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
**Faculty of Law and Political Science**

Perception of the Host Community to Peacekeeping  
Missions – Case Study UNIFIL

M.A. Thesis

by

Myriam A. Karam




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
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## Abstract

Studying and analyzing local perceptions of peacekeeping missions have recently headed the forefront of United Nations peacekeeping objectives. UNIFIL which has been present for more than 35 years in Southern Lebanon has long sought to interact with the local population within an environment that is politically and economically challenging. This paper aimed at studying the perception of the local population towards UNIFIL. By reviewing the long years of interaction since the mission's inception in 1978, UNIFILs' humanitarian services and projects created a climate of positive interaction within a community that has long suffered from continuous instability and the consequences of war. This positive climate is hindered with UNIFIL's inability to impede successive Israeli invasions and infringements of Lebanese territory. One could argue that UNIFIL's development of humanitarian services and expansion of its service delivery along the years served as a legitimization of its presence amongst the host community. To have a clearer view of the host community perception, a public opinion survey was conducted. The survey sets out religious affiliation as the most discriminatory factor amongst the local population. Shias diverted in their response compared to others which affected the whole response rate. It was revealed that they are dissatisfied with UNIFIL's security provision and implementation of its mandate. This fact can be highly related to the Shias' political affiliation, whereby Hezbollah is the most influential. In regards to Hezbollah, UNIFIL is seen favorably as long as it contributes in withholding Israel from undertaking any military action on the Lebanese territory. But its military actions against the Israeli enemy, is done regardless of UNIFILs' presence and mandate implementation.

**Keywords:** peacekeeping, UNIFIL, local perception, Hezbollah.

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## Chapter One: Introduction

The past decade has experienced an increase in UN peacekeeping operations. United Nations peacekeeping missions have developed to meet the demands of different conflicts within a changing worldwide political situation. With hundred thousand personnel worldwide, United Nations peacekeeping missions are helping countries torn by conflict to establish stability and peace. Increasingly along the years, peacekeeping missions have been tasked with more complex functions that put them into more contact with the host community.

Understanding the perception of the host community became important in the aftermath of the Cold War. With the rise of multidimensional peacekeeping missions mandated with complex tasks, such as facilitating national dialogue and strengthening the respect of human rights. Lately, local perceptions of peacekeeping operations have headed the forefront of peacekeeping missions' objectives. Peacekeeping missions have initiated the incorporation of local perceptions within the framework of mission evaluation in an attempt to gain a deeper knowledge of the context in which the mission operates. Perception which can be seen as subjective data can be quantified, and as a consequence analyzed. Thus, by gathering perceptions from the host community, peacekeeping missions attempt to incorporate this information into their work within the scope of mandate implementation.

UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) which has been present in Lebanon since 1978, has been highly discussed on both the national and international levels. It has been the center of many debates and discussions by academics, in terms of its effectiveness and mandate implementation. Being deployed in the South of Lebanon, within an

environment that is politically challenging, UNIFIL has witnessed a long history of continuous conflicts.

Since its inception and up to this day, UNIFIL has long sought to address the host community through its various services and activities. The relationship between the mission and its host community has witnessed several main political events that have shaped their interaction. From the conflict between PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israel that led to the establishment of Resolution 425, to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, that resulted in Resolution 1701. Thus, this relationship has undergone change along the years within a context that underwent a change of dynamics and mechanisms related to war and its consequences. Thus, the perception that the host community has towards UNIFIL, is said to be affected by these dynamics. Given that, the host community perceptions of the mission is integral to a mission's work; analyzing UNIFIL's case can provide insight into the current dynamics that shape the interaction between the mission and its host. Additionally, inclusion of Hezbollah in this paper is related to the fact, that this party has been a major player in the South. In addition to that, Hezbollah is highly influential amongst the Shiite population, which constitutes the majority of South Lebanon inhabitants.

The term host community shall be defined. Host community in this paper refer to the locals who reside within UNIFIL's area of operations that are in contact with the mission, the area that stretches South of the Litani River up to the Blue Line on the Lebanese-Israeli borders, and not all the Residents of South Lebanon governate. Additionally, in this paper the word "host" and "local" are used interchangeably and they connote for the same meaning.

## **1.1 Literature Review**

A review of the literature will entail an examination of the concept of peacekeeping with particular emphasis on the different classifications, including criteria used in analyzing and evaluating the success of peacekeeping operations. In addition to, discussing whether these operations have been successful or not. Afterwards, the subject of peacekeeping and host community at the international level will be discussed providing academic reviews as to why perception matters and case studies. Subsequently, the literature that revolves around UNIFIL's application of its mandate will be examined. Finally the last body of literature will revolve around UNIFIL and its host community which includes besides the local population, the main political and military actor in the South: Hezbollah.

Thus the body of literature as presented below will be divided into four parts: peacekeeping, peacekeeping missions and host community, UNIFIL revised, UNIFIL and its host community.

### **1.1.1 Peacekeeping**

As a result of the expansion of peacekeeping operations and their continuous evolution in terms of size, scope and mandates, different categorizations of the term "peacekeeping" have emerged. To start with, Ramsbotham and his colleagues refer to chronological organization of the operations. Thus peacekeeping operations have come to encompass three distinct activities that have developed as three "generations". "First generation" peacekeeping, which started at the end of WW II and lasted until the end of the Cold War, were to monitor borders and set up buffer zones after an agreed ceasefire. "Second generation" peacekeeping, at the end of the Cold War, involved a multiplicity of tasks including security, humanitarian and political objectives. Such traditional missions operated

with the consent of conflicting parties, remained impartial and lacked the authority to use force except in few cases of self-defense. Later on traditional peacekeeping developed into a more robust conflict resolution intervention mechanism under “third generation” peacekeeping operations which are referred to also as “peace support operations” that function with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the consent of the parties (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). However, this is not the only classification. For instance, Thakur and Schnabel categorize peace operations according to six “cascading generations” which are: traditional, non-UN, expanded, peace enforcement, peace restoration by partnership and multinational peace restoration/ UN state-creation (Thakur & Schnabel, 2001).

Nevertheless, Diehl and his colleagues consider that classification according to generations does not make sufficient distinction between different mission types. In addition to the fact that the same peacekeeping operation can perform multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially. Thus, they classify peacekeeping missions according to function. They list twelve types of mission which are: traditional peacekeeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control verification, protective services, intervention in support of democracy and sanctions enforcement (Diehl, Druckman & Wall, 1998). Similarly, Bellamy and his colleagues considered that the division of peacekeeping missions into “generations” is misrepresentative consequently identifying five broad types of peacekeeping operations according to the role that they fulfill in global politics rather than the particular functions that each mission fulfills which are: traditional peacekeeping, managing transition, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace support operations. Additionally, a distinction is made between Westphalian and post-Westphalian peacekeeping. Peacekeeping began as a tool to uphold the norms and the stability of sovereign states within

the international community. However, this notion of peacekeeping has undergone change. In the Westphalian period, peace was achieved by building spaces and institutions for states to resolve their problems, knowing that peacekeepers are not allowed to interfere unless given consent. In the post-Westphalian period, peacekeepers are included in the process of re-building the affected societies without the obligation of consent. Re-building of the states is done in correlation with liberal-democratic aims. Hence, there has been prominence on developing the so-called “liberal democracy” which stands out clearly in the peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1990s (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2004). Sharing this latter idea is Paris who considers that peacekeeping is intensely shaped by a global culture that perceives “democratization” and “liberalization” as the way to peace. By examining several operations deployed between 1989 and 1999, Paris analyzes the nature and evolution of peace-building from the perspective of “liberal peace”. Paris argues that these operations were directed by the objectives of promoting political and economic liberalization in an attempt to create a lasting peace (Paris, 2003).

As shown previously, the concept and practice of peacekeeping has undergone changes, thus an evolution in the thinking about peacekeeping, whereby new doctrines arose such as peace building principles (Hansen, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2004). Galtung made a distinction between peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-building to clarify the different roles needed. Peacemaking refers to the negotiation process that takes place between decision-makers focused on reaching a settlement or resolution to specific conflicts. Peacekeeping involves third-party intervention to keep apart warring groups and maintain or reduce violence. And peace-building which targets the social, psychological and economic environment at the grassroots level (Galtung, 1976). Similarly, Secretary-General Boutros Ghali in the “Agenda for Peace” came up with distinct definitions and outlined processes of

preventative diplomacy that the international community can use before peacekeeping, or concurrently and presented recommendations that strengthen peacemaking and peacekeeping. He referred to peacemaking as bringing hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means. UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement through mediation and other forms of negotiation. As for peacekeeping, it is the deployment of United Nations forces in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, in order to monitor a ceasefire between the parties, while diplomats negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials implement an agreed peace. Furthermore, he introduced the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding” as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. This concept is considered to be the most noteworthy contribution to the modern understanding of peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

When it comes to the criteria used in analyzing and evaluating the success of peace operations, authors rely on different criteria. Diehl and Druckman look at the effectiveness of peace operations by taking two aspects, first their ability in preventing and stopping violence or in other words limiting armed conflict, and second their effectiveness in promoting conflict resolution (Diehl & Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations*, 2010). Bratt goes beyond these two criteria to include four indicators which are: performance in accordance with the mandate, limitation of casualties, conflict containment and facilitation of conflict resolution (Bratt, 2013). Pushkina as well uses four indicators which are somehow similar to Bratt, limiting violent conflict in the host state, reducing human suffering, preventing the spread of conflict beyond the state’s borders and promoting conflict resolution, these four measures are essential when analyzing the effectiveness of UN missions (Pushkina, 2006).

Additionally, Van der Lijn consider that the analysis of a peacekeeping mission's effectiveness should evolve around the term "durable peace", in his opinion there are nine factors that direct a peacekeeping operation into making a positive contribution to durable peace and they are: (1) the willingness of the parties to cooperate with the implementation of the operation; (2) the ability of the operation to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties; (3) the sufficient attention of the operation on the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth; (4) cooperation from important outside actors and parties; (5) the deployment of the operation at the right time; (6) the implementation of the operation by competent personnel under competent leadership, and with clear command structures; (7) the operation is part of a long term approach; (8) "policy tools" that are implemented and coordinated within the operation and externally; (9) and the operation should provide "ownership" (Van der Lijn, 2010).

Bypassing these above-mentioned analytical frameworks is the work of Johansen who makes mention to the host community in his two criteria approach. First, he suggests to assess the effect of peacekeeping forces on the local people who are affected by their work. Second, to compare the degree of tension, violence or misunderstanding in the presence of the UN peacekeepers to the predictable results of balance-of-power activity without the peacekeeping mission (Johansen, 1994).

When it comes to the examination whether peacekeeping operations have been successful, few scholars consider that peacekeeping operations have succeeded in managing conflicts whom of which is Fortna. Through the analysis of civil wars that occurred since the end of the Cold War, Fortna demonstrates that peacekeeping missions are essential in tackling with internal conflicts. She deliberates that peacekeeping is an effective instrument

that decreases the risk of restarting a war. This applies to both small and large peacekeeping operations whereby they are considered to be equally effective. Furthermore, by interviewing government and rebel leaders in the following countries: Bangladesh, Sierra Leone and Mozambique, she exposes explicit ways in which peacekeepers modify incentives, lessen fear and mistrust, inhibit accidental escalation to war, and stabilize peace by shaping political processes (Fortna, 2008 ).

However, most of the literature refers to the failures of the UN missions which correlates with the Brahimi Report issued by the UN in 2000 that clearly stated after reviewing their own missions that “the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge” (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000).

Debrix in his book “Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology” stresses on the media strategies that give UN operations the appearance of effectiveness. By analyzing UN operations in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia, Debrix argues how these operations mimic a new world order by publicizing visual executions of peaceful intervention and humanitarian assistance. Thus, he considers that the UN peacekeeping missions of the past decade represent a study in visual simulation that is not related to what was actually happening in the international arena during the 1990s (Debrix, 1999). Similarly Higate and Henry argue that UN and NATO peacekeeping operations enclose the exercise of power. Based on a fieldwork study conducted in Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo, they consider that peacekeeping reshapes former conflict zones in ways that outline perceptions of security. In other words, peacekeeping staff reconfigures the space by executing security that entail sometimes unexpected results. Thus peacekeeping operations create a mixture of security and insecurity within the host state (Higate & Henry, 2009).

Furthermore, Rikhye acknowledges that errors have been made by international peacekeeping forces. She suggests ways for improvement by stressing on the role of governments whereby



they are expected to work more suitably such as equipping peacekeeping forces more properly, giving them more than two days' notice of an operation and others. Rikhye considers that peacekeeping is not the solemn duty of the forces but a collective work that should include national actors (Rikhye, 1984). Sharing this previous argument is Aksu who considers that marginal space is given for the stakeholders in a given conflict, to have a say in the decision-making process. Policy preferences are in the hands of the major powers, which limit the ability of operations to work as expected (Aksu, 2003).

### **1.1.2 Peacekeeping missions and host community**

Writings on the issue of peacekeeping operations in regards to the host community have recently undergone a significant growth specifically over the past ten years. While most conflict and peacekeeping studies focus on the macro-level, some scholars have attempted to shed light on the importance of including the host community in the analysis of peacekeeping operations. Pouligny was a pioneer in dealing with the issue of local populations. Through her in-depth fieldwork she provided an extensive study of the perceptions of peace operations among the local population. She considers that peace operations in war-torn societies have a direct effect on both local populations and the UN staff deployed in these missions. And while these realities are often ignored, they are as essential as the political negotiations even those of the UN Security Council (Pouligny, 2006). Similarly, Giffen considers that perceptions have an influence on judgment, decision-making and action. They are directly related to an individual's decision to escape from or submit to violence, to condemn the perpetrator in spite of risk of retaliation, or to take action in the name of justice. She pinpoints that the perception of conflict-affected communities is among the most important factors that peacekeeping operations should take into consideration in the planning and the conduction of interventions (Giffen, 2013).

Furthermore, a number of scholars insist on the inclusion of local actors within the peacekeeping framework. Hellmuller through the analysis of data collected in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) argues that the international actors are the main decision-makers whereby their top priority is the restoration of the state. These international strategies avoided or belatedly encompassed local priorities, for instance reconciliation between opposed communities and conflicts related to the land. As a result, she puts forward the potential intermediary role that the local peace building actors can play in enabling the international strategies to be more suited to the local level and in this way the targeted objectives of peace will be much more likely achieved (Hellmuller, 2013).

Likewise, Gagliardone and Stremlau refer to the term “grass-root diplomacy” and insist on the idea of its development in a way to include a greater variety of voices in the negotiation process and the building of a consensual post-conflict society. Collecting the opinions of those involved and affected by the violence can bring about new perspectives in understanding both the nature of the conflict and its possible solutions. By taking into consideration public opinion, numerous problems that arise in peacemaking exercises can be avoided (Gagliardone & Stremlau, 2008). Going about the same argument, Schia et al. highlight on another important aspect which are the current and former members of armed groups, militia and rebel groups that are rarely included in the local perceptions studies. Limited interaction, access to this population, security risks and taboos are main reasons behind their non-inclusion. Schia et al. stress on the need to consider these groups so as to better understand their interests and complaints, and inform mission strategies for advancing the process of peace (Schia, Gjelsvik, & Karlsrud, 2013).

Another body of literature encompasses the effects of peacekeeping operations on the host community and the consequences they pose. Afeno deliberates that peacekeeping operations have become linked to exploitation due to the conduct of some peacekeeping

soldiers in the African continent. The problem is intensified by the unequal power relation that exists between the soldiers and the host population. In addition to a traditional masculine military culture that is unresponsive to the concept of gender equality and rights in general. Consequently, the image of the peacekeeping institutions has been damaged correlated with an increasing local resentment towards peacekeepers. He elaborates that the low economic status of women and girls makes them more prone to prostitution and child abuse within the realm of peacekeeping operations. Poverty and exposure to violence forces women to trade sexual favors in order to sustain their survival and have gain from a materialistic point of view. Therefore, Afeno considers that the problem of civilian exploitation must be dealt with in a multidimensional resolution approach which includes the collaboration of all stakeholders that are related to the host community (Afeno, 2012). Likewise, Aoi et al. in their book "Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations" deliberate through field experiences and academic analysis that peacekeeping operations by deploying a large number of soldiers and civilian personnel unavoidably have various effects on the host community and the economy in general. Such consequences are particularly serious when they cause harm to the host community such as the case of sexual abuse and exploitation, corruption and so forth. Aoi et al. also analyze the degree to which the United Nations has attempted to manage some of the side-effects. They stress on the need of accountability which encompass anticipating unintended consequences and monitoring the effects. (Aoi, Coning, & Thakur, 2007). Preventing sexual violence, whether committed by peacekeepers themselves, armed groups or by members of the host community, presents peacekeeping missions with major challenges. More specifically, Bastick and her colleagues highlight on the issue of sexual violence and consider that ensuring the basic needs of local communities is vital in order to prevent sexual violence within the peacekeeping environment. They go further in viewing poverty, gender discrimination and social injustice as a direct link to sexual violence whether

it is suffering from sexual exploitation, rape or being domestically victimized within the community, or being subject to trafficking. Thus, to prevent sexual violence Bastick et al. recommend that peacekeeping missions ensure the basic needs of the local community in addition to involving women and girls, local leaders and civil society organizations in the peacekeeping environment, to support community development and to promote human rights (Bastick, Grimm, & Kunz, 2007).

More specifically some scholars attempted to conduct specific case studies by taking the host community as the subject matter. Henry and Higate who conducted two fieldwork trips in 2005 and 2006 to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) considered that Liberia is enduring a negative peace. They stressed on the masculinity of peacekeepers in their study and considered that the enthusiasm for peacekeepers is marginal. Many of the participants valued more conservative aspects of traditional military masculinity whilst relying on stereotypical notions of ethnic, national and religious groups in shaping their view about who was best suited to protect them and provide them with security. The research also proposed that peacekeeping may result in a number of complexities around its multi-dimensional representation given that the image the UN peacekeeping is trying to convey is displaced by national identity in the minds of the viewers (Henry & Higate, 2008). Within the same scope, in a 2014 report that aims at studying the community perceptions of the UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the majority of the surveyed civilians expressed their frustration when it comes to MONUSCO's efforts in the protection of civilians. They stressed on the fact that the mission should increase its effectiveness and aggressiveness in pursuing LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) forces; which refers to the group that is committing violence against civilians. All in all, there was a majority consensus in terms of perceiving MONUSCO as failing in responding effectively to

the crisis. It thus faces skepticism from the community about its willingness and ability to implement its mandate. (Sugule, Fitoussi, & Ronan, 2014). Additionally, Donini and his colleagues by analyzing three case countries Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone shed the light on extensive security needs of local communities and the uneven extent to which these needs are understood and responded to by major international institutions. Local communities are being neglected by outside actors. They highlight on the negative consequences of these outside actors and consider that if the perceptions of local communities were to be the standard for the effectiveness of international assistance and peace support offered to the given community then a significant shift in the ways peace missions operate is required (Donini, Minear, Smillie, Barda, & Welsh, 2005).

### **1.1.3 UNIFIL revisited**

After having an overview of peacekeeping missions in general, the following will specifically focus on the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon UNIFIL. The literature that entails a discussion of UNIFIL can be divided into two main parts: pre-Resolution 1701 and post- Resolution1701.

The literature that came after the establishment of UNIFIL under Resolution 425 focused mainly on the challenges that the mission was facing. Skogmo, Thakur and Mackinlay attempted to analyze, back then, the newly established mission. Skogmo considered that despite the increased support from the UNSC, UNIFIL was unable to achieve its mandate under the UNSC Resolution 425; mainly to confirm the withdrawal of the Israeli Forces, assist the government of Lebanon to restore its authority and restore international peace and security. However Skogmo stressed that the UNIFIL was playing several key roles one of which is being an effective buffer force where its presence prevented any regional player to mess with Lebanon's sovereignty, in addition to the humanitarian assistance it

delivered (Skogmo, 1989). Mackinlay in his examination of the mandate and performance of some peacekeeping missions makes mention to UNIFIL and classes it as a failure; operating in the absence of consenting protagonists and in the center of numerous local militias. Mackinlay concludes that peacekeeping should not be the exclusive responsibility of the UN. Despite its greater authority and impartiality, non-UN forces function more efficiently and less costly at the operational level (Mackinlay, 1989). In his turn, Thakur considered that UNIFIL was established at the insistence of the United States, which feared that Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon might disrupt U.S. efforts for a peace accord between Israel and Egypt. It was, therefore, unable to fulfill its mandate due to the lack of cooperation by the various parties involved whether Lebanese or non-Lebanese. Thakur analysis is backed up by his assumption that peacekeeping operations are possible only in certain well-defined circumstances, which include the consent of the parties and of the major powers, in which he refers to as "a pre-existing will to peace", and their authority derives from being accepted as impartial and above the conflict. But, Thakur considered that while the mandate remains unfulfilled its presence is essential. And the United Nations which is the only body that can provide international values provides UNIFIL with legitimacy (Thakur, 1987). Seemingly correlating with the previous argument that UNIFIL's presence is essential, in a documented study conducted upon the recommendation of the Arab League, it has been argued that UNIFIL assumed an important role. Besides its role in maintaining stability, the humanitarian activities undertaken by UNIFIL aim at reducing the daily problems that the local inhabitants confront (Arab League, 1980). Boustany bypassed the arguments that refer to UNIFIL's inability to resolve the crisis to argue that UNIFIL is part of the problem in a divided sectarian country (Boustany, 1994). Hence more, Hillen deliberated that like other actors present over the past two decades; UNIFIL is intensely woven into the divided structure of southern Lebanon on the political, economic and social levels. Additionally, he considered

that the UNIFIL did not have any desire to take sole or even key responsibility for both peace and security in the South even after the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces, bearing in mind its neutral, passive, and reactive character that condition its reaction in any existing situation, adding to the fact that it was initially given unachievable objectives as a peacekeeping force operating under traditional peacekeeping (Hillen, 2000).

Recent literature, post-Resolution 1701, centers on criticizing Resolution 1701 and the challenges that the UNIFIL is encountering within a local and regional environment that is politically unstable. When it comes to the Resolution itself, Makdisi argues that since its inception following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 in 1978, there has been struggle over the interpretations of the Resolution, consequently resulting in different positions regarding UNIFIL itself which was deployed within the context of two different conflicts: the Lebanese civil war and Arab-Israeli conflict. Within such an environment UNIFIL had blurred and mixed objectives, not knowing which peace it was meant to build. The same confusion reappeared after United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. The mission was the subject of disputed narratives (Makdisi, 2014). In another perspective, Moore by reviewing the casualties of the 2006 war and relying on customary international law considers that the United Nations Resolution 1701 is missing an important aspect which is a mechanism to investigate and arbitrate the claims of war crimes made against both war parties Israel and Hezbollah (Moore, 2006).

Furthermore, Murphy considers that the need to protect civilians is one of the major challenges that contemporary peace operations face. He adds that the UNIFIL has been criticized for being both ineffective and risk averse. Its original mandate did not include the protection of civilians, but this latter became a matter of concern when the treatment of Lebanese civilians by the Israeli forces after the 1982 Israeli invasion was brought to the attention of the Security Council. However, UNIFIL's inability to prevent Israeli intrusions

affected its credibility. Resolution 1701 that came in the aftermath of the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel fundamentally changed the context in which UNIFIL operated. UNIFIL was authorized to take all necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Murphy thus concludes that UNIFIL was able to maintain a fragile peace whilst significant aspects of the mandate remain unfulfilled, thus it is unable to perform an effective protection role. A prominent proof is that the 2006 war showed that it is not possible to provide effective protection in a milieu where armed hostilities take place between Israel and Hezbollah. In addition, UNIFIL seems dependent on both the Government and its ability to maintain good relations with armed elements for its security (Murphy, 2012).

When it comes to analyzing the mission's work, Makdissi and his colleagues consider that UNIFIL is not a solution; it is rather a conflict management tool that serves as a means to an end. Instead of ensuring the Lebanese State's monopoly on arms, as called for by UNSC Resolution 1701, UNIFIL for security and intelligence reasons, has increasingly come to rely on Hezbollah and the host community. They argue that UNIFIL may persist as an indefinite "interim" mission, given that the UNSC, the EU, and the US are neglecting the larger political framework that is needed to resolve the conflict. There remains a generalized lack of political will, illustrated with a lack of pressure on Israel towards reaching a final settlement to the conflict. In addition to that, other threats reside besides Israel's continued occupation of Lebanese territory and violation of its sovereignty (mostly via regular over-flights), which are the non-settlement of the Palestinian refugee camps and the non-restoration of effective Lebanese State authority throughout southern Lebanon by ensuring that the LAF have control over the use of weapons (Makdissi, Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth, 2009). Hence more, Mattelaer considers that within a context such as Lebanon following the 2006 war, peacekeeping faces conceptual problems in regards to doctrine planning; given that the UN is lacking in terms of operational planning when it comes to the goals that are set out in the



mandate .Therefore peacekeeping depends on a rather pragmatic approach in operational planning, in other words it intends to bring about conditions that hopefully would lead to the envisioned target. Additionally, despite that the UNIFIL was enhanced after Resolution 1701; it cannot achieve conflict resolution and be strategically decisive, given that it is a mission with a limited political capability. In that sense, it can only set forth the sort of conditions that make renewed hostilities less likely thus managing the conflict on an interim basis (Mattelaer, 2009). Correlating with this idea is Glume who argues that the ultimate realization of the mandate will require a regional political solution. Civil-military cooperation will not work, even in a friendly and relatively secure environment, unless the political actors take over and assume the role that they are required to do in bringing stability (Glume, 2009). One of the main roles is the role of the Lebanese Army as suggested by Colonel Arab. Colonel Arab in his 2012 research project contends that UNIFIL is accomplishing its assigned mission in Lebanon with the cooperation and support of the LAF. Their joint role in Southern Lebanon resulted in a new dimension of peacekeeping operations within an unstable region. And given that the objective of UNIFIL is to assist Lebanon in exercising its full authority, Arab considers that a strong LAF is the only way to exercise this authority. Hence, once LAF reaches the required capability level, UNIFIL will no longer be needed and the United Nations can as a result withdraw its forces from Southern Lebanon (Arab, 2012).

#### **1.1.4 UNIFIL and its Host Community**

Literature on UNIFIL and its host community is somehow limited. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of studies that aim at studying the perception of the Southern Lebanese community to UNIFIL.

Jaber by reviewing the attitude of the South inhabitants deliberates that UNIFIL which is named “Emergency forces” by the locals is expected to play a greater role. They

attribute it with great power and responsibilities and an ability to make decisions. Their role is not limited only to monitor the Blue Line and limit the Israeli invasions but to contribute to the social and economic reconstruction of the South (Jaber, 2009). Skogmo shares Jaber's argument in debating that UNIFIL enjoys widespread if not unanimous support from the community. In addition he argues that UNIFIL is an intermediate of moderation within the Shia community in the Lebanese South (Skogmo, 1989). El-Hajj in his turn considers that UNIFIL was able to build a strong relationship with the local community since its establishment. A relationship endorsed by its core principle which is humanitarian assistance. Through humanitarian services, El-Hajj argues that UNIFIL and its host community have strengthened their relationship (El-Hajj, 1998).

In his turn, Ruffa in his study under the heading "What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon", considers that the local population does not seem to be convinced by the general effectiveness of UNIFIL after Resolution 1701 suggesting that the mission is not very well perceived by the local population. Ruffa points out that while UNIFIL I, gained the trust of the Southern Lebanese, UNIFIL II is seen as a tool led by the United States to support Israel (Ruffa, 2014)

Taking the Southern community, one cannot ignore an integral political aspect which is mainly represented by Hezbollah. Regarding Hezbollah perception of the UNIFIL, Michel (2011) deliberates that Hezbollah has an ambiguous position regarding UNIFIL. Hezbollah have attempted to capitalize its military victory, after the 2006 war, in an attempt to enlarge its popularity and legitimize its maintenance of arms. Thus, it can be concluded that UNIFIL is seen favorably as long as it contributes in withholding Israel from executing a new intervention in the South. But this is correlated with Hezbollah opposing any activity that is susceptible to harm his influence and warns that it will not tolerate any attempts of

disarmament. But when it comes to the Lebanese authorities its position regarding UNIFIL is clear. Lebanon wishes to restore its territorial integrity thus it expects that the UNIFIL imposes a strict control over its borders.

Furthermore, Ruffa makes mention to Hezbollah by stating that the party makes use of certain military strategies based on the operational styles of the UNIFIL's armies'. In other words, Ruffa argues that variations in the armies' operational styles may trigger instrumental behavior by the conflicting parties which is an area often neglected by experts. Conflicting parties who are aware of behavioral differences between armies may take advantage of the situation to benefit their own agendas. Shia gives the example of Hezbollah concentrating its weapons arsenals in Italian areas of operations which are known to be less careful in inspections and in implementing operational activities (Ruffa, 2014).

After having a look at the literature, it was revealed that in recent years local perceptions of peacekeeping operations have taken an important stand within the peacekeeping literature. Awareness around the importance of including the perception of the host community have led researchers to write about this topic and as a result several studies have been conducted targeting specific peacekeeping missions whom of which is UNIFIL. A highlight on UNIFIL showed that this peacekeeping mission is encountering various challenges in terms of its mandate itself and the environment in which it is operating. It was revealed as well that perception of the host community to UNIFIL is not decisive and clear.

## **1.2 Research Question:**

The question that this paper intends to answer is: "What is the perception of the local South Lebanese Population towards UNIFIL?"

### **1.3 Methodology**

This paper will utilize both quantitative and qualitative data collection tools. By gathering and analyzing existing literatures, information can be drawn regarding peacekeeping missions in general and UNIFIL in particular.

Both primary and secondary sources will be used. Primary sources mainly based on the Lebanese- Israeli conflict and United Nations Official Reports, will provide historical evidence. In addition to, newspaper articles and UNIFIL publications, that offer information and facts regarding UNIFIL's scope of work and interaction with its host community. Additionally, secondary sources in the form of academic books and journals, relating to peacekeeping missions and UNIFIL will be used. Moreover, a quantitative study in the form of a survey conducted in Southern Lebanon will provide the paper with a collected statistical data related to the issue of local perceptions towards UNIFIL. Surveys are commonly applied to a research methodology designed to collect data from a specific population. In most situations, a survey utilizes a questionnaire as its instrument. Questionnaires are an important tool for collecting and analyzing information from a selected sample.

Therefore, this paper will be divided into several parts going from the most general to the most specific related to UNIFIL.

The first part will be handled by going through an in-depth analysis of the academic research (books and journal articles) that is related to the perception of host community to peacekeeping missions around the world. This will provide a benchmark that will be used later on when focusing on UNIFIL in particular.

The second part of the paper will provide a clearer picture of UNIFIL. At first, going through a historical perspective of UNIFIL from its establishment in 1978 under UNSC Resolution 425 in cessation of hostilities between the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) on one

hand and PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and its allies on the other hand; to its evolution under Resolution 1701 that ended the 2006 war between Hezbollah and the IDF. In addition to entailing the challenges that faced UNIFIL in terms of mandate implementation, UNIFIL interaction and liaison with the host community will be dealt correlated with an in-depth analysis of UNIFIL's delivery of services. Consequently, referring to UN reports, non-academic and academic research will provide an insight into the interaction that was taking place between UNIFIL and its host community since its establishment.

The third part deals with the issue of perception in particular. This part will, at first, examine perception in quantifiable terms through a public opinion survey administered to a sample of people who live within UNIFIL's area of operations. The survey in the form of close-ended questions will provide with major conclusions regarding the issue of how the host community views UNIFIL in terms of three main headlines: security, humanitarian assistance and liaison which include the conduct of peacekeepers.

Secondly, this part will involve a major political and military actor in Lebanon in general and in the South in particular: Hezbollah. Having an insight into Hezbollah's inception, historical relationship with UNIFIL and its view in regards to it, is beneficial. Given that Hezbollah, is seen to be highly influential amongst the Shia population which constitutes the majority in UNIFIL's area of operations. Recent research revolving around peacekeeping mission has highlighted the importance of including political actors within the framework of the mission given that mandate implementation is highly affected by the power that these actors can exert. Non-academic research mainly newspapers and TV interviews of Hezbollah's leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah political leaders will be used in this part. Not to forget that a brief examination of the relationship between AMAL Movement and UNIFIL will be discussed at first, given that both parties are the two major actors within the Shite community.

Going through these parts should provide the reader deeper understanding of UNIFIL's interaction with its host community in general and the perception that the host community hold for UNIFIL in particular. Although the conducted survey, cannot probe for any generalization, it can provide an insight for future prospective studies.

## Chapter Two: Peacekeeping Missions and Host Community

### 2.1 Evolution of Peacekeeping:

Since its inception in 1945, the UN has been called upon to maintain international peace and security, and to support the creation of environments in which peace processes can be agreed upon.

Peacekeeping is one of several UN instruments. It is established based on the principle that an impartial military presence on the ground can lessen tension between conflicting parties and generate space for political negotiations. It can aid in bridging the gap between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, should the conflicting parties have the will to reach the goal. The legal basis for peacekeeping can be found between the traditional methods for the “peaceful settlement of disputes” under UN Chapter VI or the more forceful action mandated under Chapter VII. The Member States of the UN authorize specific peacekeeping operations through Security Council resolutions. Mandates are usually negotiated by the Council provided with reports of the Secretary General about the situation in the country. Mandates are renewed at regular intervals by the Security Council and revised until a decision is taken to withdraw the mission.

Hence more, peacekeeping is defined as an instrument for peace and security based upon three core principles: impartiality, consent and non-use of force. Firstly, impartiality entails that peacekeepers should implement their mandate without favor to any of the parties to the conflict. However this doesn't mean that peacekeepers need to be apolitical in condoning violations, rather, it requires that they hold all parties to the same standards. Secondly, peacekeeping missions are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This entails a commitment by the parties to a political process. Consent in its turn

ensures that the mission has the freedom and the protection needed to carry out effectively its mandate. In the absence of such consent the mission risks becoming a party to the conflict and jeopardizes its security. Thirdly, peacekeepers refrain from the use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. In certain situations and over the last couple of years, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping missions “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order (Civil Affairs Handbook, 2012, pp. 10-14).

Peacekeeping was initially developed to deal with inter-state conflict but has been increasingly used in intra-state conflicts. Intra-state conflicts which occur within the border of a given state have increased at the end of the Cold War. Disintegration of multinational countries played an important role in this rising such as the Soviet Union or Former Yugoslavia.

Since the late 1980s and more than half a century after the establishment of the first UN field mission in 1948, an evolution in the structure of peacekeeping missions occurred whereby the size and scope of UN operations has expanded. Some peacekeeping missions are still based on the “traditional” model characterized by a military operation deployed in support of a political activity and involving military tasks such as patrolling buffer zones between conflicting parties and monitoring ceasefires. Though, past military observer mission included non-military tasks, a growing number of peacekeeping missions have become multidimensional. They encompass several components including human rights, humanitarian assistance, rule of law and reconstruction. As expanded on earlier in the previous chapter, multidimensional peacekeeping operations are also referred to as peace operations. Besides the military aspect, depending on their mandate, these missions are



tasked to: support the delivery of humanitarian assistance; supervise and conduct elections; strengthen the rule of law including assistance with judicial reform; promote respect for human rights and investigating alleged violations; assist with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; help former opponent implement peace agreements; assist with post-conflict recovery and rehabilitation and set up transitional administration of a territory as it moves towards independence. For instance, United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established to monitor the results of negotiations between the government and the rebel force named Farabundo Marti National Front (FMLN). This mission's mandate encompasses broad peacebuilding measure such as the construction of new judicial institutions as well as the reintegration of ex-combatants (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit- Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003,p.1-4).

## **2.2 Local Perceptions:**

### **2.2.1 Perceptions Defined**

Perceptions as suggested by Giffen can be defined as “individuals’ and communities’ feelings, expectations, understandings, and interpretations of events, contexts and dynamics” (Giffen, 2013, p.1-3). More specifically, another definition that correlates with the previous is the one suggested by Donati and his colleagues from the civil affairs team in the UN. They define perceptions as “the ways in which situations, events and dynamics relevant to the conflict, the peace process or the peacekeeping mission’s mandate are regarded by local people including opinions, concerns, aspirations and priorities”. (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.11). Therefore information based on perceptions is distinguished from verifiable types of data, such as mortality rates or observations on the ground, given their subjective nature.

### **2.2.2 Significance of Local Perceptions:**

There is rising awareness that perceptions held by the local populations are critical within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations.

Given that perceptions are subjective information, they are often discharged or given low priority in favor of objective data, for instance the number of reported injuries or the number of threats executed by the perpetrator. However, perception of conflict-affected communities is considered to be among the most important factors that peacekeeping operations should incorporate in the planning and the implementation of interventions. These perceptions are integral in determining the outcome of a peacekeeping operation since it is the community's perceptions of the facts that influence the communities' behavior, not the objective data.

Peacekeeping missions have always sought to have awareness of the views of the local population in order to relate their planning of interventions to an understanding of the national context. However, understanding the opinions of the population became even more important in the aftermath of the cold war, when there was a rise in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations mandated with complex peacebuilding tasks such as facilitating national dialogue and reconciliation, supporting legitimate governance and strengthening the respect to human rights (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.10-12).

Additionally, understanding what people think is essential to any political leadership. Therefore, peacekeeping operations that deal with core issues within targeted societies should consider capturing and understanding local perceptions. This understanding is vital if they are to support the development of sustainable peace and implement their mandate satisfactorily. Although locals may give inaccurate or incorrect information due to many factors such as political, religious and others, studying the perceptions is highly important and should be

taken into consideration by the peacekeeping operations (Schia, Gjelsvik & Karlsrud, 2013, p.1).

Going further, local communities have a much wider understanding of security. It is a multilayered concept in which socio-economic aspects under the heading of “human security” play an integral role. Issues such as welfare and access to services are considered to be at the core of the communities’ needs whenever there is cessation of an armed conflict. Plus, human security is regarded as essential to the prevention of recurring physical security problems<sup>1</sup> (Donini, Minear, Smillie, Baarda & Welch, 2005, p.1-6).

Hence, nowadays the majority of peacekeeping missions with a mandate to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” are authorized under Chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations to use force not only in self-defense but also in fulfillment of their mandate.<sup>2</sup>Consequently, communities expect that the mission will take robust action in order to protect them from any threat. Disappointment occurs when the mission fails to meet their expectations. This disappointment will turn into hostility and resentment in most of the cases. Once credibility is lost, in terms of a mission’s ability to carry out its mandate, the work of the mission becomes harder within a community that has lost its trust in the mission. Thus effective engagement with the community is integral. It allows the mission to gather information regarding community’s perception which is crucial to fulfilling its mandate (141 Oxfam Briefing Paper, 2010, p.7-9). This engagement should be established at the earliest possible and should continue throughout the whole mission. Such engagement gives peacekeepers the opportunity to understand the environment, to explain their priorities as well as constraints and to manage the often high expectations that the host community has of

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<sup>1</sup> This finding is part of a research conducted with 350 persons in individual and focus group settings in three locations: Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Commissioned by the UK NGO-Military Contact Group, this research aimed at examining perceptions of security among local populations, peace support operations and assistance agencies.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter VII is the section of the UN Charter that addresses threats to international peace and security. Under this Chapter, the UNSC authorizes the peacekeeping mission to “take necessary action or to use all necessary means” to accomplish the mandate task

what the mission can do. Moreover, communities' perception of their own safety is considered to be one of the best measures of how effective protection strategies are.

As mentioned in the DPKO/DFS Operational concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, paragraph 25: "an important element in determining whether the mission is meeting the objectives articulated in its protection strategy includes seeking regular feedback from the local communities it serves".

Therefore, the importance of incorporating local perceptions to peacekeeping missions as they manage transitions from conflict to peace can be summed up in these following arguments. Inclusivity helps in increasing domestic legitimacy and as a consequence sustainability of political settlements. Limiting national dialogue to elites creates short-term solutions that fail to address root causes of conflict. Thus, public participation is considered to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Second, understanding local perceptions allows missions to build confidence in the peace process, as well as the mission itself. Public confidence is seen as a key to build sustainable peace. Third, a mission is more likely to have a positive impact if it incorporates local perceptions within the framework of the services it delivers. Failing to understand the situational context can result in ineffective conflict management (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.16-19).

### **2.2.3 Integration of Local Perceptions:**

There are several key areas in which local perceptions can be included in the work of the peacekeeping mission.

Firstly, Local perceptions can be integrated in strategy development, planning and benchmarking. They can provide the data needed to set the standards and as a result measure progress in terms of governance and security issues. Understanding changes and

developments in the local environment such as monitoring whether there has been progress toward peace can help peacekeepers devise appropriate strategies based on the political circumstances. Thus, by taking local perceptions into consideration, missions can come up with more effective and responsive strategies. Secondly, collecting information in terms of how locals understand security and what are in their view the characteristics of a secure environment, helps in preparing strategies that are context-appropriate. This way, the mission will be more apt to conduct its mandate under the heading of “Civilians’ Protection”. Thirdly, confidence building is considered to be integral to the success of any mission. Therefore, an accurate understanding of perceptions can improve outreach and public information strategies which in turn build the ground of confidence. Fourthly, supporting the restoration of state authority is central to many peacekeeping mandates, therefore by assisting the locals in articulating their needs to the state, missions can aid the state in strengthening its responsiveness to its population as well as ensuring accountability. Finally, by having an insight into early warnings signs that can be captured from data gathered, intervention can as a result be more oriented toward prevention of any possible upcoming conflict. Consequently, conflict management becomes more effective and goal-oriented (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.36-52).

### **2.3 Peacekeeping Mission and Host Community: Dynamics and Consequences**

Pugh identifies four factors that affect the host community’s perception of the peacekeeping mission and its legitimacy. Firstly is the top-down scheme that is coercive and that is liable to create political resistance. Secondly is the mere fact that the encounter with the locals may produce high local expectations. The locals expect the military forces to provide them with both security and financial assistance, given that the foreigners are

regarded as having sufficient money and weapon. Additionally, locals seek to restore their rights and dignity which is an expectation that exceeds the peacekeepers' ability. Consequently, frustration will in most cases emerge among the locals which in turn they will be viewed as ungrateful by the peacekeepers themselves. Thirdly, comes the asymmetry of power between the peacekeepers and the locals that is likely to provoke tension. This asymmetry of power paves the way for what is referred to as "unintended consequences" that are referred to as the effects that are not intended within the mission's mandate or its implementation. Fourthly stands the particular composition and behavior of peacekeepers. It has been argued that given the fact that peacekeepers come into daily contact with the host community, the cultural attitudes of the "other" which in this case is the peacekeeper, is integral in determining the local legitimacy of the mission. For instance, language and religious affinity are important factors that affect the host community's perception (Pugh, 2010, p.59-65).

As mentioned earlier, traditional peacekeeping has been transformed and extended. It has shifted into a more complex facet that encloses a more interactive pattern of interaction with the host community in the form of humanitarian assistance, preventive diplomacy<sup>3</sup> and others. The modification in the scope of the UN peacekeeping operations has exposed these operations to a range of new challenges. One of these new challenges is the impact that these operations are exerting on the host community in the form of unintended consequences.

Unintended consequences can be defined as the effects, outcomes and impacts that result from the operations but are not intended within the mandate or in its implementation (Coning, Aoi & Thakur, 2007, p.168). While not all unintended consequences are negative,

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<sup>3</sup> The United Nations which has discovered the high costs of managing conflict has held a strong emphasis on preventive diplomacy. It aims at preventing disputes from arising between parties, preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and limiting the spread of conflicts when they occur. One of the examples of preventive diplomacy is the UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in 1995-1999.

most case studies of various peacekeeping operations suggest negative consequences on the host community.

One of the most prominent unintended consequences is the issue of sexual violence and abuse. As argued by Afeno, the presence of a peacekeeping mission often creates the expectation amongst the locals that they will be protected from violence. However, their rights are often violated by those presumed to be responsible for their protection. The unequal power relation and the traditional masculine military culture make the host community prone to exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. As a result, peacekeepers become predators rather than protectors in a situation where the host community is powerless and lacking services and goods. Trading food for sexual favors has become a common practice among peacekeeping soldiers. Between 2004 and 2006 many allegations of sexual exploitation were put on the forefront. These allegations involve UN personnel in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Mozambique, Cote D'Ivoire and Sierra Leone (Afeno, 2012, p. 49-54). Incidents involving rape, trading food for sexual favors, human trafficking and the organization of a child prostitution ring has been included in the allegations presented. Furthermore, the investigations of sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel of the MONUC (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo) concluded that sexual exploitation and abuse was often linked to other forms of misbehavior such as financial corruption and mismanagement, abuse of power and others (Bastick, Grimm & Kunz, 2007, p.169-171). Consequently, the image of the peacekeeping institutions has been highly damaged in these countries correlated with an increasing local resentment towards peacekeepers.

With the presence of such alleged violations, a striking challenge that stands out is the subject of accountability. While military members of peacekeeping operations are subject to the criminal justice system of the country of deployment and not to the host state, the UN can

only take administrative actions in the form of suspension or repatriation. Consequently an accountability gap takes place whereby peacekeepers who commit sexual violence are often not held accountable by their states. Thus, the host community who has undergone such traumatic events would continue to feel victimized (Bastick, Grimm & Kunz, 2007, p.173-174). Hence, as concluded from the previous, the environment of the host community is generally characterized by a lack of law and order, poverty, human suffering and trauma as a result of the armed conflicts. This environment makes the local population heavily reliant on the peacekeeping mission which result in other additional consequences that shape the perception of the host community and it's interaction with the peacekeeping mission.

Within the scope of the mission's impact on the host community environment, an example that posits itself is the research conducted in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The deployment of personnel within a host system has negative effects on the host economy: rise in basic commodity prices, increase in salary disparities and unequal standards of living. Although peace operations have positive impact on the local economy through the creation of job opportunities and the increase in the demand for goods and services, this economic stimulation is temporary and dependent on international assistance. Thus, given the unsustainability of the positive impact, negative impact will persist whilst affecting the way the host community perceives the mission (Ammitzboell & Tychsen, p.268-275).

Therefore, peacekeeping operations by deploying a large number of soldiers and civilian personnel have various consequences on the host community. Such consequences can alter the community's perception, which is a fact that is often neglected in peacekeeping evaluation and monitoring.

Furthermore, the role of the host population perceptions and expectations in terms of peacekeeping credibility and accountability is considered to be one of the key future challenges facing the UN peacekeeping. It can be said that local communities do not



passively accept and engage in what the peacekeeping mission is offering. Depending on their own needs and perceptions, they may resist some and incorporate other parts of the missions' messages and services. The lack in understanding the local context in terms of what the host wants, how it seeks to fulfill its needs and others creates a gap between the mission and its host. For instance, it has been concluded that the local community in Sudan did not ask for direct protection from the peacekeepers but rather they wished to know about the strategies that the UN mission uses in case of outbreak of hostilities so that they could plan their own response to any threat accordingly (Coning, Stensland & Tardy, 2010, p.13-19)

#### **2.4 Collecting Local Perceptions:**

Many peacekeeping missions are engaging in gathering local perceptions. Peacekeepers seek local perceptions on different issues which include mainly: attitudes towards the UN presence, political development particularly in terms of peace process and local conflict between communities and the issue of security and crime. Given that there is no formal guidance to instruct peacekeepers on how to collect and use local perceptions, while lacking a clear methodology to conduct the required research with little technical guidance on how to gather the information and incorporate them into analysis and planning; the work is often done in an ad hoc or semi-structured manner. It has been revealed that the information gathered is used primarily to inform short-term analysis and thus eliciting short-term strategies to cope with security threats and political developments. Systemic and root issues are rarely considered and are often ignored. Additionally, the perceptions of business people, intellectuals, youth, armed groups and ex-combatants are under-studied. Marginalizing perceptions of a huge portion of the community results is said to lead to ineffective strategies that could only serve on a short-term basis (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.21-25).

A multitude of approaches and methods have been used by peacekeeping operations in order to collect information on local perceptions, which include interviews, focus groups, opinion surveys, national staff, workshops, public meeting and social media (Schia, Gjelsvik & Karlsrud, 2013, p.1). The following is an elaboration of these approaches and their usage within the context of peacekeeping missions.

To start with, individual or one-to-one interviews, usually conducted with local actors and authorities, are a separate approach from that of public meetings and focus groups that will be further discussed. One-to-one interviews are the most frequently used and allow the mission to learn about the perceptions, priorities and intentions of individuals who have the capacity to affect the political situation. Questions are usually open-ended to allow respondents to expand on their experiences and thoughts. Although it is frequently used, this approach carries a great risk of bias given the risk of assuming that perceptions yielded in these interviews are representative of the local population. As for public meetings or village meetings, they are used for a variety of purposes which are mainly under the heading of providing information and promoting the discussion of mission activities and objectives. Participation is broad whereby it is open to the public and meetings are less structured than other approaches. For instance, UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia) Civil affairs in Liberia undertook a series of consultative forums with local officials, civil society and community representatives in its area of operations. During the consultations, complex issues were identified in terms of religion, citizenship and identity which yielded important information for Civil affairs. The need to develop sustainable peace structures was identified and eventually County Peace Committees were established (Civil Affairs Handbook, 2012, p.145).

Unlike public meetings, focus groups involve discussing a specific set of issues with a pre-determined group. The group is chosen based on the need to collect specific opinions, for instance communities in volatile areas that are facing security risks are often targeted. As opposed to approaching people with a predefined set of questions comes the network approach. It involves regular contact with a range of local actors through formal or informal interaction such as local authorities, community leaders, academics, civil society actors on one hand and other local ordinary people such as shopkeepers, taxi drivers, restaurant owners and others. Thus, this approach is based on building relationships with local interlocutors through continuous contact.

Furthermore, an indirect approach in gathering local perceptions is media monitoring and analysis. Social media is also included by monitoring websites and social networks such as Twitter which enable the peacekeepers to have an insight on how people are responding to a specific event or news that falls within their scope of work or within the political situation in general. By analyzing current events and identifying trends and key issues a peacekeeping mission will be able to have a continuous monitoring mechanism and locate issues that may require urgent follow-up. Peacekeeping operations have intended to increase their public information efforts in an attempt to manage local community's expectations. The United Nations Organization Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) for instance holds weekly meetings with both international and national media. It generates activities in an attempt to reach out to the community, civil society organizations and the government. It also seeks to clarify its mandate and share information in regards to its activities through its particular radio station (Martin, 2012, p.40).

And finally, the public perception and opinion surveys which provide quantitative data. This type of research has been used to monitor mandate implementation as well as identifying the views that the community may have of a peacekeeping mission whether positive or negative.

The majority of large surveys are outsourced or executed in cooperation with external partners given the lack of internal expertise and personnel. Partnership arrangement encompasses expert consultants, civil society actors, universities or research centers. These surveys are usually funded by external donors. Recently, peacekeeping missions have begun to consider strategies for understanding local perceptions in a systematic way. Due to the advances in the missions' mandates, peacekeeping missions have intended to adopt a more formal and professionalized approach to local perceptions. Accordingly, missions are starting to go beyond the casual gathering of local perceptions towards a more targeted approach, by relying on more strategic interventions and a larger set of tools. UNIFIL, UNAMID and MONUSCO are one of the few missions that have paved the way in terms of attempting to develop a systematic approach to the employment of these tools (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.26-33).

## **2.5 Challenges with the issue of Local Perceptions:**

Beyond the issue of local perceptions, missions are facing various challenges at the operational level. They are struggling with the implementation of newly assigned tasks such as linking peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Guidelines on how to apply these tasks is lacking as well as a lack of consensus among member states on the role of peacekeeping. Consequently, mission objectives have not been fully accomplished. Moreover, with weak political peace processes in several mission settings such as Darfur and Chad, peacekeeping missions are unable to fulfill their mandate in a context where post-settlement peacebuilding solutions are absent. Thus, delivering effective transition and exist strategies from conflict to peace for the host state is often hindered (Coning, Stensland & Tardy, 2010, p.11-14). The Department of Peacekeeping operations and Department of Field Support in a 2009 report clearly stated the previous challenges by announcing that: "the scale and complexity of

peacekeeping today are straining its personnel, administrative and support machinery”. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009).

When it comes to the issue of local perceptions in particular, peacekeeping missions are facing constraints that limit their ability to capture perceptions more systematically and fully incorporate them within their strategy setting. These limitations can be divided into strategic challenges and operational challenges.

To start with the strategic limitation, peacekeeping missions by nature have a short-term frame and are supposed to quickly deliver their mandates. The Security Council is responsible for planning mandates’ cycles which are usually renewed on an annual basis. Thus, most missions planning focus on hard mandated tasks such as cessation of violence rather than soft tasks which include the engagement with the local community. In addition to the short-term planning, comes the limitation in the scope of missions in some cases. This limitation is derived from the objectives and tasks that are included in the Security Council Resolutions. And this limitation is practically revealed in a mission’s inability to change and adapt to local perceptions. Adding to the political limitation, is the financial one whereby most missions lack the financial flexibility to change and adjust strategies based on local perceptions or even gather reliable data in the first place.

When it comes to the operational challenges, Civil Affairs are faced with a main challenge that is “access to sources” whether physical access or access to reliable source of information. Regarding physical access, some missions are unable to access remote areas or in some cases lack adequate and advanced technical skills and qualified personnel to conduct rigorous research. Additionally, the information people tell is highly affected by how they perceive the mission thus it might not properly reflect their views and they might be suffering from what is referred to as “assessment fatigue” where they lose patience with repeated questions and provide answers that are misleading. Going beyond that is the fact that some

missions are faced with political constraints whereby societal relations are highly politicized. The mission is continually required to take into account the local elites and maintain its relation with them which can be difficult given the constant changing political situation. Besides that, local elites can interfere with the results by intimidating communities into giving answers that are adequate to their political agenda.

Once information is gathered, missions consistently face the hurdle of effectively managing the results at hand. Information collected in different formats and through various mission components can result in competing priorities and thus an inability to tackle the expectations and needs of the locals. Even when the information is systematically collected, integrating the collected perceptions in the decision making process is faced with a range of pressures. These pressures stem from the bureaucratic structure. In other words, regular turnover in the management and the complexity of the bureaucratic structure such as cross-over of responsibility and unclear hierarchy can impact a mission's ability to systematically integrate local perceptions within the decision-making framework. Finally, there is no formal guidance to instruct peacekeepers on how to collect and use local perceptions correlated with a lack of a clear methodology to conduct the required research (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.53-59).

## **2.6 Future Outlook:**

The UN needs to be more active in collecting, sharing and analyzing local perceptions. There is significant potential to improve the effectiveness when implementing a mission's mandate by understanding local perceptions. There seem to be no connection between the results gathered from local perceptions and policy-making within the UN peacekeeping mission. These perceptions are not being adequately incorporated into mission and policy planning. By integrating local perceptions into decision-making process along with other

sources of information, missions can be more responsive to the needs of the local population. Currently, missions often make use of local perceptions in a relatively informal way that falls within short-term operational responses. A more structured approach would enable missions to fully make use of local perceptions to inform high-level strategy setting (Schia, Gjelsvik & Karlsrud, 2013, p.1).

Despite the fact that UN has taken steps over the past few years to develop strategies to protect civilians in conflict-affected communities, few have been made in regards to engaging the community in an effective and safe manner. Monitoring local perceptions will aid the peacekeeping mission with understanding how its mandate is received and what effects the mission may be having on its host (Giffen, 2013 , p.22).

Additionally, peacekeepers need to go beyond their immediate interlocutors and target peripheral and marginalized groups in order to have a broader range of perceptions. Tools and technical skills are also required as well as training and operational guidance on the use of these tools. And once perceptions are gathered, missions require a centralized unit that is mandated to collect and analyze local perceptions. Without this explicit mechanism, the full incorporation of local perceptions will be at risk.

## **Chapter Three: UNIFIL: Mandate and Scope of Work**

### **3.1 Throughout Continuous Conflicts: UNIFIL from Resolution 425 to Resolution 1701:**

Back in 1978, Lebanon was suffering from a civil war that has been going on since 1975.. In Southern Lebanon, Lebanese militias and the armed forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were players in the conflict and PLO had control of much of Southern Lebanon and made use of several military bases to launch attacks on Israel. Following a PLO attack that resulted in many Israeli civilian casualties on March 11 1978, Israel undertook a responsive measure in the form of a full-scale invasion of Lebanon on the eve of the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> of March. In the aftermath of Israel's "Litani Operation" that resulted in the occupation of 2020 Km<sup>2</sup> in South Lebanon, the Lebanese Government submitted on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March 1978, a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion. It stated that it had no connection with the Palestinian operation. Consequently UNIFIL was established on March 17<sup>th</sup> 1978 under resolution 425, whereby an interim force was decided by the Security Council and it was structured as a traditional peacekeeping mission. Resolution 426 was subsequently issued. It approved the UN Secretary General's report on the implementation of resolution 425 and authorized the deployment of a 4000 UNIFIL force for an initial period of six months. The mandate was to: (a) confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; (b) restore international peace and security; and (c) assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the Southern area (Annex 1).

Resolution 425 didn't result in an immediate end to hostilities. From their part, the Israelis continued their military operations for two more days until a ceasefire was ordered.



And the PLO's initial response was that the Resolution didn't apply to them because they weren't mentioned in it. But eventually, the PLO leadership agreed to the ceasefire on March 28, 1978 and pledged to facilitate UNIFIL's task by not attacking Israel from Southern Lebanon, following a meeting between UNIFIL commander General Emmanuel Erskine and Yasser Arafat in Beirut (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, pp.10-14).

In due course, Israel withdrew its troops from Lebanon but rather than handing over key positions near the border to UNIFIL as was required under Resolution 425, it authorized the South Lebanon Army (SLA) commanded by major Saad Haddad to take control of a 10 Km<sup>2</sup> area called "Free Lebanon" within which the SLA were the "de facto" force (DFF). During that time, the hostilities in Southern Lebanon continued. UNIFIL was in the heart of an unstable area and was sometimes the target of attacks from both the SLA and Palestinians. On April 19, 1978, the SLA bombarded UNIFIL headquarters, killing 8 UN peacekeepers, and in April 1980, three Irish peacekeepers were kidnapped and two of them murdered in SLA territory. In their turn, Palestinian factions also continued their aggressions and attacked UNIFIL such as the case of kidnapping an Irish peacekeeper in 1981; whilst continuing to occupy areas in the South (Fisk, 2002, p. 137-155).

As the civil war intensified, the fighting escalated in the South again. In June 1982, after intense exchange of fire across the Israeli-Lebanese border, Israel invaded Lebanon again, reaching and surrounding Beirut. The UN responded to the invasion by issuing Resolution 511 which authorized an extension of UNIFIL's mandate for a further period and according to their rules of engagement, UNIFIL troops were authorized to halt the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces). But for a period of three years, UNIFIL remained behind the Israeli lines. Its role was limited to providing humanitarian assistance to the local population. With lack of equipment and political support by the Security Council, UNIFIL was unable to stop the Israeli advances. During that time, Hezbollah a national resistance movement against

Israel became increasingly effective. The resistance published its "Open Letter" in 1985 announcing the emergence and objectives of its military wing. Resistance was considered to be a main and fundamental priority for Hezbollah (Qassem, 2005, p.98).

Thereafter, within the same year, the IDF carried out a partial withdrawal in 1985 by abandoning large cities such as Tyre and Sidon but continuing to occupy around 1,100 km<sup>2</sup> of land standing for 55% of South Lebanon and 11% of Lebanon's total area. The occupied area was operated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). Israel continued attacks and intrusions into Lebanon forced Southern residents to find refuge in Beirut and surrounding towns. Being reduced to 4,500 troops UNFIL played the role of a "watch -man", where several attacks took place such as the 1996 IDF attack on the Fijan Battalion Headquarters of UNIFIL in the village of Qana during "Operations of Wrath" which resulted in the killing of 107 civilians who had taken refuge (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p.16).

In May 2000, the IDF completed its withdrawal from most of Southern Lebanon while the SLA quickly disintegrated. UNIFIL remained on the ground, with continued occupation of Shebaa Farm and within a situation that was yet to evolve leading to the 2006 war. On the 12<sup>th</sup> of July 2006, Hezbollah launched several rockets across the Blue Line towards Israeli positions and in parallel a unit crossed the Blue Line and Attacked an Israeli army patrol near the border, capturing two Israeli Soldiers killing three and wounding two. A heavy exchange of fire followed across the Blue Line between Hezbollah and IDF. Hezbollah targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns south of the Blue Line and Israel retaliated by ground, air and sea attacks stretching beyond South Lebanon (Report of the Secretary General, S/2006/560, July 2006).

14 August witnessed the entering into effect of UNSC Resolution 1701 which aimed at the cessation of hostilities in anticipation of a permanent ceasefire between Hezbollah and

Israel. UNIFIL's mandate has been significantly expanded and was made "robust"<sup>4</sup> under resolution 1701 UNIFIL was charged with additional tasks and was given a new set of engagement rules with the deployment of a large number of soldiers up to 15000 from 36 different nationalities. The new mandate was to carry out and enforce the newly assigned tasks which are to: (1) monitor the cessation of hostilities; (2) accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the South, and as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon; (3) coordinate its activities with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel; (4) extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to the civilian population and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; (5) assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons; (6) assist the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points (Chiheytleh, 2009, pp.52-53)

The mandate also authorized UNIFIL to: "to take all necessary action in areas of deployment ... to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties ... and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and....protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" (Annex 2).

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<sup>4</sup> This concept has emerged gradually after the difficulties encountered by the UN in its peacekeeping operations during the 1990s in the Balkans and the Great Lakes. The redefinition focus on the terms of mandates and rules of engagement. They put in evidence the critical importance of an engaged consensus policy between conflicting parties, the need for a widened participation in the decision making and operational implementation.

## **3.2 UNIFIL Challenges**

### **3.2.1 UNIFIL under Resolution 425:**

The mandate that led to the establishment of UNIFIL was ambiguous and could not be realistically achieved. When UNIFIL's original mandate was issued in 1978 in the midst of the civil war, it was mandated to assist the Government of Lebanon but the resolution failed to recognize that there was at the time no effective government. When the Security Council met at Lebanon's request on the 17<sup>th</sup> of March, the US took the lead in drafting the resolution. Consequently the US exerted pressure on the SC to create a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon in order to avoid damaging the Camp David peace conference between Israel and Egypt scheduled on the 21<sup>st</sup> of March (Hillen, 2000, p.48).

The UN under-secretary general for special political affairs at that time Brian Urquhart expressed strong reservations about placing such a force in Lebanon stating:

“The hard facts of the situation militated against deploying such a force. Government authority, an important condition for successful peacekeeping, did not exist in Southern Lebanon, where a tribal, inter-confessional guerrilla war was raging. The terrain of Southern Lebanon was ideal for guerilla activity and very difficult for conventional forces. The PLO, a dominating factor in the area was under no formal authority.... Southern Lebanon would almost certainly be a peacekeeper's nightmare.”(Urquhart, 1987, p.288).

Hence more, the PLO and IDF never fully accepted UNIFIL's mandate with all its implications. The mission was prevented from deploying fully in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces; thus Israel retained a degree of military power in the area and continued its fight against the PLO and its Lebanese allies. UNIFIL's efforts to implement its mandate in these conditions inevitably led the force to suffer significant casualties.

Many examples demonstrate the challenges and limitations faced by UNIFIL. A year after its establishment, UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura were attacked by Major Haddad's militia which consisted of an army that was under direct Israeli control and was later known

as the South Lebanon Army. A year later in 1980, the attack was repeated. In these instances, UNIFIL was paralyzed despite having the full authority to use force in self-defense. The missions' commanders didn't want to get involved militarily so they took no action to protect themselves. In another instance, during Israel's invasion in 1982, UNIFIL was expected under its mandate to stop the Israeli army from advancing. UNIFIL was allowed to use force not only in self-defense but according to its rules of engagement when "attempts are made to prevent it from performing its duties". Then again scarce attempts were made to blockade Israeli tanks from advancing. Under-equipped, the majority of the troops stood by and watched as the Israeli army invaded the territory. Consequently, Israel's 1982 invasion entirely overrun UN troops. UNIFIL was powerless with lack of heavy arms and equipment. Here again a demonstration of the mandate's ineffectiveness and inability to take into consideration the realities on the ground (Hillen, 2000, pp.49-52).

Additionally, UNIFIL is the creation of hassled circumstances where important pre-deployment operational considerations that had always been integral of peacekeeping missions were ignored in particular the issues of clearly defining UNIFIL's area of operations and ensuring that the force would secure the consent and cooperation of the conflict parties. In other words, the force which was structured as a traditional peace keeping mission was supposed to have the consent of all opposing parties, was to be very lightly armed and could use force only in cases of self-defense. But, UNIFIL arrived to Lebanon in a civil war situation where having the consent of all parties was impossible. Sent as a traditional peacekeeping mission, the force was unable to properly defend itself against attacks, and its failure to acquire the consent of all parties was the cause of its earlier disappointments. Thus the rules of engagement were far from the reality on the ground (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, pp.18-20).

With the absence of any political settlement that would have allowed the Lebanese State to effectively extend its authority over the South; UNIFIL was established under conditions where the key parties to the conflict were at war and in an overall political framework that was weak. With no “peace” to keep UNIFIL was left with the task of managing a protracted conflict that occasionally exploded, and figuring out ways to diffuse tension.

### **3.2.2 UNIFIL under Resolution 1701:**

Following the 2006 war, a ceasefire was achieved few days after the adoption of resolution 1701. With the absence of a peace agreement; one can speak of a status quo between conflicting parties within a situation that is suspected to collapse at any given time. The parties accepted the strengthening of the mandate of UNIFIL and its military device, insofar as it plays a role in bringing to an end the hostilities and preventing the reoccurrence of others given the high cost that was paid by both parties during the war (Michel, 2011, p.409).

As the case of other peacekeeping missions, the mandate’s ambiguity is related to the inability of UN members to agree on clear strategies in order to address the conflict at hand. And with unstated political objectives that contradicted official mission goals, the result is a mandate that is left with ambiguity (Fleitz, 2002, p.118). UNIFIL’s incapacity to fulfill its objectives reflects then again the mandate’s failure to understand the reality on the ground. Within the same scope, in most peacekeeping missions, opposing parties can be easily identified. But in Southern Lebanon this was not the case. Hezbollah is best known for its ability to hide and conceal its military equipment and soldiers within the Southern territory and amongst the civilian population. Throughout the years of war, Hezbollah has acquired the ability to disguise its military capability as result of military necessity; the party’s military

wing had become an expert in clandestine operations. The fighters were able to form “secretive circles” and function secretly from the enemy. Naim Qassem, the party’s deputy leader makes mention to “Secrecy” stating that it was the key to success on the battlefield. To build a resistance movement that is different from a formal army organization, practical procedures were taken which allowed for flexibility and allowed fighters to resume their normal lives across the various towns (Qassem, 2005,p.69-70). Thus, while Hezbollah as a party is very visible in the South, its military wing operates in secrecy. Its members do not wear uniforms and do not show off militarily.

Additionally the question of UNIFIL’s ability to ensure an area free of any hostile activities is put under question. Many incidents have occurred which reveal UNIFIL’s inability to carry out its mandate properly and even to practice self-defense when put in danger. As mentioned earlier, UNIFIL’s mandate gives it the authority to apply force beyond self- defense, if its freedom of movement is blocked or if its area of operation is being utilized for possible hostile actions. In one of the instances, shortly after the enhanced UNIFIL began its operation, on the 31st of October 2006, Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace and proceeded over French peacekeeping positions. The French troops felt threatened by the Israeli planes. However the troops restrained from taking any action despite Israel’s threatening behavior (Chalton, 2006). Seemingly UNIFIL has a long history of suffering casualties as a result of Israeli’s attacks. Amongst these incidents is the death of a French peacekeeper in 2005 beside the Shebaa Farms by an Israeli tank. And more recently, the Spanish peacekeeper who was killed this year by the Israelis following Hezbollah’s missile attack on an Israeli army convoy (Blanford, 2015).

Therefore, UNIFIL faces challenges that are related to the environment in which it operates. Incidents such as rocket attacks are a clear indication that establishing an area free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani

River remains a long-term objective. These incidents demonstrate UNIFIL's inability to effectively use force despite its rules of engagement allowing it do so when facing violations of its mandate. Adding to that, the mandate's main pillar is to assist the LAF in providing safety and security across the Southern region. Knowing that LAF is lacking the military capabilities to spread its power over the borders and the fact that it is unable to tackle the construction of armed facilities by Hezbollah in the UNIFILs' area of operations, this situation highly impacts the mission's ability to fulfill its mandate (Mattelaer, 2009, p.28-29).

Another issue is the missions' troops themselves. The diversity of national contingents affects UNIFIL's ability to function in unison. The chain of command is likely to be adversely affected due to miscommunication amongst troops. Differences in languages, cultures and army style of operation also add to the problem. The presence of many contingents pave the way to under-trained troops which creates a gap of power and military ability compared with other contingents such as the case of African troops in comparison to well-trained European troops. Plus, UNIFIL officers and commanders tend to have their orders discussed with their national government. If a unit is ordered to undertake action that requires the use of force, before carrying out the action the unit commander might hesitate and seek approval from his government (Fleitz, 2002, p.61). The result of such reality is a weak chain of command whose units are hesitant to carry out required orders.

Going beyond the previous points, the argument of UNIFIL as a buffer force stands out. Interposing a buffer force between conflict parties is a peacekeeping strategy that is related to the notion of diplomatic deterrence. UNIFIL plays this role by shielding conflicting parties from each other. The massive presence of UNIFIL may change the way the parties to the conflict make their cost-benefit analysis given that any direct confrontation with peacekeepers is costly. For instance, on the Israeli side, any decision to take action is highly



put into question amongst the decision-makers taking into account Israel's image within the international community and its relation with the European countries that are part of UNIFIL's troops. It can thus be said that the idea of an Israeli tank facing a French tank may instill some restraint by the Israeli decision-makers.

However the realities on the ground are different. UNIFIL is weak when it comes to deterring the current conflicting parties Israel and Hezbollah. Fear of both parties from resulting in casualties like what happened in the 2006 war has kept another war from breaking out, not UNIFIL's presence or activities. Thus mutual deterrence is what's keeping the situation currently stable. UNIFIL's contribution in deterring the conflicting parties is minimal if not to say absent (John, 2013, pp.67-69). Furthermore, While UNIFIL works on balancing the political sensitivities of both parties and at the same time maintaining its credibility, the conflicting parties attempt to exploit UNIFIL's impartiality to their advantage. Hence, its presence is not impenetrable given the fact that Israeli incursions into Lebanese airspace occur regularly and Hezbollah continues to maintain arms within the mission's area of operations (Mattelaer, 2009, pp.19-21).

In another perspective, UNIFIL is considered to be a sub-buffer within a buffer state that separates two rivals: Syria and Israel. Accordingly, Lebanon stands out as a perfect example of a buffer state. A plan created by the major players in the international system to protect the Israelis' borders. Thus, the presence of UNIFIL is contextual and was the result of secretive planning under the heading of USA. The quickness of issuing it and the readiness of many countries to deploy their forces stand out as striking evidence. In addition, when the context changes UNIFIL's presence as well is altered. This is illustrated by the shift from the first mandate to the second one (Hanna, 2009, pp.87-92).

To sum up, during its initial mandate, UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its tasks given that it was handed unachievable goals and rules of engagement that resulted in its paralysis within civil war turmoil. The currently enhanced UNIFIL with better and adjusted operational rules have yet again found itself paralyzed because its goals cannot be put into action on the ground with a mandate that failed to take into account the realities and complexities of the situation.

### **3.3 UNIFIL Achievements:**

UNIFIL has been accused for being just a watchman counting and reporting the violations of conflicting parties, at first Israel and Palestinian guerrillas and now Israel and Hezbollah. It has also been noted as being the longest “interim” peacekeeping force, and to the extreme, even accused of disturbing the tranquility of life in South Lebanon by inconveniencing residents. Between expectations and the reality on the ground, many issues need to be addressed given that high expectations from the locals can lead to resentment and frustration.

#### **3.3.1 Tripartite Mechanism:**

UNIFIL does not carry the sole responsibility for implementing Resolution 1701. The Resolution which calls for a long-term solution to the conflict must be achieved through a political process that UNIFIL has little or no say at all. UNIFIL within its capabilities tries to maintain the cessation of hostilities, de-escalate tensions and support the Lebanese Army in ensuring a secure environment. But settlement itself should be reached by the parties themselves. In other words, UNIFIL assists in reaching a political solution but cannot substitute for it.

One of UNFIL's important innovations is its role in coordinating between the LAF and IDF. From the outset of its current mandate, UNFIL identified the need for a mechanism under which the parties can be brought together to avert or defuse conflict. With the cessation of hostilities in August 2006, UNFIL took advantage of the opportunity and proposed a meeting of commanders from both the LAF and IDF. Since then, it has become a monthly forum supplemented by ad hoc meetings. The mission takes the role of a mediator working to diffuse any confrontation that may occur. Meeting between both parties is institutionalized on a strategic as well as operational level. Leadership of both LAF and IDF meet under the tripartite forum to address military-strategic issues such as the marking of the Blue Line, warning about upcoming training maneuvers and others. Such liaison serves as a confidence-building measure and as a way to prevent small incidents from developing into conflict triggers (Mattelaer, 2009, p.20-21).

UNFIL has as well mediated the process of marking the Blue Line, the UN drawn "Line of Withdrawal" of the IDF from Lebanon in 2000. When UNFIL suggested in 2007 a pilot project to visibly mark the Blue Line, the proposal was welcomed by both parties. Despite the slow progress on the marking, it has been shown that where visible markers do exist, violations are less likely to occur (Sur & Miur, 2013, p.12-13).

### **3.3.2 UNFIL and LAF Coordination:**

UNFIL is not the agency that has the primary responsibility for security in South Lebanon. It is the responsibility of the LAF. After facilitating the deployment of LAF in the South, UNFIL now supports the LAF in ensuring security of the borders. Given that the primary responsibility for security legitimately belongs to the Lebanese state while UNFIL only provides assistance.

A coordination procedure was necessary with the deployment of 10000 Lebanese soldiers along with peacekeeping soldiers. Under Resolution 1701 and as mentioned earlier, UNIFIL was expanded in terms of troop number to include more than 36 contributing countries. The area of operations covered by the mission is divided into two sectors: East sector led by the Italian troop and the West sector led by the Spanish. It maintains over 60 positions as well as a series of checkpoints and observation posts and conducts around 400 vehicle foot and air patrols over a 24-hour period (UNIFIL Facts and Figures, 2015). The area of operation was expanded post-1701 by integrating Tyre which was previously excluded. Thus, the valley cut out by the Litani River provides a natural border with the exception of a limited number of crossing points that need to be monitored (Mattelaer, 2009, p.16).

UNIFIL and LAF share common activities such as: blue line patrols, common check points, military training, naval exercises, physical training activities and other social activities. And at the command level, regular meetings are held to draw the outlines and objectives of this strategic relationship (Chiheytleh, 2009, p.53-56).

Monitoring, deterrence and support are the main functions of UNIFIL's peacekeeping efforts on the ground. Monitoring is achieved by a mix of both dynamic and static operations. On the dynamic side, regular ground patrolling on vehicles and on foot, including coordinated patrols with LAF which enables UNIFIL to maintain presence across the area and ensure the respect for the Blue Line. As for the static operations, observation posts that are located at vantage points allow surveillance with particular focus on the Blue Line. When it comes to deterrence, UNIFIL's Quick Reaction Force plays an integral role. Composed of robust arms and tanks, this force ensures deterrence of any hostile activities through the combined presence and operations of UNIFIL and LAF troops. And as for supporting the LAF it is one of the integral elements of UNIFIL's mandate. It aims at gradually transferring

responsibilities to the LAF so that it assumes effective and full security over the borders as mentioned in Resolution 1701. For this purpose, UNIFIL conducts regular joint training and exercises with LAF such as natural disaster response, medical evacuation and so on (Filippi, 2010, p.7).

One important innovation in the enhanced UNIFIL is the addition of a Maritime Task Force (MTF) at the request of the Lebanese government which asked for the assistance of UN in monitoring and patrolling its territorial waters. It is the first mission within the UN operations to include naval assets. The MTF has a maritime interdiction mission in an area stretching around fifty nautical miles off the Lebanese coast (Mattelaer, 2009, p.13-14). Established in October 2006, its main tasks are to establish a naval presence and surveillance over the Area of Maritime Operations that stretches up to 43 nautical miles beyond the Lebanese territorial waters that extends up to 12 nautical miles; and to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) which include identifying, stopping, diverting or referring suspect Merchant vessels for inspection by Lebanese authorities. And if requested by the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy, the MTF may as well board and inspect a suspected vessel. MTF is also tasked to assist and train the LAF-Navy in order for it to gain the ability to have the full control over the territorial waters. The coordination between MTF and LAF-Navy is fundamental in order to secure the territorial waters and eventually on the long term hand over the security responsibilities to the LAF-Navy gradually (Sandalli, 2010, p.6).

### **3.3.3 UNIFIL Role in De-escalation**

Hence more, UNIFIL has shown an ability to deal with stabilizing and de-escalating issues and preventing them from turning into potentially explosive issues. Small events such as Israeli cows crossing to drink water on the Lebanese side to a pond in eastern border region near Kfar Chouba or the Lebanese shepherd straying into Israeli territory were recipe

for trouble. But UNIFIL's coordination with the LAF and its liaison between the parties allowed it to turn the situation around. As efforts for permanent ceasefire continue through the diplomatic channels, UNIFIL's presence in South Lebanon helps prevent the resumption of hostilities (Ghattas, 2010, p.8-9).

Furthermore, Lebanon is in the heart of an unstable region and UNIFIL is affected by changes that occur in the region even when they are not directly within its area of operations. Lebanon is directly affected and immersed in the turmoil, specifically the Syrian case. Therefore, any escalation of the situation in South Lebanon may be linked to the Syrian crisis and its repercussions. What happened in December 2011 is a clear example. A bomb attack on a UNIFIL patrol that wounded five French peacekeepers and rocket attacks on Israel have heightened tension in the Southern region. Thus, the South is used as an arena for political messages and UNIFIL with its international identity is the target of several terrorist attacks. Political messages are sent to the international community through attacking UNIFIL (Boumounsef, 2011, p.12).

The Syrian crisis resulted in the withdrawal of a big number of LAF troops from Southern Lebanon for redeployment in the North and on the Syrian Borders. Yet, in response, UNIFIL has scheduled more patrols and other operational activities to be carried out independently of LAF and has reviewed existing provisions with LAF (Gowan, 2013, p.2).

## **Chapter Four: UNIFIL and Its Host Community**

### **4.1 UNIFIL's Interface with the Local Population**

#### **4.1.1 Civilian and Military:**

UNIFIL accords great importance to its relationship with the local population. This relationship takes many forms and is undertaken under both Civil Affairs and Civil Military Coordination. They play an integral role in liaising with the local community and authorities on behalf of the mission in addition to undertaking an array of activities to aid and support the local population in UNIFIL's area of operations.

Civil Affairs is the interface between the mission and the community. It is the bridge that allows the host community to get into contact with the mission.. Through its multiple interactions with the local population, it connects the mission with its host. On one hand, the civil affairs office provides the mission leadership with an understanding of the social and political framework allowing it to take local considerations and integrate them into its goal setting process. On the other hand, through civil affairs, local population has access to the mission which is often perceived as distant and militarized. In other words, Civil Affairs officers who are the representatives of the mission at the local level conduct an array of tasks in a well-structured process along different objectives. They ensure that the local authorities and population are informed about the work of the peacekeeping mission by addressing any misperceptions and managing expectations about what the mission can achieve. They collect and report information about priorities, concerns and perceptions of different groups with regard to the mission including its mandate. Additionally, they report on the local situation to the mission's leadership and thus provide a wider understanding of the context. Planning

activities and seeking input on activities is also one of the key tasks of this office (Civil Affairs Handbook, 2012, pp.130-133). In its turn UNIFIL's Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) is an interface between the peacekeepers and the people of South Lebanon. Being need-driven, medical and veterinary care constitute an important element of it. These units undertake humanitarian and reconstruction activities that target improving the living conditions of the host community. The activities range from large-scale humanitarian projects to small-scale activities.

Hence more, community outreach is a key priority for the Mission whereby a specific Military Community Outreach Unit was established. It works on communicating details of UNIFIL's objectives and activities to the local population while at the same time gaining feedback from the community in relation to UNIFIL's operations in support of resolution 1701. This outreach takes the form of regular meetings with local authorities and community representatives, and forums in which issues of concern can be brought to the attention of the mission. For instance, in 2007 a series of town hall meetings have been undertaken between local community leaders and the UNIFIL Force Commander. Additionally, UNIFIL stress highly on the youth through its regular school visits or its interaction with youth in its headquarters under the heading of "A Day with UNIFIL".

Additionally, UNIFIL engages in a multi-faceted outreach media mechanism. Along the years UNIFIL substantially scaled up the number and types of its public information outputs. UNIFIL's media outputs expanded from press releases and interviews to include daily updates through UNIFIL website, Twitter and Facebook, radio programs, documentaries, promotional spots and outreach magazines. UNIFIL magazine entitled "Al-Janoub" which is freely distributed entails all its activities and accomplishments. Written in Arabic, it provides the local population in specific and the Lebanese public opinion in general with a highlight of



its endeavors. Additionally, the radio program “Salam from the South” is UNIFIL’s own production. It is broadcasted on several local radio stations: El-Mada, Voice of People, Al-Risala, Radio Delta, Voice of Lebanon. The radio program of 10 minutes provides listeners with first-hand news about UNIFILs’ activities and bring voices of the Southerners with their views on UNIFIL activities. In addition, one of the most prominent media release is the TV episode “Discover UNIFIL”. The 10-minute documentary provides insight into UNIFIL’s activities and exposes all UNIFIL’s accomplishments in terms of providing to the local population from medical supplies to agricultural assistance and others. Local citizens who were beneficiaries of the services have the chance to voice out their opinion. It is broadcasted on Lebanese TV stations: NewTv, Tele Liban and NBN (National broadcasting Network) that is linked to Amal Movement (Sur & Miur, 2013, p.14-17).

Hence, one can say that UNIFIL realizes the critical role of positive relations with the local community and the positive impact that can be generated from its interaction with it.

#### **4.1.2 Scope of Humanitarian Assistance:**

Although not a humanitarian or development agency, UNIFIL has had since its establishment in 1978, a strong humanitarian disposition in addressing the consequences of wars and occupation in the South.

Both CIMIC and Civil Affairs office implement Quick Impact Projects designed to meet the most impending needs of the local community. Both units take the lead role in the identification and management of Quick Impact Projects. QIPs are small scale projects that must be implemented within three months whereby UNIFIL sets aside 500,000\$ a year for QIPs. The mission works closely with local authorities and civil society organizations in identifying needs and priorities of the local community. These projects are various, they

target: health, environment, education, infrastructure and social needs. For instance, a health project was conducted in the town of “Adshit al Qusayr” whereby a new medical and dental clinic was established. Additionally for example one of the projects conducted aimed at providing the residents of “Baraashit” better access to collected rainwater by rehabilitating the existing pond. The water collected would help in irrigating fields and plantations. In addition UNIFIL has set up a budget for larger scale projects that benefit the community as a whole, encompassing several villages at the same time. An amount of 20,000\$ per project is usually set aside.

Additionally, some troops have specific national resources allocated for CIMIC such as the Italian and Korean. Various troops particularly those of the European Union contribute additional funds outside the UNFIIL budget through CIMIC procedures. Such budgets have increased after the attack on the Spanish unit in June 2007 for it was concluded that troops need to build better relations with the locals for security reasons (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p.26). Whereas other troops likewise the Ghanaian rely on UN funding under QIPs (Quick Impact Projects) without having national allocations provided for such projects.

UNIFIL contingents provide free medical, dental, veterinary and other assistance to the local population. In addition, they conduct various training programs for the people in various fields such as computers and languages. UNIFIL peacekeepers have proceeded to share their respective national customs and folklore with the locals where language plays an integral role. The multiple languages spoken by the troops provide a unique opportunity for the locals to learn new languages and thus interact with the peacekeepers.

Furthermore, troops vary in the importance they give to CIMIC. For example, the Italian unit prioritizes CIMIC setting up a series of projects and activities going from reconstructions activities to Italian language classes and mine risk education. In contrast, the French army doesn't consider CIMIC as a priority putting security as its main priority. French troops focus mainly on supporting schools and demining giving way to French agencies mainly through the French embassy to be involved in providing assistance (Ruffa,2014,p.208-209). Consequently this suggests two types of operational strategy across the missions' troops, the first "humanitarian oriented" likewise the Italian troop that focus on the delivery of humanitarian service and less on security. The second is "deterrence-oriented" likewise the French that pay little attention to humanitarian assistance and are more security oriented and focus on observation activities such as patrolling.

#### **4.1.3 Humanitarian Assistance from 1978 till Present:**

When UNIFIL was first deployed in the South, a raging war was taking place and the locals were suffering from its consequences. UNIFIL shared the experiences of war with the locals which brought them closer and created an atmosphere of mutual interaction.

Since the initial deployment of the mission, the provision of humanitarian assistance to the local population has been an important task for UNIFIL. The underlying and core principle behind UNIFIL humanitarian efforts is that humanitarian aid, in its own right, reduces tension among the population, strengthens relations between the mission and the local population and gives UNIFIL a visible role within the local community. During the first mandate period in 1978, an emergency relief and reconstruction program for South Lebanon was in operation, coordinated by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General. A humanitarian section was set up at UNIFIL Headquarters to deliver liaison for all aspects of

the UN assistance program and to assist the Special Representative. In addition, a humanitarian officer was assigned to each battalion for such purposes (El-Hajj, 1998,p.11).

UNIFIL opted to provide an array of humanitarian services despite low budget. Many civilians who remained in their village needed UNIFIL to survive. With its own resources, UNIFIL attempted to relief the civilians through various services without any external assistance. All of UNIFIL's units, attempted to deliver as much help as possible, including funds provided from their home governments such as the Norwegians and Finns who mobilized their own national resources. From repairing schools to clearing mines to providing medical services to the extent of sending helicopters to evacuate civilian patients and having them treated in Israeli hospitals when the security situation was of concern in Beirut. (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p.18).

An incident that best exemplifies UNIFIL's aid to the local population was its response to the Qana massacre in April 1996 caused by Israeli artillery shelling the UNIFIL position and the refugee shelters who had been given shelter in the UN Fijian position in the village of Qana. In addition to dealing with the immediate effects of the attack, UNIFIL provided 10,500 food rations, worth \$85,000, and medical supplies worth \$55,000 to the refugees; transported water to villages where the water supply systems were damaged due to the shelling, provided assistance by the Swedish engineer company and the Norwegian maintenance company with their machinery to clear roads and collapsed buildings in the damaged villages, sterilized the affected areas by the Polish medical hygiene team in order to prevent a widespread outbreak of disease and disposed of weaponry and mortar shells found in the villages by the bomb disposal teams of each Battalion (El-Hajj, 1998,p.12-13).

Similarly, UNIFIL under its new mandate continued its delivery of assistance to the local population. In the immediate aftermath of the 2006 war UNIFIL hugely aided in

repairing the damaged infrastructure. UNIFIL projects targeted primarily access to basic services, particularly water and electricity, as well as rehabilitations of infrastructure. The engineering capacity within UNIFILs' troops was put to use in rehabilitating the infrastructure that was severely ruined as a result of the war. It also developed its demining efforts in order to alleviate any disturbance that might affect the local population (Mattelaer, 2009, p.21-22).

Recently in the last couple of years, UNIFIL has diversified its delivery of projects it funds to include support to civil society and capacity building initiatives while holding strong emphasis on access to basic services (UNIFIL official website: [unifil.unmissions.org](http://unifil.unmissions.org)).

## **4.2 History of Interaction between UNIFIL and Host Community:**

### **4.2.1 Between Coordination and Tension:**

UNIFIL under Resolution 425 provided a basis of trust for the locals who were secluded from the state authority and were living in a situation where several armed militias had control and power. Earlier on, the south was the landmark for fighting between the SLA under Major Saad Haddad and the Palestinians. The resulting large-scale destruction in the southern area, which Haddad had renamed "Free Lebanon" and which was inhabited mainly by Shia Muslims and Maronite Christians had a negative impact on the locals who felt secluded and under constant attack. The locals which were caught up in this turmoil were forced to migrate; approximately 200,000 people, or one-third of the population migrated to the Suburbs of Beirut or left the country. When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after Resolution 425, Haddad's South Lebanon Army (SLA) formerly the Free Lebanon Army took over most of the areas Israel had previously controlled (Collelo, 1987, p.210-216).

The local population not only welcomed UNIFIL personnel to their homes but they also provided UNIFIL with information and potential threats against the force. Thus, UNIFIL highly relied on intelligence information provided from local villagers. In addition the locals sometimes intervened with hostile elements to prevent any potential attacks against the UN troops. In its turn UNIFIL was able to assist the locals and through its humanitarian mechanism provide relieve to the extent possible.

Furthermore, UNIFIL was sensitive to local culture and sentiments. Local leaders were always engaged in UNIFIL's activities and invited to the ceremonies and parades. The peacekeepers eventually become aware of the traditions, cultures and religions of the locals. In turn, southerners reciprocated the peacekeepers and were introduced to the various cultures and customs given the variety of nationalities that take part in the mission. Hence more, peacekeepers took measures to correlate with local sensitivities; they have made accommodations to be respectful of local culture and property, supported by training programs and the development of clear policies. For instance, troops were only allowed to sunbathe in designated locations not visible to the public and during Ramadan, UNFIL banned its troops from eating and smoking in public (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p.18-19).

Going further, even within the conduct of peacekeepers when interacting with the locals, traditional and religious considerations are respected. For instance, when saluting youth they advance by saying "Marhaba" whereas when confronting an elderly "Alsalamou Aleykoum" is used. This behavior is the result of accumulated interaction between peacekeepers that has ensued an increased exchange between the peacekeepers and the locals (Jaber, 2009, p.189).

Consequently over the years, UNIFIL was able to successfully integrate into the social and economic life of South Lebanon. By providing assistance to Southerners and helping them rebuild their lives, UNIFIL became an integral part of the community. UNIFIL was always fully responsive to the needs of the local population. Within its area of operations, individual national battalions built working relationships with the populations of their areas. The local population who had long been ignored by the Lebanese State and the international community reciprocated UNIFIL with assistance and frequently described UNIFIL personnel as “members of the family”. Any observer in the area will notice the human relationships that are displayed when local citizens pass through checkpoints. UNIFIL has long sought to establish communication chains with local Lebanese authorities, mainly with mayors, officers at local police stations, prominent members of political parties and others. UNIFIL's representatives at local celebrations of national holidays and other ceremonies have become a traditional local scene. As a normal consequence of those human relations, many marriages have taken place, mostly men from various UNIFIL troops with local girls whom in most of the situations are Shias (El-Hajj, 1988, p.14).

In the ceremony marking 30 years of UNIFIL's establishment under Resolution 425, the Force Commander back then Major-General Graziano stressed the full commitment of UNIFIL to perform its duties in close cooperation with LAF for the purpose of serving the community. He stated: “In performing our mission, we are extremely determined not only because of our capabilities but also because we are supported by the people of the South who know we are here to assist in ensuring security and stability for them.” ( Al-Janoub, 2008, p.5).

Southerners who have been long immersed in a situation that can escalate at any time, consider peacekeepers as an emergency relief that they can turn to whenever they want to fulfill their social and economic needs. The social dimension dominates here, rather than the

security one. In other terms, UNIFIL is not considered to be a separation force between Lebanon and Israel given that the locals have lessened over the years their perception of the mission as a safety and security provider given the continuous Israeli intrusions and due to the fact that Israeli conducts its intrusions without taking into consideration the international resolutions and the presence of a mission that has been agreed upon by the international community (Jaber, 2009, pp.181-182).

Consequently, the relationship between the local population and UNIFIL had its tension. Resolution 425 which remained for years unfulfilled created a drawback from the locals' side. Thus, suspicion and resentment had increased. Southerners have often accused the mission of failing to prevent Israel's violations of Lebanese sovereignty in particular it's over flights that occur regularly. In addition, to accusing UNIFIL of taking Israel's side whenever an incident takes place. Under Resolution 1701, UNIFIL was made more robust and was mandated to carry heavier weapons. Some UNIFIL troops appeared overly militant particularly the French and Spanish contingents. Locals expressed a sense of disrespect towards the newly arrived troops and didn't welcome the new changes. This is due to the residual mistrust that has increased as a result of Israel's continued infringements and the blame put on UNIFIL for not stopping these aggressions.

Consequently, UNIFIL attempted to forge on better relations with the local political leadership and municipalities including Amal Movement and Hezbollah in order to build in bridges of trust that seem to have been lost as a result of the 2006 war. And since May 2007, UNIFIL has refocused on a grass-root type of interaction similar to its first mandate that was seen as a humanitarian tool ((Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, pp.25- 26).



Moreover, despite the extent of interaction and engagement between the mission and the local population, Southerners have sometimes reacted with violence mainly stone-throwing when confronted with certain tasks conducted by the mission.

Such tensions occurred in June 2010 when patrols performed maneuvers in various towns. After the French contingent received photographs from French intelligence about Hezbollah weapons storage site in several towns; the patrols tried to investigate the matter to make sure that there is no breaching of resolution 1701. Locals in more than twenty villages stood against the troops' actions and considered that peacekeepers have exceeded their mandate by sending patrols inside towns and villages and taking pictures. Similarly the next month, locals of the village Kabreekha attacked and disarmed a French patrol which led to the injury of some soldiers. Consequently, UNIFIL was forced to halt its military maneuvers following protests in more than twenty villages across the South. Additionally, French sources have declared on several occasions that these protests are against the presence of the peacekeepers and that they are organized implying that the incidents that had occurred had an underlying political message (The Middle East Reporter, 2010, p.6-7).

#### **4.2.2 Economic Interaction:**

South Lebanon was famous for its agricultural portrait but along the years it has seen the expansion of local commerce due to UNIFIL's presence. By the mere presence of UNIFIL, locals and Lebanese expatriates became drawn to invest in new businesses under the assumption that benefit is definite. This has led to an establishment of an economic relationship between the Southerners and the peacekeepers. Locals have shown an ability to accommodate to the peacekeepers needs which are their biggest customer. Many local businesses have been established due to the solemn reason of the presence of a troop in their town or in a town nearby. For example, hotels and rental apartments have been built in

remote towns for the mere reason of UNIFIL's presence. Locals have shown an ability to even abandon their tradition in order to meet the peacekeepers' needs and demands for instance selling alcoholic drinks which is banned under the Islamic religion (Jaber, 2009, p.186).

In addition, UNIFIL staff members purchase commodities, rent apartments and enroll their children in schools. Soldiers spend a lot of money in the local shops, restaurants, markets and others which leads to economic stimulation and increase in job opportunities. For instance, during 2005, approximately 40 million USD went back to the Lebanese economy whereby it is estimated that 60 percent of the mission's budget is spent on local companies (Press Release: UNIFIL II: how it benefits the Lebanese economy, 2006).

Moreover, the force is the biggest employer in Southern Lebanon after the Lebanese government whereby it provides work for about 700 national civilians. Seldom, there is no village on the borders that does not have some kind of economic relationship with the peacekeepers or benefit from their presence. UNIFIL has thus greatly contributed in enhancing the lifestyle of the local population. By proving the latest technologies and advancements, the community was able to develop immensely over the years in various fields: medical, educational, agricultural and many others. (Ghattas, 2010, p.8).

### **4.3 Perception of the Local Population:**

#### **4.3.1 UNIFIL's Interest in Local Perception**

All the activities of UNIFIL, including those conducted on a small echelon, are immediately analyzed and put under the microscope by the host community. The host

community is always there to give its view regarding any action undertaken by the mission. It is not an over-statement to say that an increased presence in a given sector becomes evidence of partisan hostility; and on the contrary, lack of patrol in another area testify to a lack of efficacy or even a complacent passivity (Michel,2011,p.411).

UNIFIL is among the few peacekeeping missions that sought to address the issue of public opinion. It initiated a series of public perception surveys in 2007. The mission recognized the potential for local apprehension regarding the new mandate and consequently began a series of public perception surveys. Their purpose is to increase UNIFIL's capacity to target its host community messaging and communication activities and in order to improve the good relations with the communities (Pugh, 2010, p.57).

The surveys conducted by the mission explored issues of security, people's needs and concerns, the perceived impact of aid and humanitarian assistance and perceived impact of the mission including an evaluation of UNIFIL's support to the LAF. The project was managed by its civil affairs office and funded through the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Lebanese Consultancy undertook fieldwork, data entry and analysis. Information was gathered through face-to-face interviews conducted by Lebanese field workers in the UNIFIL area of operations. Surveys were conducted over a three-year period and findings of the first survey were taken as a baseline upon which changes and developments were measured. Civil Affairs provided regular briefings on the survey findings to senior mission leadership, military peacekeepers and ambassadors of troop contributing countries. As a sum, these surveys provided key insights into local perceptions of both mission leadership and peacekeepers on the ground. As a result, UNIFIL made use of the findings and incorporated them within its mission strategy by amending its approach based on the perceptions gathered (Civil Affairs Handbook, 2012, p.145-146). In other words, trends that are identified are integrated within the selection of

new Quick Impact Projects and within the shaping of military and civil tasks in addition to including cultural sensitivity training for the incoming troops. For instance, locals in one area started blocking roads to prevent troops from accessing their area. Due to the research, it was revealed that the locals were dissatisfied with the presence of noisy tanks. Consequently, these tanks were replaced with lighter military vehicles (Donati, Druet, Fearnley, Harvey & Oliver, 2013, p.38-39, p45-47). But unfortunately, UNIFIL's public opinion surveys are not made public and access to them was not possible.

#### **4.3.2 Expectation Vs. Reality :**

The people of Southern Lebanon refer to UNIFIL forces as "emergency forces". This connotation provides the peacekeepers with greater power, responsibility and ability to make decisions. It reflects a need for continuous supervision, observation and support from the mission. The locals refer to the peacekeepers as "emergency forces" given their everyday realities and ongoing crisis with the presence of the enemy across the borders (Jaber, 2009, pp.179-180).

Like the case of all peacekeeping missions, expectations among the locals are high regarding the capacity of peacekeepers to improve their situation. When they see the resources that the mission brings with it, they assume it has greater capacity to assist than the mandate allows, lacking an appreciation of the constraints. QIPs (Quick Impact Projects) while they build confidence in the mission they may as well raise expectations about the mission's role in coming up with large-scale activities. Furthermore, sometimes the locals may not understand what they have to gain by meeting with civil affairs officers or have suspicion regarding their work. They may see officers as "outsiders" who don't understand the situation or cannot be trusted. (Civil Affairs Handbook, 2012, pp.134-138).

UNIFIL having a high number of troops in a large area of 64km<sup>2</sup> by 40km<sup>2</sup> is set as a big challenge. The heavy machinery and peacekeepers moving around can create some disturbance to the locals. UNIFIL has been able to manage these disturbances and containing any misperception through its Civil Affairs by explaining the objective of the mission's work under Security Council resolution 1701 to the local population. In order to reach out in an effective manner, the Civil Affairs has three field offices: one in Sector West, and two in Sector East. In addition, the office was able to uphold its relationship with local authorities, the mayors and mukhtars, local leaders and prominent members of political parties as well as the ministries of Interior and Social Affairs, Education, Environment and Information, and cooperate with non-governmental organizations working south of the Litani River, in addition to UN agencies such as UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Therefore, civil affairs' interaction ranges from local government officials to local leader to civil society organizations to the members of the local population. (De Leon, UNIFIL Public Information Office, 2014).

Often, UNIFIL's mandate and scope of work are misunderstood by the local population. Firstly, UNIFIL is not a humanitarian or development agency. The UN has other agencies mandated for these tasks while UNIFIL has a specific peacekeeping mission. So it is essential to draw on the idea that the projects that UNIFIL undertakes or the services it provides to the local communities are all done in the context of the relationship the peacekeepers share with the people, where it is important to address the consequences of destruction post-war that the people of the South are faced with.

Secondly, UNIFIL has the mandate and the ability to use force but this is not the intent of its robust military capability. Force is a measure of last resort, it is used in self-defense, to resist

attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties, to protect its personnel, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities.

Finally, UNIFIL with an impartial presence is not a party to the conflict and is not on any side. It functions within the context of the cessation of hostilities that the parties have agreed on. It blows the whistle whenever there is any violation, in an impartial manner and ultimately defer the judgment to the UNSC (Singh, 2010, pp.1-4).

## Chapter Five: Quantitative Study

As mentioned in the previous chapters, UNIFIL has undergone a series of public opinion surveys. But these surveys aren't made public and access to them is not possible due to their confidentiality status. Thus, a survey was decided to have a clearer view of the host community perception in regards to UNIFIL.

### 5.1 Objective:

The objective of the survey is to be informed and assess the way in which the people of Southern Lebanon who live within UNIFIL's area of operations view the work of the mission.

Due to its quantifiable effects a survey provides an array of information and according to Gagliardone and Stremlau, a survey provides a strong foundation of legitimacy and comprehensiveness of the issue at hand. With the numbers at hand one can have a deeper understanding of the perception of UNIFIL by its host community (Gagliardone & Stremlau, 2008, p.1098).

## **5.2 Methodology:**

The administered questionnaire encompasses three parts. The first part aims at probing public opinion in terms of UNIFIL's performance in accordance with its mandate and security provision. The questions aim at identifying whether the respondents support UNIFIL's presence on the borders, the extent to which the respondents feel safe with UNIFIL's presence, their assessment of UNIFIL's work in providing a secure environment; and in implementing Resolution 1701 and in assisting the LAF.

The second part of the survey targets UNIFIL as a service and humanitarian assistance provider. The questions aim at highlighting on the issue of humanitarian assistance which proved to be integral throughout the previous chapters. The questions target rating the humanitarian services provided, and whether or not the respondents considered the projects to correlate with their needs and demands, and whether these services are considered to have resulted in benefit for their community.

The third part has for objective to assess the perception in terms of peacekeepers' conduct in terms of treating locals with respect, the locals' rating of the peacekeepers conduct and the peacekeepers' ability to connect and interact with the Southern community.

The survey originally set in the English language was later translated into Arabic and consequently administered in Arabic.

The survey thus encompassed 13 questions. Some of the questions used in the questionnaire were based on a public opinion survey conducted by Dr. Jean Krasno of the City College of New York at the request of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to assess the local population perception of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The questionnaire is available in (Annex 3).



The questions that were chosen were tailored to fit the Lebanese context in general and UNIFIL's context in particular. Despite that Dr. Krasno's study included open questions, the administered questionnaire in Southern Lebanon didn't include any open questions. All of the questions were close-ended questions in the form of yes/no questions and in the form of a 5 scale rating format: very good, good, fair, poor and very poor.

The choice of closed-ended questions is based on two arguments. First, questions were closed in order to avoid any divergence from the target if the questions were to be given open. Second, the questionnaire was decided to be simple and short in order to encourage people to participate in the survey and to elude any disengagement, boredom and suspicion from their part (Annex 4).

### **5.3 Sample:**

The survey was administered randomly across the following towns that falls within UNIFIL's area of deployment: Bint Jbeil, Kounin, Bayt Yahoun, Baraachit, Deir Kifa, Kherbet Selem, Deir Ntar, Safad el Batikh, Bourj Kalaway, Jmayjmeh, Naqoura, Bayt Yahoun, Ayta el Shaeb, Yarin, Marwahin, Dayr Qanun el Nahr, , Aynata, Tebnin, Sultaniye, Shaqra, Srifa, Babliye, Majdel Selem, Hdatha, Kafra, Houla, Maroun el Ras, Ayn Baal, Bazouriye, Qana, Blida, Aytanit, Tyre, Aadloun, Qantara, Rmeich, , Debel, Ain Ebel, El Qlayaa, Alma el Chaeb, Kfer Chouba.


The sample was administered to 350 individuals across all age groups starting with the age of 18 with a percentage of both males and females being somehow equal (Males: 51% and Females:49%). The participants had different educational backgrounds going from the uneducated to those holding a university degree. As for the religious affiliation the demographic distribution of the religions was taken into consideration whereby 2/3 of the respondents were Shiites and the other 1/3 were Christians and Sunnis with a lesser

percentage of the latter given that they constitute a minority. A division was made between Shiites and Sunnis given the integral disparity within the Lebanese context.

#### **5.4 Statistical Variables:**

When the data was gathered, several variables were used in the statistical evaluation. Gender was taken as a variable to see whether or not difference amongst genders can be noticed. Age was as well taken as a criterion given that UNIFIL has been present in Lebanon since 1978 and several generations have accompanied the mission. To prove whether there is a certain pattern of difference between the age groups that have been present since UNIFIL's deployment under Resolution 425 and the younger generation that have been lately introduced to UNIFIL. Additionally, educational background was put under the scope to determine if differences in perceptions can be seen between those who have no education and those of different educational levels. And finally, religion was used as a basis for analysis given the high impact that religion exerts within the Lebanese political system. To note that political affiliation was initially an aspect of interest but given the respondents' unwillingness to respond to this question, political affiliation was later refuted as a variable.

As a consequence of statistical evaluation, religion seemed to be the most discriminatory with the highest percentage whereas the others criteria seemed less significant. Therefore, the results will be analyzed by taking religion as a variable. The participants were distributed in the following manner.



## 5.5 Results:

The result of each question will be discussed separately. First, questions will be analyzed by taking the respondents' answers in general and second by taking religion as a variable.

### 5.5.1 Section One: Security


In **question one**, the participants were given the option of a yes or no answer: "Do you support UNIFIL's presence on the Lebanese borders?" The majority, 73 percent answered in support with only 24 per cent disapproving UNIFIL's presence in Southern Lebanon.

## Do you support UNIFIL's presence on the Lebanese borders ?




By taking the religious affiliation, both Christians and Sunnis responded with an overwhelming majority to UNIFIL's presence with a percentage of 99 percent and 93 percent respectively. However Shias who responded with a "no" were at a significant higher percentage of 37 percent than the other sects. This implies that there is certain a number of people within the Shia community who are against UNIFIL's presence in the first place.

## Do you support UNIFIL's presence on the Lebanese borders?




**Question two** in the form of yes/no was the following: "Would you say you feel secure with the presence of UNIFIL on the borders?" It was revealed that 56 percent of all of

the respondents feel secure with UNIFIL's presence whereas 40 percent don't.




By taking religion, both Christians and Sunnis seem to agree whereby 87 percent responded that they feel safe with UNIFIL's presence. But Shias agreed with a lower percentage of 37 percent. The majority, 57 percent responded that they don't feel safe with UNIFIL's presence.



**Question three** elaborates on the second by asking the respondents to rate UNIFIL's work in making them feel safer. 51 percent of the respondents answered very good and good whereas


23 percent answered poor or very poor. Consequently, the majority seem to be satisfied with UNIFIL's performance in terms of securing the environment.



As for religions, Christians and Sunnis answered with a higher percentage for both very good and good with a percentage of 79 and 83 for Christians and Sunnis respectively. Thus, there seem to be high satisfaction with UNIFIL's efforts in making their environment secure. However this is not the case for the Shias. The majority of the Shias answered with a fair to very poor scale with a percentage of 67 which implies a greater level of dissatisfaction amongst the Shias in terms of UNIFIL's security performance compared to both Christians and Sunnis.


## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in making you feel safer

■ very good ■ good ■ fair ■ poor ■ very poor




Questions four and five aim at assessing the respondents' satisfaction with UNIFIL's performance in terms of its mandate.

Question four asked respondents to rate UNIFIL's work in the implementation of Resolution 1701. Most of the respondents' answer fell within the fair to very poor margin with a total of 68 percent whereas only 32 percent answered very good and good.






When it comes to the religious affiliation, the percentage of satisfaction with UNIFIL's implementation of Resolution 1701 amongst the Christians and Sunnis is apparently higher than the Shias. Shia's level of satisfaction with a total of 18 percent for very good and good diverges significantly from the Sunnis with a total of 80 percent. Christians had a higher rate of satisfaction of 49 percent compared to 18 percent which rated poor and very poor.




**Question five** assesses the respondents' satisfaction with UNIFIL's work in assisting LAF. A higher number of respondents seem to be satisfied with a total of 49 percent (very good and good) than those who seemed unsatisfied with UNIFIL's assistance to the LAF with a total of 27 percent (very poor and poor).


### How would you rate the work of the UNIFIL in assisting the Lebanese armed forces?




Here again a discrepancy amongst the different sects emerged. The level of satisfaction for both Christians and Sunnis seem to be importantly higher than the Shias. With a total percent of 93 percent (very good or good) for Sunnis and 76 percent (very good or good) for Christians, this level of satisfaction is not the case for the Shias for the number of respondents who seem satisfied is 33 percent compared to a higher number for Sunnis and Christians.



**Question six** prompted to answer the following question: “Do you think that the security situation in the South would worsen if UNIFIL left? Most of the respondents, 58 percent consider that the security situation wouldn’t worsen in the South compared to 41 percent who consider that it will.




As for how the different religions diverted in this question, both Christians and Sunnis seem to highly consider that if UNIFIL left Southern Lebanon then the security situation would worsen with a 70 percent for Christians and 73 percent for Sunnis. However, Shias seem to consider the opposite with a 75 percent of respondents considering that the situation wouldn't worsen.




### 5.5.2 Section Two: Humanitarian Assistance:


In **Question seven** participants were asked to rate UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian services. Most of the respondents 78 percent rated the services very good and good entailing a high level of satisfaction in terms of the services that UNIFIL is providing. Compared to a lower percentage of 6 percent only who rated poor and very poor.



As for the different sects, all of them seem to be satisfied with UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian services. The majority of Christians, Shias and Sunnis answered with a very good or good rate with a percentage of 86, 71 and 96 for Christians, Shias and Sunnis respectively.




**Question eight** asked participants the following: “Would you say that UNIFIL’s projects correlates with the needs and demands of the Southern community?” Most respondents with a percentage of 66 considered UNIFIL’s services to correlate with their needs and demands compared with 25 percent who don’t.






Taking the religion into consideration, there seem to be an agreement to this question as well.


The majority responded that the projects and services meet their needs and demands. 74 percent of Christians, 60 percent of Shias and 87 of Sunnis agreed.



**Question nine** aimed at answering the following: “Would you say that UNIFIL’s projects have resulted in benefit to the community?” The majority of 81 percent considered that UNIFIL’s projects resulted in benefit compared to a small percentage of 13 who didn’t agree with the majority.



This question witnessed unanimity amongst the different sects for all of them considered that UNIFIL's services and projects resulted in benefit for their community. 94 percent of Christians, 72 percent of Shias and 97 percent of Sunnis answered yes to this question.




**Question ten** aimed at the following: “If UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, do you think that this will have a negative impact on your economic life?” Respondents seemed to be somehow equally split where 47 percent considered that if UNFIIL delivery of services stops, the economy of the Southern Lebanon will be affected compared to 51 percent who don’t.

**If UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, do you think that this will have a negative impact on the economic life?**



As for the different sects, the answers of the Christians and Sunnis correlate. Most of the Christians 71 percent and Sunnis 73 percent consider that the economic life will be affected however the Shias disagree whereby 66 percent considered that the economic situation won't be affected.




### 5.5.3 Section Three: Liaison

**Question eleven** targets the following: “Would you say that the peacekeepers treat you with respect?” An outstanding majority of 96 percent considered that peacekeepers treat them with respect compared to 3 percent who considered the opposite.



By looking at how the different sects answered, the overwhelming majority of all respondents answered that peacekeepers treat the people of the South with respect with an interesting percentage of 100 percent for both Christians and Sunnis correlated with a high percentage as well amongst the Shias with 93 percent.




**Question twelve** is linked to **question eleven** whereby participants were asked to rate the conduct of peacekeepers. The majority of respondents of 77 percent answered very good and good with a scarce minority of 5 percent answering poor and very poor.






Similarly, by taking religious affiliation, the rating of peacekeepers' conduct is considered to be high where the majority answered very good and good compared to the lower rating. Consequently, the majority of Christians answered 91 percent for both very good and good, Sunnis in their turn with a 97 percentage and Shias with 69 percent where in this latter sect those who answered poor or very poor is hugely less than the higher scales with an 8 percent.




**Question thirteen** aimed at assessing the participants' perception on UNIFIL's ability to connect and interact with the locals. Here again the majority of respondents answered positively with a total of 74 percent for very good and good compared to a total of 6 percent for both poor and very poor.

### How would you rate UNIFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community?



When taking the different religions, an agreement seems to be revealed in terms of how the majority view UNIFIL's ability of interaction and connection with the community. A total of 88 percent, 65 percent and 93 percent for Christians, Shias and Sunnis consecutively were rated for both very good and good. In comparison poor and very poor rating is scarce with only 3 percent of Christians rating poor, 10 percent of Shias rating poor and very poor and no rating of poor or very poor amongst Sunnis.



## **5.6 Summary of Results:**

To start with, the majority, 94 percent of participants answered in support of UNIFIL presence with only 24 per cent disapproving UNIFIL's presence in Southern Lebanon. By taking the religious affiliation, both Christians and Sunnis responded with an overwhelming majority to UNIFIL's presence with a percentage of 99 percent and 93 percent respectively. However Shias who responded in disapproval were at a significant higher percentage of 37 percent than the Christians and Sunnis. This implies that there is certain a number of people within the Shia community who are against UNIFIL's presence in the first place.

It was revealed that 56 percent of all of the respondents feel secure with UNIFIL's presence whereas 40 percent don't. By taking religion, both Christians and Sunnis seem to agree whereby 87 percent responded that they feel safe with UNIFIL's presence. But Shias agreed with a lower percentage of 37 percent. The majority, 57 percent responded that they don't feel safe with UNIFIL's presence. As for rating UNIFIL's work in making them feel secure, Christians and Sunnis answered with a higher percentage for both very good and good with a percentage of 79 and 83 for Christians and Sunnis respectively. However this is not the case for the Shias. The majority of the Shias answered with a fair to very poor scale with a percentage of 67 which implies a greater level of dissatisfaction amongst the Shias in terms of UNIFIL's security performance compared to both Christians and Sunnis.

When it comes to rating UNIFIL's work in implementing Resolution 1701, most of the respondents' answer fell within the fair to very poor margin with a total of 68 percent whereas only 32 percent answered very good and good. This is the main question in the security section whereby participants in general were dissatisfied. The percentage of satisfaction with UNIFIL's implementation of Resolution 1701 amongst the Christians and Sunnis is apparently higher than the Shias. Shia's level of satisfaction with a total of 18 percent for very good and good diverges significantly from the Sunnis with a total of 80

percent. Christians had a higher rate of satisfaction with 49 percent compared to 18 percent which rated poor and very poor. As for the participants' satisfaction with UNIFIL's work in assisting LAF. A higher number of respondents seem to be satisfied with a total of 49 percent than those who seemed unsatisfied with UNIFIL's assistance to the LAF with a total of 27 percent. The level of satisfaction for both Christians and Sunnis seem to be importantly higher than the Shias. With a total percent of 93 percent (very good or good) for Sunnis and 76 percent (very good or good) for Christians, this level of satisfaction is not the case for the Shias whereby only 33 percent seemed satisfied. Hence more, 58 percent of respondents consider that the security situation wouldn't worsen in the South if UNIFIL left compared to 41 percent who consider that it will. However, both Christians and Sunnis both seem to highly consider that if UNIFIL left Southern Lebanon then the security situation would worsen with a 70 percent for Christians and 73 percent for Sunnis. However, Shias seem to consider the opposite with a 75 percent of respondents considering that the situation wouldn't worsen.

Going from the security issue to the humanitarian services, most of the respondents 78 percent rated the services very good and good entailing a high level of satisfaction in terms of the services that UNIFIL is providing. The majority of Christians, Shias and Sunnis answered with a very good or good rate with a percentage of 86, 71 and 96 for Christians, Shias and Sunnis respectively.

Additionally, most respondents with a percentage of 66 considered UNIFIL's services to correlate with their needs and demands compared with 25 percent who don't. Taking the religion into consideration, there seem to be an agreement to this question as well. 74 percent of Christians, 60 percent of Shias and 87 of Sunnis agreed. As to whether UNIFIL's projects have resulted in benefit to the community, the majority of 81 percent considered that UNIFIL's projects resulted in benefit compared to a small percentage of 13 who didn't agree

with the majority. This question witnessed unanimity amongst the different sects for all of them considered that UNIFIL's services and projects resulted in benefit for their community. 94 percent of Christians, 72 percent of Shias and 97 percent of Sunnis agreed. And finally when it comes to the economic impact if UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, respondents seemed to be somehow equally split where 47 percent considered that if UNIFIL delivery of services stops, the economy of the Southern Lebanon will be affected compared to 51 percent who don't. As for the different sects, the answers of the Christians and Sunnis correlate however the Shias don't. And this is where the only discrepancy in this section occurs. Most of the Christians 71 percent and Sunnis 73 percent consider that the economic life will be affected however the Shias disagree whereby 66 percent considered that the economic situation won't be affected if UNIFIL stops its delivery of projects and services.

And finally when it comes to the last section, an outstanding majority of 96 percent considered that peacekeepers treat them with respect compared to 3 percent who considered the opposite, with an interesting percentage of 100 percent for both Christians and Sunnis correlated with a high percentage as well amongst the Shias with 93 percent. When asked to rate the conduct of peacekeepers. The majority of respondents of 77 percent answered very good and good with a scarce minority of 5 percent answering poor and very poor. Similarly, by taking religious affiliation, the rating of peacekeepers' conduct is considered to be high where the majority of Christians answered 91 percent for both very good and good, Sunnis in their turn with a 97 percentage and Shias with 69 percent. As for assessing UNIFIL's ability to connect and interact with the locals, here again the majority of respondents answered positively with a total of 74 percent for very good and good compared to a total of 6 percent for both poor and very poor. When taking the different religions, an agreement seems to be revealed as well. A total of 88 percent, 65 percent and 93 percent for Christians, Shias and

Sunnis consecutively were rated for both very good and good. In comparison only 3 percent of Christians rated poor, 10 percent of Shias rating poor and very poor and no rating of poor or very poor amongst Sunnis.

## **5.7 Conclusion:**

. To begin with, this is a limited public opinion survey which provides a glimpse of how a group of locals in UNIFIL's area of deployment view the mission. No generalization is to be concluded, although the survey provided information that can be used as a standpoint for further investigation within the same context.

It has been concluded that religious affiliation stands out as the most discriminatory factor amongst the population studied. Shias diverted in their view in comparison to the Christians and Sunnis. And this diversion is highly related to the Shias' political affiliation that will be discussed in the upcoming chapter.

Additionally, one striking conclusion from this study is the unanimous perception of UNIFIL as a humanitarian assistance provider rather than as a security provider.

UNIFILs' humanitarian services are seen in a highly positive manner. Across all religious affiliations respondents seem to be satisfied with these services considering that they meet their needs and expectations and that these services have resulted in benefit for their community.

When it comes to UNIFIL's performance in terms of security provision and implementation of its mandate under Resolution 1701 including assistance to LAF. Shias diverted in their response compared to others which affected the whole response rate. While the majority of Christians and Sunnis seem to feel safe with UNIFIL's presence and are satisfied with UNIFIL's efforts in making their environment secure, the majority of Shias don't feel safe with UNIFIL's presence on the borders and are dissatisfied with its performance in providing

security. In regards to Resolution 1701 in particular, when it comes to UNIFIL's work in implementing Resolution 1701 and its assistance to LAF, here again a significant divergence appeared. While the biggest number of Christians and Sunnis seem to be satisfied, the majority of Shias seem to don't agree.

Moreover, while the literature revolving around peacekeeping missions entails a wide discussion on the issue of peacekeepers' conduct and alleged violations, UNIFIL's peacekeepers' seem to stand out. It was revealed that the majority of respondents' perception regarding the peacekeepers' conduct is positive. The majority considered that the peacekeepers treat the locals with respect. And when asked about UNIFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community whereby, the majority rated it as being high. And an interesting result was noted whereby an agreement was revealed across religious affiliations.



## **Chapter Six: UNIFIL and Hezbollah**

### **6.1 Amal Movement**

Before initiating the discussion about Hezbollah in particular it is important to have a look at the relationship between Amal Movement and UNIFIL since this party was present long before Hezbollah and played an active role since UNIFIL's establishment till the present time. Not to forget that Amal movement as well constitutes a major player within the Shiite community.

#### **6.1.1 The Movement's Establishment**

AMAL movement was created in 1974 by Imam Moussa al Sader , an Iranian-born Shia cleric of Lebanese ancestry who founded in 1969 the Higher Shia Islamic Council. AMAL, is the acronym for Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah (Lebanese Resistance Detachments) and initially the name given to the military arm of the "Movement of the Oppressed". This latter organization was a socio-political group in order to promote the Shia cause in Lebanon and with a primary mission of alleviating poverty primarily within South Lebanon, the district of Eastern Bekaa and the so-called "boroughs of misery" around Beirut. The military arm of the "Movement of the Oppressed" whose mission was to resist Israeli occupation was openly declared in 1974 following a bombing incident at a training camp. AMAL fighters were receiving military training from the Fateh movement when the camp of Ain El Binnieh was bombed in the Nabi Sheeth area of Bekaa. At that time, PLO had supervised the majority of resistance activity against Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon and Amal's participation in a number of confrontations was recorded. Hence more, Imam al

Sadr never ceased to call for waging war on Israel and freeing the occupied land under the slogan of “Israel is an utter evil” (Qassem, 2005, p.14-15).

In the late 1970s the movement underwent a significant resurgence when the Shias became dissatisfied with the conduct and policies of the PLO and its Lebanese allies in addition to the mysterious disappearance of Sadr in 1978 while on a visit to Libya. This incident made of the missing Imam a religious symbol.

With the growing strength of AMAL amongst the Shia community, the PLO felt threatened in South Lebanon and tried to bring the movement down by sheer military force. However, this strategy failed and rallied even a greater number of Shias around the movement. Thus, by the early 1980s, AMAL was set as the most powerful organization within the Shia community (Collelo, 1987, p.160-161).

#### **6.1.2 Amal Movement and UNIFIL:**

At the time of the mission’s establishment there was no state authority in Southern Lebanon. To be able to survive and fulfill its mandate without becoming drawn into the conflict, UNIFIL had to set up channels of communication with local and military groups. UNIFIL made use of well-trained professional officers provided by UNTSO . They worked as military observers under the operational control of UNIFIL. They were able to establish and maintain relations with all the groups in the South including the SLA. AMAL in its turn welcomed UNIFIL and supported its presence. They were able to set up liaison and chains on interaction with UNIFIL’s high officers and commanders. With this liaison and interaction the Shiite AMAL movement became a supporter and ally of UNIFIL (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p.18).

Consequently, an excellent cooperation between UNIFIL and AMAL Movement was set up. This liaison enabled the locals which are mostly Shiites to welcome UNIFIL's presence. AMAL additionally played the role of a mediator of any dispute between the mission and the locals. It shared the trust of both the mission and the locals thus in case of any incident, AMAL was the "go to man".

Following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, AMAL leadership under Nabih Berri decided to cease resisting militarily the IDF and join a "national salvation" government grouping representatives of most of the Lebanese political parties and sects. This decision aggravated tension within AMAL between secular-oriented leadership under Berri and those such as its co-founder Hussein Moussawi who sought to Islamize the movement. As a consequence Hezbollah emerged which will later be discussed (Blandford, 2007, p.5).

Amal under's Berri leadership continued its cooperation with UNIFIL. Along the years, Amal and UNIFIL's relationship remained constant. Additionally, Amal has always supported UNIFIL in its mandate implementation. According to Shahara who is a member of the Movement and a political figure in the South, Resolution 1701 was welcomed by everyone in Lebanon particularly because it took into consideration Lebanon's demands that ended hostilities and provided a basis to achieve a permanent ceasefire and eventually a lasting peace in the area. UNIFIL is said to be successful in its mission to support the LAF in order that the Lebanese State can assert its control over all of its territories. And the mission will be successful in ensuring security and stability given that security and stability are at the Lebanese are aiming for who have long proven no acceptance for any kind of infringement on the security and sovereignty of Lebanon (Shahara, 2008,p.17).

AMAL is currently serving as a medium within the Shiite community between UNIFIL and the more conservative groups that support Hezbollah. Various statements by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri pinpoint to UNIFIL's support.

For instance, following the escalated tension due to the incidents that had occurred between the locals and the French troops, Nabih Berri stated on the 3rd of July 2010 that the people of the South support UNIFIL's presence in their towns. And within the same month, speaking at a press conference on the 7th of July, Berri called for silencing the statements that concentrate highly on the UNIFIL issue and declared that the Southerners in addition to AMAL Movement and Hezbollah are not targeting resolution 1701 under which UNIFIL is operating (An-Nahar, 2010).

## **6.2 Hezbollah : Inception and Ideology**

To start with, Hezbollah is based on three pillars. First is the belief in Islam as the last and most comprehensive heavenly messages. Second is the Jihad or Holy War which is rooted in the verb "to struggle" or "to survive" signifying making effort to battle against the enemy. Islam considers Jihad to be a basic endeavor in a Muslim's life. And third is the Jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian (Al-Wali Al-Faqih).

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was the sixth in a series of Arab-Israeli war. Given that Palestine is an Arab and Muslim occupied land and it's the duty of every Muslim to work for its liberation and given that areas of Lebanon were also occupied, the Jurist-Theologian Imam Khomeini declared that Israel is a cancerous gland. As a consequence Hezbollah rose to this mission and launched an Islamic resistance operations against Israel (Qassem, 2005, p.21-53, p.66-67). Hezbollah was established at the initiative of a group of Shia clerics, adherents of Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. In 1987 Hezbollah followed strictly the theological line of Iran's Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini and called

for the establishment of an Islamic rule in Lebanon similar to that of Iran. This hardline approach appealed to many Shias, who abandoned the mainstream Amal movement and joined Hezbollah (Collelo, 1987, p.162).

In february 1985, Hezbollah announced its existence in an “open letter”. Among its goals were to continue resisting the Israeli occupation, rejecting Lebanon’s “rotten” sectarian political system and supporting the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon (Blandford, 2007,p.5).

Since its inception, Hezbollah paid particular attention to social services which are considered to be as one of the main’s Party duties. Along these lines, Hezbollah founded a range of associations such as Jihad al-Binaa Association for construction and development; the Islamic Health Organization for health services and many others. (Qassem, 2005, p.83-86).

As a result, Hezbollah’s support within the Shia community increased. These social services along with its strong held attitude as a resistance against the enemy increased its ties with its own Shia community, thus ultimately standing out as the primary Party with the most supporters amongst the Shias. Having a state that has been continuously incapable of providing security and services to its citizens, Hezbollah was able to take on this role (Mukalled, 2009, p.105).

At the end of the 2006 war, one event highlighted the depth and intensity of Hezbollah’s support among the Shia community. A woman contacted the party and asked to be given the “abaya” worn by Nasrallah during his wartime televised speeches. Her wish was made possible. She travelled around Lebanon displaying the ‘abaya” to crowds; treating it with reverence, usually afforded to a holy relic (Noe, 2007,p.2). This incident illustrates the image that the Shiite population holds of Nasrallah in particular and Hezbollah in general.

### **6.3 Hezbollah and United Nations:**

Before starting with any interpretation of Hezbollah's relationship with UNIFIL it is important to highlight Hezbollah's position regarding UN in general.

Hezbollah's stand regarding the performance of the UN is doubted and highly criticized. Thus any UN Resolution is seen in a skeptical and doubtful manner.

The international law upon which the UN General Assembly and the SC were established diverges from the decision and performance of the five permanent members of the Council, who possess the veto right. For Hezbollah, having an international forum (UN) for resolving international disputes is important given that international issues need a mediator. But replacing principles and laws with authority and power by favoring the interests of the superpowers is unacceptable. The US is viewed to stand at the forefront using its veto right in its absolute support for the establishment of Israel; in an apparent domination of the SC.

Qassem argues that throughout UN history, an international Resolution was binding when it was issued to discipline Iraq, Libya, Iran or Afghanistan. But for UN Resolution 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973 both calling for Israeli withdrawal from Palestine, optional Israeli implementation unhampered by any form of pressure was always the case. The international community, led by the US, was always in clear support of Israeli interests (Qassem, 2005,p.257-258).

Nasrallah on the 5th anniversary of the 2000 Liberation clearly expresses the previous point. He considered that Lebanon is in the vicious circle of foreign interference. UN Resolutions exert pressure on states and these Resolutions go hand in hand with the major powers' interests regardless of the needs of the state in question. (Nasrallah Speech, May 25 2005, Bint Jbeil).

## **6.4 Historical Relationship Between Hezbollah and UNIFIL:**

### **6.4.1 Pre-2006 war:**

When Hezbollah first appeared in the South in 1983, it had an anti-West and anti-UNIFIL position. Hezbollah, a resistance movement against the Israeli enemy saw UNIFIL as a force far from being impartial and neutral. UN Resolution 425 calling for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon was considered to fall within the circle of optional Israeli implementation correlated with an absence of any form of pressure or enforcement put on Israel.

Hezbollah and AMAL differ in their view regarding the inception of UNIFIL under Resolution 425. The validity of Resolution 425 is one of the issues in which AMAL Movement and Hezbollah divert. For Hezbollah, the Resolution is considered to entail ambiguity surrounding security measures with Israel and for recognizing Israel as a nation. For Hezbollah, this Resolution which led to the establishment of UNIFIL goes hand in hand with Zionist interests which receive clear international support led by the U.S. Thereafter, given that Israel never respected the Resolution and continued its infringements, Resolution 425 went unacknowledged for a long period of time correlating with an increased resentment from the part of Hezbollah. The party considers that international attention is always given to Israel's concerns whereby Lebanon's needs and concerns are neglected (Qassem, 2005, p.101, p.149-258).

Despite Hezbollah's dissatisfaction, UNIFIL was able to establish some contact with Hezbollah leaders in the South and ultimately create a channel of communication in attempts to contain the security situation that was continuously tense (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p. 19).

After Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon on the 25th of May 2000, there was a dispute over the continuing validity of resolution 425. Hezbollah considered that the UN overstepped

its own conditions by deploying peacekeeping forces on July 28, 2001 in the liberated areas. Israelis and the U.S attempted to capitalize on the withdrawal and force the mission to recognize that Resolution 425 had been implemented at a time when parts of Lebanese territory remained under occupation.

The establishment of the Blue Line and altering the borders is seen unfavorable for Hezbollah given that this implies a denial of Shebaa's Lebanese identity thus leaving the area to Israel (Qassem, 2005, p.132).

With continued Israeli occupation of Lebanese lands, Nassrallah declared that the armed resistance against Israel would continue until all Lebanese territory is liberated and all Lebanese prisoners return to their homes. Nassrallah later added a third condition for giving up arms which is the deployment of a viable national security strategy that would effectively protect southern Lebanon from Israeli intrusions (Noe, 2007,pp.233-237).

Going further, Nasrallah believed that the responsibility of liberating Palestine is not only the responsibility of Palestinians but also the entire Arab and Islamic nation so operations will continue even if Israel implements a full withdrawal from Lebanon (As- Safir Interview, 27 February 1992). As long as Israeli occupation persists, resistance will persist for it is forged on a fundamental belief in eliminating occupation. (Qassem, 2005, p.265).

On the issue of LAF deployment in the aftermath of 2000, Qassem argued that this deployment was orchestrated by many internal players as an end to Hezbollah. Deployment of the army in South Lebanon was seen as a way to forbid Hezbollah from undertaking operations against Israel. Consequently, this would remove Lebanon from the circle of confrontation with the enemy; leaving the occupied territories issue to diplomatic channels should its Lebanese identity be recognized in the first place. Thus, the diplomatic channel would lead to the same results as other issues such as the captives and detainees in Israeli prisons and Israel's continuous infringement of Lebanese airspace.



Given this case, resistance work would totally cease and all available weapons would be seized by the LAF which will take charge of the borders (Qassem, 2005, p.150). However this was not the case as Hezbollah presence continued in the South along with the LAF and UNIFIL.

#### **6.4.2 Post-2006 war**

Following the 2006 war, Hezbollah representatives in the Lebanese cabinet voted for the Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006. The party showed willingness to cooperate in agreeing to the fact that if any of its members are to be discovered carrying arms, they can be apprehended and disarmed. Nasrallah following the 2006 war clearly declared that there would be “no armed manifestations at all” of Hezbollah south of the Litani river (Noe, 2007,p.386).

Despite agreeing to the Resolution as a cessation of hostilities, Nasrallah also questioned the purpose of the expanded force by stating the following:

“Thus far, I have not heard any country participating in the UNIFIL say that it sent its sons and soldiers to defend Lebanon and the Lebanese.....They are ashamed of us, brothers and sisters. They are ashamed of saying they came to defend us.... they talk about defending Israel” (Slackman, 2006, The New York Times).

Similarly, in his first interview following the ceasefire of August 14, Nasrallah elaborated on the party’s reservation regarding Resolution 1701 under the assumption that it doesn’t give Lebanon its national rights or the minimum of its national demands.

He clearly stated: “we will continue to fight Israel in any position it occupies. As for when and how to fight Israel, Nasrallah stated that this is up to the resistance command” (New TV interview, August 27, 2006).

When asked about the party’s performance in terms of LAF presence and UNIFIL troops, Nasrallah stated that the party trusts and supports the army in its responsibility to secure the border and responding to any violation of Lebanese sovereignty:

“It is obvious that the main and primary task of an army that goes to the border ... is defending the homeland; we will refrain from doing anything that will embarrass the army. When the army is fully deployed on the border, it will be in charge of confronting any violation ... It will assume this responsibility and the resistance will support the army”.

Furthermore when it comes to the party’s position regarding UNIFIL, Nasrallah welcomed Kofi Annan’s statement in terms of defining the task of UNIFIL under Resolution 1701 whereby Annan mentioned that the mission’s task is not to disarm Hezbollah. He considered that as long as this is not the task of UNIFIL, and as long as its main task is to back the LAF, there will not be any problem with UNIFIL in its area of deployment.

Resolution 1701, clearly indicates that the long-term solution to the conflict resides in the need to disarm all “armed groups” in correlation with Resolution 1559 previously rejected by Hezbollah and to establish a buffer zone free of any “armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government”. This task may result in UNIFIL being urged to confront Hezbollah or other armed groups in the South. It is an indication that carries serious consequences and puts UNIFIL on the forefront and encrypts the mission to be seen as the enemy from the locals who holds high support to Hezbollah (Makdisi Goksel, Hauck, & Reigeluth 2009, p.22-23).

However Annan's statement has set forth to a new perspective in terms of interpreting Resolution 1701. Consequently setting the ground for an atmosphere of acceptance and agreement to the Resolution in regards to Hezbollah. To elaborate on Annan's declaration, following a meeting regarding Resolution 1701 with European Union ministers in Brussels, Annan said that the decision to send more troops to add to the 2,000 at that time serving with UNIFIL shows that the international community wants to assume its responsibilities and show its solidarity with the people of Lebanon. Regarding Hezbollah, Annan affirmed that UNIFIL troops were not going to disarm members of Hezbollah, adding that such a process of disarmament can only be done through political agreement and not by any force (UN News Center, 25 August 2006).

More recently, the Syrian crisis has had its impact on the Southern situation. LAF units have been increasingly withdrawn in response to the deteriorating security situations in the north. The decrease in LAF troops in the Southern border district has led to a recent increase in standoffs between UNIFIL and suspected members of Hezbollah, a situation that was contained for a while after the 2006 war. Only around 10 percent of the peacekeepers' patrols are conducted jointly with Lebanese troops. The absence of Lebanese soldiers as interlocutors leaves UNIFIL patrols with an increased confrontation with Hezbollah or local residents. UNIFIL patrols face blocked paths and are compelled to back down when confrontation takes place. For instance, on the 25th of March 2013, an Italian troop was blocked by two men equipped with walkie-talkies from accessing a site overlooking "Wadi Mashawish" which had been used previously by the Italians as an observation post. The troop was not permitted to access the area based on the argument that the site is a private property (Blandford, 2013).

Thereafter, it is suspected that Hezbollah is working on reactivating some of its old facilities and previous sites that were used to attack Israel. Under the assumption that the war

in Syria is creating new levels of turmoil and insecurity in the region that put at risk the certainties that have helped maintain a somehow stable situation along the Lebanon-Israel border after the 2006 war. Hezbollah which has sent fighters to Syria to join the battle alongside the Assad regime is putting the situation in the South under the scope. Anti-Assad Syrian forces may make use of the South to continue the fight against Hezbollah, potentially turning UNIFIL's area of operations into a battlefield (Gowan, 2013, p.1).

In such a scenario, UNIFIL could become caught up in clashes between Hezbollah and the anti-Assad forces. Most drastically, Israel might take military action to try to secure its Northern border. Consequently UNIFIL could face another Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon if the situation goes out of control thus putting at risk the security at Lebanese-Israeli borders.

### **6.5 Hezbollah's Perception of UNIFIL:**

In terms of UNIFIL presence in the first place, Hezbollah isn't against the force presence. In one of his statements on the 3rd of July 2010, Hezbollah's Member of Parliament Mohammad Raad stated that the party welcomes UNIFIL's presence in the South within the framework of the force's implementation of its mandate under resolution 1701. He contended that the Southerners have long proved that they can coexist with the mission since its establishment in 1978 up to this time. Going further, for Hezbollah UNIFIL is not a force with total and absolute powers but an entity with a peacekeeping mission and a backup force to the Lebanese Army (As-Safir, 2010).

However, Hezbollah has always expressed his discontent regarding UNIFIL's action in stopping Israelis' aggressions whereby Israel still breaches Lebanese sovereignty on daily basis. Hezbollah questions UNIFIL's ability to implement its mandate. Hezbollah's MP Ali Fayyad clearly states the following:

“As far as Hezbollah is concerned, UN Resolution 1701 stipulates that UNIFIL is here to protect Lebanon from Israel... UNIFIL hasn't been able to do anything about it.” (The Middle East Reporter, 2010, p.6).

With this insight on UNIFIL's inability to stop the enemy's aggressions since its first mandate up to the current one, Hezbollah is said to react to any attack without UNIFIL's mediation. And this is clearly expressed by Nasrallah in the following statement:

“The feet that will enter our land and we know about it will be cut. ... This is our right,” Nasrallah said. “We will not forgive any ground violation of our land.” ( Al- Mayadeen Interview, 14 August 2013).

Nasrallah argued that his statement correlates with the situation on the ground. Given that in the aftermath of Resolution 1701, nothing was done in terms of stopping Israeli aggressions whereby the Israelis continue to infringe Lebanon's sovereignty by setting up mines and tracking devices. He considered that LAF and UNIFIL both hold responsibility to ensure that security is held on the borders. Primarily LAF is responsible but given its limited abilities nothing can be said in this regards.

Furthermore, he stated that UNIFIL has been reluctant in applying Resolution 1701 by overlooking Israelis hostilities. What was protecting South of Lebanon was not the UNIFIL or the international resolutions, but the tripartite equation: Army, People and Resistance.

On the other hand, Hezbollah on several instances has expressed its condemnation of attacks against UNIFIL, expressing its commitment to UNIFIL's role which is supportive of the Lebanese Army in line with resolution 1701. UNIFILs' peacekeepers and employees should be respected and not the target of any violence that can jeopardize their safety and security.

Following the roadside bomb that resulted in the injury of six Italian peacekeepers along with two civilians along Rmeileh highway leading to the coastal city of Saida on May 2011, Hezbollah issued a strong condemnation. The party considered it as a criminal act calling upon the Lebanese specialized services to investigate and uncover the perpetrators and hold them accountable. (Hezbollah Media Relations, May 2011).

Additionally, in another instance, whereby a roadside bomb aimed a UNIFIL patrol mildly wounded four French soldiers and two civilians on December 2011. This explosion occurred in Tyre near Bourj Shmali. As a reaction to the incident, Hezbollah issued a statement condemning the bomb attack against UNIFIL in general and the French battalion in particular. The party considered that the attack is a clear target of Lebanon's security and the stability of the South in specific (Hezbollah Media Relations, December 2011).

As a sum, by having a look at the historical track between Hezbollah and UNIFIL, Benoit Michel clearly illustrates Hezbollah's position regarding UNIFIL by saying: "Hezbollah has an ambiguous position regarding UNIFIL" (Michel, 2011, p.410).

UNIFIL presence in Southern Lebanon is accepted by Hezbollah as long as its presence doesn't jeopardize Hezbollah's presence as a resistance movement against the enemy on the other side of the border. In other words, UNIFIL is seen favorably as long as it contributes in withholding Israel from undertaking any military action on the Lebanese territory. However, this is correlated with Hezbollah opposing any activity that is susceptible to harm its existence and influence. Consequently, it will continue its resistance against the enemy as long as all occupied territories are liberated which include Palestine and this is done regardless of UNIFIL as a peacekeeping mission between two opposing actors. Thus, one can say that the main reason of UNIFIL's presence on the borders which is the cessation of hostilities and creating a secure environment is disregarded by Hezbollah.

## Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from this paper. Firstly, it has been revealed that while peacekeeping missions have been trying to incorporate the local community in their strategic development, little has been done regarding the issue of coming up with clear guidelines on how to collect local perceptions. Most peacekeeping missions rely on ad-hoc unstructured sources of perception gathering given the absence of a unified systematic approach.

To succeed, peacekeeping missions must have adequate resources and tailored to fit the political and regional realities of the host state. Most importantly, they must respond to the desires and aspirations of the host community. By engaging with the community at a more frequent level and by consulting with it in order to build trust and ensure appropriate expectations, peacekeeping missions can serve as a truly effective tool for peace and stability.

Secondly, since UNIFIL is an “interim” peacekeeping mission, the question of temporality is inevitable. Along the years, UNIFIL provided assistance to the Southerners. Its’ humanitarian services and projects do create a climate of positive support within a community that has long suffered from continuous instability and the consequences of war. Hence more, UNIFIL has developed into an integral factor in the local economy. This perceived image of UNIFIL as an economic supporter for the locals has helped in ensuring local support for UNIFIL’s presence.

However, while UNIFIL was able to assist the LAF and recently in the aftermath of Resolution 1701 conduct tripartite meetings in mediation between LAF and IDF, this positive climate is hindered with UNIFIL’s inability to impede successive Israeli invasions and infringements of Lebanese territory. Furthermore, one could argue, that UNIFIL’s

development of humanitarian services and expansion of its efforts along its years serve as a legitimation of its presence in South Lebanon. Without these efforts, the local population would have no reason to accept the mission's presence. For regardless of the effort that UNIFIL is putting into the relationship with the population, mistrust remains present. A mistrust that has been developed along the years in terms of UNIFIL's inability to provide security and stability in regards to cessation of hostilities for Israeli attacks can happen at any given moment regardless of UNIFIL's presence. Adding to that, the issue that stands as well in this negative perception is the locals' high expectations of the missions' abilities.

Thirdly, the public opinion survey provides a glimpse of how a group of locals in UNIFIL's area of deployment view the mission. No generalization is to be concluded. The survey has provided a wealth of information that can be used as a standpoint for further investigation within the same context.

It has been concluded that religious affiliation stands out as the most discriminatory factor amongst the respondents. Shias in particular divert in their view in comparison to the others. And this fact can be correlated to the Shias' political affiliation whereby Hezbollah is seen to be the most influential.

Additionally, in regards to the results of the public survey, the most striking conclusion is the unanimous perception of UNIFIL as a humanitarian assistance provider rather than as a security provider. UNIFILs' humanitarian services are seen in a highly positive manner; respondents across all religious affiliations seem to be satisfied with those services considering that they meet their needs and expectations, and that these services have resulted in benefit for their community. However, when it comes to UNIFIL's performance in terms of security provision and implementation of its mandate, Shias diverted in their response compared to others which affected the whole response rate. While the majority of



Christians and Sunnis seem to feel safe with UNIFIL's presence and are satisfied with UNIFIL's efforts in making their environment secure, the majority of Shias don't feel safe with UNIFIL's presence on the borders and are dissatisfied with its performance in providing security. When it comes to UNIFIL's work in implementing Resolution 1701 and its assistance to LAF, here again a significant divergence appeared. While the biggest number of Christians and Sunnis seem to be satisfied, the majority of Shias seem to don't agree. Moreover, the survey revealed that the perception of the locals to the conduct of peacekeepers themselves is positive. While peacekeeping studies entail a wide discussion on the issue of peacekeepers' alleged violations and abuse against the local population, UNIFIL's peacekeepers' seem to stand out. The majority of respondents considered that the peacekeepers treat the locals with respect, whereby an agreement was revealed across religious affiliations. And when asked about UNIFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community, the majority rated it as being high.

Fourthly, in regards to Hezbollah specifically it was revealed that UNIFIL's presence in Southern Lebanon is accepted by Hezbollah as long as its presence doesn't jeopardize Hezbollah's weaponry presence and doesn't block its "resistance movement" against the enemy on the other side of the border. In other words, UNIFIL is seen favorably as long as it contributes in withholding Israel from undertaking any military action on the Lebanese territory. One can conclude that the main reason of UNIFIL's presence on the borders which is the cessation of hostilities and creating a secure environment is disregarded by Hezbollah. This is correlated with Hezbollah opposing any activity that is susceptible to harm its existence and influence. Consequently, it will continue its resistance against the Israeli enemy as long as all occupied territories are liberated which include Palestine and this is done regardless of UNIFIL as a peacekeeping mission between two opposing actors.

By having a look at the main conclusions of this paper, several recommendations can be highlighted on that involve peacekeeping missions in general and UNIFIL in particular:

To start with peacekeeping missions in general:

- Understanding local perceptions considerably enhances a mission's ability to implement its mandate effectively. That said, missions require operational guidelines on how to collect and incorporate local perceptions into mission decision making in a systematic and ultimately effective manner.
- Peacekeeping missions should increase their employment of large-scale public perception surveys and move beyond the typical and limited sources of local perception given the high level of bias and misperception that can be drawn.
- Peacekeeping missions should develop their interaction circle, working more with local actors given the high impact that these actors can exert on the local population.

In terms of UNIFIL, while UNIFIL is successful in its humanitarian delivery, negative attitude is present regarding its security provision specifically across the Shiite community.

Thus UNIFIL needs to:

- Provide to the locals a deeper understanding of its role in terms of abilities and limitations thus lessening high expectations amongst the locals which in turns lessens frustration.
- Liaising in a more systematic manner with the Shiite population in particular to build bridges of confidence within a cooperative environment.
- As for Hezbollah, further inclusion of this party through meetings with UNIFIL officials or other means can help in building bridges which can lead to cooperation between both parties in terms of Resolution 1701 implementation. And given Hezbollah's high influence within the Shiite community, this interaction can result into a positive perception of UNIFIL on this latter.

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## **Interviews**

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Nasrallah S.H, speech on the Liberation Day Ceremony, Bint Jbeil ( 25 May 2005).

Nasrallah S.H, interview by Al Bassam, M., New TV Station (27 August 2006).

Nasrallah S.H., interview by Bin Jeddo G., Al-Mayadeen (14 August 2013).



## ANNEX 1

At its 2073rd meeting, on 18 March 1978, the Council decided to invite the representative of the Sudan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

At its 2074th meeting, on 19 March 1978, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Iraq, Mongolia, Pakistan and Qatar to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

**Resolution 425 (1978)**  
of 19 March 1978

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note* of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon<sup>19</sup> and from the Permanent Representative of Israel,<sup>20</sup>

*Having heard* the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,<sup>21</sup>

*Gravely concerned* at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

*Convinced* that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. *Calls* for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

2. *Calls upon* Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

3. *Decides*, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of the present resolution.

*Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).<sup>22</sup>*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, documents S/12600 and S/12606.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/12607.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Year*, 2071st meeting.

<sup>22</sup> One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

**Resolution 426 (1978)**  
of 19 March 1978

*The Security Council*

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;<sup>23</sup>

2. *Decides* that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides.

*Adopted at the 2075th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).<sup>24</sup>*

**Decision**

At its 2076th meeting, on 3 May 1978, the Council proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/12675)".<sup>25</sup>

**Resolution 427 (1978)**  
of 3 May 1978

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,<sup>26</sup>

*Recalling* its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978,

1. *Approves* the increase in the strength of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon requested by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately 6,000 troops;

2. *Takes note* of the withdrawal of Israeli forces that has taken place so far;

3. *Calls upon* Israel to complete its withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any further delay;

4. *Deplores* the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect for the United Nations Force from all parties in Lebanon.

*Adopted at the 2076th meeting by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).<sup>27</sup>*

<sup>23</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978*.

<sup>24</sup> One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

<sup>25</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978*.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/12675.

<sup>27</sup> One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

## ANNEX 2

United Nations

S/RES/1701 (2006)



Security Council

Distr.: General  
11 August 2006**Resolution 1701 (2006)****Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on  
11 August 2006***The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

*Expressing* its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

*Emphasizing* the need for an end of violence, but at the same time *emphasizing* the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

*Mindful* of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

*Welcoming* the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

*Determined* to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

*Taking due note* of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

*Welcoming* the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of

additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

*Aware* of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

*Determining* that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and *calls on* all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any

armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
- (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
- (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations

is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, *urges* Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and *expresses* its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and *requests* UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. *Decides* further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and

(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above;

except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and *expresses its intention* to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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## ANNEX 3

Personal data:

<b>Age (Check One):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> 13 – 18 Years <input type="checkbox"/> 46 – 55 Years <input type="checkbox"/> 19 – 25 Years <input type="checkbox"/> 55 - 65 Years <input type="checkbox"/> 26 – 35 Years <input type="checkbox"/> Over 65 Years <input type="checkbox"/> 36 – 45 Years		<b>Gender:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female
<b>Location – Town/Country Capital (Check One):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Barclayville <input type="checkbox"/> Bopolu <input type="checkbox"/> Buchanan <input type="checkbox"/> Fish Town <input type="checkbox"/> Gbamga <input type="checkbox"/> Greenville <input type="checkbox"/> Harper <input type="checkbox"/> Kakata <input type="checkbox"/> Monrovia <input type="checkbox"/> River Cess <input type="checkbox"/> Robertspot <input type="checkbox"/> Sanguellie <input type="checkbox"/> Tchien <input type="checkbox"/> Tubmanburg <input type="checkbox"/> Voinjama  <b>Other Town:</b> _____		<b>Country (Check One):</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Bong <input type="checkbox"/> Gbarpolu <input type="checkbox"/> Grand Bassa <input type="checkbox"/> Grand Cape Mount <input type="checkbox"/> Grand Gedeh <input type="checkbox"/> Grand Kru <input type="checkbox"/> Lo fa <input type="checkbox"/> Margibi <input type="checkbox"/> Maryland <input type="checkbox"/> Montserado <input type="checkbox"/> Nimba <input type="checkbox"/> Bonri <input type="checkbox"/> River Cess <input type="checkbox"/> River Gee <input type="checkbox"/> Sinoe
<b>Occupation: (describe your job)</b> _____ _____ _____		
Are you currently employed? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No    Are you a Student? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		

**Questions: Please check your answer:**

1. Would you say your security situation has improved since UNMIL has been in the country?  Yes  No

2. How would you rate the work of UNMIL in the implementation of the CPA, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement?

Very good  good  fair  poor

3. How would you rate the work of UN Peacekeepers in making you feel safer?

Very good  good  fair  poor

4. Do you think UNMIL has stayed long enough or do you think it should stay longer?

Yes, it has stayed long enough  No, it should stay longer

5. How would you rate the disarmament process (the collection and destruction of weapons) in Liberia after UNMIL arrived?

Very good  good  fair  poor

6. How would you rate the work that has been done to retrain former fighters and find jobs for them?

Very good  good  fair  poor

7. Do you think that UN soldiers have treated people in Liberia with respect?

Always  sometimes  rarely  never

8. How would you rate Radio UNMIL in its ability to get information out to the people of Liberia?

Very good  good  fair  poor

9(a). Have UNMIL soldiers and civilians tried to resolve problems in your camp, town, or neighborhood?  Yes  No

9(b). If yes, how helpful were they?

Very helpful  somewhat helpful  not helpful

10. How would you rate the work the UN is doing to retrain the New Liberian Police?

Very good  good  fair  poor

11. Are you confident that the New Liberian Police will be able to carry out their duties effectively?

Very confident  somewhat confident  not confident at all

12. How would you rate the work of the UN in assisting the elections in Liberia in October/November 2005?

Very good  good  fair  poor

13. How would you rate the professional conduct of UNMIL's peacekeeping troops?

Very good  good  fair  poor

14. Do you think that peacekeeping should be an exclusive responsibility of the UN?

Yes  No

15. If the UN is unwilling or unable to deploy a peacekeeping mission, who should take its place?

- a) A West African force under ECOWAS command  
 b) An all-African force under African Union command  
 c) No idea  
 d) Other \_\_\_\_\_

16. Do you think the deployment of an African-led peacekeeping force should always be followed by the deployment of a full-blown UN peacekeeping operation?

Yes  No

**Additional open-ended questions: Please write in your comments**

17. Have UN soldiers gone beyond their regular duties of providing security to help you or your neighbors or the community as a whole? [for example, build schools, roads, medical clinics]

(a):  Yes  No

(b): Please explain:

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18. According to the information you have, what are the tasks that UNMIL is supposed to carry out in Liberia?

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19. In your opinion, what tasks *should* UNMIL be carrying out?

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20. What do you think are the biggest challenges to peace and security in Liberia?

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21. What would you say is the best thing UNMIL has done?

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22. What would you say is the worst thing UNMIL has done?

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23(a). Has UNMIL helped to improve human rights conditions in Liberia?  Yes  No

23(b). Please explain:

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24. What comments do you have on the UN's role in assisting the elections in Liberia in October/November 2005, what worked well, and what did not?

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☺ Thank you for completing the survey

## ANNEX 4

### Personal data:

- Gender:
- Age:
- Town:
- Educational Level:
- Religion:

### Section I: Security:

1. Do you support UNIFIL's presence on the Lebanese borders?

Yes     No     No answer

2. Would you say you feel secure with the presence of UNIFIL on the borders?

Yes     No     No answer

3. How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in making you feel safer?

Very good     Good     Fair     Poor     Very Poor     No answer

4. How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in the implementation of Resolution 1701?

Very good     Good     Fair     Poor     Very Poor     No answer

5. How would you rate the work of the UNIFIL in assisting the Lebanese armed forces?

Very good     Good     Fair     Poor     Very Poor     No answer

6. Do you think that the security situation in the South would worsen if UNIFIL left?

Yes     No     No answer

Section II: Humanitarian Assistance:

7. How would you rate UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian services?

Very good  Good  Fair  Poor  Very Poor  No answer

8. Would you say that UNIFIL's projects correlates with the needs and demands of the Southern community?

Yes  No  No answer

9. Would you say that UNIFIL's projects have resulted in benefit to the community?

Yes  No  No answer

10. If UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, do you think that this will have a negative impact on the economic life?

Yes  No  No answer

Section III: Liaison:

11. Would you say that the peacekeepers treat you with respect?

Yes  No  No answer

12. How would you rate the conduct of peacekeepers?

Very good  Good  Fair  Poor  Very Poor  No answer

13. How would you rate UNIFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community?

Very good  Good  Fair  Poor  Very Poor  No answer

## I. معلومات شخصية :

البلدة :  
الجنس :  
العمر :  
المستوى العلمي :  
الطائفة :

## II. الأمن :

١- هل تؤيد وجود اليونيفيل على الحدود اللبنانية ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

٢- هل تشعر بالامان بوجود اليونيفيل على الحدود ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

٣- كيف تقيّم عمل قوات حفظ السلام في سعيها لتأمين محيط أكثر أمانة ؟

جيد جداً  جيد  مقبول  ضعيف  جداً ضعيف

٤- كيف تقيّم عمل اليونيفيل في تطبيق القرار ١٧٠١ ؟

جيد جداً  جيد  مقبول  ضعيف  جداً ضعيف

٥- كيف تقيّم عمل اليونيفيل في مساعدة الجيش اللبناني ؟

جيد جداً  جيد  مقبول  ضعيف  جداً ضعيف

٦- هل تعتقد أن الوضع الأمني في الجنوب قد يتدهور في حال غادرت اليونيفيل ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

### III. المساعدات الانسانية :

٧ - كيف تقيّم المساعدات الانسانية التي تقدمها اليونيفيل ؟

جيد جداً  جيد  مقبول  ضعيف  جداً ضعيف

٨ - هل تعتقد أن مشاريع اليونيفيل تتلائم مع إحتياجات ومتطلبات الجنوب أهل ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

٩ - هل تعتقد أن مشاريع اليونيفيل مفيدة بنتيجة أنت ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

١٠ - إذا توقفت المساعدات المقدمة ، هل تعتقد أن ذلك سيؤثر سلباً على الحياة الإقتصادية ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

### IV. التواصل :

١١ - هل تعتقد أن قوات حفظ السلام تعاملك بإحترام ؟

نعم  كلا  لا إجابة

١٢ - كيف تقيم سلوك قوات حفظ السلام ؟


جيد جداً  جيد  مقبول  ضعيف  جداً ضعيف

١٣ - كيف تقيم قدرة اليونيفيل على التواصل مع المجتمع الجنوبي والتفاعل معه ؟

جيد جداً  جيد  مقبول  ضعيف  جداً ضعيف


## ANNEX 5

## Results based on Gender




## Would you say you feel secure with the presence of UNIFIL on the borders?

■ Yes ■ No ■ No Answer




## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in making you feel safer?

■ very good ■ good ■ fair ■ poor ■ very poor




## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in the implementation of Resolution 1701?


■ very good ■ good ■ fair ■ poor ■ very poor




### How would you rate the work of the UNIFIL in assisting the Lebanese armed forces?



### Do you think that the security situation in the South would worsen if UNIFIL left?




### How would you rate UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian services?







**Would you say that UNIFIL's projects correlates with the needs and demands of the Southern community?**




**Would you say that UNIFIL's projects have resulted in benefit to the community?**




**If UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, do you think that this will have a negative impact on the economic life?**




## Would you say that the peacekeepers treat you with respect?




## How would you rate the conduct of peacekeepers?




## How would you rate UNFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community?




# Age Group




### Do you support UNIFIL's presence on the Lebanese borders?




### Would you say you feel secure with the presence of UNIFIL on the borders?




## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in making you feel safer?




## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in the implementation of Resolution 1701?




## How would you rate the work of the UNIFIL in assisting the Lebanese armed forces?




## Do you think that the security situation in the South would worsen if UNIFIL left?




## How would you rate UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian services?




## Would you say that UNIFIL's projects correlates with the needs and demands of the Southern community?



### Would you say that UNIFIL's projects have resulted in benefit to the community?




### If UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, do you think that this will have a negative impact on the economic life?






## Would you say that the peacekeepers treat you with respect?




## How would you rate the conduct of peacekeepers?





### How would you rate UNFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community?


■ very good ■ good ■ fair ■ poor ■ very poor




## Results based on Educational Background




## Would you say you feel secure with the presence of UNIFIL on the borders?




## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in making you feel safer?




## How would you rate the work of UNIFIL in the implementation of Resolution 1701?




## How would you rate the work of the UNIFIL in assisting the Lebanese armed forces?




## Do you think that the security situation in the South would worsen if UNIFIL left?




## How would you rate UNIFIL's provision of humanitarian services?




## Would you say that UNIFIL's projects correlates with the needs and demands of the Southern community?




## Would you say that UNIFIL's projects have resulted in benefit to the community?



### If UNIFIL delivery of projects stops, do you think that this will have a negative impact on the economic life?




### Would you say that the peacekeepers treat you with respect?





## How would you rate the conduct of peacekeepers?



## How would you rate UNFIL's ability to connect and interact with the Southern community?

