study of 1,160 recent French converts to Islam, 23% identified themselves as Salafists, meaning members of a sect, historically associated with violence and extremism (Powell, 27). These statistics raise a legitimate question,

Why are so many West European Muslims responding to extremism? Four major causes are given to explain such phenomenon:

- Severe unemployment leading to poverty and socio-economic crimes especially among young Muslims of 25-30 years of age.
- The Muslim youth inability and failure to adopt to their environment, especially as they feel lost by not belonging to their ancestral country of origin, nor to the new society they live in. They feel and act as rejected strangers in both societies.
- Internationally, they oppose the war in Iraq led by what they consider “ruthless, and materialistic Western powers”. As a result they believe that, it is God’s orders

for them to rise in support of their Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Lebanon and so forth.

- Last, in their psycho-social and economic disarray they use peddle drugs as well as indulge in sexual abuse violence and crimes.

The July 7, 2005 attacks in Britain were reported as retaliation for Britain's support of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These Muslim youth account in Britain alone for 28% of the poor, and mostly unemployed. They are angry with Muslim leaders whom they consider and accuse of being puppets of the West. This caused them sometimes to write some satirical songs to criticize the Islamic world or express youthful diapproval, such as in this paragraph from Blakstone Raps in a song entitled *Traitors*:

“King Fahd... what is it exactly that you do?
Custodians of the misery that you put us through
Meanwhile we are dying whilst you live off oil we accrue” (Powell, 28).

Some analysts believe that the West and particularly the US would be unable to respond in the case of a nuclear terrorist attack. They can only provide a website to provide information in case of an attack. Washington is highly concerned about its war with terrorism. The Bush administration takes it very seriously. It is ready to adopt any policy that would spare the world this calamity. Yet there is no clear-cut policy that would be able to prevent such violent crimes. For example, former Senate Intelligence chairman Bob Graham called for issuing an ultimatum to Syria to shut down Hezbollah camps in Lebanon or the US will do it militarily. This threat has not been put into effect because of its complicated ramifications, costs and even determined failure (Kondracke, 1). Timmerman claims that mosques in Brooklyn and Jersey City were zones where Osama Bin Laden and Afghan-Arab networks were raising funds and recruiting for Jihad turning Muslim youth more activist and violent (Timmerman, 179).

According to Washington journalist Mustafa Malik, who conducted fieldwork on Islamic movements in the Middle East as a research associate for the University of Chicago Middle East Center, many Muslim youths torn from their ethnic communities through modernization processes are “streaming” back to Islamist groups, seeking recognition by their leaders and families and ultimately by Allah who will reward them indefinitely with

pleasure and happiness. They are eager to choose the job of soldiering for Him (Malik, 10).

B. International Peace

In the May 2005 Conference, held in New York City, world leaders expressed great concerns about nuclear dangers, both new and old, but were reluctant to adopt clear and affective unified strategies to combat and prevent such dangers.

In July 2005, the US Senate agreed to allocate to the Bush administration \$4 million to review the feasibility of nuclear dugout. The UK in turn is actively investigating new warheads to replace those carried by Trident submarines (Edwards, 6). These policies could drive the superpowers back into a new era of arms race generated by terrorism.

A strategic Defense Initiative did already emerge in 1983 based on unilateralist attitudes and policies laid at the core of the Reagan approach to deal with nuclear threat. Mutual nuclear balance and deterrence were denounced. Security was to be built upon an ever-increasing technological American lead in world affairs. Consequently, modern ballistic missile defense aspires at reaching a complex of capabilities, revolving mainly around the destruction of hostile missiles at great distances away from the targeted country. In some cases, the aim was even to destroy such missiles over the territory of the aggressing state. In this fight against international terrorism, the international system itself proved to be inadequate and unprepared to take action to resolve many of the present news headline-grabbing events—such as violent wars of secession and self-determination movements; xenophobic hostilities against refugee and immigrant groups; contraband in MDW whether nuclear, chemical, and biological; criminal activities of transnational drug syndicates; international terrorism. The increase in these wars, clearly prove the failure of International organizations in facing them.

The danger of terrorism is facilitated by new technologies especially in transportation and communication. The Internet plays a leading role in providing networks for terrorists to meet and provide information for each other as well as setting up violent tactics and strategies.

Facing this great danger to human survival, there seems to be many differences between the world leaders themselves who so far failed to clearly define terrorism. As a result, the UN and other international organizations and agencies are incapable of proposing and putting into effect solutions and remedies. The irony in this war of terror is that no country today is safe from it, since it is hard to control madness.

The challenge to contemporary political leaders, strategists and theorists is to elaborate a comprehensive and an appropriate strategy that can provide a basis for controlling international conflicts.

The main objectives and values the international community is requested to protect and achieve can be summarized as follows:

- Securing the survival of the planet earth with its variety of species and in particular the human one. Survival means safety and health of both: the body and the mind. Modern offensive weapons do not protect nor spare any living being including the environment as a whole with its flora and animals.
- Strictly implementing the outlawing of killing and brutal abuse of humans such as mental and physical torture often leading to death. Some states and cultures disregard and violate these values, even though, they are signatories to international status and treaties forbidding genocide, violence and abuse of basic human rights.
- Improving the environmental and socio-economic conditions for healthy subsistence of all humans, while reducing poverty and combating disease and other physical and mental threats.
- Preserving cultural diversity. This fact requires maintaining and preserving considerable political socio-cultural pluralism.
- Preserving the planet's basic natural ecologies and environment including the protection of the biosphere conditions which is essential for the human survival. Maintenance of the delicate balance in the universe is essential to its perpetuity.
- Enhancing and sustaining accountability. States or private actors must be held responsible and accountable through an international vehicle for harms they inflict on people: whether groups or individuals.

Ironically, for nearly four decades, most foreign policy officials and scholars, focused their writings and calls to enhance world security, each according to his/her private beliefs and rigid understanding of the “truth”, of “what is right or wrong”, “ethical or immoral”. Each preaches and acts as though he/she controls the ultimate solution. When all fail a common enemy is always ready to be blamed for all ills in the world. The US is the chosen enemy for the 20th and 21st centuries, “America, America is the evil enemy”. World Security policy and peace thus break out of the confines of “geopolitics” as respective governments focus on military balances of power, alliance relationship, traditional “collective security” measures, economic control of world resources and raw materials.

The situation is aggravated by the flow of refugees in certain regions, threats of terrorism, racial conflicts, and genocides and world hunger all of them greatly contribute to the expansion of stress among peoples on this globe, who search for serious and effective solutions under UN auspices.

The nuclear revolution had the ironic consequence of making world powers prime objectives and instruments in their conduct to pursue and defend their national interests even when nuclear technology is used for peaceful means, ignoring the catastrophic results of such conduct.

The winds from the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 carried radioactive pollution into many countries and affected million of people’s lives while the world is unaware of the damages inflicted upon the flora, animals and atmospheric changes or conditions.

World Security lies at the intersection between threats and capacities. From states down to individuals, equilibrium between threats and capabilities offers the potentials for peace and prosperity.

As a result, every international crisis warrants a different approach to its solution. Iran like each country struggles to preserve the prerogatives its religious elites expect and preach so that its masses believe in, relying on makeshift policies, recycled capacities, and selected custom made techniques. President Jacques Chirac of France, former Foreign Minister Herve de Charette, and ex-Defense Minister Charles Millon often spoke in the late 1990s of their concern for Mediterranean security and “conflicts in the South” to include terrorists of Islamic origin, in addition to the uncontrolled migration from

Muslim Northern Africa to Europe. A sector of French public nowadays views immigration as a tool aiming to destroy national culture, and with “globalization”, takes away jobs from native original citizens.

Furthermore, the large US military presence in the Persian Gulf region is viewed by the Middle Eastern populace as a design and intention to protect US access to the region’s vast oil reserves, and change the Muslim culture in favor of Israel.

The fading of European colonialism in the Middle East following World War II coincided with a powerful current of national assertiveness in Iran and the Arab countries which were rapidly modernizing. The young populations of this region need education and employment, both being in short supply, a phenomenon that is pressing with short time to be incorporated into citizenship or prevailing political international norms.

Furthermore, the growing recognition of the gaps in the nonproliferation regime prompted the UN led by US effort to strengthen international nonproliferation controls. This effort entailed the formation by the leading Western industrial and nuclear suppliers of know-how powers to establish severe international standards to guide and control exports of nuclear technology. The result so far has been characterized by failure, inefficiency, ambiguity and further threats to world security.

The 1980s, for example, brought continued evidence of clandestine proliferation activities by countries who signed the treaty. Iraq was a case engaged in manufacturing secret weapons program prompting Israel to bomb the French-designed Osirak reactor at Baghdad in June 1981. This flagrant and unchecked violation of the NPT made that nuclear threats fall into two basic categories. First nuclear terrorism poses the foremost delicate threat. Assuming that al Qaeda or another group do possess such a weapon, deterring or preventing an attack will be hard to achieve. A second danger stems from the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to irresponsible and fanatic governments. In the long term, the danger is real and imminent to all including rogue states as well as US allies.

The Bush administration should be credited for rejecting a status quo that left unchecked the terrorists and weapons of mass destruction threats to international law and peace, as it adopted a new, three-point strategy:

- Going on the offensive against the terrorists.
- Openly confronting the “axis of evil” states, and

- Proclaiming a doctrine of pre-emption policy.

The main problem here lies in that the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been interpreted as giving all states the right to acquire and develop so called nuclear facilities for peace which include the same materials used for the making of the destructive bomb. Thus, often states use this excuse to secretly produce the bomb and achieve superpower nuclear status.

In the case of Iran, it is Tehran's failure to disclose uranium enrichment activities that put it at odds with the IAEA inspection system.

The NPT treaty has proven not to be effective in preventing such states from producing nuclear weapons under the pretext of enriching uranium for peaceful purpose. Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and now Iran are live examples. The unchecked outcome will drive the World into fear and anxiety, nuclear blackmail and worst a new world order ruled by terror.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

On January 10th 2006, Iran decided to break IAEA seals on its nuclear facilities in Tehran. This prompted an international outcry starting with Britain, as Tony Blair, British Prime Minister qualified such action to cause “real and serious alarm”. Calls were issued by various world leaders to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

Alarmed, the U.S. response was quick and firm. Washington warned that if Iran continued on its present course there would be no other choice but to refer the matter to the Security Council” to impose sanctions.

Some leaders argued to the contrary. German deputy foreign minister Gernot Erler, at first, cautioned against referring the dispute to the Security Council because it might destabilize the Middle East. Chinese and Russian leaders express support for diplomatic channels to be used.

The IAEA, in turn, accused Iran of planning to carry out small-scale uranium enrichment even though the Iranians, from time to time, claimed that their activities would not involve enrichment. Ironically, while Iran continues to insist that it is only interested in enriching uranium to lower levels to produce electricity, its former President Hashemi Rafsanjani clearly declared that Western Sanctions will not impede Iran from resuming research at its uranium enrichment plant for all purposes.

On January 12, 2006, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, British counter part Jack Straw in Berlin where, together, they issued the statement that talks with Iran had reached a dead end and agreed to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions. Iran’s response was quick. It threatened to end all voluntary cooperation with the UN nuclear “watchdog”, the IAEA, if the matter is referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. Worse, Tehran passed a law the previous year requiring the government to block intrusive inspections of Iran’s

facilities if the UN nuclear agency refers the Iranian program to the UN Security Council. US secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, responded to Iranian threats of escalation on January 12, 2006, following the declaration made by the EU3 that the US fully supports the decision announced by the Foreign Minister of the UK, France and Germany and by EU Council Secretary President Javier Solana ... Washington rejected all excuses, pretexts and rationale for the Iranian regime to resume uranium enrichment.

On February 4, 2006 the International Atomic Energy Agency referred the Iranian case to the Security Council.

Iran's response 10 days later was that it would continue to enrich uranium despite UN appeals. The Russians stepped in and offered to meet with Iranian officials to discuss ways to diffuse the crisis, but Tehran refused to cooperate, broke the seals of the UN and started uranium enrichment in Natanz plant.

US President, Georges W. Bush, met with Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, on February 13, 2006 hoping that Tehran would reconsider and take steps showing that diplomacy is not dead before the IAEA meeting in March 2006.

In the meantime, the Security Council postponed taking action until the IAEA's director general, Mohamed El Baradei, presents an update on Iran's activities by the end of March 2006. His report will include confirmation by IAEA monitors that Iran began truly feeding uranium hexafluoride gas into a handful of centrifuges, which spin the material at supersonic speeds to create enriched uranium.

The disagreement between Europeans and Iranians on 4 of March 2006 happened before the meeting session by the 35-country board of the IAEA opening in Vienna on 6 of March 2006. In early February 2006, the IAEA unanimously voted to refer Iran's case to the SC, an act that reflected doubt about Iran's willingness to cooperate and stop production of nuclear weapons. The decision permitted the Security Council to act against Iran following grace period of one month to give Iran a chance to compromise and reach an agreement. Russia's position on the SC Council involvement is one of hesitation and lack of support, although like the Europeans, the Russians had demanded that Iran stops uranium production at Natanz. When Mr. Larijani visited Russia on March 2, 2006, the Russians rejected the same plan he later presented to the Europeans, participants in the March 3, 2006 meeting.

Russia is afraid that a SC resolution would lead to a non return move toward sanctions. They opt for more negotiations with Iran for a possible face-saving by having Russia enrich Iran's uranium on Russian soil and under Russian control. That way would allow Iran to continue to operate its Esfahan plant, which transforms unprocessed uranium into a type that is ready to be enriched. This Russian proposal is by no means to be considered by the US and its European partners as a permanent solution; rather a transitory one until a final one is reached. Iran could at any time stop slipping unprocessed uranium to Russia or even worse there is no tangible guarantee that Tehran would not enrich uranium in a clandestine manner.

By forbidding the inspectors from entering into Iran, it becomes very difficult for the IAEA to provide any assurance that there is no parallel or secret nuclear program taking place. For instance, on March 6, 2006, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei spoke to the press about Iran's nuclear program, before the opening of the Agency's Board of Governors meeting in Vienna the following week.

He expressed fear that Iran appeared determined to expand its uranium enrichment program and was planning to start setting up thousands of uranium-enriching centrifuges in the year 2006. In the meantime, Tehran's threats to world economies and security hardened.

Referral to Security Council, Tehran claims, would definitely be a setback to the discussion and the talks. To have a nuclear program is Iran's God-given right, and no country will give up such a right. Therefore, Tehran will definitely resume enrichment if it is referred to the Security Council.

The U.S. called by contrast for the use of all tools to address the threat of an Iranian nuclear program, since Iran refused to respond and alleviate the concerns of the international community. The Iranian regime must be made aware that if it continues down the path of international isolation, it will suffer tangible and painful consequences.

In the morning of March 7, 2006, President Ahmadinajad raised the tone not only in full defiance of the Security Council, but he went even further and called for compensation from the IAEA for having stopped Iran from enrichment for the past two years. The IAEA should compensate Iran for causing damage to the development of its science, technology and economy.

Furthermore, some scholars fear that Iran's neighbor Iraq, under a Shiite dominated government instead of being turned into a settlement of non religious democracy challenging the obsessive rulers of the Islamic state to the East, could become an Iranian-aligned extremist God's rule state, challenging the non religious Arab regimes to the West. They consider the latest US backing of India's nuclear program would weaken attempts to limit in Iran, whose nuclear program is progressively fueling an angry Muslim world.

They feel that it was the wrong message to send right now, just days before Washington and its European allies were to ask the IAEA to refer Iran's case to the United Nations Security Council for further action.

The facts remain in this matter that Iran should not pursue enrichment on any scale, because this will allow it to master the technology, complete the fuel cycle, and then that technology can easily be applied to a clandestine program for making nuclear weapons.

Moscow offered an additional plan allowing Tehran to be able to do research on the enrichment process but without gaining the technology it needed for large-scale enrichment for bomb use.

Lavrov was believed to be referring that Russia would insist on full suspension of enrichment by Iran, in order to start talks. The latter persists on refusing the Russian initiative which as stated does not by itself permanently resolve the problem.

At the UN, the IAEA could call first for "presidential declaration" advising Iran to listen to its calls to stop enrichment and work out with inspectors. Sanctions will come as a second step.

The general agreement now is that Iran should not be permitted to have nuclear weapons otherwise face severe consequences if it persists in challenging the international community.

Lately, the US military asserted that there have been some improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and weapons that believed to be traceable back to Iran.

The British accusation on October 2005 that Iran had given the techniques for bomb attacks on British troops in southern Iraq raised heated questions although Iran denied that it is in any way responsible for supplying that technology.

The time has come now for the Security Council to act. The U.N. and world leadership are faced with the choice either, to reinforce the authority of the IAEA and its board to implement international rules and laws and prevent future catastrophes, or act indifferently, and open up the way for nuclear rearmament race.

Iran, being the third largest producer within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), threatened to use oil prices and production as a weapon against Europe, China or India if the UN applies sanctions against it.

Iran claims that it needs to protect itself against those regional and international actors it considers are enemies; consequently, it is a matter of Iranian national security as well as national and religious pride to develop its nuclear weapons and secure its national interests. Tehran's concerns and fears are clearly indicated in various speeches and declarations by Iranian leaders. The focus applies to five major factors:

1. The Israeli threat which Tehran considers as the primary danger to the region and to Islam. For Tehran, Israel is a nuclear power. It is religiously fanatic as its people claim to be the privileged and chosen people of God destined to rule the world by destroying all other religions while enslaving their followers. Iran, even claims that the Jewish holocaust by Nazi Germany never took place and that it was a fictitious creation by the Jews and their allies. Israel's aims are to politically, economically and militarily dominate the region. Examples are cited in the Israeli handling of the Iraqi nuclear power plant, the wars and defeats dealt to the Arab countries and the oppressive policies applied to the Palestinians.
2. The American Satan which is determined to rule the world and police it, allied with the Israelis against Islam. Washington intends to weaken and slowly transform it into a secular ideology under the pretext of defending human rights and democracy. Washington's first objective is to destroy Muslim culture and religion by introducing its own and consequently control the wealth and people of the region. Washington has been able to

rally around its policies Western European countries. In Tehran's views the American-European alliance is organized by Satan and his army of renegades. Luckily, Iran has some friend such as China, Russia, North Korea and others.

3. Iran claims that its major regional enemy is a Sunni ruled Iraq. It is hard to forget its war with Saddam, the chemical weapons used and its humiliating defeat. Being the promoter and defender center and authority of Shiism, Iran has little trust in its Sunni regional neighbors who, it claims would use its weakness to revive the old and traditional religious conflict. Consequently, it must prepare itself to crush any such future attempt and better prevent a possible renewal of the conflict by being militarily superior. Tehran will act as the protector of the Shiites' interests in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Gulf States, Syria and Lebanon.
4. Becoming the dominant power in the Gulf and the region. As a superpower in the region, Iran will in fast control the entire economic wealth and the military security of the region. In short, US navy will no longer be allowed to enter, nor station in the Middle East. Foreign cultural, religious, social and economic influence in the region will be reduced to its minimum. As a result, a new era of modern Muslim Caliphate will be established under the nuclear umbrella of Iran. The purity and orthodoxy of Islam will be protected.
5. The right to parity with other powers world wide. Tehran feels it has all the legal, ethical, and political rights to be a respected member of the nuclear club similar to Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and the superpowers themselves. It has legitimate rights to self defense in a world of conflicts that offer no international protection guarantees to the small states. Based on the above listed factors, it becomes very clear that Iran is

determined to produce MDW weapons as soon as possible constituting imminent threats to world security and peace.

These threats are living proofs why leaving a country like Iran with nuclear weapons is so dangerous because its intentions are not to serve peace rather to arm and hold the world hostage to its demands.

Oil provisions are rigid internationally and prices already are very high. Even if the United States and Europe do not buy oil directly from Iran, analysts feel that any Iranian effort to squeeze world supplies and prices would affect oil charges in those countries. Furthermore, Iran influences fanatics groups in Iraq, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and the Islamic militant group Hamas, and others classified by the U.S. State Department as terrorist organizations.

According to Western intelligence Tehran possesses plans that could only be used to make nuclear warheads, links between its nuclear programs and the military, and its determination to develop a large-scale enrichment program that could be misused to make nuclear arms.

Experts have suggested two general proposals for dealing with the Iranian case as well as any future cases with other countries:

- The IAEA was asked to adopt the 1997 Model Additional Protocol with its safeguard standards referring to inspections and remote monitoring; and
- The guarantee of nuclear fuel supply by the UN (IAEA) to countries so that they would have no need to reprocess their own.

Any solution to this international problem requires a clear strategy of rules, laws and regulations as well as proper means and vehicle to implement them, including unfriendly means like sanctions or even intervention. The present Iran challenge to the world must be dealt with very seriously and in the shortest time limit. There are many suggestions and proposals offered. Some may bear immediate results; others aim for a longer term.

A. Regime Change in Iran

Regime change from within allows often a country to solve its problems with another state by removing the offensive leadership from power and replacing it with a more moderate one.

According to the Bush administration, regime change could be fast and effective. Its tools vary between military intervention, political and economic isolation. Regime replacement however is much more difficult as in the case of Saddam Hussein because it requires military invasion which has high costs; and with the presence of nuclear weapons the threat of failure could be even higher. A regime change may be achieved in various ways:

1. Unfriendly and Military Means of Regime Change

Though some US voices have been raised in favor of a military strike against Iran nuclear facilities, such an attack would undoubtedly prompt Iran to use all its considerable influence among Shiite Muslims in Iraq to undermine US goals there. In other words, the West is in any delay kept subject to Iranian blackmail and is held hostage. Consequently, Iran would defy all laws and acquire nuclear weapons by “hook or crook”. Washington is presently subjected to two opposite policies called for by the Democratic and the Republican parties.

The Democrats represented by Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee claim that there are sensitive elements in Iran’s nuclear program. Consequently, these facilities should be militarily attacked to dramatically delay development.

He accused the Bush Administration for its reluctance in handling the Iranian file for the last four years. The Republicans represented by the Senator John McCain of Arizona refer to the military strike by the US against Iran as the last means for deterring the latter from obtaining nuclear weapons. Two kinds of strikes can be distinguished:

- Pre emptive strike: when it is confirmed that the danger is near and there is no other means to stop it; then the only option would be to strike before being struck
- Preventive strike: this type may usually fall under aggression; therefore it requires an international consensus through the UN Security Council. Often it is not easy

to secure such international support. It runs the risk of failure especially if the nuclear facilities are hidden and protected.

In the case of Iran, any attack by a third party like the US or Israel would be preventive, having a difficult task because Iran's nuclear facilities are widely scattered and the intelligence information provided so on its nuclear program appear inadequate.

In the case of such a preventive attack, Iran might retaliate in different ways aggravating the situation and causing an international crisis. Strategists believe that Tehran would

- Reconstruct its facilities in a short time.
- Hide them in secure and defensible places.
- Retaliate through surrogates such as Hizbullah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations against Israel, the US interests and possibly European ones.
- Cause instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and others...
- Raise the prices of oil to an unprecedented and dangerous level.
- Unite the Iranian population behind the regime; and
- Rally the support of world wide Shiism.

The adoption of such a solution to the problem is risky unless it is well planned and properly calculated with a follow-up through new and clearly established international rules and treaties.

2. Diplomacy or Economic Sanctions

Another alternative is diplomacy offering economic benefits to Iran if it clearly cooperates otherwise suffer economic sanctions if it does not. There are many talks about applying sanctions on Iran to secure its compliance with the IAEA's rules and authority. Sanctions might be applied including cutting diplomatic relations, and refusing to buy Iranian oil which could have undesirable effects on the West. The dangers of such options: first, Iran would be isolated leading to the loss of first hand and direct knowledge of what is going on in Iran. Second oil prices may also rise to very high level threatening the world economy.

Since Iran believes that nuclear weapons are a deterrent factor and a means to acquire regional power and control, it would be a great error in judgment to think that Tehran will ever honor its agreements for the peaceful use of its nuclear technology. It has already failed to fulfill its obligation and notify the IAEA of its uranium enrichment activities as it is required when it signed the NPT. Iran and North Korea will set a dangerous international example unless they are punished. Sanctions should be studied as to the timing of application and overall efficiency. To reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapon, a proposal has been made by the superpowers to offer the needed nuclear fuel for peaceful use, so that the country concerned may not choose to enrich uranium by itself. Then the process and danger of nuclear weapons would be put temporarily under control.

There is a unanimous agreement that nuclear weapons are damaging to the whole environment and that the countries that possess them should disarm. A clear policy is highly needed for managing the nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes; especially when nuclear weapons are kept in hidden and insecure locations or placed in densely populated cities, vulnerable to possession by terrorist groups.

3. Change of Government

In Iran's case the solutions to attract it to stop nuclear enrichment in the author's belief is to have a change of government from within, taking away the power from the clerics, especially the Council of Guardians, while simultaneously isolating Iran politically and economically. A world wide campaign against the practices and policies of the regime would be effective stressing Iran's oppression of human rights and the opposition, hunger and famine of the peoples, the isolation of Iran through travels ban, economic boycott and funds' freeze.

Two to three years of the industrial-scale moratorium would support IAEA investigations in Iran and 5 to 6 years more would be sufficient to rebuild international confidence and prevent a possible catastrophic tragedy.

It is evident that all offered solutions to the Iranian crisis based on the change of the regime, will only be temporarily with unpredictable solutions that might in the long term

lead to more intense religious, cultural and military conflicts in the region and world wide. There will always be other Ahmadinajad. A regime change will not guarantee the removal of the causes of proliferation and the quest by a radical and militant Muslim to rearm.

The author suggests in addition to the above offered solutions, the creation of a package that would include:

1. Urgent solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this would require the sincere determination by the US, EU and Russia as sponsors who truly desire a solution. Efforts should be intensified to have the Israelis, the Palestinians, and Syrians gather in an interrupted meeting under their mediation assisted by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to find permanent solutions and reach a final and lasting peace agreement. In the first stage and an initial part of the peace process a joint international force of 30 to 40,000 troupes fully equipped having full authority will be sent to the Middle East to disengage and maintain peace between all three parties guaranteeing their borders. In the second stage, following the signing of peace between the parties an agreement for demilitarizing the entire Middle East region from all WMD whether chemical, biological and nuclear will be negotiated and implemented. This solution would bring peace to the region, prevent a possible WWII, and promote international economic development. Naturally, offenders must understand and be convinced that they will be severely sanctioned internationally even with forceful action.
2. Address the concept of creating a regional defense strategy whose main role would be to preserve regional peace to include all parties Arabs, Iranians and Israelis with Superpowers assistance.
3. Reach an international protocol to respect cultural and religious practices and beliefs of all humans.
4. Revised all international treaties and policies relating to WMD and the proliferation of weapons, so that no future cases such as those of North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel and Iran might happen. International rules and regulations must be clear and enforceable without exception. Nuclear

technology for peace can be placed under the UN and offered to any state that requires it under strict and non-negotiable UN supervision and control through the IAEA.

The International and regional overall costs of denying Iran the acquisition of nuclear weapons constitute in the long run lesser threats and dangers leading to wider international conflicts that could bring death to 2/3 of all living beings . The longer the superpowers remain hesitant in resolving this problem, the more difficult its solution will ^{be} and more effective Iran's threat to defend itself and act as it pleases. Posterity will not forgive those who in one way or another encouraged nuclear proliferation or failed to act once for all to put an end to it.

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Appendix


The Map of Iran




<http://www.maps4free.com/map-of-iran.shtml>

Scuds

SCUD-A



SCUD-B/C



<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/r-11.htm>>

Operating Nuclear Power Reactors in the World

Total 435 Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, 30 under construction, end 1998.



<<http://www.uic.com.au/uran.htm>>

4 February, 2006 IAEA
Resolution



Derestricted 4 February 2006

(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 4 February 2006)

Board of Governors

GOV/2006/14

Date: 4 February 2006

Original: English

For official use only

The adopted agenda
(GOV/2006/13)

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006

The Board of Governors,

- (a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,
- (b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,
- (c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
- (d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
- (e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as a special verification case,
- (f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
- (g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,
- (h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67),

(i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director General in GOV/2005/67),

(j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF₆ to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms,

(k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,

(l) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and

(m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for Iran to:

- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
- reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
- ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
- pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
- implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;

2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;

3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;

4. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on



Information Circular

INFCIRC/666

Date: 3 February 2006

General Distribution

Original: English

**Communication dated 2 February 2006 received
from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Agency**

The Secretariat has received a Note Verbale dated 2 February 2006 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), attaching a letter to the Director General from the Resident Representative of Iran, conveying the text of a message to the Director General from Dr. Larjani, Secretary of the Supreme Security Council of Iran.

The Note Verbale and, in accordance with the request of the Permanent Mission, its attachment are reproduced herein for the information of Member States.

In the name of God



Permanent Mission of
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Heinest. 19/111 A-1020 Vienna/Austria
Phone: (0043-1) 214 09 71 Fax: (0043-1) 214 09 73 E-mail: PM.Iran_IAEA@chello.at

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No. 30/2006

February 2, 2006

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency presents its compliments to the Agency's Secretariat and has the honour to request the letter of Ambassador Soltanich together with the enclosed text of the message of H.E. Dr. Larijani, the Secretary of Supreme Security Council of Islamic Republic of Iran to the Director General of the IAEA dated February 2, 2006, to be published as an official INPCIRC document and make it available to the public through the IAEA website.

The Permanent Mission of Islamic Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Agency's Secretariat the assurances of its highest consideration.



Secretariat
Attn: Mr. Kwaku Aning
Secretary,
IAEA, P.O. Box 100,
A-1400 Vienna

24 September 2005 Resolution



IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

Derestricted 24 September 2005

(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 24 September 2005)

Board of Governors

GOV/2005/77

Date: 24 September 2005

Original: English

For official use only

Item 6(d) of the agenda
(GOV/2005/70)


Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005

The Board of Governors.

- (a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 11 August 2005 (GOV/2005/64), 29 November 2004 (GOV/2004/90), 18 September 2004 (GOV/2004/79), 18 June 2004 (GOV/2004/49), 13 March 2004 (GOV/2004/21), 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69), the statement of the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072) and the Chairman of the Board's conclusions of March 2005 (GOV/OR.1122) and of June 2005 (GOV/OR.1130),
- (b) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
- (c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
- (d) Recalling Iran's failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214) with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored, as reported by the Director General in his report GOV/2003/75 dated 10 November 2003 and confirmed in GOV/2005/67, dated 2 September 2005,
- (e) Recalling also that, as deplored by the Board in its resolution GOV/2003/81, Iran's policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement,

Documents



Underground production halls of the Natanz centrifuge enrichment facility.
(Timmerman, R. Kenneth. Countdown to Crisis- The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran. first ed. New York: Crown Forum, 2005. 363.)

KEY IRANIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

Uranium Fuel Cycle—Recently declared facilities

| TYPE | LOCATION | SAFEGUARDS STATUS |
|--|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| Uranium mine | Saghand (Yazd) | Not under safeguards |
| Work began in the early 1990s; Iran claims full production to begin in 2006, at 50 tons/year. Visited by IAEA inspectors in 2004. | | |
| Milling plant | Ardakan (Yazd) | Not under safeguards |
| Annual production of fifty tons of yellowcake from the nearby Saghand mine. Under construction in early 2005; production planned for 2006. | | |
| Uranium mine & mill | Gchine (Bandar Abbas) | Not under safeguards |
| Iran claimed this mine and milling plant produced only a "few hundred kilograms" of yellowcake. Dismantled before IAEA inspectors visited in 2004. Status of uranium unknown. | | |
| Centrifuge production | Kala Electric Company (Tehran) | Additional protocol |
| Manufacture of centrifuge components; centrifuge assembly and testing; pilot enrichment plant. Declared to the IAEA in 2003 after its existence was revealed by the MEK. Iran cleaned up the site in early 2003, while delaying IAEA visits. Equipment moved to Pars Trash (Tehran). Iran admitted centrifuge work began at this site in 1995; a subsequent declaration admitted work began in 1987. Two associated workshops—Farayand Technique and Pars Trash—also handled centrifuge manufacturing. | | |
| Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) | Isfahan | Additional protocol |
| Production of uranium hexafluoride (UF ₆), uranium metal, and other compounds. Full-scale production set to begin in 2004; work temporarily suspended under 11/04 agreement with the EU. Hardened underground storage bunkers discovered in late 2004. Design capacity of 200 tons/year of UF ₆ could produce fissile material for 20–30 bombs per year. | | |
| Enrichment plant | Natanz | Additional protocol |
| Pilot plant with 164 centrifuges was operational in 2003; the buried industrial-scale plant with 20,000 centrifuges is under construction; work temporarily suspended under 11/04 agreement with EU. Design capacity of 200,000 separative work units/year (roughly 500 kg of HEU) could produce fissile material for 20–30 bombs per year. | | |

Uranium Fuel Cycle—Suspected Capabilities

| TYPE | LOCATION | SAFEGUARDS STATUS |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|
| Uranium mines | Various locations | |
| In 1989, Iran announced it had discovered uranium reserves estimated at 3,500 tons at ten locations and intended to begin mining at all of them. Other sites, never visited by the IAEA but mentioned by the Iranians, include Khoshomi (possibly another name for Saghand), and unidentified locations in Azerbaijan and Sistan va-Baluchestan. | | |
| Pilot uranium conversion facility | Unknown | N/A |
| The IAEA continues to doubt Iran's claim that it built the industrial UCF in Isfahan without ever building a pilot plant to prove the processes and equipment. | | |

(continued on next page)

KEY IRANIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

(continued)

Uranium Fuel Cycle—Suspected Capabilities (continued)

| TYPE | LOCATION | SAFEGUARDS STATUS |
|--|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| Pilot enrichment plant | Lavizan-Shian (Tehran) | N/A |
| <p>The IAEA is still investigating claims by the MEK that Iran operated a pilot enrichment plant within the giant Defense Industries Organization complex at Lavizan-Shian in Tehran, using centrifuges imported from the A. Q. Khan network. Iran razed the site to prevent environmental sampling, and moved production equipment to a nearby but still undisclosed site. If confirmed, by 2003 this plant could have produced enough fissile material for 20 to 25 bombs using UF₆ imported through the A. Q. Khan network or produced at the suspected pilot UCE.</p> | | |

Plutonium Fuel Cycle

| TYPE | LOCATION | SAFEGUARDS STATUS |
|--|----------------|-----------------------------|
| Busheir Power Plant | Busheir | Safeguards |
| <p>Construction complete in 2004; fuel loading planned for 2005; critical in 2006. Using Plutonium extracted from spent fuel, Iran could produce up to 70 bombs in less than two years.</p> | | |
| Heavy water plant | Arak | Not under safeguards |
| <p>Declared in 2003, after its existence was revealed by the MEK. Industrial-scale production of heavy water expected in late 2004; temporarily suspended under 11/04 agreement with EU.</p> | | |
| 40-MW research reactor | Arak | In design phase |
| <p>Scheduled to be completed by 2014, this heavy water reactor will use natural uranium fuel and can produce enough weapons-grade Plutonium per year for several bombs. The MEK claimed in March 2005 that work on the reactor had been accelerated and that it would go critical by 2007.</p> | | |
| Plutonium reprocessing | Tehran | Violation |
| <p>Iran acknowledged in 2003 that it had carried out uranium reprocessing experiments at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center and elsewhere over an 18-year period, in violation of its existing safeguards agreement.</p> | | |

(Timmerman, R. Kenneth. Countdown to Crisis-The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran. first ed. New York: Crown Forum, 2005. 369-370.)

Government Branches

| <u>Executive Branch</u> | <u>Name</u> | <u>Year of Election</u> |
|-------------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| Chief of state | Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khamenei | 4 June 1989 |
| Head of government | President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad (4 years term) | 3 August 2005 (62% of vote) |
| First Vice President | Parviz Davudi | 11 September 2005 |
| Cabinet | Council of Ministers selected by the president with legislative approval | |
| Elections | Leader of the Islamic Revolution appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts | |

(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>)

| <u>Legislative Branch</u> | <u>Qualifications</u> | <u>Year of Election</u> | <u>% of Vote</u> |
|--|---|-------------------------|------------------|
| Unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami | 290 seats (since 18 Feb. 2000) (4 years term) | 20 Feb. 2004 | |
| Conservatives | | | 190 |
| Reformers | | | 50 |
| Independents | | | 43 |
| Religious Minorities | | | 5 |
| Unaccounted Seats | | | 2 |

(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>)

Judicial Branch



(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>)

Political Parties

| <u>Pro-Reform Coalition called: the 2nd Khordad front</u> | <u>Qualifications:</u> Includes political parties and formal pressure groups and organizations. | <u>Achievements:</u> Success at elections to the 6 th Majles in early 2000. Participated in the 7 th Majles elections in early 2004. |
|---|---|--|
| Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) | | |
| Executives of Construction Party (Kargozaran) | | |
| Solidarity Party | | |
| Islamic Labor Party | | |
| Mardom Salari | | |
| Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO) | | |
| Militant Clerics Society (Ruhaniyun) | | |
| <u>Conservative Group</u> | | |
| The Builders of Islamic Iran | Leading position in the new Majles. | Winning a majority of the seats of the Majles in Feb. 2004. |

(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>)

International Org. Participation:

ABEDA, CP, ECO, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt (signatory), ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, MIGA, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, PCA, SCO (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMEE, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTO (observer).

(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>)

Military Branches:

Islamic Republic of Iran Regular Forces (Artesh):

- Ground Forces
- Navy
- Air Force (including Air Defense)

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, IRGC):

- Ground Forces
- Navy
- Air Force

- Qods Force (special operations)
- Basij Force (Popular Mobilization Army)

Law Enforcement Forces: 2004

Military Service age and obligation:

- 18 years of age for compulsory military service
- 16 years of age for volunteers
- 9 years of age for soldiers recruited in the Iran-Iraq War
- 18 months: for conscript service obligation (2004)

(<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ir.html>)

Military Values:

| <u>Iran Weapons</u> | <u>Type</u> |
|---------------------|---|
| Fighter | Azarakhsh, Saegheh, Shafaq |
| Transport | Iran-140, Tu-334 |
| Rotary | Shahed 274, Shavabiz 2-75, Shavabiz 206-1, Shavabiz 209-1 |
| Other | Ababil, Mohajer, Fadzahir |
| Air to Surface | GBU-67/9A Qadr, AGM-379/20 Zoobin |
| Surface to Surface | Arash, Fajr, Hadid, Haseb, Nazeat, Noor, Oghab, Shahin |
| Surface to Air | Sayyad-1, Shahab Thageb |

("Iran Weapons". [Global Security.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org). 1. 30 April, 2005. 17 February, 2006)

Economic Values:

| | | |
|--|--------------|-----------|
| Unemployment rate | 11.2% | 2004 est. |
| Population below poverty line: | 40% | 2002 est. |
| Household income or consumption by percentage share: | | |
| <i>Lowest</i> | 10% | NA |
| <i>highest</i> | 10% | NA |
| Inflation rate (consumer prices) | 16% | 2005 est. |
| Investment (gross fixed) | 30.5% of GDP | 2005 est. |

| | | |
|--|--|-----------|
| Budget | | 2005 est. |
| <i>revenues:</i> | \$48.82 billion | |
| <i>expenditures:</i> including capital expenditures of | \$60.4 billion \$7.6 billion | |
| Public debt | 27.5% of GDP | 2005 est. |
| Industries | petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabrication, armaments | |
| Industrial production growth rate (excluding oil) | 3% | 2005 est. |
| Electricity - production | 142.3 billion kWh | 2003 |
| Electricity - consumption | 132.1 billion kWh | 2003 |
| Electricity - exports | 840 million kWh | 2003 |
| Electricity - imports | 600 million kWh | 2003 |

("Iran". CIA-The World Fact Book. January 10, 2006. 16 February, 2006)