THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN LEBANON:

THE BIRTH OF PRIVATE WELFARE PROVIDERS

A Thesis

presented to

the Faculty of Law and Political Science

at Notre Dame University-Louaize

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in Political Science

---

by

DANIELLA DAOU

JUNE 2023

Notre Dame University – Louaize

Faculty of Law and Political Science

Department of Law and Political Science

We hereby approve the thesis of

Daniella Daou

Candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

Dr. Paula Abi Hanna — **Supervisor**

Dr. Paula Abi Hanna

Dr. Nehme Al Khawly — **Committee Member**

Acknowledgement

I am deeply grateful to Dr. Paula Abi Hanna and Dr. Nehme Al Khawly for their exceptional guidance and support throughout this thesis. Their expertise and dedication have influenced my perspective and elevated the quality of my work. I extend my sincere gratitude to my family for their enduring love and assistance. Their faith in my abilities has served as a continual source of motivation. Finally, I want to thank my friends and classmates for their support and insightful conversations, in addition to members of the parties who generously shared their time and experiences, without whom this study would not have been possible.

Outline

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	**Full form**
AFHL	Armenian Fund for Health Insurance in Lebanon
AGBU	Armenian General Benevolent Union
ARCL	Armenian Relief Cross in Lebanon
ARF	Armenian Revolutionary Party
CAOM	Civil Administration of the Mountain
COMARES	Lebanese-Armenian Rehabilitation Central Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MSZP	Hungarian Communist Party
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance
SSNP	Syrian Social National Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Abstract

The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon, commonly known as Tashnag, are two organizations that are highlighted specifically in this thesis' examination of the phenomena of social democratic parties' downfall. Since its independence, confessional politics have molded Lebanon's political landscape, with a consociational structure that gives representation to the nation's 18 minority groups. Political parties in Lebanon were generally based on non-sectarian ideas before the civil war in 1975, however this thesis emphasizes the change in party politics that has taken place throughout time.

The study uses a multi-method approach to analyze studies on the PSP and Tashnag to determine what circumstances, such as leadership changes and the influence of the Lebanese civil war as an external shock, led to their ideological transition. This study aims to advance knowledge of the factors influencing the ideological development of leftist parties in various political systems by examining the decline of social democratic parties in Lebanon within the context of confessional politics and taking into account the experiences of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.

Keywords: socialism, consociationalism, sectarianism, ideology, Progressive Socialist Party, Armenian Revolutionary party.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The systematic fall of parties of the left, especially the decline of social democracy, has formed a trend that has been recently observed and studied in the field of political science. Researchers have focused on the shrinking of such parties specifically across Europe. In Western Europe, support for social democratic parties has shrunk significantly in both French and Dutch elections of 2017 (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). Scandinavian countries also witnessed a decreased mass base for parties of the left as they only maintained around 25 percent of the votes (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). Similarly, Hungary's and the Czech Republic's social democratic parties respectively only gathered 12 percent and 7 percent of the votes during the last parliamentary elections in 2017 and 2018 (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). The regression is more severe for Poland's Democratic Left Alliance which is no longer represented in parliament.

In explaining this trend, existing literature emphasizes the changing class structures and the rise of postmaterialist values such as environmentalism, self-expression, and gender equality that gradually took more importance than the issues of the left. However, most analysis of the decline of socialist parties adopt a region-specific lens. This thesis seeks to examine the decline of social democratic parties in another context, in Lebanon, taking into consideration its sectarian and consociational makeup, while focusing on two of its leftist parties, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon also known as Tashnag.

The research aims at studying the following polemic: what are the factors that led the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Progressive Socialist Party to undergo a shift in their

ideological identities from socialist democratic parties to sectarian social providing mass parties during the period after 1950 until the early 2000s post-Taif?

Confessional politics has been a driving force of governance in Lebanon since its independence in 1943 and throughout state-building summits namely Taif and Doha agreements which re-emphasized the consociational makeup of the Lebanese republic. Made up of 18 minorities with different parties to represent them, the people of Lebanon have a belonging to and identify with their sect and the party which provides for the former. Before the civil war of 1975, most political parties in Lebanon were found based on an ideology, away from sectarianism, and an end goal for the post-independence state. The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was founded by six individuals, most prominently Kamal Jumblatt, to join other Arab socialist parties at the time. On the other hand, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was founded based on three ideological pillars: socialism, democracy, and nationalism. Both historical members of the Socialist International, the parties in question now seem to be social providers for their communities, the Druze and the Armenians in Lebanon. This shift in party politics has been studied through decades, most prominently in the late 1990s. This thesis will utilize two main theories, “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change” (Harmel and Janada, 1994), and “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party” (Mair and Katz, 1995) in addition to other studies by Mair and Katz which allow more insight into the subject.

The research is based on various studies of the PSP and Tashnag in order to first analyze the factors behind the shift of the parties from being ideological based to becoming social providers, namely a change in leadership and an external shock manifested in the Lebanese civil war. The second step is centered on indicators that show the rise of the social provision

and sectarian survival characteristics in these parties and the decline in their ideological position. This research also takes into account an interview conducted with Hagop Pakradounian, leader of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon, in addition to an interview with a regional coordinator of the Progressive Socialist Party who preferred to stay anonymous.

Chapter 2: Methodology, Operationalization, and Literature Review

2.1 Methodology

This thesis uses a number of tools to be able to answer the research question. To answer the main research question, it will be split into two parts:

1. Indicators of the decline in social democratic ideology and practice.
2. Causes of social democratic decline in Lebanon, specifically within Tashnag and the Progressive Socialist Party.

To examine these themes, desk research of different academic articles was conducted on the decline of social democracy in Europe as it has been widely studied and how sectarianism affects partisan politics. To study the indicators of decline in the strong presence and ideology of social democratic parties, the thesis will rely on two academic works, “Historical Decline and or Change of Scales: The Electoral Dynamics of European Social Democratic Parties” and “Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy”. These two studies provide a framework to assess the decline of social democracy. Their setting is in Europe; however, this paper will adapt the findings to fit the Lebanese context.

Another tool that is used is interviews with key leaders in both parties under study, namely with Hagop Pakradounian, the leader of the Tashnag Party and a regional coordinator of the PSP who preferred to remain anonymous. The interview with Mr. Pakradounian was conducted to fill a gap in the desk research conducted on Tashnag as most studies focus on the status of the Armenian diaspora in Lebanon and the region and are communitarian based, while studies on the party formation itself in Lebanon are scarce. However, the existing literature on the formation and adaptation of the Progressive Socialist Party is rich starting with the history of

Kamal Jumblatt and ending with the sectarian profile of the party for the Druze community. The aim of the interviews was to get the parties' perspectives on their founding identity and the shift in the way they conduct politics in a sectarian context.

The approach adopted in this study is qualitative to reach an in-depth analysis and description of the adaptation of social democratic parties in Lebanon. In addition, it uses a deductive approach in applying general studies and Euro-centric analyses on the case of the two parties in Lebanon.

2.2 Operationalization

The purpose of this thesis is to prove the hypothesis that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Progressive Socialist Party, affected by armed conflict, namely the 1958 and 1975 civil wars and the war of the mountain, and the re-enforced sectarianism post-Taif, have undergone a shift in their ideological identities as social democratic parties turning instead into sectarian social providing mass parties. The research done to prepare this study is an ongoing process with sources mainly from academic articles and books. The articles are divided into studies on the history and present partisan politics and ideologies of the PSP and Tashnag, as well as on party and ideology change. Because the decline of socialist ideology was first studied in Europe, the literature on this decline will be applied to Lebanon through linking welfare states, one of the main reasons behind the decline, to clientelism. To better understand Tashnag, an interview was set up with the leader of the party MP Hagop Pakradounian through email. An in-person interview was not feasible, so the open-ended interview questions were answered via email. Furthermore, an interview was conducted with a regional coordinator from the PSP to better understand the party's position from sectarian welfare provision.

In order to verify the thesis statement, a good link between welfare states and clientelism has to be explained. Clientelism can be defined as the provision of favors, goods, and service in exchange for political support. Following this description, clientelism will be explained as derived from sectarianism and the Lebanese civil war which drove the parties under studies away from their socialist ideology and into social provision parties.

2.3 Literature Review

Literature on party models and party change has been prominent especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s by scholars who have developed theories and became pioneers in partisan politics such as Peter Mair and Richard Katz who, together and independently, have published several studies on the topic. Before Katz and Mair's publication in 1995, Harmel and Janda (1994) presented a theory that seeks to explain why parties change their positions, organizational characteristics, and strategies. In "An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change", Hamel and Janda (1994) review the existing literature of political parties, draw from their focus on party change in party systems, and formulate a theory focusing on individual parties. The study focuses on external and/or internal stimuli that affect party change such as a leadership change, change in the dominant faction within the party, or an environmental shock such as a social crisis or war.

Harmel and Janda, and several scholars after them, build on the work of Kirchheimer (1966) analyzes how parties in western democracies shifted from ideological to catch-all parties after World War II. These parties, as Kirchmeimer describes them, abandoned the intellectual calling and substituted it with a mass integration approach thus transforming into "people parties" in exchange for a wider party base and more effective electoral success. In a similar line of analysis, Katz and Mair (1992) adopt a timeframe from 1960 to 1990 and deduce in a

study that parties were undergoing a change and adapting to multiple challenges posed by their environments, just as Kirchheimer attributed the change that he studies to a post-world war society. Also independently, Mair (1989) examined party change, distinguished party instability from "an ideology crisis" and identified three causes of change which include leadership change, policy appeals for mobilization, and organizational strategy. Similarly, Wilson (1988), in his study "Why Parties Refuse to Fail", takes the French model of parties and explains how they overcame challenges through modernization of organizational structures, articulating positions on important issues, maintaining political cleavages through identity, and designing a centralized decision-making process and electoral system.

On a different note, Katz and Mair (1995), provide an analysis of the different models that parties change to ending with the emergence of the cartel party. The analysis is based on how different models of parties can be derived from the relationship between the civil society and the state ranging between the mass party, catch-all party, and the cartel party in which parties employ the resources of the state to ensure their collective survival.

All the above theoretical framework will be used to analyze the change into social democratic parties in Lebanon: The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon, also referred to as Tashnag. The literature on both parties is focused on aspects beyond ideology and organizational structure. Literature on the PSP is predominantly focused on the leadership and thought of its founder Kamal Jumblatt and most recently on the Druze community that it represents. Similarly, a big portion of the literature on the Tashnag Party sheds light on the Armenian community in Lebanon and their role in the diaspora.

In “Armenians in Lebanon: Becoming Local in the Levant”, Nalbantian (2018) takes the timeframe of 1957-58 and uses it to illustrate the Armenian’s organized presence in politics as a minority. Nalbanian further analyzes the armed conflicts between Armenian parties and the state intervention towards the end of 1958. Moving forward in time, Tashjian (2020) focuses on communitarianism and the sub-identity that Armenian parties instill in their followers. In “Communitarianism and Crisis Response”, Tashjian (2020) describes the humanitarian service provision of the Armenian parties.

Pakradounian (2017) focuses on the role and organization of parties in consociational democracies taking the case of Lebanon and explaining how community leaders have founded parties along sectarian lines in order to mobilize their interests and those of their communities. Similarly, Al Khazen (2003) studies political parties in post-war Lebanon in “Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon: Parties in Search of Partisans” and compares them against a benchmark of parties before the war to illustrate their limitations in a party system that does not allow competition.

Ohannes Geukjian published several studies on Armenian parties in Lebanon including Tashnag. In “The Policy of Positive Neutrality of the Armenian Political Parties in Lebanon during the Civil War, 1975-90: A Critical Analysis”, Geukjian (2007) explains how the three Armenian parties in Lebanon, despite their ideological differences, agreed to adopt a common policy to face threats and challenges in the Lebanese civil war. However, in “From Positive Neutrality to Partisanship: How and Why the Armenian Political Parties Took Sides in Lebanese Politics in the Post-Taif Period (1989-Present)”, Geukjian (2009) explains how the Armenian parties, mainly Tashnag, hot immersed in Lebanese politics post-Taif as they became representatives of one of the eighteen minorities of the confessional system and they

did not want their rights to decision making and their role as mutual policy makers be taken away.

As for the Progressive Socialist Party, Hazran (2010) studies the emergence of the party by examining the major ideological patterns of the Druze community 1943 and 1975. Hazran (2010) also briefly analyzes the role of the PSP and its founding ideology during the civil war. On the other hand, Rivoal (2014) analyzes the patron-client relationship between the leadership of the PSP and its followers. This patron-client relationship is an unequal hierarchal a hierarchical arrangement in which a patron offers safety or resources in return for a client's allegiance or services. The study describes in detail the political gatherings held at the Jumblatt Palace with the audience of followers and other rituals that have been taking place traditionally. Like Rivoal, Aridi (2019) in her thesis writes about the transition of the PSP from a secular party operating on socialist principles to adopting a sectarian framework protecting the Druze community. To further explain the shifts in PSP's discourse, Rowayheb (2011) argues that Walid Jumblatt mitigated risks and challenges by constantly adjusting his political discourse and alliances. The article carefully examines these changes as a calculated strategy by the PSP for survival.

Chapter 3: Theory

Parties are conservative organizations that do not seek change without a legitimate cause. While internal factors may directly lead to change, environmental triggers may also act as a significant catalyst for the process preceding change (Harmel and Janda, 1994). The external stimuli with the most influence are ones which lead the party into reevaluating its effectiveness in reaching its main goal, whether it was electoral success or a different matter. These external "shocks", as Harmel and Janda refer to them, cut deep into the party's internal system and cause a change which is deeper than that caused by internal factors such a leadership or dominant faction change.

According to Harmel and Janda (1994), the theory is based on three premises:

1- Despite having various goals, each party has a primary goal which varies among parties and, at times, within a single party over time.
2- Parties may undergo change due to other circumstances such as leadership change and internal disputes, however the most dramatic change is the one derived from an external shock.
3- External shocks are extra-party stimuli that affect its primary goal. Other external stimuli can also lead to party change, however less broadly. For example, electoral stimuli will affect parties which are vote maximizers more than parties with policy advocacy as a main goal.

The main key variables considered for change include two internal variables, a shift in the dominant faction and leadership change, along with various external stimuli. In addition, there is one factor that diminishes the effects of the variables which is the age of party as a marker

of institutionalization. Leadership change can be explained as a change in key personnel that may be part of global party commitment to achieve previously agreed upon changes. However, this new leadership may be a cause of unprecedented change as well. New leaders elected to office may advocate for new policies and bring about change, even with external stimuli absent, however the change will not be as broad as one caused by an external shock. Similarly, a change in the dominant faction within the party is bound to cause the same radius of change as with the shift in leadership, especially in the absence of extra-party shocks. This may occur in cases when factions strongly disagree on the fundamentals of party identity, organization, or strategy.

External incentives include various factors that are referred to in literature as significant "environmental changes" (Harmel and Janda, 1994). They can be economic, social, and political changes that happen outside the party realm. These stimuli can also be "universal within the system" meaning that they equally apply to all parties such as in the cases of constitutional reforms and changes in public funding. Other stimuli are party-specific such as a change in the number of votes and party support. These party-specific factors do not only cause limited change but would also stimulate a wide reassessment of party policies and effectiveness which impacts the entire organization. Such a shock, as Harmel and Janda (1994) describe it, may be considered as a "softening up" for conservative parties. An external shock can also be defined as an external stimulus that directly relates to the performance of the party towards its primary goal. This will push decision makers within the party to fundamentally reassess the effectiveness of the party in reaching its goal.

Combining the thoughts of several researchers, Harmel and Janda (1994) propose four possible primary goals for parties: vote maximization, office maximization, policy advocacy, and inter-party democracy maximization.

The event that will cause a shock to vote maximizer parties is electoral failure of a series of electoral failures. Harmel and Janda (1994) assert that attempts to assess whether such shocks have occurred will not be as effective as simply listening to the party leadership itself. Parties undergoing debates on how to overcome and improve the recent "dismal situation" can safely be assumed to be experiencing an external shock whether the electoral outcome was 5 or 25 percent less.

Office maximizer parties prioritize holding portfolios in coalition governments, which specifically pertains to multiparty systems. The shocks that office maximizers go through and that would broadly shake the fundamentals of the party are those immediately linked to participation in government. In states where coalition governments are the norm, the willingness of parties to collaborate with each other is crucial. In cases where a party refuses to join a coalition itself or does not allow a party from joining the coalition, the shock may affect the rejected party. Another shock would be derived in case a coalition that the party belongs to collapses, resulting consequently in a need to design an alternative strategy for office maximization for example through changes in ideology or position to make the party fit in within other coalitions. According to Katz and Mair (1995), coalition governments that coincide in states with a mass party model primarily conduct politics as competition, cooperation, and conflict between the different political parties and the members that they represent. These same parties make demands from the state and attempt to maximize their control of state by employing their delegates in key offices.

For policy/ideology advocates, policy purity is considered to be more important than gaining votes and portfolios. The party's shocks are directly related to policy or ideological positions which causes party members to reconsider the party's identity due to losing confidence in the suitability of key positions. An example would be the shock that was radiated to communist parties after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failure of Soviet ideology. On the other hand, for intra-party democracy maximizer parties whose main goal is the active representation of the majority of their members, a societal or party membership change may be behind a shift in party policies. For example, several agrarian parties were faced with the need for fundamental changes after farmers stopped constituting the majority of their members.

Keeping the party system modern is crucial for the survival of parties. Chirac's Rally for the Republic party in France, when faced with challenges and decreased support, adjusted the party's position on several matters, even changed the party's name to reflect a new orientation, and replaced leaders within the party ranks, all of which attracted reformers who were starting to shift away from the party (Wilson, 1988).

Chapter 4: The Decline of Socialism in Europe

Before diving in the specifics of the decline of socialist parties, it is crucial to identify the principles of the parties of the left, center, and right. In order to lessen social and economic inequality, left-wing political parties support progressive and egalitarian policies. The wellbeing of underprivileged populations is given first priority, and they support social justice, workers' rights, and strong social safety nets. To solve urgent societal issues, left-leaning parties also prioritize public ownership of important businesses and services, funding for healthcare and education, and environmental sustainability. On the other hand, center parties often take a moderate and practical approach to politics, attempting to strike a balance between the ideals of the left and the right. The promotion of economic stability, prudent budgetary management, and a dedication to social welfare without heavy government involvement are among the key tenets of center-right parties. They frequently back economic policies that favor the free market and place a high priority on spending on infrastructure and education.

Right-wing parties, on the other hand, tend to adhere to conservative values, placing a high value on individual liberty, restrained government intrusion, and free-market capitalism. To promote economic growth, they support lower taxes, less regulation, and pro-business policies. The right parties frequently place a significant emphasis on traditional social values, strong national security, and law and order.

The decline of social democracy has been a trend studied throughout Europe for years in an attempt to discover the roots of this deterioration. The literature is divided between attributing this loss to welfare state generosity and economic liberalism that drove the left to adopt center or right-wing policies, thus losing their electoral base. For decades before this decline, the welfare state was recognized as the raison d'être of socialist parties and the labor movement.

The reform of the welfare state was additionally considered an important element in explaining the electoral success and growth of social democratic parties. However, this reality has taken a puzzling turn for many researchers. While welfare state generosity has been increasing across Europe since the 1970s, social democratic parties are staggering at the polls, a drift that has been progressively evident particularly from 1990 onward (Loxbo et al, 2019). The positive correlation between influential social democracy and expansive welfare state development that has marked the "Golden Age of welfare capitalism" has reached an end and been reversed (Loxbo et al, 2019). The relationship between the expansion of social benefits and the voting rates of political parties advocating for them reaches a period of diminishing returns as the public becomes increasingly prosperous and equal. This is referred to as the principle of "diminishing utility of economic determinism" which implies that parties with a social democratic ideology would primarily reap popularity and electoral benefits from welfare reforms only when the majority of voters experience economic challenges (Loxbo et al, 2019). In other words, when the welfare state is at low levels of generosity. On the other hand, as the welfare state provision grows, the positive returns for social democratic parties, measured by the number of votes, will consequently diminish. Moreover, most research also attributes the decline of social democratic to their abandonment of their traditional ideological standpoint adopting some principles from the right.

In their empirical research, Loxbo et al (2019) while assessing the social democratic trend in 16 Western European countries between 1975 and 2014 deduced a curvilinear and substantial association between the generosity of the welfare state and the total voting percentage for social democratic parties. Figure 1 below illustrates the results.



Figure 1 from Loxbo et al (2019)

As mentioned before, one of the common factors that underlie the decline of leftist parties in the world and in Europe specifically is their shift to an ideological center when dealing with economic issues, particularly its approval of reforms that are classified within the realm of neoliberalism which is the support for a market-based economy with little government involvement and individual freedom. The reforms included the privatization of the public sector, cuts in the welfare state provision and taxes, and imposing less regulations on the financial and business sector. In the 1970s, when the waves of unemployment and inflation hit Western Europe, the "free-market right" – the advocates of a market-based economy with little government involvement and individual freedom – had already been thinking of solutions and organizing explanations as to why the social democratic order failed. Coupled with the left's ineffectiveness in proposing a credible alternative path, the neoliberal rights earned ideological dominance by adopting the argument of "there was no other alternative" to freeing markets

and halting the role of the government as Margret Thatcher, conservative British Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, stated (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019).

What started as a postwar duopoly between the traditional left and right marked by a social democratic consensus soon transformed in the twentieth century into a neoliberal consensus from both sides. In the United Kingdom, United States, and Germany, Tony Blairs' (Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and head of the Labour Party from 1994 to 2007) "New Labour", Bill Clinton's (Former President of the United States from 1993 to 2001) "New Democrats", and Gerhard Schroder's (Former Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005) SPD, respectively, adopted neoliberal principles in addition to accepting the government's limited role in shaping social and economic development (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). These trends have also been evident in Eastern Europe, in Poland and Hungary specifically. The Hungarian Communist Party rebranded itself and transformed into a social democratic party (MSZP) while adopting neoliberal principles and a pro-European position as advocated then by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU. In 1994, it entered the government with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats and further implemented neoliberal such as devaluing the currency of Hungary and reducing wages and social benefits. This cost the MSZP to lose its popularity base and consequently it lost its position as the largest parliamentary block in the elections of 1998 (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019).

The leftist party in Poland adopted a similar track. The Polish Communist Party transformed into the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which initially gathered a mass base of workers, members of the middle class, and pensioners. Similar to the MSZD, the SLD adopted neoliberal reforms once it came to power in collaboration with the Polish People's Party in 1994. The SLD brought forward strict fiscal policies, mass-privatization, deregulation, and

making the Polish economy, i.e. the economic system and conditions in Poland, increasingly accessible to foreign investors. This consequently affected the party's popularity and electoral outcome in 1997 thus promising to go back to providing social provisions (Berman and Snegovaya, 2019). However, this proved to be difficult as Poland was on the verge of joining the European Union. All the above suggests a dramatic change in the identity of parties of the left.

Chapter 5: Lebanon as a Consociational Democracy

Consociational democracy, as originally proposed by Arend Lijphart, is a power-sharing model designed to promote harmony and prevent conflict among diverse social groups. Its primary objective is to accommodate the interests of these groups and foster cooperation. Lijphart identified four fundamental elements that characterize consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969). First, it involves the formation of a grand coalition government, which includes the participation of all significant ethnic or religious groups in the decision-making process, ensuring a broad representation of interests. Second, consociational democracy grants segmental autonomy, allowing specific groups to have control over their internal affairs. This autonomy empowers groups to govern and make decisions that directly affect their constituents. Third, the principle of proportionality is crucial, ensuring that political representation is distributed according to each group's share of the population. This approach ensures that no group is disproportionately dominant or marginalized within the political system. Finally, consociational democracy includes minority veto rights, enabling minority groups to block policies that may potentially harm their interests, thereby providing a safeguard against policies that disregard their concerns or well-being. Veto rights represent the power, granted to individuals or groups, to reject or block a decision or proposal.

Consociational democracy operates on the premise that societies characterized by deep divisions along ethnic, religious, or cultural lines can attain stability and peaceful coexistence through the significant political representation and power granted to minority groups. Advocates of consociational democracy assert that by establishing institutions that promote cooperation, conflicts can be mitigated, and the dominance of one group over others can be prevented. They often cite the examples of countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the

Netherlands, which have successfully maintained stability despite significant internal divisions. However, critics argue that consociational democracy can unintentionally perpetuate and exacerbate societal divisions by reinforcing group identities and promoting a zero-sum approach to politics. They contend that such systems often consolidate power among elite groups, suppress dissent, and impede social integration. Moreover, critics caution that consociational arrangements may not be universally applicable and might fail to address underlying structural inequalities and injustices present within societies. While consociational democracy is touted as a means to achieve stability and cooperation in deeply divided societies, there are concerns regarding its potential to reinforce divisions and consolidate power among elites, as well as its limitations in addressing broader issues of inequality and injustice.

Lebanon's consociational democracy is deeply rooted in the country's historical background and its diverse societal fabric. The National Pact of 1943, a significant agreement among Lebanon's political leaders, laid the groundwork for consociationalism by adopting a confessional system that assigned political positions based on religious affiliation. This system designated the presidency for a Maronite Christian, the prime minister for a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament for a Shia Muslim, ensuring a representation of Lebanon's major religious communities. The Taif Agreement of 1989 further solidified the consociational arrangements in Lebanon. It aimed to address the challenges arising from years of civil war by expanding political representation for Muslims and seeking to restore stability. The agreement led to a redistribution of power among Lebanon's various sectarian groups and aimed to reinforce the principle of proportionality in political representation.

Despite its allure in theory, consociational democracy in Lebanon has encountered significant challenges and has been subject to various criticisms. One prominent critique centers around

the confessional system, which is argued to perpetuate sectarianism and reinforce divisions among the population. Critics contend that the strict adherence to religious and sectarian identities impedes social cohesion and undermines the cultivation of a shared national identity. Furthermore, consociational arrangements have been criticized for consolidating power among political elites and fostering clientelism. With power concentrated within sectarian leaders, there are concerns that they often prioritize their own interests over the welfare of their constituents, leading to allegations of corruption, inefficiency, and neglect of public welfare.

Another challenge pertains to the exclusion of non-sectarian groups from political representation. Secularists and women, for instance, feel marginalized within the consociational framework, as their voices and interests are often underrepresented. Additionally, the consensus-based decision-making process frequently results in political deadlock and gridlock, hindering effective governance and impeding the implementation of necessary reforms.

Chapter 6: Party Formation in Lebanon

Ever since the formation of Lebanon, it has been characterized by its diverse and active partisan politics. Over the decades, parties in Lebanon represented a large spectrum of ideological, political, and communal platforms that reflect the diversity of the Lebanese political landscape. Political parties have particularly benefited from the absence of a ruling party and official state ideology thus creating an atmosphere of openness and competition. However, this cultivating environment was not void of conflicts.

Parties in Lebanon reflect the confessional nature of the society that they represent. They were also influenced by various ideological waves emanating from the Arab world. Major Lebanese communities have generally been associated with a political party despite ideology. For example, the Sunni community was associated with parties of Arab nationalist agendas, and during the early 1970s, the Shi'a community developed parties to identify with Amal and what is now Hezbollah. By contrast, communist and nationalist parties, such as the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), did not limit their representation to one sect or geographical region. The Armenian and Druze parties, the subject of study, similar to other parties, represented their communal base as well. Despite the Progressive Socialist Party being founded by Kamal Jumblatt and his friends on socialist principles, it was largely associated with the Druze community. As for the Armenians in Lebanon, their parties catered for their own interests and were detached from the political process before the civil war of 1975 (Khazen, 2003).

Another characteristic shared by Lebanese parties is their participation in armed conflict. Most parties have the predisposition, ideologically and politically, to transform into militia forces during crises, mostly associated with regional turmoil (Khazen, 2003). This was especially true

during the 1958 armed conflict, 1975 civil war, and more recently on May 7, 2008 clashes, all of which reinforced the confessional mentality of survival of the fittest. Military training and the acquisition of weapons is a common feature of all parties in Lebanon, each with readiness to protect their own sectarian existence and territory.

Parties in Lebanon, like their counterparts in many other states, originated either institutionally through elections and from government institutions, or from external situations associated with modernization and social change. The former is established after parliamentary coalitions while the latter are influenced by ideologies and sociopolitical factors. The formation of PSP and Tashnag falls under the influence of not only socialist principles, but also identity-based considerations, more so for the Armenian diaspora.

According to Khazen (2003), Lebanese political parties evolved through five stages: the period of the French mandate from 1920 to 1943, the period post-independence from 1943 to 1970, the pre-war era from 1970 to 1975, the war years from 1975 to 1990, and the post-war period after 1990.

Two types of parties emerged in the mandate period namely ideological parties such as the Kata'ib Party, Lebanese Communist Party, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, and what Khazen (2003) calls elite-based parties such as the Constitutional Bloc and National Bloc. Party politics of that era was centered around elite rivalries, especially clashes among Maronite politicians competing for the presidency, Sunni-Maronite difference in points of view regarding Lebanon's relations with Syria and the country's Arabist profile, in other words its immersion in Arab culture, language, and affairs, in addition to the positions of different elites toward the mandate.

The Decline of Socialism in Lebanon: The Birth of Private Welfare Providers

The period after the independence of the state of Lebanon witnessed the rise of new parties: the Progressive Socialist Party and the Najjada Party in the late 1940s, the National Liberal Party in the 1950s, in addition to the Arab nationalist parties, formed outside Lebanon but influenced its internal politics, such as the Ba'th Party and Nasirite parties (Khazen, 2003). This phase saw parties more involved in domestic and foreign politics. Parties were additionally influenced and polarized by the regional and international developments including the Cold War, Arab nationalist politics and American-sponsored doctrines and defense pacts. This led parties to be part of the 1958-armed conflicts as the country was divided between the pro-Western Arab camp and the pro-Naser camp.

The phase that directly preceded the 1975 civil war was unique in the history of parties in pre-war Lebanon. More than 15 parties were active and influential, and existed along all spectrums, rightists and leftists, secular and confessional, non-ideological and ideological, moderate and radical. This period was characterized by the political assertion of parties of the left and the military and political activism of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the aftermath of the Arab countries' defeat in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The period of the early 1970s before the start of the war was also marked by the intensifying phenomenon of politicization of labor unions and university students.

The pre-war period was also characterized by the militarization of domestic politics. The presence of an armed PLO divided the Lebanese into two camps, one that is opposing the armament of the PLO and one that supports it in its warfare with Israel with south Lebanon as the base. The gap between points of views kept widening an armed conflict was inevitable as the coexistence between the Lebanese state and the Palestinian revolutionary mobilization was, at best, temporary.

During the war in 1975, political parties were already equipped to participate in armed conflict. As the war catalyzed, parties transformed into militias each using weapons to protect their territories, people, and interests, all while fighting on the extent of Arabism, the ideology promoting Arab identity and unity, in Lebanon. The transition to peace after Taif was abrupt with no peace talks or rehabilitation process for the political leaders who changed hats overnight from war lords to politicians.

Chapter 7: Socialist Parties – The Case of Lebanon

European social democratic parties lost their identity with the rise of governmental social provision and a generous welfare state during which they were forced to adopt neoliberal reforms in order to stay in power. Following a similar trajectory, social democratic parties in Lebanon adopted a clientelist approach, enforced by the society's sectarian nature, in order to maintain power and popularity. This has consequently turned social democratic parties in Lebanon, namely the PSP and Tashnag, away from their founding ideological principles and into social provision mass parties. We hypothesize that this shift was due to external shocks: the 1975 civil war and the sectarian principles reinforced by the Taif Agreement, the 1985 civil war and the War of the Mountain.

7.1 The Foundation of the Progressive Socialist Party

On May 1, 1949, Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze feudal lord from Mukhtara, along with Abdullah Al Aleily, Albert Adib, Fouad Rizk, Fareed Jubran, and George Hanna declared the conception of the Progressive Socialist Party on Labour Day in Beirut. These multiple founders were, according to Aridi (2019), leftists genuinely interested in democratic secular and progressive socialist change. Four out of the six founders were Christians, and three of them came from the lower middle class. The flag of the PSP upon establishment of the party was very detailed to match its philosophy. The red circle surrounding the globe represents the freedom that will engulf the universe in the future: "the way of true progress". The blue globe resembles a world of transparency and spiritual clarity, where the materialistic is led by the non-materialistic to a supreme goal: "equity between people - shown in a white triangle with equal joints - in work (the pickaxe) and intellect (the pen)" (Aridi, 2015).

The party was not a platform for the Druze community to express itself, but rather surpassed confessionalism and its ideology reached members of different sects. The party's anti-sectarian ideas were difficult for Jumblatt to promote particularly for his Druze community due to the gap in levels of education at the time. As a feudal lord, Jumblatt gained quality education in one of the prestigious schools of Aintoura and later moved to France to pursue a degree in law. As a result, the disparity between his and his community's levels of political thinking was evident. Against this background, the Druze community were historically mostly rural with little access to post-secondary education. This reality has helped the PSP to branch out to different sects through socialism. Although the PSP was not established based on a chieftain system, it quickly remolded into one (Aridi, 2019). Jumblatt was undeniably seen as the party's leader although he preached secularism. This may be attributed to his charismatic speeches, wit and education, but most notably to his status as a feudal lord. He was known among his community as the "Mu'allim" meaning teacher in Arabic. Consequently, assimilating the PSP's discourse and decisions to Kamal Jumblatt became normal.

In its first year, the PSP's membership was diverse and represented different sects. 56.3% of the members were Christians, 38.61% were Druze, 4.75% were Sunni Muslims, and 0.31% were Shi'a Muslims (Aridi, 2019). The party exponentially gained popularity as its membership expanded from 318 to 1,956 committed followers in less than a year. However, in 1950, the gap quickly resolved itself and the percentage of Druze members rose to 68.9% (Aridi, 2019). Despite this rise, studies reveal that the fluctuations in the sectarian distribution of party membership are an indicator to the adherence to the party due to its principles as opposed to confessional considerations. This is important to note to emphasize the non-sectarian start of the PSP and its focus on socialist principles.

Following the assassination of Kamal Jumblat in 1977, his 28-year-old son Walid assumed the role of party president and feudal chief of the Jumblati bloc. However, Walid did not share the same philosophy and ideology as his father. According to Aridi (2019), Walid's education at the American University of Beirut, which was known for its Arab Nationalism and anti-Lebanese establishment ideas, influenced his political beliefs towards more revolutionary ideologies. Records from the PSP indicate that after his father's death, Walid openly rejected his father's secular policy and focused more on mobilizing the Druze community, aiming to increase their representation within the party.

7.2 The Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon - Tashnag

Founded globally in parts of the 1890 Russian Empire, now Georgia, the ARF was established in Lebanon in 1904 through its university students association. The main goal behind the party's early formation was to combat the injustice brought upon Armenian communities by the Ottoman Empire. Its extension to Lebanon, according to its leader MP Hagop Pakradounian was deemed necessary given that the region was also under Ottoman rule and because it had formed alliances with several other anti-Ottoman movements such as with the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Macedonians, as well as Arab factions. Socialism was one of four founding ideologies for the ARF, namely nationalism, democracy, revolutionary, and socialism. Each of these ideologies served as a pillar which puts the party into context. While socialism was adopted as an economic mechanism - "from each according to what they can give and to each according to what they need" - democracy led transparent governance, and nationalism to emphasize the Armenian cause and nation state (Interview with Pakradounian, 2021). The revolutionary element was used as a tool to mobilize the Armenian people.

Similar to the PSP, the ARF's flag and symbol resemble its founding ideology. Against a red background stands a pen, sword, and shovel representing intellect, equity and hard work, and the fight for the nation.

7.3 The External Shock - Civil Wars, Armed Conflicts, and the Taif Agreement

Several armed conflicts and civil wars have characterized Lebanon's turbulent history, each having a lasting effect on the nation's political environment, social institutions, and most importantly partisan politics. The following subchapters dive into four crucial eras in Lebanon's history: the Civil War of 1958, the 1975 Civil War, the War of the Mountain, and the Taif Agreement that further instilled sectarian-based clientelism in Lebanon. These "external shocks" were the drive behind the Tashnag and PSP inward-facing perspectives in each of the parties with the goal of protecting the interests of their own communities. The sectarianism that was reinforced during these armed conflicts led Tashnag and the PSP, among other Lebanese parties, to switch from socialism to sectarian survival.

7.3.1 1958 Civil War

The existing literature points out alternative armed conflicts that have served as a catalyst toward adopting clientelist approaches based on sectarianism, especially for the PSP namely the 1958 civil war and the 1983 War of the Mountain.

One significant challenge that Kamal Jumblatt faced, and is considered to be of utmost importance, was the first modern civil war in Lebanon in 1958. Fawaz Traboulsi provides an explanation of the workings of the Chamoun regime, characterizing it as an authoritarian regime supported by the USA and driven by an uncompromising ideology (Traboulsi as quoted by Aridi 2019). Aridi (2019) also quotes Georges Naccache, who stated that anyone not aligned

with the Chamoun regime was labeled either a traitor or a Syro-Bolshevik. This definition implied that anyone opposing the regime posed a threat to Pan-Arabism, which advocates the cultural and political unity of Arab states, due to the association with "Syro," as well as a threat to freedom and democracy. This strategic use of terminology aimed to garner further support from the USA, as Pan-Arabism suggested Nasserite domination in the region, while Bolshevism ensured American backing since they pursued a containment policy.

The death of Nassib Al-Matni, a prominent Maronite journalist aligned with the anti-Chamoun movement, along with the President's reluctance to deny rumors about his intention to seek re-election, sparked a series of opposition strikes. The previously loose alliance found more reasons to unite after Al-Matni's death, calling for a general strike and Chamoun's resignation. Al-Matni not only criticized the Chamoun regime but also advocated for stronger ties with the newly formed United Arab Republic, comprising Syria and Egypt under Abdel Nasser's leadership. The events of 1958 extended beyond violent clashes in Beirut, as the rebellion, as described by Caroline Attié, spread to regions like the Bekaa, Tripoli, and the Shouf. These clashes, though brief, resembled a civil war. Opposition to Chamoun was primarily peaceful, but Jumblatt and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) aimed to capture Beirut through military means and forcibly remove the President (Aridi, 2019). It was the Druze militia, led by Kamal Jumblatt, associated with the PSP, that spearheaded this effort. Discussions regarding religious and feudal clans, traditional social units based on family ties and hierarchical connections, had already begun during this conflict. Adhering to the data mentioned earlier, numbers indicate that in 1958, Druze membership in the PSP accounted for up to 78%, while membership from other sects significantly declined (Aridi, 2019). According to PSP records, the party faced challenges from sectarian divisions, leading to the purge of seventeen members, most of whom

were Christians. These members held influential positions within the party but were expelled due to their political stances.

The war of 1958, also coinciding with the formation of the United Arab Republic under the leadership of Jamal Abdel Nasser, strengthened the socialist ideology and pan-Arabism in the region, at a time when, in Lebanon, right-wing nationalism was on the rise led by President Chamoun. The conflict between Kamal Jumblatt and Chamoun reached its peak before 1958 specifically in 1955 when Chamoun declared Lebanon's buy-in to the Baghdad Pact. This Anglo-American agreement was designed to contain any communist or Soviet influence in the region, keeping in line with the Eisenhower doctrine, a strategy adopted by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1957 to grant military aid to Middle Eastern countries facing communist threats. This was exacerbated by Jumblatt losing the parliamentary elections of 1955. It was the first time since 1943 that there was no Jumblatti in the parliament, despite his coalition with the Christian parties. This was humiliating for Jumblatt and his socialist Muslim counterparts as Chamoun succeeded to keep them away from power (Aridi, 2019). All of the internal conflicts and the presence of a Nasserite state and supporters so close to home frightened the right-wing camp which led to a call for arms. Fed up with Chamoun's policies, Jumblatt and his clan took advantage of a nearby ally and plotted a coup to take over the regime.

This three-year civil war was one of the reasons behind the transformation of the PSP in a way that made Druze's belonging an intrinsic force. A large part of the Druze community identified themselves as pan-Arabists and socialists, however, the force that pulled them closer to the party was its leader, Kamal Jumblatt. The communal distribution of the party in 1958 and in the years to follow had a major shift. Membership data reveal that the war cast-out almost all

non-Druze members, leaving Kamal Jumblatt to preside over a Druze-oriented movement (Aridi, 2019).

Armenian political parties actively participated in and had an impact on the events that unfolded in 1958. Concurrently, they leveraged their position within the Lebanese political system to vie for power within the Armenian community. This power struggle eventually escalated into violence, continuing until December 1958, nearly two months after the conclusion of the Lebanese mini-civil war, when the Lebanese army intervened. These tensions and violent clashes between Armenian parties and their armed factions had a significant and unprecedented spatial consequence: the territorialization of specific areas in Beirut (Nalbantian, 2018). While Lebanon already had existing divisions based on sect and class, the events of 1957-58 resulted in the reorganization and relocation, often forcibly, of many Armenians in neighborhoods such as Mar Mikael, Sin el Fil, Bourj Hammoud, and Corniche el-Nahr, based on their political party affiliations (Nalbantian, 2018).

Similarly, the 1958 war had implications on Tashnag, along with the other Armenian parties. Armenian parties during that time were deeply divided. Tashnag supported the pro-government coalition led by President Chamoun despite its right-wing anti-communist position. Tashnag's decision stemmed out of mutual interests including electoral considerations between Chamoun and the party (Geukjian, 2007). The anti-communist stand that Chamoun's alliance took coincided with the anti-Soviet position of the Tashnag during the 1950s when its leadership in Armenia was planning to overthrow the Soviet regime while militarily supported by the US (Geukjian, 2007). This shows that throughout history, Tashnag chose to put its nationalist identity above its socialist one to protect the interests of the party and be in alignment with events in Armenia and the diaspora.

Ideological differences between the Armenian parties, Tashnag, Hanshag, and Ramgavar stemmed from the developments happening in the region, especially the growing socialism in the region proclaimed by the Arab unity and Abdel Nasser's strong character. These ideological conflicts led to armed clashes between the parties during the 1958 war. However, fast forward to 1974, an unprecedented decision took place that would be crucial to these parties during the 1975 civil war.

7.3.2 1975 Civil War

The sectarian-based structure of Lebanon's political and administrative positions reinforced sectarian identities and exacerbated divisions among different religious groups. This system hindered the formation of cross-sectarian connections based on ideology or class. For instance, labor unions in Lebanon were organized along sectarian lines, while efforts to establish national unions that transcended sectarian boundaries remained ineffective. Even though government policies permitted the exploitation of workers from all sects, national workers' movements repeatedly faced setbacks (Malley, 2018). Similarly, political parties, youth and women's movements, and professional associations were organized along sectarian lines rather than embracing a national perspective.

Simultaneously, the government distributed contracts and safeguarded the economic interests of sectarian leaders, leading to the emergence of a dominant commercial-financial oligarchy comprising influential families from various religious sects. These leaders established patron-client relationships, where the wealthy and powerful oligarchs provided financial aid, employment, loans, contracts, and legal support to individuals within their own sect. This fostered loyalty among their clients, as there were limited alternatives for assistance from the

state. These patronage networks contributed to widespread nepotism, corruption, exploitation, and inequality. The competition for clients within these networks often led to internal conflicts within sectarian communities, further exacerbating tensions between different religious groups. Additionally, as the Muslim population grew without any adjustments to the established power ratios that favored Maronite Christian dominance, inter-sect tensions escalated.

The culmination of these social, economic, and sectarian tensions occurred in the form of a civil war that commenced in 1975. Various sectarian militias emerged and engaged in conflicts with each other. While many underlying tensions were rooted in social and economic factors, the Lebanese people's strong identification with their respective sects led the conflict to take on a primarily sectarian nature rather than a class or social struggle (Malley, 2018). As the conflict escalated, the country became fragmented into separate territories governed by sectarian militias. Maronite, Shiite, and Druze militias controlled substantial areas of Lebanon, and both Syria and Israel, neighboring states, intervened and occupied significant portions of Lebanese territory.

The Lebanese Civil War of 1975 was also triggered by internal political disputes that intertwined with the wider Arab-Israeli regional conflict (Hägerdal, 2019). Following its independence from France in 1943, Lebanon established a parliamentary democracy based on a rigid sectarian power-sharing arrangement, with the presidency reserved for a Maronite Catholic, despite Christians and Muslims being roughly equal in numbers. Dissatisfaction with this system emerged along multiple fronts: Muslim communities sought greater representation within the existing structure, leftist groups aimed to dismantle it entirely, and advocates of the Palestinian cause desired changes in both foreign policy and the status of Palestinian refugees

present in Lebanon since 1948. These tensions escalated when a significant number of Palestinian armed groups relocated to Lebanon following the conflicts in Israel in 1967 and Jordan in 1970 (Hägerdal, 2019). The Lebanese Army, weakened by limited capabilities and political conflicts, became a cause for concern among Christian leaders who started arming their own supporters. Periodic clashes occurred between Palestinian and Christian militias, but it was an incident in Beirut's Ain El Remaineh in April 1975 that ignited street fighting, leading to urban warfare and commonly recognized as the starting point of the civil war.

The Lebanese-Armenian community, with Tashnag as the biggest representative, found itself in a challenging position during the civil war, as they were caught in the midst of the conflict. Unlike in 1958, when Tashnag and other Armenian political parties participated in the strife, they chose to remain neutral and refrain from engaging in violence during the 1975 war. Several factors contributed to this decision. Firstly, the Armenian political parties learned from the inter-communal fighting between 1956 and 1960 and sought to avoid repeating it (Tashjian, 2020). Secondly, the younger generation of leaders, who replaced those exiled from Soviet Armenia, had less hostility towards the Soviet Union, reducing tensions within the community (Tashjian, 2020). Lastly, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in 1965 united the community and reinforced their commitment to communal solidarity as seen in subchapter on the Taif Agreement. These factors compelled the political elites of the Lebanese-Armenian community to prioritize the community's interests over their own ideological and political beliefs. As a result, the community adopted a policy of "positive neutrality" during the Lebanese civil war from 1975 to 1990. This policy was welcomed by the Lebanese Muslim community, who saw the Armenians as a bridge between themselves and other Christian sects. However, some Christian elites felt betrayed by the Armenians, believing

that they should have fought alongside them against Lebanese Muslims and Palestinian militias.

The concept of positive neutrality meant that the community did not passively disengage from the conflict but actively engaged in dialogue and mediation efforts without aligning with any conflicting parties. Community leaders faced significant challenges in maintaining this neutrality. They used their longstanding networks with various local and regional actors to de-escalate clashes in Armenian neighborhoods and played a vital role in mediating the release of kidnapped Armenians (Tashjian 2020). Armenian parties also established self-defense units to ensure the safety of the community in Armenian-majority neighborhoods such as Bourj Hamoud and Achrafieh. However, despite this positive neutrality and disengagement from offensive armed clashes, the civil war forced the Tashnag to look inward and protect their own communal interests.

On the other hand, the PSP was heavily engaged in the civil war as an armed and organized militia, similar to all other parties. The nature of the party had already begun to change and shift into a sectarian base after the 1958-armed conflicts. This had somehow foreshadowed the occurrence of the civil war in 1975 during which the PSP would use the Druze base that it had been mobilizing since the late 1950s. It is estimated that the PSP deployed between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters in addition to a total of 16,000 military and civilian personnel.

7.3.3 War of the Mountain

The War of the Mountain was also a turning point for the PSP. Following the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977, the traditional Druze reaction was to pass the leadership to his son as head of the family and party. The War of the Mountain was the first test for Walid Jumblatt. It

was also a point of no return as it instigated communal and tribal tendencies in the party. The won battle was branded as a victory for the Druze community as opposed to the 1958 events where it was more considered as a victory to the left (Aridi, 2019). After 1983, the PSP was branded as representing the Druze and their interests, in addition to seeing to their social wellbeing. This was coupled with Jumblatt gaining legitimacy over the territories that he won during the war. “In the eyes of Walid Jumblatt, the party was now a protector of the Druze community in Lebanon and an organization that takes charge of their needs and existence”. (Aridi, 2019, 74).

On June 6th, 1982, Israel entered the conflict as a new armed actor in Lebanon. Following its initial invasion of Lebanese territory in 1978 through an alliance with Lebanese Christians, Israel seized further control by taking advantage of the internal disputes among various parties. Israel went on to occupy Beirut, becoming the first Arab capital (besides Jerusalem) to be occupied by Israeli forces. Israel's invasion not only targeted PLO bases in West Beirut but also confronted Syrian forces in Lebanon, turning them into adversaries on Lebanese soil. Israel aimed to establish a new and stronger government in Beirut that could resist Syrian intervention.

According to Israel, Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Lebanese Forces militia known for its ruthlessness, was deemed suitable for the position of Lebanese president due to his popularity among the Christian population and the growing strength of his militia. Gemayel's election was seen as a victory not only for the Lebanese Forces and Israel but also for the majority of Lebanese Christians that were aligned with Gemayel. Christians viewed this as a step toward winning the civil war and asserting their dominance over the Muslim factions. While Gemayel did not advocate for making Lebanon an exclusively Christian country, he rejected the idea of

Lebanon with dominant Arab features, which was a fundamental principle of the 1943 National Pact.

After his election, Gemayel called for Lebanese independence and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country, much to the dissatisfaction of both Israel and Syria. Despite being labeled the "candidate of the Israeli Tanks" by Walid Jumblatt, Gemayel's demands did not align with the interests of either Israel or Syria. Less than a month after his election, Gemayel was assassinated in a Beirut explosion.

Following Gemayel's assassination, his Lebanese Forces militiamen, supported by Israeli forces, forcefully took control of the Mountain region. The Mountain area was predominantly inhabited by Christians, but it had remained relatively unaffected by the war between 1975 and 1982 due to the security provided by PSP militiamen. This marked the beginning of the Mountain War, which was initiated by an elected president using his militia even before being officially sworn into office. The Lebanese Forces confronted PSP militiamen, who, in turn, received support from the Syrian army, PLO, and other leftist and anti-Gemayel militias.

The conflict that took place in the Shouf and Aley districts during the Lebanese civil war was the most intense and deadly of all the battles. Multiple attacks occurred, resulting in massacres in more than 27 villages. Around 20,000 displaced Christians sought refuge in Deir El Qamar, where they were under siege until December of that same year (Aridi, 2019). The withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Shouf and Aley regions was crucial for the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) to regain control over the territory it had lost in 1982.

The devastating casualties of this war included up to 160,000 displaced citizens, 2,700 people who went missing, 1,155 civilian deaths, and 368 deceased Lebanese Forces militiamen on the

Christian side. The opposing party suffered 207 civilian deaths and 324 dead militiamen. According to Rowayheb, the PSP's victory would not have been possible without the assistance of Syria, which provided arms logistics, and the few Palestinian militias that remained after the PLO's withdrawal in 1982.

The significance of this conflict lies in its impact on the rest of the war and the subsequent Taif Agreement. It shaped Lebanon's politics in the 1990s and influenced the drafting of the Taif Accord. The changes in the population of Mount Lebanon, both psychologically and demographically, instilled fear among the Christian bloc and a sense of superiority within the Druze bloc. The War of the Mountain was remarkable for several reasons, including the parties involved, political interventions, and surrounding events. Importantly, it marked the first major clash between the Druze and Christians since the 1860 war. Although Walid Jumblatt had already begun recruiting Druze members into the PSP and shifting the party's focus from secularism to communalism, it was the War of the Mountain that truly redirected the party's trajectory. Winning the war and establishing the Civil Administration represented a significant turning point for the PSP, as it embraced a new communal policy.

Following the war, approximately 50,000 Druze and 150,000 citizens were displaced from their home villages between 1983 and 1985, leading to a demographic disparity between the two communities and a historical shift (Aridi, 2019). Druze dominance in the Aley and Shouf regions allowed Walid Jumblatt, as the victorious leader, to establish himself and the PSP as the new leaders of the Druze community.



Organization of the PSP after the War of the Mountain (Aridi, 2019)

The War of the Mountain and the subsequent establishment of the Civil Administration of the Mountain (CAOM) served as catalysts for the Druze community's strong support for the PSP as their primary political force. The PSP, like other parties, had its own militia that functioned as an army for the government. The CAOM encompassed various components typically found in a government, such as providing essential services like water and electricity to the population. The president played the role of the head of state, while the political bureau and party control resembled a council of ministries. Some accused Walid Jumblatt of creating his own self-governing region by establishing this system of governance. However, Jumblatt also advocated for the central state to emulate the CAOM as it exemplified a decentralized state model.

The second significant aspect that makes it a turning point in the PSP's political and communal trajectory is the party's triumph over its adversaries. The victory achieved in the war was perceived as a Druze triumph. Unlike the events of 1958, scholars like Caroline Attié and Fawaz Traboulsi argued that if the war had been won, it would have been a victory for the left-wing forces (Aridi, 2019). However, the circumstances had changed by 1983, and the PSP had come to represent the Druze community, or at least a significant portion of it. The PSP's success in the war of the mountain granted Walid Jumblatt both authority and legitimacy over the territory he reclaimed or captured from his opponents.

One could argue that the death of Kamal Jumblatt served as a catalyst for change within the Party. However, in reality, it was the War of the Mountain that revealed Walid Jumblatt's true intentions and future vision for the PSP. The recruitment efforts that followed his father's death can be seen as a reaction and a means to establish himself as a prominent figure in Lebanese politics. However, it was the victory in the war and the establishment of the CAOM that demonstrated Jumblatt's consistency and determination in terms of the party's political approach and its role in the years ahead (Aridi, 2019). From Walid Jumblatt's perspective, the Party had transformed into a protector of the Druze community in Lebanon, assuming the responsibility for their needs and overall existence.

7.3.4 Taif Agreement

The Lebanese civil war officially came to an end by the Taif Agreement. In October 1989, Lebanese members of parliament met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the auspices of Riyadh and the Arab League, with Iran's involvement, the assistance of the US, and Syria's direct supervision, to debate, negotiate, and finalize the deal. The Taif Agreement established a cease-

fire, demanded that all militias be disbanded and disarmed, that a nonsectarian national army and police be built, that parliamentary elections be held, and that all religious and ethnic groups' rights be recognized by one another (Bennett, 2013). It requested that Syrian peacekeepers leave within two years and that Israeli forces withdraw immediately.

The Taif Accord of 1989 acknowledged the demographic changes that had occurred since the 1932 census and sought to address the issue through a compromise. The 1932 census remains the only official one to date and has played a crucial role in the division of representations based on its results. Taif recognized the need to increase Muslim representation in light of these changes while also preserving Maronite interests. The accord acknowledged that the institutionalization of sectarianism had caused problems and stated that the elimination of political sectarianism was a fundamental national goal. However, despite these acknowledgments, the Taif Accord maintained the sectarian foundation that underpins all state institutions and further solidified sectarianism through several constitutional amendments. While the accord restructured the country's political landscape, it retained the sectarian nature of the system. The core of the political system, based on sectarian divisions, remained intact, along with the potential for future conflicts. The sectarian-based patronage networks, with their associated issues of political and economic corruption and significant levels of inequality, also persisted (Malley, 2018).

The Taif Agreement, that brought an end to the fifteen years civil war and imposed peace, also reinforced sectarianism as a political and social mechanism in Lebanon. Lebanese politics ceased to be driven by ideology, rather turning into fragmented sects, represented by one or many parties, with a duty to coexist.

Jumblatt, the son, accepted the terms stated in the new agreement, among which were surrendering arms. He also adopted a post 1990 PSP rhetoric, which is to protect the Druze community. The new technique did not resort to violence but was very peaceful and focused on political maneuvering and choosing different coalitions that were often contradicting. The schemes of Walid Jumblatt were different from those of his father and had a main purpose to serve the party, himself, and the Druze community (Aridi, 2019). A clear message was sent during the armed clashes of May 8, 2008 to all politicians and parties in Lebanon. The PSP has kept its weapons, some if not all like most parties, and was not afraid to use them to protect the Druze community and the geographical locations in which they are most concentrated. Rowayheb (2011) asserts that after these external shocks, Jumblatt did not restrict himself with any ideological considerations if the alliance he was about to form served his interests.

In preparation for the 60th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide on April 24, 1975, leadership delegations from the three parties met to discuss preparations. These meetings led to the development of sympathy and respect towards each other. During one of these meetings, a policy of positive neutrality was agreed on and adopted which coincided with the start of the war on April 13 (Geukjian, 2007). The target was to avoid another series of intra-communal violence post 1958. However, this was soon transformed into a partisanship policy post-Taif. Before the civil war, Tashnag participated in politics however without Armenians being recognized as one of the six main communities: Maronites, Shi'as, Sunnis, Druze, Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox (Geukjian, 2009). The status-quo for Tashnag shifted post Taif as the agreement recognized Armenians as a seventh main sectarian component. As a result, Pakradounian asserted that "in the post-Taif period after being recognized as a predominant minority the Armenians must further defend all their communal rights with no concessions"

(Geukjian, 2009). Although Tashnag had always maintained a focus on the interests of its Armenian people, it now asserted that it represented a sect within Lebanon and was thus immersed in sectarian clientelist politics. Within the Taif, another political win for Tashnag was under a sectarian disguise. The Armenian community was newly assigned a fixed number of seats in the cabinet, one in a 14-member government, and two in a 28-member government. In addition, parliamentary seats also increased to comprise a sixth seat.

Chapter 8: Welfare System in Lebanon

Lebanon is home to around 6,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Altan-Oclay and Icduygyu, 2012; Chaaban and Seyfert, 2012). These NGOs, much like the country's civil society as a whole was shaped by the government's declining welfare provision. In Lebanon, the country has been typified by its sectarian nature, and this significantly reflects on the NGO sector (Altan-Oclay and Icduygyu, 2012). This means that mobilization, at times, also happens along sectarian lines. In other words, NGOs are more likely to replicate the mobilization of the state rather than transcend it. Chaaban and Seyfert (2012) argue that some NGOs might even use their programs to rally support and popularity for a sectarian leader.

NGOs in Lebanon dominate several sectors such as health, education, youth advocacy, environmental outreach, arts, and culture. Scholars argue that this widespread variety of NGOs in Lebanon stems from their role as welfare providers and recipients of international donations during the civil war. Additionally, NGOs in Lebanon have enjoyed cooperative relations with the state since the Ottoman rule. In states where public welfare functions are in decline, it is natural that religious charities, local and international NGOs, and political parties to provide basic services. However, in pluralistic societies service provision can be used as a tool to gain political support or maintain confessional ties. Raising the question of who benefits from such services highlights the independence of non-state providers of political links. In the absence of the state, welfare providers have the opportunity to use sectarian concerns to shape access to public essential services (Cammett, 2011).

Breaking down the socio-political background of Lebanon is key to understanding the role of its civil society organizations. Since the National Pact in 1943, the country has been governed by a consociational democracy system which is based on a power sharing formula whereby all

public institutions and offices are divided along the religious communities that make up the state. While this arrangement allowed for all the confessional groups to coexist, it has led to their division, at the same time legitimizing sectarian identities (Haddad, 2017).

When the state is failing and fragmented, NGOs and civil society initiatives based on tribal, familial, religious, or ethnic natures will rapidly develop. They will have a stronger ability to carry out several functions normally performed by voluntary civil society associations in developed countries and contexts (Haddad, 2017).

Sectarianism has created a prevalent class of confessional NGOs, making the Lebanese model of civil society a distinctive case in the region. Because the Lebanese socio-political context is built on patron-client relationships and divided along sectarian lines, several prominent families, politicians, and parties have founded their own organizations in order to "boost their status as local notables" (Beydoun as quoted by Haddad, 2017). Within a confessional state, sectarian parties compete for communal resources to gain legitimacy. NGOs affiliated with political parties and sectarian ties blur the line between service provision and political ideology, as a result politicizing the former. In the absence of the state, Marchetti and Tocci (2009) assert, the lines separating the civil society from the state also become blurry. With the absolute absence of state rule, NGOs inevitably adapt to the situation and fill the gaps of the state.

Similar to the NGOs of the authoritarian Arab states, Lebanese NGOs also suffer from some elements of control and dependency. The main coercion feature is exercised by international donors which divide NGOs according to international issue-oriented priorities, thus pressing NGOs to address foreign needs rather than local ones. In addition, NGOs that are affiliated to

political parties and those with patronage relationships with the state lead to the questioning if they legitimately represent the needs of Lebanese citizens.

Moreover, sectarian-oriented NGOs challenge the "traditional conceptions of the relationship between voluntary associations and the state" (Jones, 2011). This consequently reinforces the notion that NGOs are issue-oriented intermediaries self-placed between the state and the civil society. In other words, ideology-affiliated NGOs blur the line between their own legitimacy and that of the state's (Jones, 2011). As Haddad (2017) states it, the direct contact that these NGOs have with citizens makes it possible to attain high levels of legitimacy and credibility while at the same time strengthening communitarian ties. In providing services that the government could not, such NGOs were able to operate without state intervention and to develop an increased level of political autonomy.

Service provision, a task dedicated to NGOs nowadays with the absolute corruption and inadequacy of the state, has always played an important role in the confessional makeup of Lebanon. Sectarian leaders have used social services provided for by the state in order to alleviate instability in their respective communities (Jones, 2011). Historically, in the late 1960s and leading to the civil war in the early 1970s, the gap between sectarian leaders and their constituencies widened, and the lack of social services divided sectarian communities along class lines. This developed into a dependency on sectarian militias and groups to provide basic needs such as food and water. These same leaders and their parties sought to reestablish trust by using social development and social services as a tool to rally support and sectarian loyalty. According to Haddad (2017), the collapse of the state led to the rise and domination of communitarian organizations. These organizations were able to access financial resources sent to Lebanon from western countries.

As the war continued, citizens relied more on services provided by these organizations. The service providing organizations were functioning in the absence of laws that govern them, creating what Marchetti and Tocci (2009) referred to as "systems of self-help and tribunal justice". In the absence of the state, these organizations focused on providing educational and health services and most of them were based on communal and religious identities (Haddad, 2017). In addition, these NGOs were predominantly providing services within their communities in return for political support, creating what Marchetti and Tocci (2009) labeled as a "shadow state".

After the war ended, and as the country was economically devastated, infrastructure and service provision were left in the hands of NGOs, a majority of which were sectarian organizations. However, after decades of the implementation of these reform strategies, social development in Lebanon continues to lag with regional poverty dominating in several areas and limiting access to basic services. This has of course been exacerbated with the influx of Syrian refugees whose vulnerability was also to be mitigated by civil society actors.

The provision of services in Lebanon has been historically associated with sectarian parties and their welfare agencies. During the civil war, these parties provided social services as ways to legitimize their political action. It is estimated that welfare amounted to 20% of their budgets (Chaaban and Seyfert, 2012). They either provide health services, education, financial assistance, and food, or act the intermediaries whose purpose is to facilitate access to public entitlements (Cammett, 2015).

NGOs were also formed in response to waves of migrations such as Palestinians, Armenians, and Shi'a from the south of Lebanon. With the purpose of easing displacement pressures, each

community established grassroots initiative that were later institutionalized as NGOs with frequent ties to political parties (Chaaban and Seyfert, 2012).

In a study by Chaaban and Seyfert (2012), data collected on the prevalent nature of NGOs operating on ground shows that confessional NGOs rise in number and visibility after periods of political disturbances. Indeed, the share of confessional NGOs rose significantly after unrest in 1958, during the period between 1975 and 1991, and 2005.

The clientelist nature of the political system, contacts with politicians and political organizations, and loyalty to a party make up the key prerequisites for gaining access to basic services (Cammett, 2015). Several NGOs have deep-rooted connections to sectarian parties which run a vast network of not-for-profit health clinics, social assistance programs, schools, and hospitals. The services provided by such NGOs are open to all citizens, however, data shows that sectarian supporters receive generous benefits.

Chapter 9: Post-Taif Private Welfare Providers

Lebanon is “no more than a patronage system”, asserts Rivoal (2014). The political party is an intrinsic part of personal and family life. Just as pictures of the family with Walid Jumblatt are seen in almost every Durzi home in Lebanon and abroad as empirically proved by Rovoal (2014), the same case applies to Armenian homes whose walls and old crystal vitrine hold the symbol, annual calendar, and pictures of Tashnag. It has become part of both communities’ pride and collective memory. It is perhaps also due to their status as somewhat closed communities and protectors of their ethnicities and common identities that political heritage has become an important element in their everyday lives. Communities in Lebanon are taught to “think like a clan, sect, or ethnic group as important than membership to the Lebanese system” (Suleiman as quoted in Pakradounian, 2017). This education is made public through party-funded schools, media outlets, and university clubs among others.

By the end of the civil war, with collapsed state institutions and sectarian re-modified parties, the PSP and Tashnag resorted to being social providers for the Druze and Armenian communities respectively. When asked about his speech during the 126th anniversary of the ARF announcing the foundation of three major funds for the Lebanese-Armenian community, Hagop Pakradounian states that just like family members take care of each other, the Armenian community and the ARF are intertwined in the same manner to care for and protect each other. These three pledged funds comprised covering the wedding expenses of couples who are both Armenian, providing US$2,000 for every Armenian child after the second one, and covering the baptism costs of any child that holds an Armenian name (Pakradounian, 2017).

The Lebanese Civil War had a profound impact on the Armenian community, leading them to reexamine their identity and establish a self-contained entity within the larger Lebanese state.

In this sectarian fertile land, the community constructed its own institutions, including courts, cultural and educational centers, medical facilities, and a bank, to ensure the security and well-being of its members (Tashjian, 2020). Despite the declining number of Armenians, Lebanon is often referred to as the heart of the Armenian Diaspora, as it exemplifies the application of both Smith's and Anderson's theories to the Lebanese-Armenian context. The community's identity represents a rediscovery and continuation of their cultural and political heritage, forged through a combination of political and socio-economic factors, and shaped by the leaders of the community within the country. However, the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 disrupted the progress made by the community, once again posing an existential threat to the Armenians. In response to the political and economic crisis, community leaders rallied together to find solutions and address the challenges faced by the community.

The initiative known as "COMARES" was the result of collaboration between leaders from the three Armenian Churches (Apostolic, Catholic, and Evangelical), representatives from the three political parties, the AGBU (Armenian General Benevolent Union), and the Armenian Red Cross Relief of Lebanon. Under the leadership of His Holiness Khoren I, Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia, they joined forces to address the needs of the Armenian community (Tashjian, 2020). This included the restoration of Armenian businesses and churches, as well as providing humanitarian aid and relief to numerous Armenian families after the civil war of 1975.

The efforts of COMARES involved working closely with both national and international agencies. In parallel, they coordinated with the Soviet Armenians and their government, as well as wealthy Armenians who organized fundraising events to support the community.

Through these collaborative endeavors, COMARES aimed to alleviate the challenges faced by the Armenian community and assist in its recovery and well-being.

Both parties, Tashnag and the PSP, have low-tuition subsidized schools for their members, hospitals, economic services, and many more facilities. The communal ties also go beyond the Lebanese community but were also extended to Syrian-Armenian and Syrian-Druze during the refugee influx from Syria.

As a result of the Syrian conflict and the ensuing turmoil, many Syrian-Armenian families sought refuge in Lebanon. In response, the Armenian community in Lebanon once again rallied together to provide humanitarian assistance to these families. The Tashnag Party had already established a small group dedicated to mobilizing and delivering relief aid to Armenians in Aleppo. To specifically address the needs of Syrian-Armenian residing in Lebanon, the party founded the "Syrian-Armenian Relief Commission." The commission comprised representatives from the three Armenian denominations, as well as the Karaguezian and Jinishian centers, AFHIL (Armenian Fund for Health Insurance in Lebanon), the Armenian Relief Cross in Lebanon (ARCL), and the Armenian Parliamentary Block office (Tashjian, 2020). The primary objective of this commission was to offer support in various areas such as housing, medication, financial aid, and education for the refugees. Additionally, the commission facilitated the registration of these refugees with the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), ensuring they received the necessary assistance and protection.

In addition, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to unite the community, the Central Committee of the Tashnag Party convened a meeting with Armenian social and health institutions. They established the "Corona Crisis Committee Lebanon" in late February 2020.

This committee took on the task of raising awareness about public safety measures related to the pandemic through various social media channels. Additionally, the committee provided assistance to infected Armenians in the form of financial support, food provisions, and healthcare services. Their aim was to help those affected by the virus within the Armenian community and alleviate some of the challenges brought about by the pandemic (Tashjian, 2020).

Prior to and during the economic crisis in Lebanon, the Armenian Parliamentary block, led by the Tashnag Party, initiated various social and educational projects for the Armenian community. These initiatives included granting scholarships to Armenian university students, assisting with marriage expenses conducted in the church, and providing financial aid to families with three or more children (Tashjian, 2020). The party's committee actively raised funds to support Armenian families in need, offering them ration packs and medical assistance.

Various Armenian benevolent and socio-medical institutions and organizations also made important contributions in addressing the community's needs. With Armenians facing cash access limitations, rising unemployment, and business losses, organizations like the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) played a crucial role in ensuring food security within the community (Tashjian, 2020). They provided food rations and fresh meals to thousands of families in need.

Similarly, the PSP have organized aid to their communities and supporters. During the financial crisis and COVID-19, the PSP strengthened its initiatives and NGOs, primarily in Mount Lebanon and Shouf villages. The party initiatives, funded by Walid Jumblatt, according to the interview with the regional coordinator of the PSP, revolved around medical assistance, hospitalization, agricultural support, food assistance, and scholarships.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

Socialist parties have been moving away from their ideological focus and adopting other approaches crucial for their survival. In Europe, the welfare state pushed social democratic parties out of the system and sharply reduced their popularity and electoral outcome. However, this was also possible due to these parties adopting neo-liberal policies at a time when it was important for their remaining in power. While the trend reached the Lebanese socialist parties, the reasons differ. Clientelism and maintaining communal ties to stay in power through a sectarian electorate transformed the PSP and Tashnag from ideology-focused to social providing mass parties.

The political landscape in Lebanon following the Taif Agreement provided an opportunity for Jumblatt to continue his established agenda, with a primary focus on safeguarding the interests of the Druze community. Initially aligned with Syria until 1998, Jumblatt later switched sides and led a revolution against them, ultimately becoming a prominent figure in the March 14 movement in 2005. His leadership played a significant role in forcing the retreat of Syria's army from Lebanon. In 2008, Jumblatt further displayed his political maneuvering by opposing Hezbollah and revealing the weapons his party possessed after the war. However, his opposition to Hezbollah ceased when he perceived the Party to be militarily superior, prioritizing the safety of the Druze community. Consequently, he declared a truce and ended the conflict.

This thesis concludes a positive result of its hypothesis, however with some limitations. One limitation is the nationalist ideology of the ARF which coincides with socialism in its four pillar founding principles. The ARF was founded by Armenians for Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and to protect their community from aggression. As a result, it has always focused on

the interests of the Armenian community in Lebanon. However, it is safe to say that the external shock of Tashnag, embodied by the post-war Taif agreement, pushed the party to be immersed in sectarian partisan politics. As a second layer to this study, two things should be considered. First, the link between the European and Lebanese causes of the decline of socialism, namely a generous welfare state and clientelism. Second, the impact of the nationalist ideology on the ARF and its role in protecting the Armenian diaspora on its status as a social provider for Armenians in Lebanon.

June 2023 marked a leadership change in the PSP with Taymour Jumblatt as the uncontested new leader of the party. The third generation Jumblatti, just like his father before him, was set to inherit the leadership of the party based on kinship and tradition. This was evident when in 2017, Walid Jumblatt passed the mantle to his son by symbolically placing his “kufiyah”, one that his father before him traditionally wore, on his son’s shoulders.

Members and supporters of the PSP welcomed this change as a new blood to rejuvenate the party. As mentioned earlier, one of the internal catalysts behind changes within party identities is a change in leadership. While Taymour’s era is anticipated by scholars to monitor the transformation of the party, one cannot assume that the PSP will go back to its pre-Walid Jumblatt era where it adopted a pure socialist rhetoric. This is not because Taymour Jumblatt does not believe in his party’s ideology, but simply due to the fact the PSP has been fully submerged in sectarian partisan politics for more than 40 years providing for and protecting the Druze community.

References

Altan-Olcay, O. and Icduygu, A. (2012). Mapping civil society in the Middle East: The cases of Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* 39 (2), 157-179.

Aridi, N. (2019). In the name of the father the son and the holy party, the case of the progressive socialist party. *American University of Beirut*

Bennet, C. (2013). Planning ahead for a post conflict Syria: Lessons from Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. *International Peace Institute.*

Berman and Snegovaya (2019). Populism and the decline of social democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 30 (3), 5-19. DOI 10.1353/jod.2019.0038

Cammett, M. (2011). Partisan activism and access to welfare in Lebanon. *Brown University.* DOI 10.1007/s12116-010-9081-9

Chaalan, J. and Seyfert, K. (2012). Faith-based NGOs in multi-confessional society: Evidence from Lebanon. *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.*

El Khazen, F. (2003). Political parties in postwar Lebanon: Parties in search of partisans. *The Middle East Journal 57(4)*

Geukjian, O. (2007). The policy of positive neutrality of the Armenian political parties in Lebanon during the civil war, 1975-90: a critical analysis. *Middle Eastern Studies 43(1)*

Geukjian, O. (2009). From positive neutrality to partisanship: How and why the Armenian political parties took sides in Lebanese politics in the post-Taif period (1989-present). *Middle Eastern Studies 45(5)*

Haddad, T. (2016). Analyzing state-civil society associations relationship: The case of Lebanon. *International Society for Third Sector Research.* DOI 10.1007/s11266-016-9788-

Hägerdal, N. (2019). Ethnic cleansing and the politics of restraint: Violence and coexistence in the Lebanese civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (1), 59-84*

Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994). An integrated theory of party goals and party change. *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 6(3), 259-287. DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006003001

Hazran, Y. (2010). Lebanon's revolutionary era: Kamal Junblat, the Druze community and the Lebanon**.** *The Muslim World p. 157*

Jones, P. (2011). Lebanonizing the state: NGOs in a confessional society. *University of Oregon*

Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (1992). The membership of political parties in European democracies, 1960-1990. *European Journal of Political Research 22: 329-345*

Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party. *Party Politics,* 1(1), 5-28. DOI: 10.1177/1354068895001001001

Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The transformation of the Western European party systems. *Politics in Western* European Democracies: Patterns and Problems p.151-166

Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational Democracy. World Politics, 21(2), p.207-225

Mair, P. (1989). Continuity, change and the vulnerability of party, West European Politics, 12(4) 169-187. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402388908424770

Malley, M. (2018). The Lebanese civil war and the Taif accord. *The History Teacher* 52(1), 121-159

Marchetti, R. and Tocci, N. (2009). Conflict society: understanding the role of civil society in conflict. *Global Change, Peace, and Security,* 21 (2), 201-217. DOI: 10.1080/14781150902872091

Nalbantian, T. (2018). Armenians in Lebanon: Becoming local in the Levant. *Leiden University.* doi:10.1017/S0020743818000946

Pakradounian, L.A. (2017). For the sake of Lebanon: Parties, groups and leaders. *California State University*

Rivoal, I. (2014). Intimate politics: The art of the political relationship in Lebanon. *Anthropology of the Middle East 9(1): 1-17.* DOI:10.3167/ame.2014.090102

Rowayheb, M.G. (2011) Walid Jumblat and political alliances: The politics of adaptation. *Middle East Critique* 20(1), 47-66, DOI: 10.1080/19436149.2011.544535

Tashjian, Y. (2020). Communitarianism and crisis response: The model of Lebanese-Armenians. *New Eastern Politics*

Wilson, F.L. (1988). When parties refuse to fail: The case of France.

Annex A

Interview with MP Hagop Pakradounian, Leader of the Tashnag Party
November 2021

1) What do you consider was the driving force behind the formation of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Lebanon? To what extent was socialism as an ideology rooted in this foundation?

- The Armenian Revolutionary Federation, known in Lebanon as the ARF party (Tashnagtsutioun in Armenian means federation/alliance) was founded in 1890 in Tbilisi Georgia, and officially in Lebanon in 1904 through its university student's association, "Zavarian" named after the man who was one of three founders of the ARF party globally, and the founder of the ARF in Lebanon through its student association Simon Zavarian.

  At the time socialism was the main driving force of newly founded political organizations. Yet it is important to remember that when the ARF party was founded both globally and in Lebanon, its main driving force was to combat the injustice brought forth by the ottoman empire and its sultan, it was formed as a political party with a paramilitary wing. Its foundation in Lebanon in 1904 was just an extension of the already existing cells and units within the ottoman empire as Lebanon was part of the Ottoman empire at the time. Given that the ARF also had many alliances with anti-ottoman movements all around the ottoman empire, such as with the Greeks, Bulgarians, Macedonians and many Arab organizations, it was only natural to have an organizational structure

within mount Lebanon, the main area where anti ottoman Lebanese sentiment lies.

As far as socialism goes, it is not the only ideology the party believes in. ARF is founded on four ideological pillars that are all equally important. Socialism, democracy, nationalism and revolutionary. Not to be confused with social democracy, nor social nationalism. Each ideology is a separate pillar that completes the next. The ARFs ideological system is understood in the way it works, socialism as an economic system, from each according to what they can give and to each according to what they need, democracy as a way of governance, free fair and transparent through elections, nationalism in which we do not mean Armenians being more important than other races, but since as a people we have been ignored by the world while we have been subjected to genocide and killed and massacred, the belief is that our national cause and nation state are as important as the other ethnicities and citizenships of the world. Whereas the revolutionary pillar was regarded as the main way to awaken the minds of the Armenian populous that was under foreign rule for 600 years.

2) Has the motive as a party changed, especially as it now exists within deep sectarian divisions?

- The motive of the party changed after Lebanon gained its independence and became an independent sovereign country, other than fighting for the rights of

the Armenian people as a whole, the ARFs motive to exist in Lebanon was and still is to represent the Armenian populous in Lebanon in specific, and in turn serve Lebanon and the Lebanese public as a whole through political and economic intervention. The party also started work on the social level since its existence in Lebanon, in order to protect the language, customs and traditions of its populous through organizing the construction of schools, cultural centers and churches, so that the Armenian population isn't lost in the waves of immigration, but remain attached to its ethnic roots. Thankfully the Armenian cause in no way contradicts with the political work that benefits Lebanon, on the contrary, all this has benefited Lebanon greatly by introducing a new educated, vibrant and economically fruitful people into the spectrum, which would have otherwise remained refugees in rust belts all over the country.

Lebanon is a sectarian country and as such the Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholic and Armenian protestant communities are recognized as three different sects within the Lebanese sectarian system (the protestants are part of the minority grouping in this case) Lebanon gained its independence from the French mandate while the Armenians were here, in other words Armenians have been on this land before Lebanon was independent, as such they were part of the first political system that was formed in the country after independence, and remained to continuously be part of that system.

3) In a consociational setup where ideology often dissolves in the face of everyday challenges, how is the socialist doctrine still practiced and present in the ARF's policies?

- Sectarianism does not conflict with socialism, it is not communism, nor does it deny the existence and rights of different sects and religious divisions, they are not contradictory. But in specific, in the political and sectarian maze that is Lebanon, the ARF in specific makes sure to vote with or against bills and resolutions based on its socialist principles, and based on the main principle of benefiting the society as a whole, and not just the rich and powerful. On the other end, given the Millet system inherited from the ottoman empire, each sect governs its domestic matters, and it is no secret that the Armenian Millet in this case including all three Armenian sects govern their matters democratically. As such the ARF is also takes part of the "Milli Majles" elections of the Armenian denominations, and has its representatives there, who make sure to govern through the pillars of the party, examples are the decisions of school fees belonging to the Armenian patriarchate of Beirut, also teachers' wages and the wages of "public servants" that work within the Armenian society and communities. The party also makes sure that in dire circumstances the people it represents are cared for and are not left needing food and medication, the party has established many community organizations that assist in medical care, funds for families, students (university or elementary/high school) cultural and sports organizations with nominal fees,

because of its socialist principles, so that all have equal opportunity in taking part in whatever interests they have. The children of the poor will go to school alongside the children of the rich regardless of being able to afford school fees, they will learn the piano, or they will dance and play soccer and basketball regardless of their financial background. They will all be able to have a roof over their heads, jobs, rights as workers regardless of their economic class.

4) In your speech during the 126th anniversary of ARF's formation, you announced the establishment of three major funds allocated to the preservation of the Lebanese-Armenian identity, among several other social initiatives that the party launches for its community. May you please elaborate on the role of ARF as a social provider for the Armenian community in Lebanon. Do you consider this to be a primary party objective and why?

- The ARF is born from the Armenian public and not the other way around, and just like a family takes care of each other, the party and the Armenian community are intertwined in the same way, they take care of each other, protect each other, and care for each other. Armenian history as a whole has shown this to be truth, since the party was established in 1890, it has protected the people through all the ways possible to it, from paramilitary activities to public and political support. The wellbeing of the people is our priority, and stemming from our ideological pillars, and as explained in the previous question, we made sure that all Armenians are able to afford schooling,

> through the Armenian university students fund, that no family is left without children because of financial issues through the Armenian family fund, and that no child's christening is denied because of financial issues through the Armenian identity fund.
>
> As a people subjected to genocide, living all over the world, we have to make sure that Armenians remain Armenian and are not lost in the tides of assimilation and emigration. No matter where, an Armenians primary duty is as a citizen, yet the roots should never be forgotten, that protection comes from the ARF through making sure that the people are not left needy in anything part of protecting a society is through protecting their economic and financial well-being, as well as cultural and traditional and most importantly educational well being.it is hard to understand how a primarily political party deals in such issues, yet in countries where the state can not provide this support, we are not in a position to allow a genocide surviving people to be lost because of such issues.

5) The Armenian parties in Lebanon, most prominently ARF, played a reconciliatory role during the civil war and adopted a policy of positive neutrality, not wanting to be heavily involved in a bloody war, instead advocating for national unity. However, this changed post-Taif where the Armenian community was recognized as one of the seven major communities in Lebanon and thus became an integral part of the power-sharing formula. ARF then dived deep in internal politics (breaking its impartiality) and took an anti-government stand while forming a coalition with the Free Patriotic Movement

during the Rafic Hariri cabinet. This was justified as protecting the Armenian rights in the confessional power-sharing system.

Do you consider that confessionalism in Lebanon paved the way for ARF to immerse in mass-model social provision and focus less on socialist ideals?

- First and foremost, pre Taif and pre civil war, the Armenians as a whole with all their parties were also heavily involved in Lebanese politics as part of the National accord (Misaq al watani), they always stood with the legitimacy as in the democratically elected and formed bodies, parliament, cabinet and presidency. During the civil war where legitimacy was a grey area at most, and while we stood at the edge of a cliff after which the Lebanese nation was being destroyed, the Armenian parties as a whole took the decision to adopt national neutrality and take every chance in persuading all sides to stop destroying this country. We as Armenians know very well what it means to lose a homeland, and we didn't want to lose one again. After the civil war when all parties settled on the Taif, it wasn't up to us, the party that was driving to reach an agreement, to fight that agreement. Throughout the civil war we worked to stop it, and the Taif with all its faults was the agreement that stopped it, and that reason in itself was enough for us to be on board. The Taif specified the sectarian division and as Armenians took what was given to us. The ARF along with the other Armenian parties went back to take sides with the legitimacy which was less grey than during the days of the civil war, because even if we had a president and cabinet, and prime minister, there was also

Syrian presence in the political scene. Up till the year 2000 we had allied ourselves with Rafic Hariri, not just the ARF but all three Armenian parties. It was during the year 2000 when Hariri decided to not allow the Armenians to have their own parliamentary block, "kettlet nouweb el Arman" that would be allied with Moustaqbal and wanted them to be part of the Moustaqbal parliamentarian block. This was seen by the ARF as a way to diminish the sovereignty of the Armenian political representatives, and tie their decisions to the Moustaqbal decisions, the ARF did not agree to that in par with its standing as the protector of the Armenian people, this time politically. We lost those elections and the Armenian parties that allied themselves with the Moustaqbal movement were a part of that block. During municipal elections after the year 2000 the relations were fixed and we were allied and the issues of independency in political decision making were solved. Yet after Rafik Hariri's assassination, during the divide between 14th and 8th of March the ARF was denied the chance to work with Saad al Hariri at the start, while FPM was part of the 14th of March movement, we allied ourselves with them, and did not become a part of the 8th of March movement, but rather were allied with forces from the 8th of March. The ARF resumed its role and said at every chance that its doors were open to all and they would always serve to clos gaps between different parties in order to resolve conflicts rather than give into them.

In the case of the ARF social provisions or social support has never been about elections, nor has it been about the clientelism that rules Lebanese politics, it

has more of a socialist base to it rather than electoral. It is about giving the people what they need, and not buying their votes through provisions once every four years. The vast network of community and social organizations established and supported by the ARF is not a civic contract between the people and the party, it is a duty that has been carried out for over a hundred years, a duty that the ARF is bound to by its founding principles, a duty towards protecting the community on all fronts. The electoral concept and the understanding that the Armenians vote in blocks for the ARF is just a manifestation of the trust they hold towards the party. Without those votes the party will still support the people regardless of the electoral process, this support has never been absent, it was around when there were no elections nor any hope for elections, it was around when the ARF had only one member of parliament, and it was around when the ARF had more, and it will be around even if the ARF has no representatives in government. The bond between the community and the party is that of a family. I will admit that the work will be harder without being represented in the governing bodies of the country, without being part of the legitimate rule of the country, but the ARF will never stop supporting the people no matter how hard it is, simply put because that is what it was founded for, and that is why it remains, a raison d'etre if you must.

5) Has the Lebanese civil war and its outputs, as portrayed by the Taif agreement, played a role in shifting the policies of the ARF Party (example: from neutrality to partisanship)? If so, what were the most significant changes in your opinion?

- It depends on how you view the ARFs principles, the way I see it we have not shifted in our policies, we have always protected and represented our communities, we have always supported the legitimacy of Lebanon, the unity of Lebanon and resolving conflicts peacefully and democratically. All these principles have not shifted. If we are discussing political maneuvering, well every political phase in Lebanon needs a different political decision to deal with, in order to remain within the basic principles that govern the decision-making process of the party and community we represent.

6) The internal politics of a party plays a major role in shaping its policies, especially after a change in leadership. Do you believe this was ever a cause of transforming ARF's approach as a party?

- The way the ARF is governed internally is different than other parties, the general policies are governed democratically through an electoral process where every single party member takes part in electing representatives who meet to first and foremost discuss and decide the policies of the leadership within general guidelines for the next term of the central committee of the party, and then elect the members that are most capable to achieve the goals set by this meeting based on the policies voted upon also within the same meeting. Leadership change does not affect policy change in the ARF, policy change of the party members effect leadership change. The party is who decides, the leadership abides.

Annex B

Interview with Regional Coordinator in the Progressive Socialist Party
June 2023

The interviewee wished to remain anonymous.

1) The Progressive Socialist Party, like many other Lebanese parties, was established along clear ideological lines. However, we see that the party has relinquished its founding socialist principles in favor of adopting a welfare scheme along sectarian lines. What are your comments?

When Kamal Jumblatt founded the Progressive Socialist Party, and as its name indicates, it was a party for all people, ensuring the availability of their equal opportunities. Its purpose was to help the poor and oppressed. However, times have changed. The state merely exists to help the people and with this almost complete absence of the state, welfare has to be provided by some entity, in this case the party.

The ideology of the party is the same, however the needs differ. Nowadays, especially during the financial crisis and post COVID, people are in need of assistance, especially medical care. The PSP is proud to have established an initiative (NGO name omitted to maintain the anonymity of the interviewee) in Mount Lebanon to benefit the people of 14 villages, a program which I directly oversee. The initiative helps people with hospitalization, food portions and boxes, agricultural support for farmers, and scholarships for students. This is all funded by Walid Jumblatt.

In Lebanon, unfortunately, people follow leaders because they are supporting them. People are kept hungry to be mobilized, but we are against that as PSP. We want to help everyone, not just members of the party or those who are Druze, but everyone so that we achieve equality. This is the essence of our socialist ideology.

We wish the state was less corrupt. If this was the case, let them impose more direct taxes and provide welfare such as education, hospitalization, medication, and social support to the citizens. When this becomes a reality, not only the PSP would not have to provide for people, but all parties will cease to assume this role.

Annex C

Flag of the Progressive Socialist Party

Annex D

Flag of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Tashnag